Learning War’s Lessons: he German Army and the Battle of the Somme 19161 I Robert T. Foley Abstract At the beginning of July 1916, the British and French armies launched a massive offensive against the Germans along the Somme River. Surprised by both the intensity and ferocity of the Entente battle of material on the Somme, the German army was caught completely off guard and suffered high casualties, if not great loss of terrain. Over the course of the battle, the Germans were forced by superior Anglo-French weaponry and tactics to improvise a new defensive tactical doctrine. This article makes use of contemporary German “lessons-learned” reports to explore the development of these new defensive tactics and show that the lessons-learned system reined during the battle allowed the German army to stay intellectually lexible despite the overwhelming pressures of the battle. O n 26 June 1916, French and British artillery commenced what was to be the longest artillery preparatory bombardment of the First World War to that date. Between 26 June and the start of the infantry assault on 1 July, the two armies ired some 2.5 million artillery and mortar rounds into the German 1. I would like to thank the British Academy, who provided a grant to fund a portion of the research for this article. I would also like to thank Dr. H. B. McCartney and the anonymous readers for helpful comments on drafts of this article. Robert T. Foley is senior lecturer in modern military history at the University of Liverpool. An expert on German military history, his books include Alfred von Schliefen’s Military Writings (London, 2003) and German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge, 2005). He is currently writing a history of German strategy from 1916 to 1918 and is working on a project on how armies learn and innovate in wartime. he Journal of Military History 75 (April 2011): 471-504. Copyright © 2011 by he Society for Military History, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the Editor, Journal of Military History, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, P.O. Drawer 1600, Lexington, VA 24450. Authorization to photocopy items for internal and personal use is granted by the copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), 121 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA (www.copyright.com), provided the appropriate fee is paid to the CCC. ★ 471 ROBERT T. FOLEY defenses astride the Somme River.2 his long and extensive bombardment set the scene for what was to become one of the war’s longest single battles.3 Above all else, this would be a battle based on a proligate use of resources, both in terms of material and manpower. Before the battle’s end toward the end of November, the equivalent of 96 British divisions, 70 French divisions, and 147 German divisions would sufer on the front along the Somme.4 Even more so than the previous Entente ofensives and perhaps even more so than the German ofensive at Verdun, the Anglo-French ofensive on the Somme was to become a great Materialschlacht, a battle of material. In 1915, the German army on the Western Front had successfully defended against overwhelming Entente ofensives, so much so that the Chief of the General Staf, Erich von Falkenhayn, had called the German army in the west Germany’s “iron wall.”5 However, previous battles did not prepare the German army for the relentless Materialschlacht of the battle of the Somme, and with some 430,000 casualties it sufered grievously at the hands of the French and British armies over the course of the battle.6 Using the Erfahrungsberichte (lessons-learned reports) of the units that fought in the battle of the Somme, it is possible to reconstruct how the German army learned in 1916 in a way that adds signiicantly to our understanding of the German “doctrine” process in the First World War. hese reports, compiled by units immediately after their time in the front line, were submitted to higher headquarters across the Western Front as a means of spreading the lessons of the battle quickly 2. William Philpott, Bloody Victory: he Sacriice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (London: Little Brown, 2009), 167–69. Although the battle has been the subject of numerous books, Philpott’s book brings the French contribution to the ofensive back into the picture and provides perhaps the most balanced account of the battle. When operating together, the British and French forces are often termed the “Entente,” after the entente cordiale signed by the two countries in 1904. 3. he year’s other great battle—Verdun—lasted from February to December. 4. he actual numbers of divisions is smaller—52 British, 44 French, and 96 German. However, many of these were deployed more than once, so I have given the “equivalent” number here relecting this. he British and French numbers are from Philpott, Bloody Victory, 438; the German are from Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd. XI: Die Kriegführung im Herbst 1916 und im Winter 1916/17 (Berlin: Mittler, 1938), 102–3. 5. Erich von Falkenhayn, quoted in “Die Besprechung in Metz am 29.Juli 1915,” W10/51312, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (BA/MA), Freiburg, Germany. Also see, Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156–80. 6. he number here is taken from German ten-day casualty reports from 24 June to 10 November 1916, compiled by Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht to Oberste Heeresleitung, Ie Nr. 5249, 26 January 1918, HGKPR/189, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv-Kriegsarchiv (HStA-KA), Munich, Germany. he question of calculating German casualties has been the subject of much debate. For the most recent examination, see James McRandle and James Quirk, “he Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty Counts in World War I,” Journal of Military History 70 ( July 2006): 667–702. 472 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 throughout the entire army.7 Although such reports had been produced in previous battles, it was during the battle of the Somme that these were irst produced systematically by a wide range of units from regiment to army group. he length and intensity of the battle of the Somme forced the German army to rely on these reports to disseminate knowledge about the new tactics and techniques employed by both sides in this epic battle. Consequently, these reports provide us with a unique window on how the units ighting on the Somme struggled to deal with the new and extreme conditions posed by the Entente battle of material and how they were forced by Entente tactics to reform German defensive doctrine continually while in battle. Of course, there is a historiography of how the German army learned and how it developed General Erich von Falkenhayn, in its doctrine during the First World War. he Hans F. Helmont, Der Weltkrieg foremost source on this is G. C. Wynne’s If in Bildern und Dokumenten, 2 Germany Attacks: he Battle in Depth in the West, vols. (Leipzig: J. M. Meulenhof, which was irst published in much-abbreviated 1915–16), 1:33. form at the start of the Second World War in 1940.8 his seminal work has provided the foundation for all subsequent analyses of the development of German doctrine during the war. Building on Wynne, Timothy Lupfer has analyzed the formal doctrine process of the German army from 1916 to 1918.9 Finally, Martin Samuels’s Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 compared the ability of the British and German armies to adapt to the rapidly changing conditions of the Western Front.10 7. his article make use of analysis of reports from the Oberste Heeresleitung, Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Armee-Oberkommandos 1 and 2, ifteen army corps, thirty-two divisions, and twenty-three brigades or below, as well as a number of technical specialists. his amounts to 71 percent of the army corps and almost 33 percent of the divisions deployed in the battle. 8. hree editions exist: G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: he Battle in Depth in the West (London: Faber & Faber, 1940); a facsimile edition of this (New York: Greenwood Press, 1976); and a inal, unexpurgated edition based on Wynne’s original manuscript, edited by Robert T. Foley (London: Tom Donovan, 2008). (Subsequent references will be to the unexpurgated edition.) 9. Timothy T. Lupfer, he Dynamics of Doctrine: he Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1981). 10. Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995). MILITARY HISTORY ★ 473 ROBERT T. FOLEY While these works have told us a great deal about the development of German doctrine during the war, there are several problems with this historiography. First, none of these works makes use of original archival material. Although each utilizes the formal German doctrine manuals, none uses original contemporary reports.11 Without this, they are able to give only one aspect of the development of German doctrine during the war. Moreover, Wynne and Lupfer, in particular, are based only on memoir literature and regimental histories. Although this memoir literature is extensive, it allows for the reader to see only what the author intended him to see. Moreover, Wynne’s seminal work reads like a hagiography of Fritz von Loßberg, who played a key role in the German defensive battles of 1915 to 1917. Loßberg, however, was not an objective observer of events.12 By basing his analysis on Loßberg’s memoirs, Wynne gives a very selective picture of the development of German defensive ideas.13 Moreover, Wynne’s work was less about learning in the German army than about shortcomings he perceived in the British army, both in the First World War and on the eve of the Second World War.14 Indeed, even Lupfer’s work has a secondary purpose: it was written in the early days of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army and was clearly designed to inluence this process.15 More importantly for this article, however, existing historiography analyzes the background and implementation of formal doctrine within the German army. his formal doctrine was written within the German High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL) and disseminated from there down to the lower levels of command. As such, they analyzed the top-down doctrinal approach within the German army. his article will show that a separate approach to doctrine existed within the German army, one based around a lessons-learned system developed during the battle of the Somme. hese reports allowed for innovation to be shared laterally between units rather than through the top-down approach analyzed by the existing historiography. An analysis of these lessons-learned reports shows that, despite the severe strain placed on the German army in the battle of the Somme, it was 11. Samuels does make limited used of a few reports translated by the British army during the war, but still relies heavily on Wynne and Fritz von Loßberg (Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege [Berlin: Mittler, 1939]) for his main points on the battle of the Somme. See Samuels, Command or Control, 171–78. 12. Indeed, the organization responsible for the writing of the German oicial history described Loßberg’s memoirs (Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege) as “almost a falsiication.” Quoted in Markus Pöhlmann, Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg: Die amtliche deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1914–1956 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 169. 13. See Robert T. Foley, introduction to Wynne, If Germany Attacks, xx–xxvii. 14. See publisher’s note to Wynne, If Germany Attacks, vii–viii. Wynne’s criticism of the British high command in the First World War was so strident that his work for the British oficial history of the war had to be substantially rewritten by Sir James Edmonds. Andrew Green, Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Oicial Histories, 1915–1948 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 167–94. 15. Although Lupfer is critical of Wynne’s emphasis on Loßberg’s role in doctrine, he still sees its development as the result of “the talent of several great soldiers.” Lupfer, Dynamics, 63. 