Myanmar / Burma Insurgency
Myanmar’s borderlands are home to dozens of ethnic armed groups that have fought against the military on and off since the country’s independence in 1948. Since the Tatmadaw toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup, some of these groups have been active in training the People’s Defence Forces that emerged to resist the putsch. "Helped by resistance groups formed after the coup, hundreds of experienced and fairly well-armed fighters managed to simultaneously attack key junta sites. They seized several towns and villages in the region, took control of military outposts and cut off important trade routes to China," Kean said, adding that the attack had been “the junta’s biggest setback in the field for a long time”.
Following the 2021 coup, the military launched an ambitious offensive to subdue its opposition throughout the country. The offensive quickly devolved into a scorched earth campaign, with junta troops regularly looting villages, torching homes, and torturing and killing civilians. But more than two years later, the military has made little headway, while the armed opposition has increasingly adapted and made significant gains, despite being outmatched in equipment, training, and manpower.
The 2021 crisis in Myanmar had the country on the verge of collapse. The Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, a local research group, said that as of January 2022 about 61% of the country was embroiled in armed conflict. Before the coup, 65% of the country was peaceful. Widespread destruction from the armed conflict between the junta and anti-coup forces, combined with economic instability, painted a bleak future for the country. Since seizing power, the military junta had violently suppressed public dissent, killing 1,435 people and is currently holding 8,385 more in detention.
An estimated 2,380 Myanmar junta soldiers were killed and around 600 wounded during December 2021, according to the parallel National Unity Government. Between Dec. 7 and Jan. 6, 1,077 blasts and attacks targeting junta forces were reported across the country, except in Rakhine State. The preceding month, 788 incidents were reported with 2,117 regime troops killed and 682 injured.
There were long-running armed internal conflicts across the country. Reports of killings, disappearances, beatings, torture, forced labor, forced relocations, the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual violence, and other abuses committed by government forces and armed opposition and rebel groups were common. Within the military, impunity for abuses and crimes continued, although the military took disciplinary action in limited cases. Military officials reportedly killed, tortured, and otherwise seriously abused civilians in conflict areas without public inquiry or accountability. Following ethnic armed groups’ attacks on the military, the military reportedly often directed its attacks against civilians, resulting in deaths.
Four ethnic armed groups–the Kachin Independence Army, the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organization; the Shan State Army, the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party; the United Wa State Army; and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army–were listed in the UN secretary-general’s 2020 report on Children and Armed Conflict as perpetrators of the unlawful recruitment and use of children. The military was conditionally delisted by the secretary-general as a perpetrator of unlawful recruitment and use of children due to continued progress on child recruitment, although the secretary-general called for continued progress on use of children.
The government restricted the passage of relief supplies and access by international humanitarian organizations to conflict-affected areas of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Shan States. The government regularly denied access to the United Nations, international NGOs, and diplomatic missions, asserting the military could not ensure their security or by claiming that humanitarian assistance would benefit ethnic armed group forces. In some cases the military allowed gradual access as government forces regained control over contested areas.
As of November 2020, an estimated 326,500 individuals were living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to violence in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and northern Shan States. The large number of primarily ethnic minority IDPs in primarily ethnic-dominated parts of the country can be traced back to decades of conflict between the central government and ethnic communities.
Myanmar’s military had accepted the concept of federalism on 21 August 2020 after decades of resistance to the idea, signing an agreement on the final day of government-sponsored peace talks to set the stage for building a federal democratic union after 2020. The shift reverses 70 years of military rejection of a federal union for the complex multi-ethnic nation, but analysts said the latest agreement was thin on concrete achievements. The hard work lies ahead as the national army continues to fight wars in far-flung states dominated by ethnic minority groups, they said.
The fourth round of the Union Peace Conference included 230 representatives from the government, the military, political parties, and the 10 ethnic armed organizations that have signed the government’s nationwide cease-fire agreement (NCA). Seven rebel forces, including the largest and most powerful ones, stayed away. Myanmar military spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun of military information committee later told reporters that rebel groups that had not signed the NCA must lay down their arms and sign the cease-fire pact so the peace process can move forward. “The military believes that any peace negotiations without a cease-fire could still be problematic,” he said.
The representatives at the Union Peace Conference, a series of meetings aimed at ending various ethnic insurgencies that have ravaged Myanmar since its founding in 1948, agreed on Union Accord Part III, the blueprint for implementing a process for creating a democratic federal union process. First inked at the 2016 round of the Union Peace Conference, the accord comprises a framework agreement for implementing the NCA, steps for implementing the peace process after 2020, and basic principles for establishing a democratic federal union.
