Q. Dr Soroush, we�ve been hearing for some time that you�re busy
studying the ideas and works of the Mu�tazilites. I wanted to ask
you about the ins and outs of this.
A. I started thinking about this project a long time ago - even
before I began speaking about renewing the Mu�tazilite experience -
and I wanted to work on this subject both from the
historical-chronicled aspect and from the analytical-rational
aspect. I respect the Mu�tazilite school of thought and I esteem
them highly, because they were the first group to raise the banner
of rationality in Islamic culture. Unfortunately, not much remains
of the works of the vanguards of the Mu�tazilite school of thought.
We find their views mirrored in their opponents� works. In other
words, most researchers have referred to the books written by the
Mu�tazilites� opponents - i.e., the Ash�arites - in order to know
what the Mu�tazilites were saying and, as you know, this method
imposes many limitations on the researcher. Fortunately, over the
past 50 years and even more recently than that - over the past 10
years - many good discoveries have been made in Yemen and in a
number of other regions, and some of the authentic and early works
of the Mu�tazilites have been found. Now, a group of researchers at
the Frei Universität Berlin are examining and publishing these
books. Sabine Schmidtke and a number of other researchers are deeply
involved in this project. I�m trying to use their findings. On the
whole, many doors and windows have been opened in this field, and
researchers can enter it with greater ease and confidence. I, too,
am trying to do my share - more from the analytical-rational aspect
than the historical-chronicled one, of course - in studying the
Mu�tazilites� views.
Even back at the time when I was learning about and teaching the
Ash�arite school of thought and the Ash�arites� views on exegesis,
theology and ethics, I was gradually becoming interested in the
Mu�tazilites and their disagreements with the Ash�arites. This was
how it happened that I chose this project. Of course, there was
another reason for my interest; as I�ve said elsewhere, it was the
form that the question of modernity and tradition had taken in Iran.
The question of modernity and tradition has turned into a grim
subject in our country. Everyone speaks about tradition and
modernity as if they were closed chests, and then they try to
describe their similarities and differences. I think that this is
out of keeping with the analytical approach. We have to open the
chests of tradition and modernity, take out their components and
demonstrate the link between them. Speaking in this closed way is
not going to take us anywhere. I started the Mu�tazilite project in
order to breathe new life into tradition and modernity. Rereading,
reconsidering, renewing and assessing the views and ideas of the
Mu�tazilites and their school of thought, which are hefty components
of tradition, can bring new gains, and truly show us the way both to
using tradition and to extricating ourselves from tradition. This is
the kind of potential I see in the Mu�tazilite project and I�m
trying to take advantage of it.
Q. You said that you became interested in the Mu�tazilites in the
context of the feud between tradition and modernity. But I�d like to
know what your main question was in studying this Islamic school of
thought. Did you have a prior plan when you studied the
Mu�tazilites� views? Was there a link between your prior views and
this study?
A. Of course, this study was linked to my prior ideas. I like the
Mu�tazilite religious theory and ethics, and the main reason why I
like this school is because they raised the banner of
revelation-independent reason and then they reflected on the nature
of the relationship between these two independent things - i.e.,
reason and revelation - and offered a new view. This quality - i.e.,
the rationality of their school - is extremely valuable. I think
that it�s a coin that has currency and is precious, and it can be
used in the market of learning and research. So, my project is the
project of rationality and I see the Mu�tazilites as fellow
travellers and I try to establish a link with them.
I came across the views of the Ash�arites and the Mu�tazilites
directly when I started teaching the philosophy of morality. I used
to teach Izz al-Din al-Iji�s Al-Mawaqif, the classical book on
Ash�arite theology. The Mu�tazilites� views are also mentioned and
severely criticized in the book. But, even through these
possibly-misrepresented views, you can get a sense of some of the
Mu�tazilites� important insights and ideas. Later, I studied them
more directly, especially their Qur�anic commentaries. Subsequently,
it was the theory of contraction and expansion that really further
clarified the issue for me. I realized that there have been two sets
of presuppositions in approaching the Qur�an and exegesis - at least
in the history of Islamic culture: one consisted of Ash�arite
presuppositions and the other of Mu�tazilite ones. It was from this
perspective that I turned to these two groups� commentaries. For
example, I studied Fakhr Razi�s Tafsir Kabir and Jarallah
Zamakhshari�s Tafsir Kishaf and saw how these presuppositions were
fully involved in their understanding and annotation of the Qur�an.
