External Kin, Ethnic Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Mobilization in the People's Republic of China By Enze Han B.A. July 2001, Beijing Foreign Studies University M.A.P.P.S. May 2003, University of British Columbia M.A. August 2004, University of British Columbia A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 31, 2010 Dissertation directed by Bruce J. Dickson Professor of Political Science and International Affairs UMI Number: 3413606 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI 3413606 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Enze Han has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of July 30, 2010. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. External Kin, Ethnic Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Mobilization in the People's Republic of China Enze Han Dissertation Research Committee: Bruce J. Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Henry E. Hale, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member James M Goldgeier, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii ©Copyright 2010 by Enze Han All rights reserved iii To my parents, Tang Denghan and Han Jingxian iv Acknowledgement This dissertation would not have come into fruition without the help and guidance I have received throughout the years. First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee members Bruce Dickson, Henry Hale, and James Goldgeier. As the chair of the committee and my mentor since I first came to the George Washington University, Bruce has given me continuous encouragement and support. He has always made his office door open for me, and I greatly appreciate his patience and understanding towards my project. During the graduate school years, Henry has always been my source of inspiration and guidance. His profound knowledge on the subject of ethnicity and nationalism, his enthusiasm towards my dissertation, and his cheerful encouragement and timely responses to my writings and questions would always be missed. Jim has continuously shown faith in my project and I benefited greatly from his guidance and support. In addition to my three regular committee members, I also would like to thank Harris Mylonas for his willingness to be a reader of my dissertation. His comments and our conversations, either in person or through skype when I was in China doing field research, have been instrumental in helping me improve my work. Finally, I am grateful for Professor James Millward of Georgetown University for agreeing to be an external reader of my dissertation; I have benefited greatly from his deep knowledge of Xinjiang and ethnic minority issues in China. At the George Washington University, I would like to thank professors Harvey Feigenbaum, Lee Ann Fujii, Jai Kwan Jung, Ed McCord, Kimberley Morgan, Sean Roberts, Susan Sell, and Holger Schmidt for their willingness to read and offer comments v on my writing and for their encouragement throughout the years. I am also grateful to Chris Deering, Martha Finnermore, and Forrest Maltzman for their support as graduate advisors. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues and friends at GWU and the DC area for their devoted friendship during my graduate school years: Lindsay Ballard, Davy Banks, Dina Bishara, Sayaka Chatani, Sonja Davidovic, Colm Fox, Kelly Hammond, Steven Herman, Huang Qiongyu, Luke Johnson, Greg Leon, Lin Zhixiao, Brian Karlsson, Craig Kauffman, Kazuhiro Obayashi, Joseph O‘Mahoney, Mike Schroeder, Wayne Silby, Sun Liang, Miles Townes, Huan-Kai Tseng, Ajay Verghese, and Zhu Mengping. This dissertation would not have been possible without institutional and financial support from the following institutions: At the George Washington University, the Political Science Department and the Columbian College for Arts and Sciences have generously funded five years of my graduate education; the Sigur Center for Asian Studies has also funded two consecutive summer research trips to China. The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation has kindly awarded me a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship for 2009-2010 for me to complete the writing of this dissertation. I would also like to thank the Association for Asian Studies for giving me a China and Inner Asia Small Grant in 2008. I am also indebted to several people and institutions who offered tremendous help during my field research in China. In Beijing, Professor Zhang Xiaojing provided me institutional support and contact information. In Yunnan, Mr. Ma facilitated my field trip throughout the province. Mr. Ai kindly provided me a nice room to stay at his house in Xishuangbanna. In Yanbian, Ms. Zheng provided help for access to the ethnic Korean vi Joseonjok communities there. In Inner Mongolia, I want to express gratitude in particular towards Mr. Ju for helping with my research among the ethnic Mongols. Finally, in Xinjiang, I would like to thank Ms. Lou for taking care of me when I first got to Urumqi. Most importantly, I would also thank numerous people of various ethnic backgrounds that I met in Yunnan, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Yanbian who assisted my research, whose names for various reasons must remain anonymous. Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my family back at home in Hangzhou for incessant love and care. Without their support, I would not have made it this far. My father Tang Denghan and mother Han Jingxian have tolerated my long absence from home. Through phone calls across the ocean, their caring words would be kept in my heart. My sister Tang Jun, my brother-in-law Xu Miaozhong, and my lovely niece Linlin, have also been a source for consistent support. It is to my parents I dedicate this dissertation. vii Abstract of Dissertation External Kin, Ethnic Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Mobilization in the People's Republic of China Why are some ethnic groups in a given country more politically mobilized than others? In particular, why are some ethnic minority groups, such as the the Uighurs, are more political mobilized than other ethnic minority groups in China? Situated within the comparative literature, this dissertation examines conditions under which ethnic minority groups in China would be more likely to mobilize for more autonomy from the Chinese state. It pays special attention to the interactive process between domestic and international factors in the construction and maintenance of ethnic identity in China, and how a specific configuration between domestic and international factors contribute to the likelihood of ethnic minority groups mobilizing for more autonomy. Adopting the triadic relationship model of ethnonational politics proposed by Brubaker, this dissertation makes three inter-related theoretical arguments. First, the presence of external kin is extremely important in constructing and maintaining an ethnic minority group‘s boundaries. Due to common cultural ties, such as language, religion, and so forth, cross-border communications and interactions between the ethnic minority group and its external kin can be frequent and intense. The encountering of external kin can produce a feedback function on the ethnic minority group. It provides an opportunity for ethnic minority group members to fully appreciate their commonalities and differences with both their external kin and the majority group of the state in which they reside. It is part of the negotiation among ethnic minority group members in their viii imagination of belonging. Second, specific configurations of reference frameworks engaging the ethnic minority group and its external kin weigh heavily on how an ethnic minority group perceives its living conditions within the current ―host‖ state. A minority group is more likely to feel dissatisfied and to hold grievances against the domestic majority and the state if the group perceives that its external kin enjoy relatively higher standards of living. On the other hand, if a group perceives its external kin are worse off, the minority group would be more likely to feel content about their own current life conditions in the host state, even though they are subject to hardship and disparity when compared to the majority group. Finally, the external kin‘s actions toward the ethnic minority group are also extremely vital. Depending upon whether or not the external kin offer support, the ethnic minority group might develop different assessments of their belonging to a supranational ethnicity, which would in turn influence their calculation to mobilize for more autonomy or not. In this dissertation, I argue that it is only when external kin enjoy better living conditions and provide support for the ethnic minority group will we be able to expect the ethnic minority group to be more likely to mobilize. This dissertation is primarily concerned with a comparative analysis of four ethnic minority groups in China—Uighurs in Xinjiang, Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Ethnic Korean Joseonjok in Yanbian, and Dai in Xishuangbann. It examines in detail the comparative framework each group engages with their external kin relations and the amount of external support each group receives. Through such a comparative study, this dissertation explores the discrepancies among these four ethnic groups in terms of political strategies that they adopt towards the Chinese state. It offers an explanation to account for why the Uighurs would seek overtly to gain more autonomy or even ix independence from the Chinese state, while other groups choose to either emigrate from or assimilate into the Chinese society. Other than these four cases, this dissertation also tests the main hypothesis using the Minority At Risk (MAR) dataset to see how far the argument travels. x Table of Contents Dedication ……………......................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments……………...........................................................................................v Abstract of Dissertation ...................................................................................................viii Table of Contents................................................................................................................xi List of Figures and Illustrations….…………....................................................................xii List of Tables………………………………....................................................................xiii Chapter 1: Introduction....................................…................................................................1 Chapter 2: Ethnicity, External Kin and Ethnic Mobilization…….....................................37 Chapter 3: Mobilization and Violence in Xinjiang....…………………………………....74 Chapter 4: Inner Mongolia - Resistance for More Autonomy?.......................................129 Chapter 5: Dai Cultural Revival and National Identification in Xishuangbanna............181 Chapter 6: Emigration and Fragmentation of the Joseonjok in Yanbian………………223 Chapter 7: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….268 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………288 xi List of Figures and Illustrations Figure 1: Map of Xinjiang…………………………………………………………….....77 Figure 2: Map of Inner Mongolia………………………………………………………131 Figure 3: Map of Xishuangbanna………………………………………………………185 Figure 4: Map of Yanbian………………………………………………………...........227 xii List of Tables Table 1.1 Ethnic Groups in China and their Population………….……………..……….19 Table 1.2 Varieties of Languages Spoken in China…….………………………..………20 Table 2.1 Predictions for Ethnic Minority Group Strategies...……………………..……72 Table 3.1 List of Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang and Their Respective Population.…...……92 Table 3.2 Uighur/Han Distribution in Xinjiang………………….....……………………92 Table 3.3 Comparative Economic Development PPP (Xinjiang)......…………………..116 Table 3.4 Regions in Xinjiang and GDP Per Capita PPP………..……………………..117 Table 3.5 Uighur Population in Central Asia and Turkey…….………………………..122 Table 4.1 Language Usage in Four Mongolian Villages…..….………………………..152 Table 4.2 Some Mongol Concentrated Areas in Inner Mongolia………………………162 Table 4.3 Mongolia‘s Major Export Destinations……………………...………..……..167 Table 4.4 Mongolia‘s Major Import Sources……………………..……………..