| We need Your Support. Make a Donation now! or |  |
|
Alternative Voting Methods Tutorial and essays by James Green-Armytage
Contents General: Introduction, voting methods survey, definitions and criteria, recommendations Proposals: Cardinal pairwise, delegable proxy: direct democracy, delegable proxy: representative democracy, collective budget-setting, iterative pairwise, reciprocal pairing, anti-strategy measures, debate-inclusion, computing CPO-STV Argument essays: The strategic vulnerability of "margins" Condorcet, the value of first choice votes, an argument against Borda, 4/04 reply to CVD
This introduction to voting methods is intended to be readable by someone who is totally new to the field.
This rather huge survey describes about forty of the most interesting single-winner and multiple-winner voting methods. The methods are often illustrated using numerical examples, and occasionally with nifty esoteric-looking diagrams. This page is the oldest on the site, so some of it may be slightly out of date, but it is still quite informative.
A number of definitions and criteria that are useful for discussing and evaluating voting systems. Primary topics include majority rule, defeat strength, strategy, and continuity. Many of the key concepts are illustrated by numerical examples.
A brief index of my most-recommended methods for a few of the most basic voting situations.
Cardinal-Weighted Pairwise Comparison Proposal A new voting method that allows voters to both rank and rate the candidates, and thus to indicate which of their preferences are stronger than others. The method incorporates the ratings data into a Condorcet-efficient pairwise tally. The short version of the proposal is available in html and pdf formats. There is also a longer version of the proposal, which is slightly out of date in some respects, although it contains more detailed information and arguments than the shorter version.
Direct Democracy by Delegable Proxy This paper introduces the delegable proxy system, which resolves the information paradox long associated with direct democracy. The paper describes the essential elements of a good delegable proxy system, as well as discussing a wide range of possible additions to and variations on the basic structure. This paper takes the place of an earlier proxy paper, which advocates a more specific proposal rather than explicitly leaving variable elements up to later choice.
Representation by Delegable Proxy A proposal in which a delegable proxy system determines the composition of legislative bodies, and the relative voting power of each legislator.
Collective Budget-Setting Proposal A direct-vote budget-setting algorithm based on STV, which allows voters to decide the point at which a project has received enough funding, that is, the point where they begin allocating money to another project.
Iterative Pairwise Voting Procedure A proposal for a multiple-round voting procedure using Condorcet's method, for use primarily for voting in relatively small groups, such as voting within a legislature or council. Argues that the extra rounds are well worth the small additional cost, in that they provide a line of defense against strategic manipulation.
An attempt to apply some of the tools of voting methods to other areas... such as the interaction between a workforce and a job pool, college applications, and forming romantic relationships.
A quick list of measures that have been proposed to reduce the vulnerability of Condorcet to the burying strategy.
A brief proposal for a Condorcet-STV hybrid to be used in deciding which candidates to include in a debate.
Computational conservation in CPO-STV First, I describe a series of shortcuts that can be used to make a full CPO-STV tally somewhat less computationally expensive. Second, I describe a slightly less thorough version of CPO-STV that would be even less expensive.
The strategic vulnerability of "margins" Condorcet An argument against using "margins" methods in contentious public elections.
The Value of First Choice Votes A pro-Condorcet argument that the position of one candidate on a ranked ballot derives significance from its relation to the position of other candidates.
An argument against the Borda count Several reasons why I don't think the Borda count should be taken seriously as an election method.
Reply to the Center for Voting and Democracy's April 2 analysis Part of the discussion comparing Condorcet's method with instant runoff voting.
miscellany:
Archived Discussion List Postings Annotated links to links to writings of mine in the archives of the Election Methods mailing list.
Alternate versions of documents Here is an earlier version of the cardinal-weighted pairwise proposal. Here is an earlier introduction to voting methods; first written in the fall of 2003. The writing style of this one is a bit more formal, and I think that it may be in some ways less engaging than the July '04 introduction. However, there might be some interesting bits here that are not in the new introduction. Cardinal pairwise criteria: An excerpt from a longer version of the cardinal pairwise paper, which gives informal proofs regarding criteria the method passes and fails.
A variety of helpful voting methods web sites
questions or comments? you can e-mail me at jarmyta (at) antioch-college.edu you are also invited to visit my homepage
|