Myanmar’s military overthrew the democratically elected NLD government on 01 February 2021, claiming the party had stolen the country’s November 2020 ballot through voter fraud. Amid nationwide turmoil, the military has stepped up offensives in remote parts of the country, triggering fierce battles with local People’s Defense Force (PDF) militias and some of the dozens of ethnic armies that control large swathes of territory along Myanmar’s periphery.
Branches of the People’s Defense Force militia from a dozen different regions in Myanmar formed an alliance to collectively take on the country’s junta, despite each group facing respective offensives since the military seized power seven months ago, members said 01 September 2021. The PDF groups, which are mostly based in embattled Sagaing region and Chin state, but are also located in of Mandalay and Magway regions, as well as Kachin and other ethnic states, announced on 28 August 2021 that they had allied to bolster their resistance to the military.
They told RFA’s Myanmar Service they would welcome additional militias into the fold. “It means a stronger united force through which each group can help the others with whatever is needed,” said a member of the Nhalone-hla Hardcores, a group based in the seat of Mandalay’s Myingyan township. “Right now, we are 12 in a unified group. If other groups want to join us, our leaders will consult with them and decide whether to accept them or not.”
The alliance of a dozen PDF groups expanded on one formed by the Mindat PDF, which had been engaged in frequent clashes with the junta forces, the Kanpetlet Defense Force (KDF), the Chin National League — comprised of the Falam, Kalay and Kabaw PDFs — and the Zomi Federal Union — comprised of the Tedim and Tunzan PDFs — formed on 24 August 2021.
Defiant villagers targeted in arson attacks by pro-junta forces in northwestern Myanmar staged a protest 11 February 2022 against the “fascist army” that is leaving a widening trail of destruction in their rural township. Protesters came from four villages in Pale township, Sagaing region, where more than 1,100 houses had been burned to the ground in the past two weeks, according to residents – part of a scorched earth campaign in apparent retaliation for attacks by anti-junta People’s Defense Force militia on junta forces.
The protesters, making the three-finger salute adopted by opponents of the military, carried two red and gold peacock flags of the National League for Democracy, the party of Aung San Suu Kyi. Her civilian government was toppled in a military coup one year ago that has plunged Myanmar into a deepening civil conflict – including in this corner of Sagaing, which has become a hub of anti-junta resistance.
The arson campaign, which has forced thousands to flee, extended to Sagaing’s Mingin township to the north, where another 270 houses were destroyed in fires set by Myanmar troops and pro-junta militia on 10 February 2022 in two neighboring villages, local residents said. Another 130 houses were destroyed in Mingin township on Feb. 2, meaning that at least 1,500 houses have been razed in Pale and Mingin since Jan. 31. In the Feb. 2 attack, Bin village lost about 100 homes. Aerial photos of the settlement show a gold-colored Buddhist stupa surrounded by ashen remains of destroyed homes.
Junta claims that the situation in Myanmar is “under control” couldn’t be farther from the truth, residents and analysts said 04 March 2022, calling the comments part of a bid to “save face” in front of the global community as the nation crumbles. Speaking to Chinese and Japanese reporters during a Feb. 23 online interview, junta Information Minister Maung Maung Ohn said that the regime had “taken full control of the country’s stability and security” as it had been able to “suppress — within the bounds of law — all crimes and inhumane acts” within a short period of time.
The former general said that more than 3,000 ward or village administrators in various regions and states had resigned due to “threats” by prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitaries — who the military calls terrorists — but that the junta was able to appoint more than 2,600 people to fill the vacancies and ensure security.
As of 04 March 2022, more than 1,600 people had been killed since the coup and some 12,300 arrested, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights organization based in Thailand.
The Biden administration formally determined that violence committed against the Rohingya minority by Myanmar's military amounts to genocide and crimes against humanity, US officials told Reuters 20 March 2022, a move that advocates said should bolster efforts to hold the junta that now runs Myanmar accountable.
Duwa Lashi La is the acting president of the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, a parallel government formed in opposition to the junta after the latter seized power in a February 2021 coup. Speaking to FRANCE 24 from a secret location in the country, Duwa Lashi La said 11 May 2022 that "within a year, we achieved significant success on the military and administrative fronts". He claimed that his People's Defence Force controls 15 percent of Myanmar and that combined with the ethnic resistance groups, the "collective resistance forces" control "almost 50 percent" of the country.
The State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known, has a five-part theory of victory, and believes that time is on its side.