474 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 still capable of rapid innovation in the face of new challenges. he lessons-learned system employed in the battle of the Somme allowed the German army to learn and disseminate lessons throughout the army rapidly while in the middle of battle. he formal doctrine process analyzed by the existing historiography shows us only a system that was playing catch-up with a more lexible lessons-learned system that shared knowledge at the lower levels of the German army. Because of this ability to change quickly, the German army was able to counter many of the new tactics employed by the Entente in the battle of the Somme. he battle also codiied a lessons-learned system that continued through the rest of the war, which allowed the German army to innovate rapidly in the face of new Entente tactics in 1917 and 1918. Consequently, the German army emerged from the battle an intellectually more lexible, and hence stronger, army, despite its grievous casualties. German Defensive Doctrine before the Battle he battles of 1915—particularly the “autumn battle” in Champagne—had resulted in considerable development of German defensive doctrine.16 Gone were the simple single trench defensive lines of 1914. By the end of 1915, all armies on the Western Front had developed complicated, multi-layered defensive systems, each comprised of a series of trench lines. In October 1915, the OHL issued new instructions on defense. hese ordered all armies to construct at least two defensive positions. hese positions were to be at least 2,000 meters apart, hopefully forcing any enemy that broke into the irst position to redeploy his artillery before being able to attack the second. Each position was to consist of at least two trench lines separated by 100 to 150 meters. Each trench line was to be provided with large numbers of bunkers and dugouts that were to be deep enough to withstand heavy artillery ire. he instructions indicated that there should be enough dugouts for all the troops assigned to defend the defensive position. Moreover, trenches were to have as many protected artillery observation posts as possible. he trench lines were to take advantage of the terrain to provide opportunities for lanking ire against advancing enemy troops. Moreover, the “autumn battle” had demonstrated clearly the importance of placing trenches in reverse slope positions, where they could not be directly overlooked from enemy lines. Each trench line, but especially the irst, should have deep—up to 30 meters—barbed wire zones to make enemy approach more diicult. he defense was also to use machine guns liberally, particularly for lanking ire. hese were to be in the front line in covered positions, though if necessary they could be deployed farther to the rear.17 Another crucial aspect of defense was artillery. he OHL issued an addendum to its instructions based directly on the lessons of the “autumn battle” that covered the importance of infantry/artillery cooperation in the defense. hese called for each 16. For an overview of this, see Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 52–64; and Samuels, Command or Control, 158–70. 17. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr. 7563r, “Gesichtspunkte für den Stellungskrieg,” October 1915, PHD7/1, BA/MA. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 475 ROBERT T. FOLEY German artillery in iring position, in Hans F. Helmont, Der Weltkrieg in Bildern und Dokumenten, 2 vols. (Leipzig: J. M. Meulenhof, 1915–16), 1:[63]. artillery battery to be assigned a particular sector of the front line. hese batteries were to work up a pre-planned barrage that could be called in by signal from the infantry in the front line when the enemy attacked. his short but intense barrage (termed Sperrfeuer) was designed to cause the maximum number of casualties on attackers while they were exposed in no man’s land. In addition, artillery was instructed to concentrate on enemy trenches, including rear trench lines and approach trenches, before and during the enemy attack to disrupt this attack as much as possible.18 Subsequent analysis of the “autumn battle” discovered that, to be efective, each battery should be given a Sperrfeuer zone of no more than 200 meters.19 Importantly for the battle of the Somme, the OHL’s new defensive instructions continued to emphasize holding the front line at all costs. Although the instructions stressed that defense in depth was “of the highest importance,” they also stated that “the depth of the defensive position should in no way interfere with holding the [irst] line irmly.” Defenders were required to fall back step by step if necessary, but they were to retake the front line, which was designated the “main battle line.” Rearward lines were there primarily to provide cover for reinforcement, though they clearly also ofered insurance against the front line being lost.20 18. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Nr. 17411, “Erfahrungen aus den letzten Kämpfen,” October 1915, PHD7/1, BA/MA. 19. Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia Nr. 290, “Erfahrungen aus den Septemberkämpfen bei der 6. und 3.Armee,” 5 November 1915, 20–21, Folder 19, Box 5371, Case 13-2, Record Group (RG) 120, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 20. Chef des Generalstabes, “Gesichtspunkte.” 476 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 he battle of Verdun ofered some important lessons for defensive tactics that modiied the October instructions. First, although the OHL still placed heavy emphasis on a forward defense, this was changing. In May, Falkenhayn sent a short report based on the lessons of the battle of Verdun that recognized a densely held front line could result in higher casualties. He wrote: “he more weakly a line under enemy preparatory ire can be held, the better.” Of course, if lost, the front line still needed to be retaken, so Falkenhayn also stressed the growing importance of immediate counterattacks (Gegenstöße), which were designed to hit the enemy before he had time to consolidate his gains. However, Falkenhayn also recognized that such attacks were not always successful. In these cases, he advocated a more deliberate counterattack with careful artillery preparation (Gegenangrif). Falkenhayn’s document shows that the German army was on its way to developing a distinction between rapidly launched Gegenstöße and more deliberately prepared Gegenangrife, as well as the beginnings of a lexible defense, even before the Somme battle.21 he Initial Attack he sector chosen by the Entente armies for their ofensive—a 40-kilometer section of the Western Front on either side of the Somme River—was defended by the 2nd Army, commanded by General of Infantry Fritz von Below with GeneralMajor Paul Grünert as his chief of staf. his command team, and most of the units of the 2nd Army, had been in place long enough to develop a sophisticated defensive system. By June 1916, the 2nd Army had constructed two defensive positions as required by the OHL instructions. Taking advantage of the high ground, the irst position generally overlooked the Entente lines. he geology of the region also helped: chalky soil allowed for easy construction of deep dugouts, and the 2nd Army built many of these. Moreover, they transformed villages in or near the front lines into veritable fortresses. Between the irst and second defensive positions, the 2nd Army constructed a number of strong points, built for all-around defense. he second position, 2,000 to 4,000 meters behind the irst, was not as well developed as the irst, and a third position had only just begun to be sketched out before the ofensive. However, as the irst position had been sited before the “autumn battle,” the importance of the reverse slope had not been recognized. Consequently, these trenches were largely placed on the forward slope, and were thus often in view of Entente observers. Moreover, the trenches tended to be closer together than the 100 to 150 meters recommended by the OHL.22 he deep defenses of the 2nd Army helped contain the initial Entente infantry assault on 1 July, which, despite the massive preparatory bombardment, met with 21. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Ia Nr. 27793, 12 May 1916, RH61/1145, BA/ MA. his was not yet the lexible defence in depth that would develop later in the war as suggested by Philpott, Bloody Victory, 165. 22. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, he Somme (London: Yale University Press, 2005), 37–39; Jack Sheldon, he German Army on the Somme, 1914–1916 (London: Pen & Sword, 2005), 110–13. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 477 ROBERT T. FOLEY Battles of the Somme, in he Story of the Great War, vol. 10 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1916), 2919. only limited success. It was in the south of the sector attacked that the British and French forces penetrated the German irst position. Around the villages of Mametz and Montauban and south of the Somme, the German irst position was not as well developed and not as well supported by artillery. here, French forces even managed to penetrate parts of the German second position. While the extraordinarily high cost to the attackers on 1 July is perhaps one of the best known aspects to the battle of the Somme, the cost to the German defenders had also been high: the XIV Reserve Corps north of the Somme reported 109 guns out of action, and south of 478 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 the river, the 121st Infantry Division lost almost all of its artillery when its positions were overrun by the French. Indeed, the 121st Division was so badly hit by the French attack that it needed immediate reinforcement by a reserve division and soon had to be withdrawn from the front line. To make matters worse, between Mametz and Hebrecourt, the German defenders had largely lost their well-constructed irst position and had been forced back into the poorly constructed second position. Lacking deep dugouts and protected artillery positions, here, German troops were even more exposed to the Entente artillery.23 By late afternoon on 2 July, the situation had become so critical in the 121st Division’s sector that the 2nd Army ordered that the second position be abandoned that evening and a stand taken in the third position just west of Peronne. he 2nd Army hoped that this would force the enemy to redeploy his artillery and buy the defenders some time to reestablish their position. When Falkenhayn learned of this on his arrival in the 2nd Army’s headquarters, he immediately rescinded the order. In doing so, he reinforced the German army’s prevalent doctrine of avoiding withdrawals at all costs. He stated: “he irst principle of position warfare must be not to surrender a foot of ground and when ground is lost to throw in even the last man in an immediate counter-attack.” Falkenhayn used the 2nd Army’s attempt to surrender ground as an excuse to remove its chief of staf, Paul Grünert, and replace him with Colonel Fritz von Loßberg, the German army’s foremost expert on defensive battle.24 he decision on 2 July to hold the front at all costs set the tone for the German defense on the Somme. Shortly after Falkenhayn’s visit, Below issued orders emphasizing the necessity of holding all ground. He wrote: Despite the current superiority of the enemy in infantry and artillery, we must win this battle. Large-scale loss of terrain, as we have sufered in certain places, will be wrested back through counter-attack from the enemy after the arrival of the coming reinforcement. At the moment, we must hold fast our current positions absolutely and improve these through small-scale counter-attacks. I forbid the voluntary withdrawal from positions. Every commander is responsible for ensuring that this solid will for battle is understood by every man in the army. he enemy must only be allowed to ind his way forward over our dead bodies.25 he 2nd Army would ight tooth and nail to maintain and, if necessary, win back its initial positions. When combined with Entente tactics based on heavy artillery preparation, this decision had important consequences for how the defensive battle 23. Albrecht von Stosch, Somme-Nord Bd. I: Die Brennpunkt der Schlacht im Juli 1916 (Schlachten des Weltkrieges Bd. 20) (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1928), 56–63. 24. Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd. X: Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel in der Obersten Heeresleitung (Berlin: Mittler, 1936), 352–55. 25. Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia Nr. 575, “Armeebefehl,” 3 July 1916, M33/2 Bü 24, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg—Hauptstaatsarchiv (HStA-Stuttgart), Stuttgart, Germany. See also Loßberg, Tätigkeit, 221. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 479 ROBERT T. FOLEY would be fought. First, despite a growing emphasis on holding forward positions with fewer men to reduce casualties, the requirement that the front line be held at all costs encouraged units to put more men into the front line to ensure its retention. Second, the requirement to retake lost positions promoted counterattacks, even if the situation did not warrant them. In such circumstances, unnecessary, and potentially high, casualties were diicult to avoid. Moreover, this defensive battle would be fought at a distinct disadvantage. he Entente naturally tried to exploit their initial success between Mametz and Hebrecourt, where the well-constructed German irst position had largely been taken. he defenders would have to ight from a position that was not complete. Continually pounded by enemy artillery, the existing trenches and the few dugouts were quickly destroyed, and the defenders were forced to ight from improvised positions for the remainder of the battle. Development of Command Structures and “Battle Management” If the OHL’s and the army’s emphasis on hold at all costs set the overall tone for the defense, how this mission was accomplished—defensive doctrine—was forced to develop quickly in the face of the realities of the battleield. It was in the area of higher command that the battle of the Somme ofered some of the most important lessons for the German army, and it was in this area that some of the most important changes occurred. Above all else, the battle of the Somme was a battle of material. Although it was not as long as the battle of Verdun, the battle of the Somme put greater pressure on the German army’s resources. Some statistics from the battle bear this out. During the course of the battle, the 1st Army used on average 90 to 100 tons of engineering material, such as cement, sand bags, and barbed wire, per day. Each day, the army also went through around 5,500 hand grenades and 10,000 lares. To keep the army supplied with such material, 120 to 150 train loads were required daily.26 his paled in comparison to the requirements of the artillery. On 1 July, the XIV Reserve Corps alone ired almost 120,000 artillery rounds, with a single ield gun battery iring over 4,600 rounds.27 he expenditure of artillery munitions grew steadily over the course of the battle: in July, the 1st and 2nd Armies ired more than 3,566,500 rounds; by September, this had risen to more than 5,417,000; and in October, a staggering 6,376,925 rounds were ired.28 Perhaps more importantly, from the battle’s start, manpower was a scarce resource for the German army. By the end of August, the size of the 1st and 2nd Armies had risen to 750,000.29 he intense and constant Entente artillery ire, combined with increasingly attritional 26. Armee-Oberkommando 1, “Erfahrungen der 1.Armee in der Sommeschlacht. Teil II: Verwaltungs- und Wirtschafts-Erfahrungen,” 9, RH61/2314, BA/MA. 27. XIV. Reservekorps, “Erfahrungen in der Somme-Schlacht,” 19 September 1916, 456 F7/849, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg—Generallandesarchiv (GLA), Karlsruhe, Germany. 28. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, “Munitionsverbrauch bei 1. und 2.Armeen,” July– December 1916, HGKPR/573 and HGKPR/574, HStA-KA. 29. Max von Gallwitz, Erleben im Westen 1916–1918 (Berlin: Mittler, 1932), 92. 480 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 German trenches on the Somme, in Armand v. Ardenne et al., Der Krieg 1914/19 in Wort und Bild, 3 vols. (Berlin: Bong and Co., 1919), 3:861. infantry tactics, took their toll on German troops. he high casualties meant that the battle had to be continually resupplied with units. In July alone, thirty-seven infantry divisions were or had been in the battle.30 By 19 July, it was clear that the battle had become too great for one army to control.31 herefore, Falkenhayn ordered that the battle zone be split between two armies and that an army group (Heeresgruppe) be formed to command the two new armies. A 1st Army was reformed and given command of the battle north of the Somme. his was placed under the command of Fritz von Below. Loßberg remained his chief of staf. General of Artillery Max von Gallwitz, who had previously commanded an attacking group in the battle of Verdun, took over command of the 2nd Army.32 He was supported by Colonel Bernard Bronsart von Schellendorf as his chief of staf. At the same time, Gallwitz was named commander of the new “Army Group Gallwitz” and given overall command of the battle.33 30. Compiled from Weltkrieg X, Anlage 3: Verzeichnis der vom 1.Juli bis Ende August auf dem Kampfelde eingesetzen Generalkommandos und Divisionen, ihrer Ablösungen, Verschiebungen und Verluste. 31. See Loßberg’s comments in Tätigkeit, 231. 32. Gallwitz’s appointment also led to the beginning of a certain cross-fertilization of lessons from the battle of Verdun with those of the Somme, which he saw as one of his most important tasks as army group commander. Gallwitz, Erleben, 93–94. 33. Weltkrieg X, 366; Gallwitz, Erleben, 59. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 481 ROBERT T. FOLEY With the supply of material becoming central to ighting on the Somme, the “battle management” aspect of command took on a much greater role for the higher commands than previously. Instead of taking tactical decisions that decided the battle, higher commands (corps, army, and army group) increasingly became focused on providing the forward units (divisions and below) with the material they needed to conduct their defense. As a consequence, divisional command became more important, and the division, as opposed to the prewar idea of the army corps, became the prime tactical unit by the battle’s end. Indeed, the battle of the Somme hastened the demise of the permanent connections between divisions and army corps and accelerated the transition to the division as the basic combat unit. In the war’s early years, the German army had tried hard to keep the peacetime structure of an army corps having two divisions permanently attached. While this could not always be maintained, the goal was always to restore the connection at a future date. For several reasons, the two-division army corps model could not continue during the battle. First, the defense in depth that developed on the Somme meant that a division might have a front of a kilometer. his would mean that a two-division army corps would have a front of two kilometers. In such circumstances, army corps stafs were unnecessary for every two divisions. Command, and with it the complex lines of supply, was more efectively maintained by one corps staf for many divisions. Second, the battle used up infantry at a prodigious rate. It was rare for divisions to last more than two weeks at the front before their infantry was reduced to the point that they could no longer hold the line. Of course, this rate was not consistent; some divisions were used up faster than others, depending on the combat in which they were engaged, the strength of their position, and so forth. It was more eicient to withdraw individual divisions when they became combat inefective than it was to withdraw an entire army corps.34 As the divisions rotated quickly in and out of the combat zone, many corps stafs (now termed Gruppe) stayed in place, giving continuity to the defense.35 hese commanders knew the battle conditions they faced and could communicate this to the newly arriving divisions. hese “permanent army corps commands” generally stayed in line for a month, though some stayed in place for most of the battle. he changing relationship between the corps and the division was not always welcomed, nor was it without its drawbacks. Despite an efective extension of their 34. Armee-Oberkommando 1, Ia Nr. 2122, “Erfahrungen der 1.Armee in der Sommeschlacht 1916. Teil I: Taktischer Teil,” 30 January 1917, 3–4, 456 F1/525, GLA-Karlsruhe. 35. Gruppen were formally established on 6 July, though even before this date the existing army corps had more than two divisions. Reichsarchiv to J. E. Edmonds, 14 September 1935, RH61/1762, BA/MA. here is no English equivalent of “Gruppe,” so I have translated these as “permanent army corps” to distinguish them from “army corps,” which continued to exist as a class of command and sometimes served under or alongside Gruppe in the battle. To make things all the more confusing for English-language readers, the term Gruppe was also used for the eight-to-tenman squads that made up platoons and for ad-hoc groupings of units at the battleield. 482 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 command responsibilities, many corps commanders resisted the change, seeing it as a reduction in their tactical authority.36 Moreover, divisions, with only one general staf oicer and a few adjutants, did not have the necessary numbers of staf to ight a complex battle, nor did the commanders and staf always have the proper training for their new role. Finally, a certain number of divisional commanders, especially those who had been brought back from retirement for the war, simply were “not up to the mental and physical demands of the Somme battle.”37 To make up for some of these deiciencies and to smooth the rapid turnover of divisions, Army Group Gallwitz instituted bodenständige Generalstabsoiziere (permanent general staf oicers) for each divisional sector of the front. hese oicers stayed in place for long periods of time and eased the transition between divisions. hey transmitted important knowledge to the arriving units, such as the local conditions at the front, the activities and locations of the enemy, and lessons from previous local engagements.38 A similar structure was put in place for the heavy artillery of the two armies. In July, all heavy artillery was concentrated under the command of a general of foot artillery for each permanent corps. Divisions were left in command only of their ield artillery, which eased their command and staf burden.39 After this date, while the ield artillery of the divisions rotated out of the line, the heavy artillery of the permanent corps and the armies stayed permanently. Heavy artillery units were attached to divisions or commanded directly by the permanent corps as necessary. To make more efective use of the heavy artillery, foot artillery regimental commanders were permanently assigned to each divisional sector.40 hese permanent stafs were so successful that permanent combat engineer commanders, as well as a permanent communications company, for each sector were established.41 With men being a resource like any other, the role of the army group increasingly became about managing the low of divisions in and out of the battle front. hus, 36. For example, see III.bayerische Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 16000, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,” 30 October 1916, 5, MKr/2924, HStA-KA. 37. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Ia Nr. 660, “Die Lage an der Somme,” 27 September 1916, HGKPR/234, HStA-KA. 38. Anonymous liaison oicer from Armee-Oberkommando 6, “Eindrücke an der Sommefront,” no date, but probably mid-August 1916, AOK 6, Bd. 21, HStA-KA; XXIII.Reservekorps, Ia Nr. 5592, “Bericht über die während der Somme-Schlacht gemachtem Erfahrungen,” 5 December 1916, 3–4, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 39. he divisional “ield artillery” was comprised of 7.7 cm ield cannon and 10.5 cm light ield howitzers. 40. Armee-Oberkommando 1, Ia/Art Nr 35, “Armeebefehl für die Neugliederung der Artillerie,” 21 July 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. Also, Generalleutnant a.D. Beeg, “Bay. General der Fußartillerie Nr. 2: Tätigkeit des Stabes während der Sommeschlacht,” in Die K. B. Schwere Artillerie im Großen Kriege 1914–1918 (Munich: Max Schick, 1928), 41–42. Beeg was the General der Artillerie for AOK 2 until 19 July, after which time he performed the same role for the newly formed AOK 1. 41. AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 16 and 29. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 483 ROBERT T. FOLEY one of the key lessons of the battle of the Somme was how to use reserves more efectively. When the battle broke out, the German army was left scrambling to pull together reserves to send to the battleield. he result was often units cobbled together from anything other armies felt they could spare. One such unit was Division Frentz, and its experience is a good example of the challenges of using reserves in the battle of the Somme. his unit was formed only on 26 June. Its eight infantry battalions came from seven diferent regiments. he division’s ad-hoc infantry regiments were simply numbered “one, two and three.” On 1 July, the units of the division were thrown piecemeal into the battle: Its artillery was Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, placed under the command of the 121st from Armand v. Ardenne et al., Der Division. Its combat engineering company Krieg 1914/19 in Wort und Bild, 3 vols. was put at the disposal of the XVII Army (Berlin: Bong und Co., 1919), 1:35. Corps. he staf of Infantry Regiment 2 and one of its battalions were assigned to the 11th Division. he two remaining battalions of this regiment were given to the 121st Division. he staf of Division Frentz was left with only four battalions and a battery of ield artillery under its command. As new units arrived on the battleield, such as the 2nd Battalion, Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 22, the divisional staf provided some command and control. In the evening of 1 July, the division’s four remaining battalions were thrown into the line around Biaches and Barleux, and the division was placed under the command of the 121st Division. Two days later, Division Frentz was ordered to take over from the 121st Division, which had sufered high casualties and was to be withdrawn. All of Division Frentz’s units, along with some artillery reinforcement, were inally uniied on the battleield. he problem with this was that Division Frentz had no communications units. hese had to be withdrawn from elsewhere on the 2nd Army’s front to provide the division with communications capability.42 While Division Frentz’s experience was perhaps extreme, all too often during the battle units were broken up and thrown piecemeal into the front line. Regiments were detached from divisions, and battalions were detached from regiments and were used to reinforce threatened areas of the front. As we have seen, artillery in particular was separated from its parent unit and usually stayed in place much longer than its division. An efort was made to reunite these disparate 42. Division Frentz, “Bericht über die Kämpfe der zusammengesetzten Division Frentz an der Somme vom 30.6.