……..167 Table 4.5 Comparative Economic Development (Inner Mongolia)....…………………173 Table 4.6 Questionaire in Inner Mongolia………………..……...……………………..175 Table 4.7 Questionaire in Inner Mongolia………………..…………………………….175 Table 4.8 Questionaire in Inner Mongolia………………………..…………………….176 Table 4.9 Questionaire in Inner Mongolia…………………..………………………….178 Table 5.1 Population Changes in Xishuangbanna since 1953……………………….....188 Table 5.2 Questionaire in Xishuangbanna..………………………...…………………..211 Table 5.3 Comparative Economic Development (Xishuangbanna)…………………....216 Table 6.1 Population Distribution and Changes in Yanbian…………………………...232 Table 6.2 Comparative Economic Development (Yanbian)…..…………………..……240 Table 6.3 Joseonjok Population Growth in Yanbian….…………………………..……246 xiii Table 6.4 Changes at Korean Schools in Yanbian.……………………………..……...248 Table 6.5 Questionaire in Yanbian……………………………………………..………263 Table 6.6 Questionaire in Yanbian…………………………………………..…………264 Table 7.1 Predictions for Ethnic Group Strategies in China.…………………………..272 Table 7.2 Statistical Analysis Using MAR...…………………….…………………….279 xiv Chapter One Introduction: Politics of Ethnicity in China A Theoretical Puzzle and an Empirical Puzzle In recent decades, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, writing on ethnic conflict and ethnonationalism has proliferated. Most of this literature, however, focuses upon groups that are already in conflict and have been effectively mobilized. There is a lack of exploration and comparison between groups that have been mobilized and those that have not. Indeed, when we look at the vast number of ethnic groups in the world, only a small fraction of them are actually in conflict.1 Everywhere there is a hotspot of ethnic conflict; there also exist groups nearby that peacefully coexist. It is imperative for scholars to study ―positive‖ cases together with ―negative‖ ones, and to examine systematically why some groups are more politically mobilized than others. This dissertation aims to address this theoretical ethnic mobilization puzzle—why some ethnic groups are more likely to mobilize for more autonomy than others?2 In China as in the rest of the world, one usually hears only about the Tibetan or the Uighur pro-autonomy/independence movements; rarely does one read news or reports about ethnic mobilizations of any kind by other ethnic minority groups in China. Almost James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): p. 716. 2 In this dissertation, I use ―ethnic mobilization for more autonomy‖ as a blanket term to refer to movements aiming to improve a certain ethnic group‘s current collective status, whether it is mere cultural autonomy or full-right independence. Also, it is empirically difficult to differentiate between whether a group simply wants more autonomy and whether it has more ambitious goals. One notable example is among Tibetan exiles. The Dalai Lama proclaims that he is seeking ―genuine autonomy‖ for Tibetans in China, while other more radical groups such as the Tibetan youth congress declares its goal to achieve a truly independent Tibetan state. 1 1 all reports on ethnic minorities coming out of China will mention the struggles of the Tibetans and the Uighurs, yet very rarely are other minority groups mentioned, if at all. Why would the Tibetans and Uighurs want to mobilize for more autonomy and even push for secession from the Chinese state? Why have other ethnic minorities not done so or exhibited such signs of mobilization? This dissertation also aims to explain the empirical puzzle of why some ethnic groups in China are politically mobilized for more autonomy while others are not. Meanwhile, in the field of China studies, previous works focusing on either Tibet or Xinjiang have usually been single case studies. In order to better bridge the ―isolated‖ field of China studies with the broader discipline of Political Science, my research also brings studies on ethnic politics in China into a more comparative perspective that can facilitate cross-fertilization. This dissertation thus aims to provide a comparative framework that enables the study of why and how some groups in China are more effectively mobilized than others. Additionally, China is one of the largest multi-ethnic states in the world that spans across vast territories over East, Southeast, and Central Asia. Any ethnic conflicts within China‘s borders are important in their own regard, and certainly any potential spill-over effects will have strong implications across the AsiaPacific region. Thus I hope my research will also be of interest to concerned policymakers. Based on a comparative case study of several ethnic minority groups in China, this dissertation argues that both domestic and international factors must be incorporated into the analytic model to explain ethnic mobilization for more autonomy. Adopting a triadic relationship model that involves a domestic ethnic minority, the external kin of the 2 minority, and the state where the minority resides; and taking an ethnicity-as-category approach, this dissertation argues that it is the interaction between domestic and international factors that contribute to the construction of ethnic group boundaries and group members‘ preferences for whether or not to pursue more autonomy. The encountering between ethnic minority groups and their external kin influence how ethnic minority group members perceive and evaluate their living conditions in the state they currently reside. It is only when an ethnic minority group perceives that its external kin enjoys better living conditions and when the external kin is willing and capable of offering support, can we expect that the minority group will be likely to mobilize for more autonomy. A Triadic Relationship Model for Ethnic Mobilization for More Autonomy Though the literature on ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict is vast it can, in general, be broken down into two broad approaches. The first explores why ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict occur.3 With different assumptions about the nature of ethnicity, different schools of theories on ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict focus on divergent factors to explain this question. For example, the primordialist school posits ethnic identity as given, fixed, and conflictual, and argues that ethnic groups are mobilized for conflict because of primordialist attachment and ―ancient hatreds,‖ and so forth.4 There is a sense of naturalness, according to such theories, to why ethnic groups would be mobilized and come into conflict with each other. On the other hand, there is a broadly 3 See Chapter Two for a fuller literature review on ethnicity and why some ethnic groups are more likely to mobilize for more autonomy. 4 For example, see Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," British Journal of Sociology 8 (1957); Pierre Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier Press, 1979); Stephen Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!," APSA-CP 12, no. 1 (2001). 3 conceived constructivist school that disagrees with this taken-for-granted assumption about ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict. These constructivist approaches hold that, in general, conceptualization of identity is fluid and constantly changing, and pay special attention to exogenous factors to help understand how ethnic identity is negotiated and constructed in one specific way.5 Despite their differences, these two areas of the literature are mainly concerned with the question of why groups would want to mobilize and why groups would come into conflict with each other. The other general approach to ethnic mobilization is mainly borrowed from the social movement literature. The focus here is to examine the how—how groups are mobilized. Generally speaking, this approach converges into three main analytical foci: political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing. 6 Most of the existing literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization, however, center their primary theoretical explanation upon domestic factors. For many theorists, the study of why ethnic groups are mobilized for political action or in conflict with each other can and/or should be explained through political, economic, and institutional factors that are restricted within the sovereign boundaries of nation-states. It is of course not to dispute the explanatory power of these domestic-focused theories. There are ample reasons, however, to argue that one needs to take into consideration international factors to produce a more satisfactory explanation of ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization. Indeed, many scholars have started to pay attention to the Kanchan Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics," APSA-CP 12, no. 1 (2001). For example, see Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge, Uk: Cambridge University Press 1996); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press 2001). 5 6 4 international dimensions of ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization.7 Rogers Brubaker, in Nationalism Reframed, explicitly argues that we should study nationalism and nationhood through a triadic relationship model that involves domestic minority, majority, and external kin of the minority.8 This dissertation follows this line of inquiry and aims to study how domestic factors interact with international ones in ethnic mobilization in the People‘s Republic of China. Situated within the comparative literature, this dissertation examines conditions under which ethnic minority groups in China would be more likely to mobilize for more autonomy from the Chinese state. It pays special attention to the interactive process between domestic and international factors in the construction and maintenance of ethnic identity in China, and how a specific configuration between domestic and international factors contributes to the likelihood of ethnic minority groups mobilizing for more autonomy. Adopting a triadic relationship model of ethnonational politics, this dissertation makes three inter-related theoretical arguments. First, the presence of external kin is extremely important in constructing and maintaining an ethnic minority group‘s boundaries. Due to common cultural ties, such as language, religion, and so forth, cross-border communications and interactions between the ethnic minority group and its external kin can be frequent and intense. The encountering of external kin can produce a feedback function on the ethnic minority group. It provides an opportunity for ethnic minority group members to fully appreciate their commonalities and differences 7 For example, see David A. Lake, and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake, and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Michael E. Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1996). 