- First, the military will continue to wage a violent campaign across multiple fronts to wear down opposition forces through a war of attrition.The junta will increasingly rely on artillery and air power. The violence will be excessive and intentionally target civilians. And of course the junta will try to terrorize the population into submission: nearly 40,000 homes have been set on fire throughout the country, 27,000 in Sagaing alone.
- Second, the junta will assiduously target the shadow government's funding and logistics. The National Unity Government takes great pride that they have raised over $100 million through online sales of military-owned properties and crypto-bond offerings. They have used crypto currencies, tethered to the U.S. dollar to move money, and created digital wallets.
- Third, the military will focus on the opposition's center of gravity: their alliance with key Ethnic Resistance Organizations. This is both the shadow government's greatest strength and greatest vulnerability. No Bamar-led government has had better ties with the ethnic forces than the NUG, whom they see as offering the best hope of establishing a democratic federal republic.
- Fourth, the junta will focus on decimating the urban guerrilla forces. The military was not surprised to be fighting a multifront war against the ethnic armies, even if the proliferation of people's defense forces caught them off guard. But the attacks by the Yangon and Mandalay urban guerrillas undermined their claim to have the situation under control in the eyes of the urban middle class, whom they desperately need to win over.
- Fifth, the junta will hold "elections" in an effort to legitimize their rule, taking a page out of the playbook written by Thailand's generals in 2019. They have announced the establishment of proportional representation, and the military will still receive 25 percent of parliamentary seats.
Ethnic armed groups and PDF groups shrugged off Min Aung Hlaing’s threats 27 March 2023, saying that there is little the military can do that it hasn’t already tried. Khu Hteh Bu, the spokesperson of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the political wing of the Karenni Army, said the military has been arresting and torturing Myanmar’s ethnic minorities “for decades” with no result. “We think that the more threateningly they talk to us, the more they reveal the pain and loss they have suffered because of us,” he said. “They are using all their strength to crush us. But since the people neither support them nor give up rebelling against them, they are just creating their own sordid destiny.”
Myanmar - Operation 1027 / Operation 1111
Fighting in Myanmar between the military junta and an alliance of ethnic armed groups intensified since late October 2023 after an unprecedented offensive in the country’s north exposed the junta’s struggles on the ground. The UN called for all sides to respect international law in a statement on 17 November 2023, saying that more than 70 civilians had already been killed and some 200,000 displaced by the upsurge in violence.
Dubbed “Operation 1027”, the offensive began on 10 / 27 / 2023 in northern Shan State on the Chinese border. Three armed groups – the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – joined forces under the Three Brotherhood Alliance moniker. The United Wa State Army announced that they were neutral in the current conflict. While many had hoped that the Wa would join forces, their neutrality could make an army attack from the south through territory it controls difficult. This offensive was not a total surprise. The TNLA has been fighting for most of 2023. The MNDAA had warned that they would join the TNLA should the military attack their positions in the Kokang region. The inclusion of the Arakan Army from Rakhine state was a bigger surprise, because the group had earlier concluded that they could get greater autonomy in their western state by not fighting, and had reached a ceasefire in November 2022.
Intense armed clashes, including artillery shelling and airstrikes, persisted between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), spanning multiple townships in northern Shan. This new front of the conflict has now expanded into the Northwest, Southeast and Rakhine. In the east, Karenni forces launched Operation 1111 and by December 2023 controled nearly 80% of Kayah state. They were fighting in the capital Loikaw on November 11. The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force targeted junta bases in Loikaw University and a prison in the capital of Kayah state. In the following days, the junta army retaliated with airstrikes and shelling, killing 20 civilians, according to the Karenni Human Rights Group. The attacks killed six women and 14 men, including one child. Junta troops stationed at the university were frequently raiding nearby villages and shelling them with heavy artillery, said Khun Bedu, chairman of Karenni Nationalities Defense Force. The group attacked the prison to free those who had been imprisoned after the military coup. “The fighting broke out around the prison. Our platoon commanders surrounded Loikaw Prison, but our forces did not break out and seize the prison,” he told Radio Free Asia. The junta’s air force prevented the group from freeing any prisoners, he said. Regime spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun released a statement saying the attack on Loikaw University was a “barbaric act,” but did not comment on the junta’s use of airstrikes near the prison or the killings. Zaw Min Tun said Karenni troops attacked Loikaw University and attempted to take the teachers hostage, according to a pro-junta newspaper. Khun Bedu denied these accusations, saying the attack was carried out because the army was stationed there and that teachers were relocated by Karenni troops during the fighting. KNDF Deputy