–9.7.1916,” 9 July 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 484 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 units, but frequently units had to ight under the command of unknown oicers. he III Bavarian Reserve Corps was indicative of the feeling of most units about this practice when it wrote: “mixing units is from the start a recipe for failure, since they do not have their usual commanders. Outside commanders, who do not know the subordinates, increase the diiculties of command and issuing orders.”43 If the battle of the Somme had proved that individual armies did not have the resources to ight major, long-lasting defensive battles, it also showed that an army group made up of only two armies also lacked the necessary resources. Repeatedly, Army Group Gallwitz had to go cap in hand to the OHL for more divisions, aircraft, and artillery. In turn, the OHL had to strip other armies on the Western Front of these resources, giving them exhausted, fought-out units in return.44 Accordingly, a larger army group under the command of the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht, previously commander of the 6th Army, was formed on 28 August. General-Lieutenant Hermann von Kuhl remained his chief of staf. he new “Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht” was comprised not only of the 1st and 2nd Armies, but also of the 6th Army and, from 29 August, the 7th Army. he orders for this new unit stated: Command extends over operational and tactical afairs, as well as the personnel matters related to this. herefore, troop movements from one army to another . . . lie completely within the authority of the army group command.45 he battle had also shown that “dual-hatted” commands did not work well. Gallwitz, who had been commander of both the 2nd Army and Army Group Gallwitz, later wrote of balancing the demands of the situation: he twin position of neighbor and superior is not a comfortable one. I believe I did not interfere improperly in the internal afairs of the other army, but also understood that this charge did not always set easy with them given the development of the chain of command.46 Accordingly, the new army group was a separate organization; Rupprecht gave up command of the 6th Army when the new command was formed. hus, Rupprecht and Kuhl were free to command the four armies under them unencumbered by the pressures of commanding a separate army as well.47 43. III.b.AK, “Erfahrungen,” 2. 44. Falkenhayn feared the weakening of the rest of the army this entailed. Weltkrieg X, 418; Loßberg, Tätigkeit, 237–38. 45. OHL to Armee-Oberkommando 6, Nr. 33501, 26 August 1916, HGKPR/362, HStAKA. 46. Gallwitz, Erleben, 93. See also Rupprecht’s diary entry for 26 August 1916, in Kronprinz Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch, ed. Eugen von Frauenholz, 3 vols. (Munich: Deutscher National Verlag, 1929), 1:523. 47. Indeed, the new “Erster Generalquartiermeister” Ludendorf said to Kuhl that he would have liked to have given Rupprecht and Kuhl command over the entire Western Front, but that it would have been too diicult to subordinate the German Crown Prince Wilhelm to the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. Hermann von Kuhl, diary entry for 8 September 1916, “Kriegstagebuch,” W10/50652, BA/MA. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 485 ROBERT T. FOLEY he new army group took over a diicult position. he 1st and 2nd Armies had sufered some 185,000 casualties between 24 June and 28 August,48 and a division needed to be rotated out of the front line every day.49 Moreover, the armies sufered from a growing shortage of artillery munitions. On 3 September, there were available only 250 rounds per ield gun, 150 rounds per heavy ield howitzer, and 50 rounds per 21 cm “mortar.”50 he situation was not helped by chaotic rotation of units in and out of the front. his caused considerable stress on units, as some were left in the front for too long.51 Rupprecht and Kuhl saw bringing some order to the rotation of units as one of their irst priorities. In the army group’s lessons-learned report, they wrote: he experience of the battle of the Somme has demonstrated that divisions cannot hold out for more than around 14 days in such diicult combat. he efect of overwhelming enemy artillery ire, existing in the shell holes, not enough rations, the stench of corpses, and all the other diiculties of a lengthy battle quickly consume the nerves of leaders and men. he strength of their nerves has limits. If units are kept in line longer than their strength allows, then even the best units fail.52 Even with the resources of four armies, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht struggled to institute a manageable divisional rotation scheme. hough the army group tried hard to build a reserve with which they could rotate fought-out divisions, Entente pressure meant that every available unit was quickly used up. With a shortage of divisions across the Western Front, the army group was forced to keep its divisions in line longer than two weeks. Of course, British and French divisions sufered high casualties too, but they had the spare divisions to maintain the pace of the ofensive. On 27 September, the army group wrote to the OHL: Between the Ancre and the Somme at the moment, 11 German divisions are facing about 9 French and 13 English divisions . . . hey relieve their divisions in good time before they are completely exhausted and introduce new divisions where they intend the next attack. hus, they are superior to us in strength [Gefechtskraft], since they have a considerably larger number of divisions available than us . . . hey are in the position to give their fought-out divisions time to rest and train before they are re-deployed. he army group complained that its units had no time for rest or retraining since immediately on being removed from the battle line, they were assigned to another part of the front. his part might not be under enemy attack, but it still needed to be held; given 48. Rupprecht, diary entry for 2 September 1916, Kriegstagebuch, 2:4. 49. Weltkrieg XI, 11. 50. Rupprecht, diary entry for 3 September 1916, Kriegstagebuch, 2:8. 51. Kuhl, diary entry for 8 September 1916, “Kriegstagebuch.” 52. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Iab Nr. 2222, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für die Heeres-Gruppen-Führung,” 10 February 1917, 2, 456 F1/521, GLAKarlsruhe. 486 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 the requirements of the Somme, the average divisional front on the rest of the Western Front had increased greatly. All this meant that units back in the battle for the second or even third time were worn out at a faster rate than fresh divisions. he army group wrote: “In this battle, which has exceeded all earlier battles in its violence, some divisions fail in the face of large-scale attacks in a surprisingly short time.”53 Development of Defensive Doctrine Overwhelming material superiority enabled the Entente forces to use their artillery to lay waste to the German defenses, as the heavy Anglo-French artillery ire quickly leveled German trenches and obstacles. Lessons-learned reports written by units soon after they left the battle front noted that even the best constructed trenches would not withstand more than a few days’ worth of heavy artillery ire. Indeed, many noted that by late in the battle, trenches had become a hindrance to movement and ofered little in the way of protection.54 As Entente artillery ire ranged across the depth of the defensive system, troops felt the open terrain was often safer than the trenches.55 By the end of July, the sectors of the front under constant enemy attack had become wastelands—German trenches had all but ceased to exist. In their place were loose positions based on shell holes, which became known as shell-hole positions (Trichterstellungen).56 Although shell-hole positions made tactical command and control more diicult, their advantages clearly outweighed their disadvantages, and most units attested to their efectiveness. For example, the 113th Infantry Division wrote that its infantry sufered “only limited” casualties when in shell holes even under the heaviest enemy artillery ire. he division wrote that there was an added advantage to shell-hole positions: troops could not “grovel” in deep dugouts and be surprised by the enemy attack.57 he Bavarian Ersatz Division noted that its troops preferred shell-hole positions to trenches and that they could be made to dig trenches only with great diiculty.58 As the battle progressed, shell-hole positions allowed German units to ight a diferent type of battle from that envisioned in existing doctrine. Indeed, at times, the battle had become much more mobile.59 he 3rd Battalion, Infantry Regiment 53. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, “Lage an der Somme,” 27 September 1916. 54. II.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 65, “Bericht über die in der Zeit vom 8.–18. September gemachten Erfahrungen des II.Batls. I.R.65 in den Kämpfen an der Somme,” 6 October 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 55. Ibid. 56. For an evocative description of the battleield, see Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv, Die Bayern im Großen Kriege 1914–1918, 2d ed. (Munich: Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv, 1923), 279. 57. 113.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 660, “Erfahrungen aus den Kämpfen an der Somme,” 4 November 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. 58. Bayerische Ersatz-Division, “Bericht über die Erfahrung in der Somme-Schlacht,” 26 November 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 59. he III Bavarian Army Corps went so far as to describe the battle as “more like Bewegungskrieg than Stellungskrieg.” III.b.AK, “Erfahrungen,” 1. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 487 ROBERT T. FOLEY 27 described how its troops would be withdrawn from the foremost shell-hole position during the heaviest enemy bombardment to shell holes 50 to 100 meters behind the front line to avoid the worst efects of this ire. Each squad was given a particular section of the foremost line it was to re-occupy once the enemy infantry assault was launched. hese squads were not to wait for orders to do so, but were to move forward as soon as the enemy infantry was apparent or as soon as the heaviest artillery ire moved farther to the rear.60 Despite its ability to reduce casualties, not all units believed that holding shell-hole positions should be encouraged. he 214th Infantry Division had a range of objections: In shell-hole positions, the real position of the front line was never known. his made artillery support more diicult, as the German artillery had problems knowing where to place its barrages. Moreover, it was too easy for units to lose touch with other units on their lanks, and this made it easier for the enemy to break into the German position. According to the division, shell-hole positions also made reliefs of frontline units more diicult. Perhaps most tellingly, the division objected to the loss of control shell-hole positions imposed and the breakdown this signaled in the old methods of command, writing “only in trenches can the company and platoon leaders maintain inluence over their people.”61 While most units believed shell-hole positions were useful, opinion was more divided on the signiicance of the deep dugouts (Stollen) that had formed a key element in German defensive thinking before the battle. Some units, like the 113th Infantry Division quoted above, felt that the deep dugouts encouraged troops to play a passive role in defense. Indeed, this viewpoint was supported by the number of German troops being taken prisoner or killed in their deep dugouts before they could get out to meet the coming enemy attack. However, other units believed the cover provided by such positions to be essential to defense. For example, the 27th Infantry Division insisted that deep dugouts were the key to successful defense. he division wrote: Guillemont was held because the garrison and machineguns could shelter from even the heaviest artillery ire in deep dug-outs. he Sperrfeuer of our artillery could also happen quickly because the garrison had found cover from enemy artillery in deep dug-outs. he construction of artillery-proof dug-outs for infantry, MGs [machine guns] and artillery observers is the fundamental requirement of an efective defence. Everything else is of secondary importance.62 60. III.