8 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 5 with both their external kin and the majority group of the state in which they reside. It is part of the negotiation among ethnic minority group members in their imagination of belonging. Second, specific configurations of reference frameworks engaging the ethnic minority group and its external kin weigh heavily on how an ethnic minority group perceives its living conditions within the current ―host‖ state. A minority group is more likely to feel dissatisfied and to hold grievances against the domestic majority and the state if the group perceives that its external kin enjoy relatively higher standards of living. On the other hand, if a group perceives its external kin are worse off, the minority group would be more likely to feel content about their own current life conditions in the host state, even though they are subject to hardship and disparity when compared to the majority group. Finally, the external kin‘s actions toward the ethnic minority group are also extremely vital. Depending upon whether or not the external kin offer support, the ethnic minority group might develop different assessments of their ethnic and national belongings, which would in turn influence their calculation to take action for mobilization. In this dissertation, I argue that it is only when external kin enjoy better living conditions and provide support for the ethnic minority group will we be able to expect the ethnic minority group to be more likely to mobilize. Since this theoretical framework centers on the concept of external kin, it is necessary to provide an explicit definition of what constitutes external kin. I define external kin as a group (or groups) that share similar language, culture, religion, customs and so forth with the ethnic minority group. In some situations, these two parties might share a similar name, while in others they might not. What is crucial is the perception of such a kin relationship in the eyes of these two parties. Thus, this ethnic kin relationship 6 can be defined either narrowly or broadly, depending on the specific circumstances and political discourses that framework such a relationship. Applying this set of theoretical arguments to China, I argue that we should understand different ethnic groups in China and their political mobilization or nonmobilization from the perspective of their relationship with their external kin and the comparative framework they engage. For groups that have external kin relationships with neighboring countries, it is much easier to negotiate a set of alternative identity for themselves and to resist the assimilative power from the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state than such actions would be for other groups that do not have such external relationships. This might be the reason why the Yi and many other groups indigenousonly-to-China have to reconstruct myths of their belonging in the Chinese polity. For example, anthropologist Stevan Harrell reports that many Yi scholars contend that the Yi were the true founders of the Chinese nation and that the Han Chinese were late-comers who usurped the Yi‘s rightful place at the pinnacle of the glorious Chinese civilization.9 There are also many mythical stories detailing these ethnic minority groups‘ origins that usually unfold in the following fashion: in ancient time there were several brothers, and the Han Chinese are the descendants of the older brother, and the ethnic minority groups are the descendants of the younger siblings. In this way, these different ethnic minority groups can reconcile their differences from the Han Chinese majority but still emphasize their connection with them and their rightful place within the Chinese nation. For ethnic groups that have external kin relations, however, it is much easier to maintain their Stevan Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, Studies on Ethnic Groups in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). 9 7 independent cultural reproduction and find an alternative basis to rest their distinctive identity upon distinctions from the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state. Acknowledging that the presence of external kin matters in group‘s identity construction and maintenance, I would also argue that, for groups that have external kin, satisfaction with their living conditions in China and their perception of the Chinese state are conditioned upon a comparative framework that involves China and the neighboring countries where the external kin resides. For example, for groups such as the Uighur, its nationalist movements have been tied deeply with similar ones in Central Asia since the late 19th century. In the 20th century, first the Soviet Union and later the independent Central Asian Republics as well as Turkey all have provided a modern and much more developed alternative model beyond China. For the Uighurs, a broadly defined kin relationship with the Turkic world is often emphasized by various parties, and thus is used in this dissertation. In contrast, for ethnic Mongols in Inner Mongolia, the Mongolian People‘s Republic and later Mongolia, has not be able to present a strong and appealing model, mired as it is in great underdevelopment and poverty. Therefore, in order to understand a minority group‘s preference formation process of whether or not to pursue political action, one has to take this comparative framework into account to explain the mobilization or lack thereof among different ethnic minority groups in China. Finally, we have to examine the stance that the external kin takes towards their ―ethnic brethren‖ in China. The external kin‘s willingness to offer support for the ethnic minority group is vital for any mobilization to occur. For example, Mongolia‘s national identity construction—based wholly on the Halh Mongol ethnicity—has caused a sense of rejection among many Inner Mongols and has contributed to the integration of the 8 Inner Mongols with the Chinese state. Similar experiences can also be found among ethnic Korean Joseonjok in China who have gone to South Korea for work but experience rejection and discrimination there. The experience leads many ethnic Korean Joseonjok to realize how ―Chinese‖ they have become.10 On the other hand, the external support that the Uighurs and Tibetans get makes possible not only the hardening of boundaries between these groups and the majority Han Chinese, but also the actual mobilizations by providing resources and organizations. This specific attention directed towards the external kin does not mean the domestic factors are irrelevant. On the contrary, the host state and the domestic majority it often reprepresents is one of the three pillars in the triadic model utilized in this dissertation. On the one hand, the state‘s ethnic policies can have its direct impact on its ethnic minorities. In some situations, repressive measures are adopted towards any political dissert or cultural expressions made by the ethnic minority group. Or the state might be more cooperative and tolerant in other situations. On the other, its policies might also be reactions towards gestures made by the ethnic minority group and/or its external patron(s), kin or otherwise. Perceiving the rebellious nature of the ethnic minority group, the majority state might become more reactive and show more willingness at clamping down on the ethnic minority group. In addition, any signals of interference from the external parties would also not be taken lightly and the majority state‘s policies towards its ethnic minority population might even harden because of these external factors. Therefore, variations in the host state‘s policies towards ethnic minorities should be taken seriously in conjuction with our attention on the external kin. 10 For detailed analysis, see later chapters on Inner Mongolia and Yanbian Koreans. 9 This dissertation is primarily concerned with a comparative analysis of four ethnic minority groups in China—Uighurs in Xinjiang, Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Ethnic Korean Joseonjok in Yanbian, and Dai in Xishuangbann. In the dissertation, since the four ethnic groups are all subject to the same Chinese state, most of the time we can hold the state‘s ethnic policies as constant. Thus, important political junctures pertaining to the Chinese state are particularly focused upon in the detailed analysis of the four groups. However, there are still variations in terms of how the Chinese state implements its ethnic policies in various regions. These variations will be discussed in detail in the four empirical case studies chapters. Other than focusing on ethnic policy making by the Chinese state, this dissertation examines in detail the comparative framework each group engages with their external kin relations and the amount of external support each group receives. Through such a comparative study, this dissertation explores the discrepancies among these four ethnic groups in terms of political strategies that they adopt towards the Chinese state. It offers an explanation to account for why the Uighurs would seek overtly to gain more autonomy or even independence from the Chinese state, while other groups choose to either emigrate from or assimilate into the Chinese society. It is necessary to state clearly at the beginning the nature of the theoretical argument that is put forward in this dissertation. The argument that a comparative framework between the ethnic minority group and its external kin conditions the preference formation process for the ethnic minority group should not be read as a causal argument. The external variable is only one part of the bigger picture of ethnic politics that should include both domestic and external variables. What the comparative framework does is to provide a permissive condition that informs ethnic group members‘ 10 identity construction and preference formation. It plays a role similar to a catalyst. In situations where external kin enjoys higher living conditions, this disparity between the external kin and the ethnic minority group would intensify the previously existing grievances, which might be based on a totally set of other variables. Similarly, in situation where external kin has lower living conditions than the ethnic minority group, the perception of this gap between the two would dampen or restrict the propensity of ethnic minority group members to feel grieved and mobilize polically. Therefore, this theoretical framework on ethnic politics should be examined together with explanations that focus on domestic or other international variables, as we will see in the empirical chapters. Research Methodology and Case Selections This dissertation utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methods. Since my theoretical framework examines the interactive mechanisms in a triadic relationship model involving the ethnic minority group, its external kin, and the Chinese state, the major part of the dissertation is composed of controlled case studies of four ethnic minority groups in China. The four cases are the Uighurs in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Ethnic Korean Joseonojoks in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, and the Dai in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture. The four cases have been selected in order to allow for variation on the key independent variable—the comparative development level of each group‘s ethnic kin abroad. Also, the four ethnic groups are geographically located in distinct 11 parts within the Chinese territory: Xinjiang in the Northwest, Inner Mongolia in the North, Yanbian in the Northeast, and Xishuangbanna in the Southwest. Data for these four cases were collected through more than one year of field research in various ethnic minority regions of China. During the summer of 2006 and 2007 I undertook field research in Xishuangbanna, in southern Yunnan province. From February to August 2008 I completed field work in Inner Mongolia, Yanbian, and Xinjiang. Data collected are in the forms of official documents, interviews with government officials, and interviews with local ethnic minority people. During my field research in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, I carried out interviews using an open-ended questionnaire. In Xinjiang, I interviewed governmental officials, academics, as well as local Uighur youth. Potential interviewees were identified and arranged through local contacts in various places using a snowball method. In Xishuangbanna, research was carried out mainly in Jinghong, the capital city, and Damenglong, a rural township 20 kilometers away from the Sino-Burmese border. In Yanbian, research was mainly carried out in the capital city Yanji and a border city Hunchun. In Inner Mongolia, field sites were Hohhot, the capital city, the Da‘erhan and Maomin‘an Banners of Baotou Municipality, and Zhalute Banner of Tongliao Municipality. Finally, in Xinjiang, research was mainly carried out in Urumqi and Kashgar. All people‘s names used in this dissertation have been altered to protect their identities. 