Commander Marwi said: "Our primary target is to seize control of Loikaw, which is the command center of the regime [in Kayah State], and to pull down the pillars of the junta’s administrative machinery..... Those involved in the fighting are the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, Karenni Army, Karenni National People’s Liberation Front, People’s Defense Forces [PDFs] from Demoso, Moe Bye, Pekon, Loikaw townships, and some units under the command of the National Unity Government, as well as some local resistance groups. It is fair to say that almost all of the armed groups in Karenni State are involved.... " The ultimate goal of the operation is to drive them out of Karenni State. The operation should enable us to bring the entire Karenni State under our control, install our own administration, and deliver public services to the people.... Operation 1111 is inspired by Operation 1027 [launched in northern Shan State on Oct. 27]. It is important that we launch operations in our respective areas so that a nationwide coordinated attack takes shape on its own. We urge revolutionary groups in other areas to carry out similar operations. We need to help each other, take strength from each other’s success and try to destroy the military dictatorship. We welcome and support the launch of any [anti-regime] operation that takes place. A KNDF battalion has joined Operation 1027. Some of our comrades have died in the fighting there. Our battalions also joined the battle for Kunlong [in northern Shan State]. The KNDF is ready to join all anti-regime operations across the country." Myanmar’s borderlands are home to dozens of ethnic armed groups that have fought against the military on and off since the country’s independence in 1948. Since the Tatmadaw toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government in a February 2021 coup, some of these groups have been active in training the People’s Defence Forces that emerged to resist the putsch.
“It’s the biggest challenge that the military junta has had to face since the coup d’état of February 1, 2021,” said Thomas Kean, a specialist on Myanmar at the International Crisis Group, an NGO that monitors global conflicts. Fighting erupted in mid-November 2023 in Shan, Kachin and Chin states in the country’s north as well as in Rakhine State in the west, where an informal ceasefire had been in place for almost a year until early last week. Armed groups have taken the fight to the Tatmadaw in Kayah State in the country’s east, according to Kean. At least 70 civilians, including children, have been killed since the fighting erupted in earnest on October 27, and more than 90 wounded and more than 200,000 displaced, according to a UN statement.
"Helped by resistance groups formed after the coup, hundreds of experienced and fairly well-armed fighters managed to simultaneously attack key junta sites. They seized several towns and villages in the region, took control of military outposts and cut off important trade routes to China," Kean said, adding that the attack had been “the junta’s biggest setback in the field for a long time”.
By mid-November 2023 the new front of fighting between Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) in northern Shan since late October had expanded to the Northwest, Southeast, and Rakhine with increasing urban areas now affected by intense fighting and aerial bombardment. As of 14 November 2023, more than 200,000 people across these states and regions have been forcibly displaced due to the fighting. Many have also moved towards the border with China in northern Shan. Over half a million people have been displaced in Myanmar amid a surge in fighting between the military and armed groups that stated in late October and has spread to over two-thirds of the country, the UN humanitarian affairs office reported on 08 December 2023. Among those fighting the military are a loose coalition of well-armed ethnic militias, as well as the People's Defence Forces (PDF) - the armed group supporting National Unity Government (NUG) and opposed to the February 2021 military coup, according to media reports. In a flash update, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that more than 578,000 people are estimated to have been displaced since 26 October but cautioned that figures are difficult to confirm given undocumented returns, repeated displacements and telecommunication blackouts.
Speaking at an emergency meeting of the National Defense and Security Council in the capital Naypyitaw a day later, Min Aung Hlaing stressed the urgency of putting an end to the northern offensive. “The three ethnic alliance attacks in northern Shan state near the China-Myanmar border will break the country into pieces,” he said. Min Aung Hlaing will search for scapegoats and purges and reshuffles will follow as the military grows desperate. Revolutions always eat their own. Will the assembled brass put Min Aung Hlaing out to pasture before he comes for them?
The Three Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, (TNLA) the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Arakan Army had swept across northern Shan State, taking control of over 126 of the military’s forward operating bases. The Brotherhood Alliance claimed to control or partially control 13 towns.
Casualty figures are very hard to confirm and any claims should be taken with a large dose of salt, but Brotherhood Alliance forces now control much of Highways 3 and 34 to the key China border towns of Muse and Chinshwehaw. One cenral government light infantry battalion (LIB) laid down their arms without putting up a fight. That in itself is very telling. On paper a LIB is supposed to be roughly 200 men per battalion, though a September 2022, order called for a floor of 185 men. The battalion that surrendered had only 41 men. Other militia forces have likewise surrendered.