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 27, “Bericht: Erfahrungen aus dem Stellungskrieg,” 30 November 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 61. 214.Infantrie-Division, Ib Nr. 2391, “Erfahrungen in der Somme-Schlacht,” 30 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. See also, AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 10–11. 62. 27.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen an der Somme über Verteidigungskampf und Stellungsbau,” 3 September 1916, M33/2 Bü 308, HStA-Stuttgart, Emphasis in the original. See also III.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 27, “Bericht: Erfahrungen aus dem Stellungskrieg”; and 16.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 5750, “Bericht über die Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,” 11 September 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 488 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 Regardless of opinion on the use of shell-hole positions and deep dugouts, the heavy artillery ire and the impact this had on the trenches, particularly of the foremost line, forced German units to embrace a new defense in depth. As the battle progressed, it became clear that units should have smaller fronts, but considerably more depth, than called for in existing regulations. An ideal deployment, rarely met given the requirements of the battle, for a three-regiment division would be two regiments in the front line, with the third held back as divisional reserve, giving a division a front of 800 to 1,000 meters. More often, each regiment was deployed in the front line.63 A regiment of three battalions would have a front of 400 to 500 meters: One battalion would be in the front line (Kampfbataillon), another would be behind it as immediate reserve (Bereitschaftsbataillon), and a third would be farther behind resting in reserve (Ruhebataillon).64 Indeed, each company would also be deployed in depth, with only a light screen in the front line. Preferably, reserves behind the thinly held front line would shelter in deep dugouts or other secure areas, ready to emerge when the worst of the enemy’s ire had passed. Further, the reserve battalion would be far enough back that it was out of range of all but the longest-range enemy artillery. Reports constantly stressed the importance of having at least one battalion out of constant enemy artillery ire. It was felt that this was necessary to give troops a break from the battle and would enable units to remain longer in the battle line.65 he practice of defense in depth was more problematic than the theory. First, the irst German position often lacked the necessary protection for the troops behind the forward trench line. As the battle progressed, dugouts were either destroyed or captured, and the heavy Entente artillery ire made digging new dugouts diicult. he report of the 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division, which “failed” in early September in the face of a French attack near Bouchavesnes,66 wrote: What is marked on the maps as R1, IV and V Positions was really nothing more than a few lines of trenches sketched into the terrain about 1,500 meters apart. he lack of obstacles, the lack of depth to the position (a second line) and the deiciency in dug-outs, particularly for the immediate reserve and the storm detachment, was felt greatly. Cover in the destroyed and incomplete battle line was limited and remained thus, despite attempts at improvements. 63. Armee-Oberkommando 1 to Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, Ia Nr. 934, 26 September 1916; and Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, “Lage an der Somme,” 27 September 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. he army group complained in this report that the divisional sectors were still too wide and consequently divisions were unable to ight a defence in depth. 64. AOK 6, “Eindrücke an der Sommefront”; XXVI.Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 2/24.10, “Erfahrungen in der Sommeschlacht. Richtlinien für zukünftige derartige Kämpfe,” 24 October 1916, 7, 456 F1/521, GLA-Karlsruhe. 65. For example, 28.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 10/16, “Erfahrungen an der Somme,” 16 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 66. Loßberg, Tätigkeit, 152. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 489 ROBERT T. FOLEY he single, parallel trenches were easily seen by aircraft and were immediately and systematically attacked by artillery and were leveled.67 he lack of communications trenches also meant that approaching the forward line was dangerous. Given such conditions, casualties and the risk of Entente breakthrough remained high. As forward lines became more permeable, the defensive battle became more about dealing with enemy break-ins. his increased the importance of rapid Gegenstöße. hese immediate counterattacks hit the enemy when he was still exhausted from the initial assault and before he had time to consolidate his position. hey could lead to some spectacular successes. he 22nd Reserve Division reported on the only Gegenstoß its units carried out between 1 and 10 July. his was launched by a lieutenant and a single man, who carried out a hand grenade attack against the lanks of a French unit that had broken into the German position. hey quickly took 147 French prisoners and freed a number of German prisoners. With the help of a captured French machine gun, this group was able to reestablish the German front line and hold of subsequent French attacks.68 However, not all units had the necessary training to carry out these types of attacks. A number of failed large-scale counterattacks (Gegenangrife) to retake lost positions around Maisonnette Ferme and Estrées in late July prompted Gallwitz to issue instructions about the diference between the two types of counterattack and when they were to be applied: I. If the enemy has penetrated part of our position a Gegenstoß on the lanks, coming quickly from the decision of a subordinate leader, ofers every prospect of success. Every subordinate leader must be educated in this and keep back enough reserves. II. If for some reason the immediate Gegenstoß is not successful, then a planned and carefully prepared Gegenangrif leads to success. he requirements and the preparations must be checked by the higher command and if necessary altered.69 Gallwitz went on to outline the elements of a successful Gegenangrif, which included careful reconnaissance of the enemy position, the employment of special “storm units” along with the normal infantry, clear attack goals, and careful artillery preparation. Given the costliness of such attacks, however, Gallwitz ordered that only “lost tactically important points” should be retaken by such prepared attacks.70 67. 53.(Sächs.) Reserve-Division, I Nr. 2130/X, “Erfahrungen der 53. Res.-Div. in der Somme-Schlacht,” 29 October 1916, 14.b.ID, Bd. 11, HStA-KA. 68. 22.Reserve-Division, Ia Nr. 2839, “Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,” 2 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 69. Heeresgruppe Gallwitz, Ia Nr. 115, 27 July 1916, M33/2/25, HStA-Stuttgart. 70. Quoted in Weltkrieg X, 369. 490 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 Even with Gallwitz’s orders, the distinction between the two types of attacks remained vague to many units—units rotated in and out of the battle quickly and were not always given time to learn the relevant lessons before their deployment. he 208th Infantry Division noted in its report: he diference between Gegenstoß und Gegenangrif has not yet settled enough in the consciousness of the troops. he actual Gegenstoß must come from the troops (squad or platoon leader). he commanders who must evaluate such a Gegenstoß are the company and battalion commanders. . . . All higher commanders must stay out of the decisionmaking. heir orders only relate to Gegenangrif. Training for subordinate commanders in independent Gegenstoß has not yet made enough progress.71 Friedrich Sixt von Arnim, at the time commander of the IV Army Corps, noted that this lack of clarity had sometimes led to Gegenangrife being carried out without the necessary preparations, and when these ill-prepared operations failed, they cost not only unnecessary casualties but also a certain loss of trust between German troops and their commanders.72 he new form of battle also made tactical reserves more important than hitherto had been the case. As we have seen, the defense in depth relied on reserves being available at all levels of command from company to division.73 As the enemy broke into the German position, troops would rush forward to deal with the situation. he report of the 214th Infantry Division summed up the new tactics: the irst line of the irst position can only be held if reserves stand close behind it, which launch a Gegenstoß from the rear without orders at the moment the enemy infantry assault begins. his tactic allows the irst line to be held with only a weak garrison. A strong garrison does not increase the ability of the irst line to resist, but rather merely increases losses. Only enough riles and machine guns should be kept in the irst line to prevent the enemy from seizing it without ire preparation by surprise.74 he need for immediate counterattacks combined with a defense in depth increased the importance of small-unit leaders within the German army.75 All 71. 208.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,” 10 December 1916, 456 F7/849, GLA-Karlsruhe. 72. IV.Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 1357, “Erfahrungen des IV.A.K. aus der Somme-Schlacht im Juli 1916,” 22 August 1916, 7, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 73. 12.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 1691/I.16, “Erfahrungen der 12.Inf.-Division aus den Kämpfen an der Somme vom 12.11.–18.11.16,” 4 December 1916, 456 F7/849, GLAKarlsruhe. 74. 214.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen.” 75. he term Kampftruppenkommandeur used by Wynne and Samuels to describe forward battalion command does not seem to have yet been coined during the battle of the Somme, as it appears in none of the Erfahrungsberichte or army orders. See Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 84; and Samuels, Command or Control, 176. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 491 ROBERT T. FOLEY reports stressed the need for squad and platoon leaders to take the initiative in launching Gegenstöße. he demands of the battleield meant that these leaders simply could not aford to wait for orders from above. hey had to take rapid decisions and action if there was going to be any prospect of containing enemy break-ins. his was a major departure from earlier doctrine, which had the company as the basic tactical unit, and the new responsibilities fell on very junior leaders, who had had little previous training for this role. To meet the need for reserves to carry out the counterattacks, companies began forming their troops into four platoons, rather than the standard three.76 he fourth platoon would generally be made up of combat veterans and junior leaders, who could be trusted to operate without orders from above.77 Indeed, units at all levels began forming “storm units,” an innovation brought from the battle of Verdun.78 hese were permanent or semi-permanent all-arms units made up of the most reliable and experienced men.79 Varying in size from unit to unit, their task nonetheless remained the same—to carry out the most challenging ofensive missions.80 As the battle wore on, special training was developed to pass on the lessons of these elite units across the German army. he new storm units were not always popular with regular units—there was a feeling that storm units took the best men out of frontline units, where they were most needed. he XIX Army Corps dismissed this fear, noting how efective storm units could be in counterattacks. hey also noted that the very elite nature of storm units spurred on the rest of the infantry to do better, writing that the feeling amongst the ordinary infantry was “if these guys can do it, so can we.”81 All-Arms Cooperation If the battle of the Somme was primarily a Materialschlacht, it certainly demonstrated the superiority of Entente forces at ighting an all-arms battle and showed that the German army had much to learn on this front. In particular, the battle showed how much further the Entente had progressed in using airpower to 76. AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 8; 5.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 271, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht für den Verteidigungskampf und den Stellungsausbau,” 27 September 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 77. 