12 The Four Cases Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Xinjiang is the official autonomous region of the Uighurs, an ethnically Turkic group of people that speaks a Turkic language and practices Islam. Besides the Uighurs, Xinjiang is also home to various other ethnic groups, including Kazak, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Sibe, Hui, Han Chinese, and others.11 According to the 2000 census, the Uighur population is about 8.2 million or approximately 46 percent of Xinjiang‘s total population, while Han Chinese comprise 6.7 million or about 37 percent. Over 90 percent of the Han Chinese in Xinjiang live in the urban areas in Northern Xinjiang while the majority of the Uighur live in rural Southern Xinjiang.12 First the Soviet Union, and now the independent Central Asian republics, together with Turkey have provided a more developed and modern model for the Uighur in Xinjiang.13 Since the founding of the People‘s Republic of China in 1949, the Uighur in Xinjiang have frequently rebelled against Beijing‘s rule. In the 1990s, for example, a series of violent attacks were launched by separatists who claim to build an independent Eastern Turkistan.14 Most recently, Xinjiang experienced one of the most deadly riots ever to occur in its capital city Urumqi in July 2009.15 Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2005), p. 3. 12 Herbert S. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han Relations in Urumqi," Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (2003): p. 431. 13 Sean R. Roberts, "A "Land of Borderlands": Implications of Xinjiang‘s Trans-Border Interactions," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 14 See for example, Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004). 15 James A. Millward, "Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning Point?" Central Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (2010). 11 13 Inner Mongolia The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was first founded in 1947. There are more than five million Mongols living in China, and most of them reside in Inner Mongolia. The historical relationship between Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia (formerly known as the Mongolian People‘s Republic and now Mongolia), and the China proper has been very complicated ever since the Mongol Empire conquered China and set up the Yuan Dynasty based in what is now Beijing. Outer Mongolia declared independence after the fall of China‘s last Dynasty—the Qing—while Inner Mongolia still remains within the Chinese state today. Economically, Mongolia has lagged far behind the PRC, particularly during recent decades. Today, Inner Mongolia has become a predominantly Han Chinese province with Mongols only accounting for 17 percent of the population. According to Uradyn Bulag, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia exhibit no strong independent spirit.16 Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Ethnic Koreans, or Joseonjok as they are often called, in China mostly migrated to the northeastern provinces of China between 1850-1945 to either escape famine in Korea or to stage an independence movement against Japanese invasion and colonial rule.17 The Joseonjok in China number about two million, and the largest concentrated area is the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin province. In Yanbian, Joseonjok constitute more than 30 percent of local population. Joseonjok enjoy very high education 16 Uradyn E. Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonialization and Ethnicity Building," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press 2004), p. 84. 17 Si Joong Kim, "The Economic Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in China," in The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy, ed. C. Fred Bergsten, and Inbom Choe (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2003), p. 102. 14 achievement in China. Interestingly, they have two kin states—the more prosperous South Korea and the economically devastated North Korea. Since the 1990s, the Joseonjok community in China has experienced significant exposure to South Korea. Tens of thousands of Joseonjok have migrated to South Korea, lured by the higher wages there. In the meantime, there has also been significant wave of Joseonjok migration to big cities within China to work for the South Korean business concerns in China. These intensified interactions with their external kin, and the economic differences between South Korean, China, and North Korea, have forced the Joseonjok to reevaluate their ethnic identity and national belonging. Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture The Dai is an ethnic group that has traditionally lived in a territory that is now a southwestern borderland between China‘s Yunnan province and countries Burma and Laos. The group belongs to a larger Tai linguistic group that historically spread throughout the upland regions of mainland Southeast Asia. They mostly practice Theravada Buddhism and have customs and festivals similar to other Tai-speaking people in Mainland Southeast Asia.18 Compared with the groups living in China, the Dai‘s ethnic kin living in Burma and Laos have suffered considerable poverty as well as political instability during the past decades. Although in recent years there have been a resurgence of Dai cultural identity groups, they have not demonstrated strong aspirations to political separation from the Chinese state.19 Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 19 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle and London: University of Washingon Press 2004), pp. 55-6. 18 15 A comparative study of these four groups forms the core of my dissertation. The goal in each of these four cases is mainly to examine the interactive mechanisms among the ethnic minority group, its external kin, and the Chinese state. In addition to these four case studies, the dissertation also includes a statistical testing of my hypothesis outside of the Chinese context by using the Minority At Risk (MAR) dataset from 1950-1995. Chapter Outline In Chapter Two, I present a theoretical discussion of the triadic relationship model to explain the preference formation of ethnic minorities and their propensity for mobilization for more autonomy. First, I review various approaches within existing literature on ethnic conflict and mobilization, and critically assess their merits and limits. I specifically endorse Fredrik Barth‘s view of ethnicity that emphasizes boundary construction and maintenance, and I argue we should treat ethnicity as a category. Then I present the triadic relationship model and argue why it is necessary to introduce an external factor to offer satisfactory explanation of ethnic mobilization. Chapters Three to Six are my empirical case studies of four ethnic minorities in China. Emphasis will be paid to how each ethnic group‘s connection with their external kin, and how the comparative framework between the minority group and their external kin affect on the preference formation process of each ethnic minority group under study. Chapter Three focuses on the Uighur case, especially its political mobilization for more autonomy during the past three decades. It analyzes how the Uighurs‘ perception of their external kin in Central Asia and Turkey has fed into their discontent in China. In addition, both ideological and material support the group receives externally provide 16 necessary conditions for actual mobilizations to occur. Chapter Four focuses on the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and discusses why the dominant political strategy taken by the Mongols is trying to maintain some cultural autonomy, though linguistic and cultural assimilation is also gaining speed. It argues that the independent country of Mongolia has not been able to present a strong and appealing model, nor has it been able to offer support for the Mongols in China. Thus, despite the existence of some fringe groups claiming to politically mobilize the Mongols, the Mongol mass have not responded in the same way as the Uighurs. Similar to the Mongols, the Dai in Xishuangbanna, as shown in Chapter Five, have also gained further incorporation into the Chinese body politic, while making any talks for autonomy purely within cultural domains. The political and economic chaos in neighboring countries of Burma and Laos has made the Dai realize the benefit of being a Chinese citizen, thus strengthening their aspiration for assimilation. Finally, the ethnic Korean – Joseonjok discussed in Chapter Six, because of the strong economic appeal of South Korea, have emigrated out in large droves to either South Korea or major Chinese cities where South Korean investments are concentrated. Yet, because of the lack of support and their suffering discrimination from the South Koreans, many Joseonjok people have developed ambivalent views about the relationship between their ancestral homeland, Korea and their current host state, China. Chapter Seven, the Conclusion Chapter, tests the main hypothesis using the Minority At Risk (MAR) dataset to see how far the argument travels. It also ties together previous chapters and makes some concluding comments on this dissertation‘s theoretical contribution, and offers some policy recommendations. 17 China’s Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Policies Before beginning, it is crucial to pause briefly to talk about the development of China‘s ethnic minority policies in the context of China‘s long and fraught process of nation-state building. In the West, China is often portrayed as a homogeneous nation-state with a singular, ancient, and continuous civilization.20 This over-simplification of Chinese society‘s composition also often equates being Chinese with being a member of the Han Chinese majority. In reality, however, China is a multicultural and ethnically diverse country, with tremendous cultural and linguistic heterogeneity among its population that is dispersed over a vast territory. Officially, there are 56 ethnic groups residing within the territories of the People‘s Republic of China. According to the 2000 National Census, the Han majority comprises about 90 per cent of China‘s population. There are also 109 million ethnic minority people making up the remaining 10 percent of the Chinese population. Table 1.1 lists all 56 ethnic groups in China and their population according to the 2000 National Census.21 On one hand, the 56 ethnic groups in China speak a wide variety of languages that belong to four of the world‘s largest language families: SinoTibetan, Turkic-Altaic, Austral-Asiatic, and Indo-European.22 The varieties of languages spoken in China are listed in Table 1.2. On the other hand, even the Sinitic languages spoken by the majority Han Chinese are also officially classified into eight groups: Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Gan, Xiang, Kejia (Hakka), Northern Min, and Southern Min. And Louisa Schein, Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 3. 21 The census data can be accessed at http://chinadataonline.org/ 22 Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (London: C. Hurst, 2004), p. 7. 20 18 usually differences between these dialects can be as big as between languages. Thus, in a Bourdieuian sense, the differences between language and dialect are purely political.23 Table 1.1 56 Ethnic Groups in China and Their Population Ethnic Group Population Ethnic Group Population Han 102,207,565 Tu 241,198 Zhuang 16,178,811 Mulam 207,352 Manchu 10,682,262 Xibe 188,824 Hui 9,816,805 Kirgiz 160,823 Miao 8,940,116 Daur 132,394 Uighur 8,399,393 Jingpo 132,143 Tujia 8,028,133 Maonan 107,166 Yi 7,762,272 Salar 104,503 Mongol 5,813,947 Blang 91,882 Tibetan 5,416,021 Tajik 41,028 Buyi 2,971,460 Achang 33,936 Dong 2,960,293 Primi 33,600 Yao 2,637,421 Ewenki 30,505 Korean 1,923,842 Nu 28,759 Bai 1,858,063 Gin 22,517 Hani 1,439,673 Jino 20,899 Kazak 1,250,458 Deang 17,935 Li 1,247,814 Bonan 16,505 Dai 1,158,989 Russian 15,609 She 709,592 Yugur 13,719 Lisu 634,912 Uzbek 12,370 Gelao 579,357 Monba 8,923 Dongxiang 513,805 Oroqen 8,196 Lahu 453,705 Derung 7,426 Shui 406,902 Tatar 4,890 Wa 396,610 Hezhen 4,640 Naxi 308,839 Gaoshan 4,461 Qiang 306,072 Lhoba 2,965 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Laada Bilaniuk, Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 23 19 Table 1.2 Varieties of Languages Spoken in China24 Sino-Tibetan Language Family Tibetan, Jiarong, Menba, Jingpo, Yi, Hani, Lisu, Lahu, Naxi, Jinuo, Zaiwa, Achang, Bai, Tujia, Lhoba, Qiang, Prmi, Nu, TibetanBurmese Group Deng, Derung Madarin, Wu, Yue, Gan, Xiang, Kejia (Hakka), Northern Min, Southern Min Sinic Group Zhuang-Dong Zhuang, Buyi, Dai, Dong, Shui, Mulam, Maonan, Lajia, Li, Group Gelao Turkic-Altaic Language Family Mongolian Mongolian, Dongxiang, Tu, Daur, Bao'an, Eastern Yugur Group ManchuTungusic Group Manchu, Xibe, Hezhe, Ewenki, Oroqen Uighur, Kazak, Salar, Uzbek, Tatar, Kirgiz, Western Yugur, Turkic Group Tuva Austral-Asiatic language Family Wa, Blang, De'ang Indo-European Language family Tajik, Russian Language Family Korean, Gin (Vietnamese) Uncertain Acknowledging the tremendous diversity existing within Chinese society, and to resist the simplifying views of the West about what is China and what is Chinese, this dissertation‘s approach towards names and terminologies are enumerated as follows: the terms China and Chinese are used to denote the political meanings of the country and citizenship, while Han Chinese is used throughout to refer the majority group and their language. Whether one should use the English term Chinese or the Chinese term Han to refer to the majority Han Chinese is very much an ongoing debate among scholars with Regie Stites, ―Writing Cultural Boundaries: National Minority Language Policy, Literacy Planning, and Bilingual Education,‖ in China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development, ed. G. A. Postiglione (New York and London: Falmer Press 1999), pp. 97-8. 