Operation 1027 is important for five key reasons.
First, the Brotherhood Alliance supports the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and its goals for a federal democracy – even though to date it has not fought alongside the NUG, despite its alliance with the Kachin Independence Organization, a key member of the NUG’s multi-ethnic alliance. The TNLA has trained NUG’s people’s defense forces (PDFs), but thus far it has only fought the military in self defense. PDFs are now fighting alongside the Brotherhood Alliance.
Second, Operation 1027 is, if not actually further coordinated offensive operations against the junta, clearly opportunistic actions by other groups. The coordinated offense had clearly taken the military by surprise. Of all the various conflict zones in the country, including Sagaing, Chin, Kachin, Mon, and Tanintharyi, Shan had seen significantly less fighting. This is a new front that the military can ill afford. On Nov. 6, a coordinated operation between the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army and a PDF took control of Kawlin Township in Sagaing. It is the first of 330 township capitals in Myanmar to fall, and the first where the NUG flag was raised. It remains to be seen whether the Arakan Army will break their ceasefire in Rakhine. They may feel compelled to do so if their forces in northern Shan suffer heavy casualties. But even if they don't break the ceasefire, for the past week the military regime had been redeploying forces to Rakhine. Karreni forces launched a coordinated offensive in Kayah State on 7 November and fighting between the military and Karen National Liberation Army in the southeastern Tanintharyi region has also escalated.
Third, Beijing sent several high level delegations to Naypyidaw to pressure the junta to resume the stalled Kyaukphyu port project and the railroad and roads that would connect it to Yunnan province under China’s Belt and Road Initiative of infrastructure lending. Following the visit by a top Chinese diplomat, after Min Aung Hlaing was unceremoniously not invited to the Belt and Road’s 10th Anniversary summit in Beijing last month, Naypyidaw solicited tenders for the port project. Highway 3 and 34 are the main arteries from Mandalay and Naypyitaw to China, and part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. The free trade zone in Muse-Ruili is currently stalled, and China’s railroad terminates there. Border trade with China is critically important to the junta, as dollar-denominated trade is too expensive for the sanctioned regime. And those roads are a key conduit for armament imports from China.
Fourth, Operation 1027 clearly demonstrates their agency and willingness to resist Chinese pressure if it goes against their interests. The capture of border posts ties into the broader question about China’s involvement. All three members of the Brotherhood Alliance have traditionally been dependent on China, which stepped up their pressure on them and the KIA this year to cease their military operations against the military. China’s special representative to Myanmar has convened several meetings to pressure them to engage the junta and rejoin the peace process. While they politely refused, they also pledged to protect Chinese economic interests.
Fifth, upon capturing Chinshwehaw and two other cities – all havens for cyber scams, human, drug and wildlife trafficking, and illegal casinos – the MNDAA began to dismantle the criminal syndicates. Chinese began fleeing Laukkaing, another hub of illicit activity, to escape the fighting. Radio Free Asia has reported that Thailand is trying to repatriate 162 nationals who had been trafficked to the border crime zones. Shutting down the crime zones is a significant development in itself. But it will also impact the junta’s coffers. Most of the special economic zones are controlled by local border guards forces who are allied with the military regime. These former ethnic resistance armies accepted autonomy in return for economic concessions. The junta is believed to get a large cut of the proceeds. But if nothing else, the loss of the criminal syndicates will dry up the funds necessary to administer the border guards forces and keep their loyalty.
Finally, while the military is able to use helicopters to resupply forces in northern Shan, it doesn’t have sufficient airlift capacity to mount a full scale invasion. And with the loss of 126 camps and their supply of weapons and ammunition, it has few places from which to stage attacks. If the military tries to launch a counter-offensive and fails, that will have a huge impact on morale within its ranks, and concurrently cause a huge spike in the morale of the NUG and its allies and partners, which have been suffering high rates of casualties. It would also likely lead to more defections and desertions of soldiers and border guard units that can no longer be resupplied.
The military is likely to respond with more indiscriminate air strikes and long range artillery bombardments from a safe distance. Both will result in more civilian casualties, including in China, and refugee flows. Rather than an offensive, there might be a buildup of troops in a defensive perimeter around Pyin Oo Lwin, which is the home of the military’s once prestigious Defense Services Academy, and thus highly symbolic.