It was at this point that the Mu�tazilites and the Ash�arites took
on added importance for me. They became illustrations of the theory
of contraction and extraction, and were used to explain, defend and
confirm the theory. This was the first aspect of my liking for the
Mu�tazilites.
From another aspect, the Mu�tazilites� rational morality was of
interest to me. As we all know, the Mu�tazilites believed in the
principality of morality. In modern parlance, they believed in the
objectivity of moral values and held that, regardless of the
existence or non-existence of the prophets, morality had its own
independent value. In other words, human reason can say whether an
act is good or not. God endorses and confirms the verdicts of
reason. That is to say, an act that reason considers good or bad is
also considered good or bad by God. This independence of moral
reason from revelation was very important to me. I�ve studied the
Ash�arites views and arguments on the philosophy of morality
diligently. They have some novel ideas in some respects. But they
run into problems on the wellsprings of morality. Some people
imagine that my book Learning and Values is Ash�arite through and
through, whereas this is not at all the case. There, I have at most
explained the views of Hume and a number of modern philosophers
about how an �ought� cannot be derived from an �is� or how moral
propositions cannot be derived from factual propositions; I haven�t
said anything more than this. That is to say, the question of how
moral values are discovered - whether reason discovers them or
revelation teaches them to us - is an independent issue that has to
be discussed in its own place. Like the Mu�tazilites, I believe that
human reason discovers them as evident and can, therefore, establish
a revelation-independent reason. Of course, I disagree with the
Mu�tazilites on some issues. I find the Ash�arites
experience-oriented or empirical, whereas I find the Mu�tazilites
more Aristotelian. Of course, I�m not an empiricist in the sense
that I think that human knowledge can be summed up in experience,
but I�m very empirical in the sense that I�m not prepared to
sacrifice science on the altar of First Philosophy. I give
experience a strong and sturdy share of things, and I believe that
many verdicts that should be determined by experience shouldn�t be
entrusted to the blade of philosophy. I think that the Ash�arites
are stronger than the Mu�tazilites when it comes to empiricism. For
example, on this same question of whether an act is good or bad, the
rationality of good and bad acts doesn�t mean that we derive
everything from evident, a priori rationality; basing things on
experience is rational too. This is a mistake that some writers
make.
Q. Here, by empiricism in morality, you mean that we should take
the utility of morality into account?
A. No, I�m talking about rational good and bad. Acts are good or bad
based on reason. But this doesn�t rule out seeking assistance from
experience and looking at an act�s practical benefits. We mustn�t
assume that rationality means a priori; this is not at all the case.
The reason-experience dichotomy that some people draw is an
unacceptable and unreasonable dichotomy. In the views of the
Mu�tazilites, I sometime see an excessive defence of a priori
rationality which I don�t like; I prefer the experience-orientedness
of the Ash�arites. This isn�t the place for discussing this. But in
a talk that I gave a few years ago in Qom - which, unfortunately,
ended with an attack by the vigilante groups - I spoke about the
Ash�arites� experience-orientedness and about how - in formulating
theological verdicts - they look at actual events and occurrences in
the world and do not neglect these things. Let me give an example,
the Ash�arites don�t by any means rule out or deny evil and
injustice in the world. They accept it as an empirical fact and this
acceptance has an impact on their theology. So, they believe that
God has a right to create evil and they do not try to explain it
away. I�m not concerned about this theological conclusion now; but I
very much admire the fact that the Ash�arites don�t close their eyes
to the real world.
By way of another example, the Ash�arites believe that whatever
anyone obtains is part of their God-given bounty, even if they�ve
obtained it by improper (haram) means; whereas the Mu�tazilites and
some other theologians try to explain these things away. I prefer
the Ash�arites� experience-oriented approach, but I find the
Mu�tazilites� rational analyses about morality, the attributes of
God and about God�s word more acceptable. Hence, the debate that
you�re witnessing these days which has led to a kind of clash
between me and others is deeply rooted in the Mu�tazilites� ideas.
Let me also add here that I consider myself a �neo-Mu�tazilite�. I
believe that the Qur�an is God�s creation. The Mu�tazilites said
this. But we can take one step further and say that the fact that
the Qur�an is God�s creation means that the Qur�an is the Prophet�s
creation. The Mu�tazilites didn�t explicitly take this step but I
believe it is a necessary corollary of their creed and school of
thought.