24 20 profound implications for how one perceives and understands China, and is itself tremendously politically charged. For example, whether the Mongol Yuan Dynasty or the Manchu Qing Dynasty were Chinese empires have deep implications on some contested historical narratives and claims made by various parties, for example, either the PRC‘s version of historical unity and continuity or those who try to deconstruct and give authority and legitimacy for a certain group‘s historical claims of sovereignty. Without diverging into those debates, however, I believe it is reasonable to demarcate the term ―Chinese‖ from ―Han Chinese,‖ especially in the modern era. On one hand, we have to admit that the words ―China‖ or ―Chinese‖ did not exist in the classical Chinese language. In contemporary usage, the name of the country China - Zhongguo (Middle Country -中 中 人 ) and Chinese people - Zhongguoren Middle Country People - are devoid of clear connections with the majority Han Chinese (汉族). Thus the usage of ―Chinese‖ to refer to the majority ―Han‖ can only potentially commit a sin of Orientalism. On the other hand, one has to note the tremendous efforts made by two modern Chinese states, both the Republic of China (ROC) and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), to emphasize and promote the concept of being Chinese as a civic term that include multiple ethnic groups within its scope. For example, under ROC rule, the official discourse claimed that the Chinese nation was a unity of five groups, Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim (五族共和). And, under the PRC rule that 21 followed, the official discourse holds that ―China is a united multi-ethnic country‖ (统一 多民族 家).25 That said, one has to admit that modern China‘s nation-building process is an ongoing and contested process, and certainly is one full of contradictions. Stevan Harrell, for example, notes that ―nowhere does the conflict between the two models of a political system—empire and nation-state—manifest itself more acutely or more ambiguously than in the People‘s Republic of China.‖26 On one hand, China was once an empire that engaged in multilayered administrations that incorporated both central codes and locally patterned authority.27 However, the political and cultural core of the empire had more civilizing/assimilationist tendencies than others. The Confucian tradition, in a way similar to a pervasive monolithic religion, regarded itself as the only true civilization and saw its mission to civilize or transform ―barbarian people‖ into being Chinese. Thus, theoretically at least, anyone can become Chinese no matter what his or her ethnic origin is, and access to elites in imperial times was ―by culture rather than by birth.‖28 This was the very reason why peoples of ―foreign‖ origin could become legitimate rulers of China if they conformed to the Confucian way, which explained the rightful rule of the country by the Mongols during the Yuan Dynasty and the Manchus during the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, as a nation-state today, China still explicitly proclaims itself as a multi- Xiaotong Fei, Toward a People's Anthropology (Beijing: New World Press, 1981). Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, p. 25. 27 Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press 2006), p. 9. 28 Stevan Harrell, "Linguistics and Hegemony in China," International Journal of the Sociology of Language 103 (1993): p. 101. Also see Stevan Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," in Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1995). 25 26 22 ethnic state. This involves adopting the Soviet model of granting autonomy to ethnic minorities and permitting or sanctioning certain expressions of cultural diversity in the areas of language, culture, and religion. Yet again, all the elements of an ideal nationstate are still promoted by the state—that is ―the myths of a common origin and glorious past; the idea of sacred territory, clearly distinguished from foreign soil, to be defended with the blood of its sons and daughters; a national print language, also taught universally in the schools; and a visceral distrust (sometimes combined with envy or even admiration) of everybody and all things foreign.‖29 This contradiction between empire and nation-state certainly does not pertain to China alone, as we can observe in the debates about the civic versus ethnic nationalisms in the West.30 However, when we approach the politics of ethnic affairs and the Chinese state‘s policies towards ethnic minorities, this contradiction should be taken seriously as it plainly manifest throughout China‘s modern political history. The collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911 under pressure from both foreign threat and domestic insurgency heralded the break-up of the empire and the birth of the modern Chinese ―nation-state.‖31 At the beginning of this period, when the Republic of China was founded, ―anti-Manchu‖ rhetoric was initially used to reclaim the legitimate rule of China for the ―Han Chinese,‖ to mobilize the masses to overthrow the Qing court, and to rally public for support of the new Republic. However, facing the reality of the country‘s diverse social composition and concerns over keeping national unity throughout the vast territory that it had inherited from the Qing, the Republican government had to court Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, p. 25. See for example Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 31 For a good discussion of how the concept of a unified yet inclusive Chinese nation-state was constructed in the aftermath of the Qing empire, see James Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 29 30 23 various ethnic minorities for their support—particularly the bigger ones—and to legitimize itself in their eyes to prevent the disintegration of China. This threat was very real, as evidenced by Outer Mongolia‘s declaration of independence in 1912. Thus the concept that the Chinese nation was composed of five groups—the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim—was conceived and promoted by Sun Yet-sen. The first national flag of the ROC, for example, was five stripes of equal width symbolizing the equality of these five groups. Despite Sun‘s official acclaim that the Chinese nation was composed of five nationalities, Sun‘s ideology on ethnic minorities and Chinese nationalism was in essence still very much assimilationist. Very much inspired by the American ―Melting Pot‖ model, Sun held that a single Chinese nation must be constructed. He explained, ―The name Republic of Five Nationalities exists only because there exists a certain racial distinctions which distorts the meaning of a single republic. We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China, i.e., Manchus, Tibetans, etc… We must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.‖32 Sun‘s ideas on ethnic minorities and Chinese nationalism came under the influence of the Soviet Union a few years later, however, and concepts such as selfdetermination and autonomy for ethnic minorities were also incorporated to the official ROC government political discourse. But this contradiction between assimilation and pluralism was left unresolved and cut short by the early death of Sun. Sun‘s successor Chiang Kai-shek had no taste for ideas such as ethnic minority self-determination or Yet-sen Sun, Memoir of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), p. 180; June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press 1976), p. 16. 32 24 autonomy, and he bluntly branded them merely Communist propaganda.33 To Chiang, the ethnic differences existing in China were due to regional and religious differences but not race or blood. Thus all people in China belong to the same race stock and the goal was to eliminate all the cultural differences and make a single Chinese nation.34 The implementation of the Republican government‘s minority policies was relatively weak because the government was constantly battling various warlords, the fast-growing Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945. The one area that the ROC government did devote some energy to was on national education. As a result, a network of primary and secondary schools were set up in minority areas to teach ―modern education, citizenship, Han language, vocational skills, and hygiene.‖35 While there was one area that the ROC government permitted some minority power was the set-up of a Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau (蒙藏委员会) to manage affairs related with Mongolia and Tibet,36 even these efforts were cut short. In 1946 the Chinese Civil War broke out, and by 1949, Chiang, together with his troops and government, was defeated by the CCP and was forced to flee to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. During its competition for power with the Nationalist Party (KMT), and especially during its early defeats and the Long March of 1934 and 1935 through the rough terrain of Southwest China, the CCP and its troops came into direct contact with various ethnic minority groups living there Colin Mackerras, China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (Hong Kong, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 59. 34 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 35 Dreyer, China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China, p. 18. 36 This Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau was modeled on the Qing‘s Court of Colonial Affairs (理蕃 院). In the Republican government, the bureau first became a separate ministry, but later was downgraded to a commission. Interestingly, this Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau still exists today in Taiwan. 33 25 for the first time. The realization of how diverse China actually was and the need to garner the support of various ethnic minority groups greatly influenced how the CCP‘s general policies towards ethnic minorities were formulated. Inspired and influenced by the ―success model‖ of the Soviet Union, the CCP decided to adopt a political structure for the PRC-to-be that would grant ethnic minorities certain rights of autonomy and self government, although the clause for ethnic minorities to pursue self-determination as existed in the Soviet Constitution was later dropped.37 In September 1949, right before the PRC was to be formally established, the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Congress passed a Provisional Constitution for the PRC—the Common Program. Under the Common Program, Article 53 guarantees ethnic minorities the rights to develop and use their native languages and scripts. It also promised to create writing systems for those minorities that did not have a written language, and to standardize oral and writing languages where various forms existed within the same ethnic minority group. It also stipulated that the government should assist different ethnic minority groups in those tasks.38 The first PRC Constitution of 1954, the1952 General Program of the PRC for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy, and the 1953 Electoral Law all specifically provided for proportional minority membership in legislative bodies, and pledged that ethnic minorities should have equal rights vis-à-vis the majority Han Chinese and that Han chauvinism towards ethnic minorities should be prohibited.39 Also in the 1954 Constitution, the rights of ethnic minorities to use and develop their native languages and 37 Originally, in the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet founded in 1931, there was a statement saying that all minorities living within the territory of China enjoy the full right of self-determination. However, this explicit right of secession was dropped from the Chinese Soviet Constitution in 1935. See Mackerras, China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century, p. 72. 