The military responded with an escalation in the number of long-range artillery and aerial bombing, both of which have resulted in increased civilian casualties. On 03 December 2023, the NUG's Ministry of Human Rights released details on SAC attacks on civilians, documenting 84 airstrikes, and 112 artillery strikes that resulted in the death of 244 civilians. Such attacks would continue as the military had neither sufficient number of troops to retake lost territory, nor sufficient means to move troops. One cannot control territory from the air.
By 15 December 2023 more than 660,000 people are estimated to have been newly displaced since the escalation of armed conflict on 27 October, with some people displaced several times and others already starting to return home. Total current displacement now stands at 2.6 million people nationwide. The volatile context is generating significant protection risks including increased civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, exploitation, forced recruitment and forced labor. Food, safe shelter, non-food items and hygiene kits, basic health services and protection support remain priorities with shortages of essential supplies being reported in many areas due to commercial and humanitarian transport blockages. The return of urban guerrillas is an important milestone that demonstrates both a decline in the military's control over the cities, and the growing confidence of the PDFs to conduct operations. While there have been significant opposition gains in the countryside, within the cocoons of Mandalay and Yangon, the military regime has gone to great lengths to project a sense of normalcy, so that the population will acquiesce to military rule. Restaurants and bars are open, life goes on.
Reports from the ground suggest that the military is building up its defenses in Naypyidaw, Yangon, and Mandalay, with increasing shows of force and patrols of armored vehicles. Naypyidaw is already a fortress city that will be hard to attack. But the capture of heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems should give opposition forces the ability to now target the city. Likewise, greater proximity will allow the small drones and quadcopters that the opposition has used to drop mortar shells the ability to strike targets. Even symbolic strikes in Naypyidaw would sew fear among regime loyalists, undermine morale, and sap the will to resist. The military understands the importance of maintaining a sense of security in the cities. There's always been violence in the borderlands, but once violence hit Yangon and Mandalay, people questioned the military's hold on power. To that end, they began deploying Chinese-made CCTV cameras with artificial intelligence. Urban guerrilla networks that were active in 2022, were systematically taken apart. The arrest and torture of one member, often led to the rest of entire cells. That is now changing, with more attacks by opposition People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) in the cities in December 2023. The most notable recent attack was the Dec. 1 assassination of the chairman of the pro-military New National Democracy Party, Than Tun. He had been a National League for Democracy (NLD) member before defecting to a pro-military party that was established by a senior advisor to the State Administrative Council (SAC). the junta’s formal name. These assassinations are meant to convey good operational intelligence on the part of the PDFs, and at the same time, serve as a warning that if they can hit someone so close to the SAC, then the military is unable to protect anyone. On 29 November 2023, PDFs attacked a compound of the military-owned conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd, in Yangon’s Insein Township. This was an important symbolic target, as the conglomerate is one of the most important sources of revenue for the military. On Nov. 30, local PDFs used drones to drop bombs on a police station and two military posts in Yangon, while PDFs in North Okkalapa Township bombed forces encamped at a local high school. There have been bombings, more recently, in Dagon township. In short, the war is coming to the cities. With each week, there will be more assassinations, more drone attacks, and more bombings that target security forces and symbols of military rule. This will shatter any false pretense that the military is still in control and empower more civil disobedience. It’s no wonder that Min Aung Hlaing has suddenly called for a political solution, before it all comes crashing down. Troops from the 55th Light Infantry Division (LID) stationed in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State, surrendered to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) 26 December 2023, according to military analysts close to sources on the ground. Local pro-junta Border Guard Force (BGF) members under warlord Bai Suocheng also surrendered to the MNDAA, said the military analyst. An analyst monitoring the fighting in northern Shan State reported, “Based on a video clip on social media and accounts of residents, it is believed that three battalions of about 60 soldiers each from the 55th LID [were stationed around Laukkai]. “This would suggest a total of 180 troops. Reports indicate that about half of them were killed [in fighting], while the remaining half chose to surrender.” It should be noted that the Myanmar regime army is notoriously over-officered, as in most armies a group of 60 troops would considered a platoon, a subunit of a company, which is a subunit of a battalion in real army - even if another 60 troops per unti were KIA, a formation of 120 troops would be a somewhat under-strength [ie, over-officered] company, while a real battalion, would have four companies wtih upwards of 400 troops. The 55th LID was renowned for its combat ability before the 2021 coup, but its troop numbers and morale have declined since then, said Kaung Thu Win, a former army captain who defected. “As their deployment prolonged, [the 55th LID] lost active status. They have been fighting for a long time and are weary, and they don’t want to fight,” he said.
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