113.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen.” 78. Gallwitz, Erleben, 69. 79. A good example of this is the 10th Reserve Division, which built a Sturmkompanie of three platoons of ifty rilemen and sixteen combat engineers from each of the division’s regiments. hese platoons were assigned to the regiments as Stosstrupps (storm troops) during battle and acted as a training unit in quieter times. 10.Reserve-Division, Ia Nr. 661, “Kampfwert,” 10 February 1917, XV.bay.RK, Bd. 219, HStA-KA. 80. On the development of stormtroop units and tactics, see Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York: Praeger, 1989); and Hellmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der deutschen Sturmbataillone im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1938). 81. XIX.Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 3232, “Erfahrungen des XIX. A.K. aus der Somme-Schlacht im Oktober–November 1916,” 15 November 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. 492 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 support their ground forces. With far greater numbers, British and French aircraft dominated the skies above the Somme for most of the battle.82 his allowed them to observe everything that went on behind the German front line. Once again, the old adage “if it can be seen, it can be destroyed,” came to the fore, as Entente aircraft spotted for their artillery. Writing of its time in the front line in early July, the 22nd Reserve Division noted: Enemy aircraft possessed unlimited command of the air. With extraordinary daring, they overlew our infantry and artillery positions at very low heights (200 to 300 meters), in all weather, even rain, taking no notice of infantry ire, took their photographs, and directed the ire of their artillery.83 Even with reinforcement, German aircraft were not able to prevent Entente aircraft from taking an active and important role in the battle. Indeed, Entente aircraft not only observed for artillery, but they also increasingly conducted attacks of their own against targets on the ground. he 16th Infantry Division, which was in the line in late August, wrote: Cooperation between the English aircraft and their infantry and artillery was exemplary. he English aircraft not only directed the artillery ire on discovered batteries, dug-outs, and occupied trenches, they killed any personnel who showed themselves in the trenches with aimed machinegun ire and threw bombs and hand grenades at batteries and dug-outs from low levels.84 It was this cooperation between the Entente air and artillery that forced the radical changes to German defensive doctrine—defense in depth, the adoption of shellhole positions, and so forth—described above. “Our airman have failed us completely.”85 his statement by the 1st Battalion, Infantry Regiment 29 sums up the feelings of many of the German units that served on the Somme. In part, this failure was due to the numerical superiority of the Entente aircraft. Although the diference was never the ten to one claimed by the 1st Army, the ratio was still very much in the favor of the Entente.86 On 1 July, 109 German aircraft faced 310 Entente. Although the 1st and 2nd Armies 82. Georg P. Neumann, Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 473. Given the importance of Entente airpower in the battle, particularly its contribution to the all-arms battle, the subject has received surprisingly little attention from historians. he British oicial history of the air war remains useful: H. A. Jones, he War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 203f.; and Peter Hart, Somme Success: he Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme, 1916 (London: Pen & Sword, 2001), provides a more recent interpretation of the air war from the British perspective. 83. 22.Reserve-Division,”Erfahrungen,” 16. 84. 16.Infantrie-Division, I Nr. 5750, “Bericht über die Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,” 11 September 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 85. I.Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 29, “Erfahrungen und Beobachtungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,” 17 September 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 86. AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 30. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 493 ROBERT T. FOLEY received reinforcement over the course of the battle, the Entente also reinforced their armies. By early August, the 1st and 2nd Armies had some 250 aircraft. However, the number of Entente aircraft had also risen to at least 500.87 If a numerical inferiority was not enough, German aircraft were also technically inferior to many of the Entente models,88 and many of the German pilots lacked the necessary experience to perform the challenging tasks demanded of them.89 he German inferiority in the air had a major impact on how the defensive battle could be fought. Entente air superiority enabled them to use aircraft to spot for their artillery. his spotting took the form of directly spotting artillery ire, but also in air reconnaissance through photographs of the German positions. heir superiority also enabled the Entente to see deep behind German lines. he Germans struggled to do any of these tasks well. As reinforcement arrived, the 1st and 2nd Armies were forced to push many of these down to divisions to enable them to hold the line. Each division was assigned an “air detachment” of six aircraft to carry out close reconnaissance and to spot for the divisional artillery. Longerrange reconnaissance was meant to be conducted by aircraft of the permanent army corps and the armies, but with few available aircraft, and these needed desperately by the divisions, this was often diicult.90 Another area of shortage was in ighter aircraft. he year 1916 was one of transition for the German air force. he battle of Verdun had seen the irst serious use of Kamplieger, as they were then known, to attempt to gain control of the air. hese fast and highly maneuverable, usually single-seat, aircraft were designed to shoot down enemy reconnaissance aircraft and enemy spotting balloons.91 he Entente had witnessed the success of this and had also invested considerable resources into producing large numbers of such aircraft in time for the battle of the Somme. he German air force initially had no real counter to this. It was only when signiicant resources were taken away from Verdun that the German ighter aircraft could mount a serious challenge to the Entente over the Somme.92 With only limited aerial spotting capability, the German artillery struggled to conduct a meaningful counterbattery campaign during the battle. In theory, this task should have fallen to the permanent army corps. hese units had the necessary reconnaissance assets and survey detachments, both of which were required to plot 87. Weltkrieg X, 349 and 375. 88. Neumann, Luftstreitkräfte, 472. 89. Erich von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft: Ein Rückblick auf die Entwicklung und die Leistung unserer Heeres-Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1921), 71–76. he lack of an oicial history of the German air force in the war makes reconstructing the war in the air from the German perspective diicult. 90. Weltkrieg X, 359 and 385–86. 91. Hermann Cron, Das deutsche Heer im Weltkriege (Berlin: Karl Siegismund, 1937), 205. 92. See Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia Nr. 627, “Erfahrungen über Angrif und Verteidigung im Stellungskriege,” 22 September 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. his report stressed that “airmen must work more closely with the infantry and stop seeing themselves as a special weapon.” 494 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 the locations of enemy guns, as well as command of the required heavy artillery. However, as we have seen, a lack of aircraft meant that permanent army corps often did not have enough planes to locate enemy iring positions systematically. Moreover, shortages in artillery pieces and munitions meant that counterbattery work took a back seat to providing the necessary Sperrfeuer to protect the front lines. Indeed, one permanent army corps artillery advisor dismissed the idea that German heavy artillery should dedicate more of its time to counterbattery ire. He noted that the requirements in munitions for such a task were very great, as was the time required to knock out an enemy battery. He also pointed out that “often, our batteries have reported receiving 1,000 to 2,000 [enemy] rounds in the space of a few hours. Despite this, the result was usually not more than the loss of a few casualties and a few guns.”93 he 2nd Army calculated that at least 100 21 cm rounds or 150 to 200 15 cm rounds would be required to counter a single enemy battery efectively, and this could only be accomplished using air observation.94 Indeed, despite heavy reinforcement, the 1st and 2nd Armies continued to sufer from a shortage of artillery and munitions throughout the battle. Before the battle, experience had shown that a ield artillery battery should be available for every 200 meters of front to provide the necessary Sperrfeuer. When Ludwig Lauter, the General of Foot Artillery of the OHL, visited the 1st and 2nd Armies in early September, he found massive diferences in this distance. In the 1st Army, the Sperrfeuer sectors of batteries ranged from 175 to 550 meters.95 he 2nd Army’s ranged from 240 to 500 meters.96 He also found that gun losses could reach 25 percent every day.97 he army group simply did not have the facilities to make good these losses.98 Between 26 June and the end of August, the 1st and 2nd Armies lost 1,068 out of 1,208 ield artillery pieces deployed and 371 of 820 heavy artillery pieces deployed.99 For frontline units, this was a serious shortfall. he 16th Infantry Division, for example, lacked between a quarter and a third of its establishment of artillery at any one time during its time in the battle.100 Facing such heavy losses, the heavy artillery was forced to take a greater part in the Sperrfeuer than was optimum, meaning that it could not conduct counterbattery work. 93. Bayerische General der Fussartillerie Nr. 4 (Oberst Rosenberg), “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,” 29 September 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. For similar comments, see report of Major Spillecke (commander of II/b.Res.Fußa.Rgt Nr. 3), “Erfahrungen im Stellungskrieg,” 2 December 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. 94. Armee-Oberkommando 2, Ia/Gen.d.Art. Nr. 924, “Artl. Schiessen mit Fliegerbeobachtung,” 1 August 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 95. Otto Muths, “Die schwere Artillerie in der Somme-Schlacht (II.Teil),” unpublished manuscript, 9, RH61/1766, BA/MA. 96. General von der Fußartillerie des Großen Hauptquartiers, “Die artilleristische Verhältnisse bei der 2.Armee,” 30 September 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 97. Muths, “Schwere Artillerie,” 8. 98. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, “Lage an der Somme,” 27 September 1916. 99. Gallwitz, Erleben, 95. 100. 16.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen.” MILITARY HISTORY ★ 495 ROBERT T. FOLEY he heavy losses of artillery were due only in part to Entente counterbattery ire. he biggest cause was wear and tear on the barrels and poorly constructed munitions with primitive fuses.101 Repeated iring not only made guns less accurate by wearing out the bore, but also weakened the barrel.102 When this was combined with the poor quality of steel and the primitive fuses used in many German projectiles in 1916, the result was often disaster—a barrel explosion that rendered the gun useless.103 Although no statistics on the artillery of the 1st and 2nd Armies on the Somme have survived, statistics gathered on the artillery of the 5th Army’s attack on Verdun show the efects of heavy usage with poor munitions. Between 12 February and 26 May 1916, a staggering 26 percent of the Army’s heavy artillery and 57.3 percent of its ield artillery were lost to barrel detonations.104 he division of the ield and the heavy artillery instituted by Army Group Gallwitz in July did not prove particularly popular amongst the units that fought on the Somme. he complicated artillery command structure put in place early in the battle clearly did not work as intended. Many units complained that the division made the artillery less responsive to immediate demands and less able to support the front. here was a general consensus that divisions needed their own heavy artillery. he I Bavarian Reserve Corps spoke for most when it wrote: “he separation of command—ield artillery under the divisional commander and the heavy artillery under the general of foot artillery of the army corps—made more diicult the direction of the artillery in its rapidly changing positions and in its diferent tasks.” he corps concluded that “the organization of all the artillery must match that of the infantry in its sector. herefore, the ield artillery and the bulk of the heavy artillery must be assigned to the division and completely subordinate to the divisional commander.”105 By late September, this complicated artillery command structure had begun to change. From this point, both the ield and the heavy artillery were normally subordinated to an artillery commander embedded within the frontline division. 