38 Minglang Zhou, "The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People's Republic of China since 1949," Bilingual Research Journal 25, no. 1/2 (2001): p. 153. 39 Barry Sautman, "Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints," Law & Policy 21, no. 3 (1999): pp. 287-88. 26 the obligation of their local governments to use their languages were affirmed.40 By the end of 1950s, the Chinese government had set up 5 provincial-level autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefectures, and 105 autonomous counties. When the CCP first came into power, the new government‘s knowledge of ethnic minorities was still very much limited. In order to design and implement policies targeted at ethnic minorities, the first thing the government needed to do was to build a thorough understanding of the situations facing each ethnic minority. Thus in the 1950s, the government started the Ethnic Identification Project (民族识别), which was considered as ―the most thoroughgoing definition program in China‘s history.‖41 At the very beginning, the government publically solicited applications from all sectors of society for ethnic minority status. When the government received more than 400 applications by groups that demanded to be registered as ethnic minorities, the government was caught quite unprepared and didn‘t have the knowledge to judge whether some of the groups were actually just Han Chinese, or whether they were ethnic minorities but should be part of a larger group.42 Thus, the government sent hundreds of thousands of researchers, mainly ethnologists, historians, and linguists, as well as party cadres to all corners of society to investigate and verify the minority status of these groups. The standard they used to evaluate a certain group‘s ethnic identity was borrowed from Joseph Stalin‘s four characteristics for nationality: common history, language, economy, and psychological nature. But in many cases traditional Han folk categories were also consulted, and sometimes also gave weight to people‘s own ethnic 40 Zhou, "The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People's Republic of China since 1949," p. 153. Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," p. 23. 42 Ralph A. Litzinger, Other Chinas: The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 7. 41 27 consciousness.43 As a result of these investigations and categorizations, initially 55 groups were identified and recognized as such, including the majority Han. And in 1979, one more group—the Jinuo—was added to the list to complete the current 56. According to the 2000 Census, however, there are still 734,438 people with non-identified ethnic identities, and many groups are still applying for recognition.44 The CCP‘s ethnic identification project certainly provided grounds for the Chinese government to better control, manage, and coordinate ethnic minority affairs. Nonetheless, it also represented the CCP‘s Marxist vision of human society‘s historical development and its self-acclaimed goal of ―helping‖ various ethnic minorities to achieve a universal standard of progress and modernity in socialist China. The core of its vision and discourse on ethnic minority social structure and culture centers on the CCP‘s adoption of the social evolutionary theories developed by the American sociologist Lewis Henry Morgan. Morgan asserted that the development of human history proceeds everywhere in distinct stages, with each stage consisting of a complex of related cultural traits, and that people who display certain sorts of cultural traits must be representative of the particular stage in which those traits occur.45 In this way, the Chinese government was able to identify at what stage of historical development various ethnic minority groups were—be it the primitive, slave, or feudal stage. For example, the Yi was classified as a slave stage society, while the Tibetans were thought to be at the beginning of the feudal stage. And most conveniently, the CCP put the majority Han as the group (together with perhaps the Ethnic Korean Joseonjok and the Manchus) as the one that had Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," p. 23; Litzinger, Other Chinas: The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging, p 8; Gladney, Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects, p. 9. 44 The Chinese National Census data can be accessed at www.chinadataonline.org. 45 Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," p. 16. 43 28 progressed furthest into the feudal stage. It was then the duty for the most ―developed‖ Han to help the lesser societies to progress and march together towards socialism. There is the common saying that the Han Chinese is the older brother of the Chinese nation (汉 族是老大哥). This tension between emphasizing ethnic equality on one hand while prioritizing the Han Chinese as the leading force has been a dominant theme in China‘s ethnic politics. This paved the way for the rationale that the government as well as the Han majority have the responsibility to help the ―underdeveloped‖ ethnic minorities, whether with its efforts to help the minorities standardize or create new language scripts or sending down Han youth and cadres to minority areas to ―help‖ the locals. During the early years of the PRC, the CCP‘s policies towards ethnic minorities were relatively pluralistic and tolerant. First, the government standardized several ethnic minority written languages and created new scripts for groups that did not have written languages. For example, the government first revised eight writing systems: Kazak, Kirgiz, and Uighur, based on Cyrillic script; Jingpo, Lahu, and Miao based on the Roman alphabet; and Dai, based on Indic script.46 Later, 18 new writing systems were created for various ethnic minority groups, usually using the Roman alphabet for Southern minorities and Cyrillic scripts for northern minorities.47 Second, the government promulgated policy guidelines about minority language usage and started to promote bilingual education. In 1952, the government‘s Implementation Program of Autonomous 46 Zhou, "The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People's Republic of China since 1949," p. 155. The original intension to use the Cyrillic scripts was to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union, since many ethnic minority groups in the north and northwest spread across the Sino-Soviet borders. However, with the breakup of the Sino-Soviet relations in late 1950s, those Cyrillic scripts were dropped from usage. For example, initially Cyrillic was adopted for the Mongols in China in order to strengthen communication with the Mongolia People‘s Republic (a Soviet satellite and adopted Cyrillic for its language), but later the government decided to switch back to the traditional Mongol script, as it is still used till this day. 47 29 Governance in Minority Regions required local autonomous governments to use minority languages in official business, education, and cultural activities.48 Also, the government issued guidelines about practices of bilingual education in three different types of minority communities, depending upon the contemporary scale of language usage and whether writing systems were available for teaching.49 Third, the land reforms carried out by the CCP in most Han areas were not immediately carried out in minority areas. Indeed, the program carried out in the minority areas was called Democratic Reforms (民 改革) instead of Land Reforms (土改). There were several reasons for such a delay. One is the idea that many minority groups were still not ready for the ―landlord economy‖ stage, so land reforms were not appropriate. Another reason was the CCP‘s need to appease local leaders in minority areas and to court their support. By delaying land reform the CCP enabled local leaders to hold onto their previous land tenures for much longer than their Han counterparts. As a result, the Democratic Reforms carried out in ethnic minority areas were not as violent as the Land Reforms in most Han areas, where landlords were often violently struggled and persecuted.50 This pluralistic approach towards ethnic minority affairs did not, however, last very long. Coinciding with the rise of political radicalization when Mao Zedong started the Anti-Rightist campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and ultimately the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government rolled back many of its accommodationist policies towards ethnic minorities and initiated more dramatic efforts to integrate and assimilate various ethnic minorities. In one speech made by Mao on ―Ten Relationships‖ how to 48 Zhou, "The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People's Republic of China since 1949," p. 153. Ibid.: p. 155. 50 Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, p. 50. 49 30 build socialism, he stated that Han chauvinism should be fought against, but local nationalism should also be fought against.51 In 1958, an editorial made by the Minority Culture and Education Department of the State Commission on Nationality Affairs argued that in ethnic minority communities Mandarin Chinese (Putonghua) should be taught in primary schools, all students should learn Mandarin Chinese, and Mandarin Chinese should be used in literacy classes for ethnic minorities.52 Thus, Mandarin Chinese started to be promoted nationwide, and bilingual education for ethnic minorities were either stopped totally or dramatically sidelined. During this period, for example, in Mongolian communities Mandarin Chinese became the language of instruction in most primary and secondary schools; and in Tibetan communities Mandarin Chinese became the language of instruction in most primary and secondary schools while Tibetan was given only supplementary status.53 The Cultural Revolution, which ran from 1966 to 1976, was a particular disaster for the CCP‘s ethnic minority policies. At the time, the concept that ethnic minorities were distinct from the Han majority was rejected. The party came to believe that minorities should be treated in the same way as the Han, and by granting ethnic minorities special treatment, it would hinder the assimilation process of the former into the greater Chinese society.54 Thus, all agencies for minorities were disbanded and passages dealing with minority autonomy in the constitution were eliminated. Autonomous units were dissolved in many places, and ethnic minority leaders were X Liu, and Zhang C. , Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhuyao Lindaoren Lun Minzu Wenti (Speeches on Nationalities Issues by Chinese Communist Party Leaders) (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, 1994), pp. 120-21. 52 Zhou, "The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People's Republic of China since 1949," pp. 159-60. 53 Ibid.: pp. 161-62. 54 Thomas Heberer, China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation? (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. , 1989), p. 25. 51 31 deposed, struggled, and in many cases persecuted. Most damaging of all is the thinking that ―Four Old Things‖ (四旧) —old thinking, old culture, old morality, and old customs—should be ―smashed.