Q. You spoke about the combined attractions of the Mu�tazilites
and the Ash�arites. When you speak about Mowlana Jalal al-Din Rumi,
your critics say that Dr Soroush�s liking for Rumi doesn�t fit in
with the other components of his thinking. Apart from your personal
liking for Rumi, what was the theoretical grounds for your closeness
to him?
A. I don�t know what you mean when you speak about my personal
liking for Rumi. My liking for Rumi is a liking for his thinking;
otherwise, I�m not a blood relation of his or anything. I very much
like and respect his ideas, approach and outlook towards praising
God and his spiritual experiences. I find it a pleasure to learn
about them and I try to take part in these experiences to the extent
that I�m able.
As to the second point and your suggestion that Rumi is an
Ash�arite, I seriously doubt it. There are some very big whales who
don�t fit into the small pools of this or that school of thought. I
believe that he�s neither an Ash�arite nor a Mu�tazilite in the
conventional sense. He�s neither a Sunni nor a Shi�i. He�s none of
these things. Tight garments of this kind don�t fit his gigantic
stature. It would be best for us to think of Rumi as falling into
the Rumi school of thought. I believe - and others who have read
this great man�s works believe - that Rumi has extracted points from
both the Mu�tazilites and the Ash�arites. And even the hostility
that he expresses towards philosophers mainly stems from the fact
that he feels that philosophers have set up shop outside the
prophets� shop and have created a detour, lengthening the short path
to God. For example, he has a story about a poor man who is looking
for treasure. He says that the man is constructing bows and arrow
that make the quarry harder to catch, that he�s becoming so
entangled in philosophical reflection as to be blinded to truth and
that the more he runs, the more he distances himself from his
destination.
So, you see, Rumi likens philosophers to people who are running but
who, in so doing, distance themselves from God rather than moving
closer to Him. Secondly, by emphasizing rational analyses,
philosophers distance people from and make them oblivious to
spiritual experiences. They close people�s eyes to insight and open
them to learning. This is why Rumi sometimes opposes philosophers
and philosophically-inclined Mu�tazilites. Otherwise, in the
Masnavi, Rumi can present you with clear rational arguments in a
single verse. For example, when he argues that God�s munificence is
not based on people�s merit and that God bestows things on people
regardless of merit. He said that God�s munificence was the kernel
and merit was just a husk. His argument was: if God�s munificence is
based on merit, then who grants the merit itself? In other words,
the merit would have had to be granted without some prior merit.
This is a clear, rational argument that Rumi puts forward. Of
course, Rumi doesn�t want to appear in the guise of a Mu�tazilite or
Ash�arite theologian, and quite frankly says: If I busied myself
with questions and answers / when would I ever quench people�s
thirst?
Rumi says that his task is to be the cup bearer and to quench the
thirst of those who long for spiritual experience; not to entangle
them and himself in theological disputes. What attracts me to Rumi
is this broad perspective that he has on the world and the
experiences that he had in understanding the cosmos, God and human
beings. I can claim that Rumi had five or six big experiences, and
that all of the Masnavi and the Divan-e Shams are expositions and
interpretations of these great experiences. And these few great
experiences can keep alive people�s enthusiasm forever.
Let me underline the point that Rumi, like all fallible human
beings, has flaws and limitations, which we must view with
discernment. If we follow great figures, we must follow their
strengths.
Q. Let�s return to your research on the Mu�tazilites. I wanted to
ask you whether the outcome of your research will be published in
the form of a book or will we have to trace and track its impact in
your lectures and articles?
A. I have no plan for a book yet. God willing, I will write various
articles and publish them. Then, a collection of the articles will
be published as a book. As I see things, this is a very extensive
project and - if I can - I have to formulate new verdicts in at
least several domains. And, to this end, I must study a vast number
of sources. I hope I�m up to the task.
Q. So, it would appear that your forced absence from Iran�s
academic environment hasn�t been altogether bad for you; it has
provided you with a new opportunity.