101. In late 1916, the Germans introduced new mechanical safety fuses, which helped reduce burst tubes in their ield cannons from every 5,000 to 6,000 rounds to every 30,000 to 40,000 rounds. Alfred Muther, “Organization, Armament, Ammunition and Ammunition Expenditure of the German Field Artillery during the World War,” Field Artillery Journal, July– August 1935, 311. 102. he practice of leaving many guns in place and merely relieving their crews could not have helped limit wear and tear on barrels. See Otto von Moser, Feldzugsaufzeichnungen als Brigade-, Divisionskommandeur und als kommandierender General 1914–1918, 2d ed. (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser, 1923), 210. 103. On the poor quality of the construction of many German artillery projectiles, see Ernst von Wrisberg, Wehr und Wafen 1914–1918 (Leipzig: Koehler, 1922), 89–90. 104. Hermann Schirmer, Das Gerät der schweren Artillerie vor, in und nach dem Weltkrieg (Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1937), 285. 105. I. Bayerisches Reserve-Korps, Ia Nr. 2351, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht im August/September 1916, 18 September 1916, 5, 456 F1/527, GLA-Karlsruhe. See also XIX. (2.K.S.) Armeekorps, Ia Nr. 2877, “Erfahrungen des XIX.A.K. aus der Somme-Schlacht im August 1916,” 1 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 496 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 However, given that divisions, and their ield artillery, continued to rotate rapidly in and out of the battle line, commanders of the heavy artillery were kept in place for long periods to serve as “advisors” to the divisional artillery commanders. he permanent army corps, however, still kept control over some specialist guns. Within the divisions, the artillery was divided into two groups—one for the battle against the enemy infantry and mortars (Kampfgruppen) and the other designed to deal with the enemy artillery (Sondergruppen).106 he Kampfgruppen were generally assigned a speciic sector of the front corresponding roughly to an infantry regiment’s sector.107 Indeed, tying a Kampfgruppe to an infantry regiment’s sector went some way to increasing cooperation between the artillery and the infantry, which was generally felt to be poor. German infantry complained bitterly about poor Sperrfeuer. Infantry units believed it often came too late and was not heavy enough, and rounds often fell short onto German positions.108 he resentment felt by the frontline soldiers toward their own sister arms can be seen in graiti that was common in German dugouts during the battle: “God strike down England, our artillery, and our aircraft.”109 Once again, the poor cooperation between German artillery and infantry could be traced to the efects of enemy artillery ire. With telephone lines cut and command and observation posts destroyed or forced to move, there was often command chaos within the German lines. One battery of Field Artillery Regiment 185 captured this well in its report: Cooperation between the infantry and the artillery did not succeed as required, even during the enemy preparatory ire. his is due in the irst instance to the heavy enemy artillery ire, which reached too far behind our lines and destroyed the telephone lines between the infantry and artillery commanders and which delayed runners so that they arrived too late. Further, frequent changes in commands and units and frequent changes in the command posts of the commanders [did not help].110 106. General von der Fußartillerie des Großen Hauptquartiers, “Die artilleristische Verhältnisse bei der 2.Armee,” 30 September 1916. here remained considerable debate amongst the artillerists as to the best structure. Lauter favored the concentration of heavy artillery in the Gruppen, as did Gallwitz. Muths, “Schwere Artillerie,” 8; Gallwitz, Erleben, 88. 107. Oberst Seeger (artillery advisor to AOK 1), “Die Feldartillerie im Stellungskrieg: Erfahrungen und Folgerungen,” Summer 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. he OHL issued new orders to this efect on 2 September 1916. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, II Nr. 34,001, “Über artilleristische Erkundung und Beobachtung im Stellungskriege,” 2 September 1916, M33/2 Bü 712, HStA-Stuttgart. 108. It is worth noting that the artillery felt the infantry had unrealistic demands of them. See Seeger, “Feldartillerie Erfahrungen.” 109. Neumann, Luftstreitkräfte, 473. 110. 5.Batterie, Feld-Artillerie-Regiment 185, “Erfahrungen aus den Schlachten an der Somme, 3.9. bis 26.9.1916,” 9 October 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 497 ROBERT T. FOLEY he porous and lexible nature of the German front line created by new defensive techniques also caused problems. In addition to putting artillery positions at risk from enemy infantry attacks,111 artillery commanders were not always aware of where their own frontline troops were located. Moreover, batteries were themselves often forced to change their positions due to enemy ire or break-ins. Field Artillery Regiment 267 wrote of the challenges it faced in providing timely and accurate ire in support of the infantry: During the course of repeated changes in battery positions, crucial shooting tables, battery plans, notations, etc were lost. Without telephone communications forward, this made ranging ire very diicult. Daily, two or three patrols had to be sent forward to the artillery liaison oicer to observe the fall of shot for the batteries. hese patrols took 5 hours to make it forward and back, so only one ranging ire could take place each day. herefore, it took a very long time for each battery to be fully ranged on its iring zone.112 With limited artillery support, the infantry was often left to its own devices for defense. Hand grenades, once a specialist weapon, were used extensively to aid in defense, as were a growing range of small-caliber mortars. Both types of weapons gave the infantry some much-needed close support.113 However, it was the machine gun that really provided the ire support so required by the defending infantry. he lessonslearned reports recognized the centrality of the machine gun to the success of the defense on the Somme. he 1st Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 28 wrote: “he infantry battle was always supported by our machineguns. As long as the machineguns and their crews were intact, every English attack was bound to be beaten back.”114 As machine guns became more and more important, German units quickly found that they could never have enough of these. Most regiments had an establishment of ifteen machine guns at the beginning of the battle. he 1st Army was successful in inding enough guns to bring this up to twenty-ive or thirty over the course of 111. his was a very real problem, particularly at the beginning of the battle. It was quickly realized that artillery should be between 2,000 and 3,500 meters behind the German front line and that there should be at least two trench lines between the artillery position and the front line. Seeger, “Feldartillerie Erfahrungen.” here were also calls to equip the artillery with modern close-combat weapons so they could defend themselves against enemy infantry. 4.Batterie, Feld-Artillerie-Regiment 185, “Bericht über die Erfahrungen während der Somme-Schlacht,” 8 October 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 112. Feld-Artillerie-Regiment 267, Tgb.Nr. 1173/16, “Bericht über die Erfahrungen, die vom Feld-Artl.Regt.267 während des Einsatzes an der Somme gemacht worden sind,” 30 December 1916, 456 F7/849, GLA-Karlsruhe. 113. Grenade throwers (Grenatenwerfern) were found to be particularly useful. See 10.Reserve-Division, Ia Nr. 3466, “Erfahrungen der 10.Res.-Div. aus der Sommeschlacht,” 20 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 114. I.Bataillon, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 28, “Bericht über das Zusammenarbeiten der verschiedenen Truppengattungen in der Schlacht an der Somme,” 6 October 1916, 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 498 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 the battle.115 Prior to the battle, German defensive doctrine maintained that machine guns should be employed in the forward-most trench. However, the battle showed that guns deployed forward would quickly be destroyed. Instead, units deployed their machine guns in depth in shell holes with instructions to ire only at the last minute to avoid being spotted by enemy aircraft. he 183rd Infantry Division wrote: “Single machineguns deployed outside of trenches proved themselves to be especially worthwhile in the battle, since they were not discovered by enemy artillery, which concentrated mainly on the trenches. Repeatedly, enemy breakthrough attempts were brought to a halt by machineguns deployed like this.”116 he battle showed once again the importance of lanking ire, which had a great moral efect on the enemy and helped keep guns hidden. Indeed, some units even took to using a barrage of ire from machine guns iring over the heads of the frontline infantry.117 Of course, the importance of machine guns was also recognized by the Entente, and every efort was made to put them out of service. Consequently, gun crews sufered high casualties. Based on previous experience, the machine gun company of Infantry Regiment 65 went into the line with more crews than needed, and asked for additional infantrymen to be assigned as the battle wore on.118 his company also recommended that once a gun ired, it should change position, as the enemy focused his artillery on German machine guns. Report after report stressed the need for more men to be trained to use machine guns, both German and enemy, to take the place of the gun teams when they were wounded or killed. Consequently, one of the key recommendations to come out of the battle was that training on machine guns be extended to ordinary infantrymen as well.119 Indeed, the battle of the Somme proved once and for all that the days of a uniformly armed infantry were well and truly over. From this point on, infantry units would be armed with a wide array of weapons, from riles to hand grenades to small mortars and to ever increasing numbers of machine guns. Not everyone welcomed the infantry’s increasing reliance on such ire-support weapons. Some units felt that the infantry had become lazy and did not play an active enough role in defense.120 After its time in the battle, the 185th Infantry Division wrote: 115. XIX.Armeekorps, “Erfahrungen October,” 7; and AOK 2, “Erfahrungen.” 116. 183.Infanterie-Division, “Erfahrungen über die Sommeschlacht,” July 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 117. 22.Reserve-Division, I Nr. 2889, “Erfahrungen aus der Schlacht an der Somme,” 2 October 1916, 8, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 118. Machinengewehre Kompagnie, Infanterie-Regiment 65, “Erfahrungen der M.G.K. des I.R.65 an der Somme in der Stellung vor Combles in der Zeit vom 7.–20. September 1916,” 456 F1/530, GLA-Karlsruhe. 119. AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 6. 120. his was not just a German gripe. Many in the British army lamented that their infantry did not make enough use of their riles and bayonets. See Paddy Griith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front: he British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916–1918 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), 67–70. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 499 ROBERT T. FOLEY Once again, it has been shown that the infantry make very little use of their riles and also only ire their machineguns when faced with an enemy advance. he result is the enemy infantry moves freely even at good ranges and only needs to take cover against artillery ire. he origins of this reticence on the part of the infantry lies in the desire not to give away their position and thus call down enemy artillery ire upon themselves.121 While some of this may have been infantrymen doing their utmost to avoid becoming the target of enemy artillery ire, clearly poor training played a part as well. he high casualties sufered by the units ighting on the Somme had to be replaced, and these replacements naturally lacked the experience of those soldiers lost. Moreover, they demonstrated shortcomings in the training programs of new recruits. Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote at the end of September: It cannot be denied that our infantry is not the same as earlier. After heavy losses, the fought-out divisions are barely refreshed. hey are forced to be redeployed to another sector [of the Western Front] immediately without a day of rest. In other armies, they have to occupy larger sectors than they have ever had to, since these armies have been weakened by giving up many units. herefore, the units have no time for rest and certainly no time for training. . . . After 4 to 7 weeks, when the division is again deployed to the Somme, it arrives considerably less able to ight and with few, mainly young, oicers.122 he Battle of the Somme and New Defensive Doctrine he new type of battles fought in 1916 convinced Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorf, who had taken over command of the German army from Falkenhayn at the end of August, that the German army needed new doctrine. he battle of the Somme had clearly already altered signiicantly the way in which German units fought a defensive battle. As we have seen, German defenders were forced by the hitherto unseen weight of Entente artillery ire to adopt a more lexible defense based on deeply deployed units. Moreover, the front trench line, once so important to German defensive doctrine, had all but ceased to exist, instead being replaced by a loosely held- and tied-together position of shell holes. Command had changed radically too. he creation of a large army group made up of a number of armies recognized the increased importance of “battle management” in the Materialschlacht. By the end of the battle of the Somme, the infantry division had become king in the tactical ight, with its superior command, the army corps, playing a more supporting role. Moreover, a lack of communication between the forward and rear lines meant that lower unit commanders played a 121. 185.Infanterie-Division, I Nr. 1300, “Erfahrungen aus der Somme-Schlacht,” 12 October 1916, HGKPR/216, HStA-KA. 122. Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, “Lage an der Somme,” 27 September 1916. See also Rupprecht, diary entry for 24 October 1916, Kriegstagebuch II, 52. 500 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 more central role in ighting the disparate engagements that would be taking place in the forward position. Battalion and company commanders, and even squad leaders, were called on to launch rapid counterattacks to contain and throw out the enemy that broke into the forward position. In late September, the new OHL issued new guidance on the defensive battle which incorporated many of the lessons learned during the battle of the Somme.123 his was a short, interim document, however. Real change would come with the writing and dissemination of a set of new doctrine manuals once the battle was over. hese were the “Training Manual for Foot Troops in War,”124 the “Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare,” and the “General Principles of Defensive Position Construction.”125 he “Training Manual for Foot Troops in War” was designed to replace the aging “Exercise Regulations for the Infantry,” the manual for teaching new recruits, with a doctrine that incorporated the lessons of the war. Perhaps most importantly, the “Training Manual for Foot Troops in War” changed the balance of command within units, and recognized the squad of eight men rather than the company as the basic tactical combat unit. It also recognized the central role played by support weapons deployed within infantry units, such as machine guns and light mortars. he “Principles of Command in Defensive Warfare” and the “General Principles of Defensive Position Construction” set the principles by which higher units would ight. he division formally became the principal combat unit. Indeed, over the course of 1917, the new OHL substantially reorganized the army to create new divisions and to standardize the divisional structure across the army relecting the lessons of the battle of the Somme.126 Ideally, its regiments were to deploy in depth, with one battalion forward, another as a ready reserve, and the third resting out of enemy artillery ire. “Defensive Battle” also made some important decisions about artillery. As we have seen during the battle of the Somme, opinion was split as to who should command the heavy artillery, the division, or the permanent army corps. he new doctrine now put heavy artillery under the command of the divisional artillery commander (though it did not rule out permanent army 123. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Ia/II Nr. 175, “Erfahrungen der SommeSchlacht,” 25 September 1916, 456 F1/521, GLA-Karlsruhe. 124. his was irst promulgated in January 1917, though another version had been written in December 1916. See Oberstleutnant Engelmann, “Die Ausbildungs-Vorschrift für Fußtruppen (A.V.F.) vom Dezember 1916 und der 1. und 2.Entwurf der Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Fußtruppen im Kriege (A.V.F.) von Januar 1917 und Januar 1918,” unpublished manuscript, RH61/284, BA/MA. Interestingly, this was compiled by the 3rd Army, and few of those who wrote this new doctrine had served on the Somme. See “Liste der Bearbeiter der AusbildungsVorschrift für die Infanterie,” PH3/28, BA/MA. 125. hese two manuals formed parts one and eight of the “Vorschriften für den Stellungskrieg für alle Wafen.” Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, “Allgemeines über Stellungsbau,” 15 August 1917, PHD7/3, BA/MA; and “Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg,” 1 December 1916 (Neudruck vom 1.März 1917), PHD7/16, BA/MA. 126. Cron, Geschichte, 100. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 501 ROBERT T. FOLEY corps having artillery for specialist tasks).127 he new doctrine also codiied the diference between Gegenstöße and Gegenangrife that had developed during the battle of the Somme. One of the most signiicant departures in the new doctrine came with the decision that the forward line did not need to be held at all costs. “Defensive Battle” stated: he higher command should not make it a rigid and unconditional rule that the ground cannot be abandoned. It should conduct the defense so that its own troops are on favorable ground, while the attacking force is only left unfavorable ground. herefore, the armies and army corps are to ensure that orders for the evacuation of sectors are given when the situation no longer requires they be held.128 Not everyone in the army agreed with the new doctrine. In particular, many objected to the concept of lexible defense, with its acceptance of losing some terrain. One of the most vocal critics of this was Fritz von Loßberg, who as chief of staf of the 1st Army during the battle of the Somme and the foremost expert on defensive battle in the German army, had considerable inluence. Loßberg had long rejected the idea of voluntarily surrendering territory,129 and the battle of the Somme conirmed his belief that the front line should be held at all costs. Loßberg used the 1st Army’s lessons-learned report on the battle of the Somme, disseminated two months after OHL’s new doctrine, to emphasize the importance of holding the front line irmly. He wrote: Categorically, every unit must ight in that section of the foremost position that it is assigned to defend. he voluntary surrendering of a position or of parts of a position can lead to the most disastrous results for neighboring units. herefore, the voluntary surrendering of a position should only take place with the permission of a higher commander, who is in a position to determine its efects on neighboring units and on other arms (artillery).130 Loßberg went on to argue that it was only this steadfast refusal to give ground that allowed the 1st Army to withstand the overwhelming enemy attacks on the Somme: During the battle of the Somme . . . [e]very man had to ight where he was stationed. Only over his dead body could the enemy advance. he [1st Army] believes that it was due to this determination to ight, a determination with which every leader was imbued, that the enemy, despite his superior numbers, was bled to death by the closely knit ranks of our ighters.131 127. In 1917, divisions were given a heavy artillery battalion of two heavy howitzer batteries and a 10 cm cannon battery. his was in addition to their existing ield artillery regiment, which had two battalions of ield cannon and a battalion of light ield howitzers. Ibid. 128. “Abwehrschlacht,” 9–10. 129. Loßberg, Tätigkeit, 249f. 130. AOK 1, “Erfahrungen I,” 11. 131. Ibid., 12. 502 ★ THE JOURNAL OF Germany’s Battle of the Somme, 1916 Traditionally, this division between the doctrine produced by the OHL in late 1916 and the 1st Army’s report on the Somme has been seen as a major doctrinal split within the German army.132 New evidence shows that this is not the whole picture. Loßberg’s instructions to his staf for the writing of the 1st Army’s lessons-learned report cast new light on this divide. While there is no doubt that Loßberg was unconvinced by the new doctrine of lexible defense, these instructions make clear that he had been ordered by the OHL to poke holes in its new doctrine.133 hus, the OHL understood clearly that its new doctrine would not be the inal word, but rather a departure point for further reinement, and Ludendorf was encouraging his subordinates to use their lessons-learned reports to challenge this doctrine. Indeed, how the new doctrine would be applied would vary from unit to unit, and Loßberg in particular remained unconvinced about the eicacy of lexible defense until much later in the war.134 Conclusions he battle of the Somme put the entire German army under tremendous strain. he overwhelming Entente superiority in manpower and material ensured that the German defenders on the Somme would always be on the back foot. Only by ighting more intelligently could the 1st and 2nd Armies prevent the collapse of their lines and an enemy breakthrough. Overall, they did this successfully. Although many of the relevant ideas were beginning to be recognized by the German army before the battle’s start, the sheer violence of the Entente ofensive forced German units to institute new command structures and new defensive tactics. Writing reports about their experiences became an important method not only for individual units to learn the lessons of the battle, but also for disseminating these lessons rapidly to other units. Indeed, conditions and tactics on the Somme battleield changed so quickly that these reports, spread widely throughout the army, became a vital means by which arriving units could prepare for the battle. he importance of these reports in preparing units for the battle is shown by a report of the III Bavarian Army Corps, which said: “All ‘lessons’ that are important for commanding in the battle of the Somme . . . should be given to the relevant stafs and units with enough time that they can be distributed down to the company level before their arrival in the battle zone.”135 Before the battle of the Somme, writing lessons-learned reports had been an ad-hoc afair, generally done only by higher commands. he battle of the Somme enshrined a new lessons-learned process within the German army, which allowed for ideas to be shared quickly between units as well as up the chain of command. 132. Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 109–11; Samuels, Command or Control, 172–75. 133. Chef des Generalstabes, 1.Armee, 17 December 1916, HGKPR/217, HStA-KA. 134. Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Bd. XIII: Die Kriegführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse ausserhalb der Westfront bis November 1918 (Berlin: Mittler, 1942), 80–81. 135. III.bay.AK, “Erfahrungen,” 1. MILITARY HISTORY ★ 503 ROBERT T. FOLEY Indeed, this system created a new defensive doctrine within the German army tailor-made for the conditions of the Somme during the course of the battle. his lessons-learned system did not end with the conclusion of the battle of the Somme. For every subsequent battle on the Western Front, each division, and most higherlevel commands, would produce a report of the lessons it had learned. Once again, these would be distributed widely within the army to transfer the most up-to-date knowledge across the army. Of course, the OHL continued to write doctrine. However, the rapid pace of tactical change on the First World War battleield ensured that more often than not, this was out of date by the time it reached the troops. Lessons-learned reports for subsequent battles ofered a running critique of this top-down doctrine. hus, the true source of German tactical innovation from 1916 onwards was not the formal doctrine process examined by previous historiography, but rather the army’s lessons-learned system. his system, reined during the battle of the Somme, allowed new ideas to be shared between units much more rapidly than the slower doctrine process and represents the true legacy of the battle of the Somme. 504 ★ Copyright of Journal of Military History is the property of Society for Military History and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.