‖55 As a result, many ethnic minority holidays, traditional cultural customs and relics were banned or destroyed. During the Cultural Revolution, ethnic minority cultures were heavily repressed. Monasteries, mosques, churches, and other places of worship were shut down; monks and other clergy were forced to disband, and in many cases were forced to ―secularize‖ (还俗). For example, the 10th Panchen Lama was forced to marry. Most monasteries in Tibet were destroyed.56 Although one could argue that this mass-scale cultural destruction and political repression occurred both in ethnic minority areas and Han Chinese areas, it is undeniable that the sufferings of ethnic minorities during the Cultural Revolution were the most excessive. In ethnic minority areas, the Cultural Revolution was perceived as political as well as ethnic persecution, since the state could easily be equated with the majority Han Chinese. Political movements such as the Cultural Revolution inevitably took upon the characteristics of ethnic conflicts. For example, in Inner Mongolia, there was a mass purge of Mongol elites because the Mongol leader Ulanhu and the so called underground ―Revolutionary People‘s Party of Inner Mongolia‖ were accused of having separatist goals. According to certain statistics, an estimated 16,222 Mongol were killed.57 During Ibid., p. 26. About the political chaos and cultural destruction in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution, there have been debates about the participation of Tibetans during the Cultural Revolution. See Lixiong Wang, "Reflections on Tibet," New Left Review 14, no. March-April (2002), Shakya Tsering, "Blood in the Snows," New Left Review 15, no. May-June (2002). 57 Heberer, China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation? , p. 27. 55 56 32 this era relations between the Han and various ethnic minorities were extremely tense, and many of the wounds from this period would take a long time to heal.58 The end of Cultural Revolution and the emergence of more pragmatic leadership within the CCP after the death of Mao heralded the return to more pluralistic ethnic minority policies. First, efforts were made to readdress the wrongs and atrocities committed during the Cultural Revolution in ethnic minority areas. Many members of the old minority elites were restored to their previous positions in local government, the People‘s Congress, and/or the People‘s Political Consultative Conference. Second, the government started legal reforms to provide more institutionalized autonomy and rights for various ethnic minority groups. The 1982 Constitution, still in use today, elaborates a wide range of minority rights to be realized through national and local legislatures.59 The Constitution specially states that ethnic equality is to be cherished and prohibits bignation chauvinism, a.k.a. Han chauvinism. In 1984, the National People‘s Congress passed the Law on Regional Autonomy (LRA) (民族区域自治法) whereby autonomy areas are empowered to adapt, modify, or supplement national laws according to local conditions.60 In the LRA, more power was given to autonomous areas especially in the areas of education, culture, environment, health care, and family planning. One must note, however, that ethnic minority autonomous areas do not have absolute power in lawmaking. Their legislation should not contradict national laws and in many instances must 58 For example, during my field research in Inner Mongolia, one Mongol informant conveyed to me that, before the Cultural Revolution, the Mongol-Han relationship was in general quite good, and inter-marriages were regular occurrences. However, after the Cultural Revolution, the relationship between the two had deteriorated greatly. It wasn‘t until recent years that things have improved between the two groups. Another Mongol informant, a Mongolian literature professor at a university in Inner Mongolia, also pointed out the continuing popularity of ―scar literature‖ (伤痕文学)，a school of writing that specifically focuses upon the atrocities and sufferings during the Cultural Revolution, among the Mongols till this day. 59 Sautman, "Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints," p. 288. 60 Ibid.: p. 289. 33 be approved by higher law-making bodies. Despite these restrictions, the LRA does provide legal ground for some forms of ―soft‖ autonomy. As Barry Sautman notes, ethnic minority autonomous area legislatures ―do have some independent authority and most local deputies are minority people.‖61 There are three main areas in the LRA that directly address preferential treatment for ethnic minorities. First is the call for preferential hiring and promotion of ethnic minorities in enterprises, government institutions, and public security forces. Second, addressing the thorny issue of family planning, Article 44 of LRA states that ethnic minority autonomous areas will be subject to more lenient family planning measures. For example, whereas urban Han Chinese couples are permitted to have only one child, urban ethnic minority couples are allowed to have two children. In rural areas, ethnic minorities are even allowed to have more than two children. This is one of the reasons that according to recent census data, the growth rate of ethnic minority population in China has been faster than that of the Han Chinese.62 Third, in the areas of language use and education, bilingualism is once again permitted and promoted, and certain guidelines about preferential admission of minority students to secondary and tertiary schools have been implemented.63 One of the main flaws and limits of the PRC laws on ethnic minority autonomy and rights is that they are usually very vague and too general. There is also a lack of effective supervision of the actual implementation and enforcement of these laws. Although it is ―facile to accuse that minority rights are systematically denied in the Ibid.: p. 294. Dudley L. Jr. Poston, "The Minority Nationalities of China" (paper presented at the International Population Conference /Congrès international de la population, Montreal, 1993). 63 However, one has to note that the LRA only give out very general guidelines, therefore, real practices on preferential education vary a lot in different ethnic minority autonomous areas. 61 62 34 PRC‖, there are many areas that improvements can and should be made.64 Those laws that aim to protect ethnic minority autonomy and rights are increasingly becoming inadequate as China‘s economy and society have changed at too fast a pace. Many laws were made when China still had a planned economy but now China‘s economy has moved beyond a state-orientation to a more market-based model. Thus there are situations where these laws cannot achieve their intended goals. For example, although the government can guarantee certain percentage of ethnic hiring in government institutions, there is no legislation to systematically require private business to follow similar quota systems in their hiring practices. As a result, discrimination against ethnic minorities in private businesses‘ hiring practices is reported to be quite serious.65 Also, previously university students would automatically be assigned jobs by the government, but this practice is no longer the case as the government has started to retreat from the economy. Ethnic minority students thus have to compete with Han Chinese students in jobs that usually require substantial Mandarin Chinese language capabilities. Even though there are still preferential admission policies for ethnic minorities at the university level, there has not been effective and corresponding state legislation to protect ethnic minority students after they finish university education. Meanwhile, with the loosening of the state‘s control over society, people have great freedom in terms of moving from one place to another to look for jobs. One consequence is the flood of economic migrants from Han Chinese areas to ethnic minority areas, either doing small business, trade, or service jobs and so forth. It would 64 Sautman, "Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints," p. 300. The main reason is many private businesses are owned by Han Chinese, and often one would notice in hiring ads that it would state that the company such and such is only looking for Han Chinese applications etc. 65 35 take little time for one to notice the significant presence of Han Chinese in ethnic minority autonomous areas. It is safe to argue that ethnic minorities in China these days faces great population pressure in their home territories. Another side effect of Han Chinese migration into ethnic minority areas is the increasing assimilation of ethnic minorities into an encroaching sea of Han Chinese. One common topic heatedly debated among ethnic minority intellectuals is the so called process of ―Hanification‖ (汉 ) among younger generations. It is very hard for younger generation ethnic minority people to grow up in a monolingual environment. Mass media, modern communication channels, pop culture, and all the conveniences and ―fun stuff‖ offered by contemporary Chinese society all require one, especially the young, to conform, acculturate, and/or assimilate into the majority Han Chinese language and culture. Under the hegemony of the monolithic capitalist economy, and without enough state legislation to protect ethnic minority group‘s cultural rights, nowadays it is very hard to resist the assimilative power of Han Chinese language and culture. After this brief review of the background of politics of ethnicity in China, now let us turn to the theory chapter. 36 Chapter Two Ethnicity, External Kin and Ethnic Mobilization Introduction Ethnic conflict has been a major source of intra-state conflict in many parts of the world. Especially since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic rise in ethnic conflict both in terms of frequency as well as intensity. The violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by bloody genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo. The war in Chechnya during the democratic transition in Russia was a sign of the uneasy tension between a ―sovereign‖ state upholding its territorial integrity and the ―grieved‖ minority group striving for secession and independence. Even if these violent breakdowns of states and secessionist warfare are rare, ethnic politics remain one of the most contentious phenomena that can be extremely divisive and violent even in conventional democratic settings. Elections in India, for example, often come with clashes between the Hindus and Muslims, and many times they generate lots of causalities. Well-established Western democracies are not immune to ethnic politics either. The ―Quebecois Independence‖ question is still part of the Canadian political discourse. The tension between the Walloon and Flemish communities in Belgium can sometimes threaten continuation of the Belgian state. Not to mention the occasional ―terrorist‖ acts in Northern Ireland and Basque country. The plethora of ethnic conflicts and the supposedly ―tenacious‖ nature of ethnic politics have fomented a fast-expanding literature in comparative politics about the nature of ethnicity, nationalism, and the related political processes. In the vast literature on civil 37 war and violence, democratic bargaining, social movements, and so forth, ethnicity has commonly been incorporated as one of the main independent, or intervening, variables in people‘s theoretical frameworks. However, there are still many debates and disagreements regarding the nature of ethnicity, and consequently the causal mechanisms for group conflicts. The divisions between primordialism and constructivism, loosely defined, remain salient. Indeed, views that ethnic identity is stable, fixed, and ―ancient old‖ versus those that argue ethnic identity is situational and constantly changing, can have tremendous implications on how we understand and explain ethnic politics. Furthermore, there are also contentions about whether ethnic conflict should be considered as a simple dyadic relationship between the domestic majority and minority, or whether should consider the role of external patrons. This discussion inevitably blurs the line between comparative politics and international relations, and can have deep impact on the policy-making community who aim to ―help‖ and ―solve‖ the ethnic conflict issue. This chapter thus first serves as a review of the comparative literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization. It foremost engages the debates between primordialists and constructivists about the nature of ethnicity and various theories derived therefrom upon ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization. In particular, it engages Fredrik Barth‘s view of ethnicity that emphasizes boundary construction and maintenance.1 It treats ethnicity as a category with different layers of identification, rather than a stable and fixed entity. Ethnic group boundaries are ―negotiated, defined, and produced through Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1969). 