A. Of course, I�m grateful to providence. Now that, thanks to the
broadmindedness of Iranian officials, I�m barred from some
occupations, I�m busying myself abroad and one of my activities is
research. Thanks be to God, there are resplendent libraries and very
learned researchers with whom I can discuss things and from whose
learning I can benefit. Of course, I�m not unheedful of developments
in Iran. I�d like to mention one point. Just last year alone, we
witnessed two important developments in terms of publications: one
was the publication of a translation of Ibn Arabi�s Fusus al-Hikam
and, the second, the publication of a translation of Heidegger�s
Being and Time. Both were very important, because the authors are
important writers in the history of Eastern mysticism and Western
philosophy, and because of their importance to our old and modern
thinking. And also because of the fascination with which these
figures and their works have been viewed in Iran. These translations
represent hard work and determination, and, fortunately, the
wellspring of this sort of hard work has not dried up amongst us.
The least effect that this hard work will have is that it will
demystify these types of figures. In other words, both Ibn Arabi and
Heidegger will lose their halo of sanctity.
Q. Especially Heidegger, with whose supporters you�ve had many
arguments in Iran -
A. Of course the truth of the matter is that, more than me arguing
with them, it is they who have insulted Popper. Let me mention a
point here. A historical mistake has been made. I saw this mistake
both in the writings of Mr Babak Ahmadi and in the writing of Mr
Jamadi - the respected translator of Being and Time - and in the
things that other people have said. These people have imagined that,
after the revolution, there was a quarrel in Iran between Popper and
Heidegger, or between their followers. This is a totally mistaken
tale and, unfortunately, it keeps being repeated. The truth of the
matter is that one side, in view of its political interests,
levelled some insults at Popper and reaped some rewards as a result.
And if there was any argument - and there was very little - it was
the same as the one that occurred in the West while Heidegger was
still alive; namely, over the question of whether Heidegger had
cooperated with the Nazis or not. I believe that, today, it is
crystal clear that he did cooperate with the Nazis. And I saw that
Mr Jamadi, with total fair-mindedness, has said in his works that
Heidegger�s cooperation with the Nazis is a plain, deplorable
historical fact. Where there was room for argument was on the
question of whether Heidegger�s philosophy is in line with that
cooperation and those political stances or not. Personally, I think
that it is. As to it being said that Heidegger�s philosophy should
be abandoned in favour of Popper�s or the other way around, that�s a
different question. The man who led the opposition to Popper used to
insult him and used to accuse him of imposing inanities on
philosophy. In my view, these kinds of remarks were inappropriate in
the realm of learning and discussion.
At any rate, I wanted to say that the translation of Heidegger�s
Being and Time was an important and auspicious event. As I said,
first, it demystifies Heidegger and the book. And, secondly, it
shames those who, for years, have used Heidegger to justify
themselves but have failed to translate even half a sentence from
his works in all this time. And, ultimately, it�s been someone
outside the university environment who has done the translation and
he ought to be congratulated.
Dr Movahed�s work in translating Fusus al-Hikam is also a massive
accomplishment. I�ve seen his work. He was rightly given a medal.
His mastery over English and Arabic and, of course, Persian is
admirable. And he�s done a very great service to Ibn Arabi�s school
of thought.
Let me say something, in particular, to those who believe that the
works of great figures such as these can�t be and shouldn�t be
translated: Far from losing something in translation, on occasion
translated works gain something. In other words, translation is a
service to the author. Let me give an example. Heidegger never
became Heidegger in Germany. It was when his works were translated
into Italian and French that Heidegger became important. Even now,
he is more important in France than he is in Germany. Others made
his work more comprehensible. Ibn Arabi has now lost his aura of
sanctity and readers in Iran can understand him better.
Persian-speakers are in a better position to establish a
relationship with him.
I believe that if, when the Qur�an first came to Iran, it had been
translated into good, readable Persian, and if Iranians had also
always read and studied the Qur�an in Persian, alongside reading it
in Arabic, we would undoubtedly be different Muslims than we are
today. The fact that the Qur�an is out of reach for Iranian Muslims
and the fact that it is locked in the Arabic language has had an
impact on our Muslim-ness. The translations that are now being done
of the Qur�an are a very auspicious development. And the
translations are increasingly good and this will have a long-term
impact on our beliefs, our theology and our religiosity. We have to
welcome all these things and researchers should be encouraged to
translate classical Eastern and Western books into Persian. This was
a project that I proposed to the Academy of Sciences which was,
unfortunately, left by the wayside. So, when this kind of work is
done outside the academy, it should be praised by all culture
lovers. I�d like to use this opportunity to congratulate and praise
Dr Movahed and Mr Jamadi, and I believe that they have done lasting
work.
** Translated from the Persian by Nilou
Mobasser
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