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Re: HTTPD bug

Martin J Hargreaves <ch11mh () surrey ac uk> writes:

      Unfortunately just running as 'nobody' is not enough, you have
to either disallow the following of symlinks in user
directories (which is a good idea anyway), choose which users
can have symlinks and have a more complex access list (this is
NCSA httpd, I don't know about the CERN version), or lastly
just allow any user to give the network read access to your
system (may be option for those in a secure environment or who
trust all the users on the system).

Aren't there plenty of other ways an untrusted user could distribute
"other" readable files, like e-mail, news, a reference in his home
page to another httpd on a high numbered port, printouts stapled to
telephone poles, etc.  Would you sleep better at night knowing that
your untrusted users might be distributing your password file or any
other files they can read without making the httpd follow symbolic
links?

-- 
Joseph C. Konczal  <konczal () csmes ncsl nist gov>             
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Tech. A62, Gaithersburg, MD  20899  USA
(301) 975-3285

NIST Computer Security Resource Clearinghouse - http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov

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Current thread:

• Re: HTTPD bug Mr Martin J Hargreaves (Apr 16)
  • Re: HTTPD bug Darren Reed (Apr 16)
  • Re: HTTPD bug Baba Z Buehler (Apr 17)
    • Re: HTTPD bug Mr Martin J Hargreaves (Apr 17)
      • Re: HTTPD bug Joe Konczal (Apr 18)
  • Re: HTTPD bug carson () lehman com (Apr 17)
    • Re: HTTPD bug Tom Fitzgerald (Apr 17)