1 38 social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities.‖2 It calls for special attention to the interaction between internal ascription and external categorization, and the process of how different layers of identification are activated and politicized under different conditions. Following that, it offers an interpretation of the comparative literature on ethnic mobilization for more autonomy by using the ethnicity-as-category approach. It demonstrates that most constructivist writings on ethnic mobilization are consistent with the ethnicity-as-category approach. Subsequently, it argues for the need to incorporate the international dimension, especially external kin of the minority group, into our theorization about ethnic conflict and mobilization. There is a great theoretical logic in combining the ethnicity-as-category approach with a triadic relationship model that emphasizes the dynamic field of relationship among the ethnic minority, their external kin, and the majority state. Finally this chapter presents a theoretical model of how ethnic mobilization can occur in an interactive process involving the ethnic minority, their external kin, and the current state in which the ethnic minority group resides. What is Ethnicity and Why does it Matter? Comparative literature on ethnicity can be broadly demarcated between two camps which have different assumptions about the nature of ethnicity. On one side is the so-called primordialist view that generally conceives ethnic identity as given, stable and fixed. On the other are the constructivists who dispute the stable and fixed nature of ethnic identity and espouse the view that ethnic identity is constructed, fluid, and can change under Joane Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," Social Problems 41, no. 1 (1994): p. 152. 2 39 certain social, economic, and political processes.3 Certainly, as some scholars point out, the primordialist view is more often ―a commonsensical assumption informing arguments about other questions than as an explicit argument in itself,‖4 and certainly there are degradations and overlaps in how different approaches actually treat ethnicity. In order to facilitate our discussion, I will present this discussion as if there were a dichotomous divide between the so-called primordialist and constructivist approaches. The caveat here then is not to put different scholars into the ―wrong‖ camp against their own wishes, but rather the words below serve as a broad literature review of the common approaches. The ―pedigree‖ of the primordialist conception of the nature of ethnicity might be traced to the writings of the German Romantics of the 18th century. The linguistic nationalism of the 18th century German Romantics as proposed by Herder, Humboldt, and Fichte, for example, view human beings by nature as ―belonging to fixed ethnic communities which are, in turn, defined by the constitutive elements of ‗language, blood and soil‘.‖5 In this view, people who speak different languages are separated from each other by the force of nature, and a common language defines common characteristics of human beings. Each ethnic group thus represents ―a historically grown, uniquely shaped follower in the garden of human cultures.‖6 This view of the naturalness of ethnic groups has implications for certain nationalist ideologies, for which it is considered sufficient for 3 This division between the primordialist and construcitivist camps is by no means the only way to carve up the field. For example, Henry Hale categorizes different approaches along the spectrum of whether different schools of theories conceive the nature of ethnicity as conflictural or epiphenomenal. Based on how one thinks about the nature of ethnicity, Hale organizes the comparative literature on ethnicity along the assumption of whether one thinks ethnicity as ―hard‖ conflictural, ―soft‖ conflictural, ―ultra-soft‖ conflictual, or toally epiphenomenal. Henry E. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 8. 4 Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics," p. 7. 5 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), p. 29. 6 Andreas Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory," American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 4 (2008): p. 971. 40 people who speak the same language, or people who have the same culture, to upset all existing political arrangements and have their own state.7 However, one has to point out that this kind of hard-core primordialist view of the absolute division of human beings is no longer proposed with great fanfare in the academic community, with perhaps the exception of Van den Berghe, who argues that ethnic groups are natural because they are extensions of biological kin groups selected based on genetic evolution.8 Most proponents of the primordialist view these days would accept that one‘s ethnic identity was constructed or acquired at a certain point in history. However, once acquired, ethnic identities tend to be stable and unchanging. For example, Clifford Geertz, who is most commonly credited with primordialism, agrees that the primordial attachment can stem from the ―assumed givens of social existence,‖ but still ―one is bound to one‘s kinsman, one‘s neighbor … as the result not merely of personal affection, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligations, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.‖9 Thus, what really defines the primordialist view is not so much the origins of one‘s ethnic identity, but rather that one‘s ethnic identity is immutable for the present and future. As Van Evera points out, ―our ethnic identities are not stamped on our genes, so they must be socially constructed,‖ however, ―ethnic identities, while constructed, are hard to reconstruct once they form.‖10 The implication for such a conception is that individuals have a single ethnic identity, which can be unambiguously identified, and is Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), pp. 68-9. Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon. 9 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 259. 10 Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!," p. 20. 7 8 41 fixed for the long term. Conceptualized this way, it is thus possible to treat ethnic groups as uniform and stable, and take them as ―exogenous variables in our theories linking them to political, social and economic outcomes, since they exist prior to and independent of these outcomes.‖11 The fundamental disagreement between the primordialists and constructivists is this fixed and stable nature of ethnicity. To the constructivists, ethnic identity is fluid and can be constantly changing. One‘s ethnic identity is endogenous to specific social, economic and political processes. Depending upon specific causal variables, individuals can have multiple layers of identifications. Thus, what is theoretically interesting is to probe how ―changes in the value of these causal variables‖ can ―lead to changes in individual identifications.‖12 Ethnicity should not be treated as an exogenous variable because ethnic groups are not fixed entities, and the ―components‖ of ethnic groups cannot be taken for granted. Kanchan Chandra identifies four variants of constructivist approaches to ethnic identity construction and change. Each variant identifies a different set of variables and mechanisms for identity change. The first variant is the so-called ―modernist school‖ of nationalism, represented by Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Karl Deutsch. It is the modernization process that leads to ethnic and national group formation. Nations, in similar ways ethnic groups, are not historically immanent entities; on the contrary, it is the imperatives of the great social economic changes that fomented the formation of national and ethnic identities. People‘s identities are the ―local political and 11 12 Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics," p. 7. Ibid. 42 psychological consequences of macrohistorical forces.‖13 Geller, for example, points out that it was industrialization and urbanization that made it imperative and possible for a common culture to emerge.14 Similarly, Anderson talks about how print capitalism made it possible for vernacular languages to become the foundation for the imagination of a common national community.15 Deutsch on the other hand contends that the industrialization process and the rise of modern nation states brought formerly isolated people together, and facilitated the formation of cultural homogeneity.16 The second variant emphasizes the role of political institutions in the construction and reconstruction of ethnic identities. External institutional structure, especially the modern state, is the key variable for identity formation and change. For example, before the late 19th century, most people outside of Paris did not speak French, and it was through the work of the modern state machine, through such societal forces as education, conscription, and violence, that turned various diverse peasant communities into Frenchmen.17 In research on colonial and post-colonial settings, institutions of the colonial state oftentimes were credited for ethnic group identity formation and social division.18 Through the processes of labeling, categorization and different treatment of subject groups, colonial rule ―transformed antecedent patterns of social identification and 13 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): p. 851. 14 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism . (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 16 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966). 17 Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). 18 For example, David D. Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 43 shaped patterns of ethnic mobilization.‖19 For example, Gerard Prunier, in his book on genocide in Rwanda, shows that the labels ―Tutsi‖ and ―Hutu‖ were primarily a class difference rather than ethnic ones in pre-colonial times.20 In non-colonial settings, modern nation states have also undertaken various efforts to identify and categorize people. Censuses, for example, are considered powerful instruments for the modern nation state to create the sense of the composition and divisions among the population along ethnic, racial, and cultural lines.21 In the former Soviet Union as well as contemporary China, both states carried out detailed and tenuous ethnic identification work that categorized groups according to Stalin‘s four criteria for nationality. On ID cards, passports, and other official documents, one is constantly reminded of his or her ethnic identity, and we can certainly argue that these assigned categories in various ways and to different extents have been accepted and internalized. Political institutions work their way by tying one‘s ethnic identity with public policies and redistributing of resources and life opportunities. Affirmative action policies in various countries would thus arguably harden or at least maintain the division among different groups, and keep the current group boundaries salient.22 Also political institutions can shape political coalition formation along different ethnic cleavages. For example, in his study on political coalition formation in Zambia, Daniel Posner Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, "Ethnicity as Cognition," Theory and Society 33 (2004): p. 34. 20 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 21 For example, see Silvana Patriarca, Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David I. Kertzer, and Dominique Arel, Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 22 For example, we can think of the relationship between affirmative action policies and caste in India along such a line of inquiry. See Frank De Zwart, "The Logic of Affirmative Action: Caste, Class, and Quotas in India," Acta Sociologica 43, no. 3 (2000). 19 44 demonstrates how political institutions shape ethnic cleavages either along linguistic or tribal lines, depending upon the nature of the country‘s electoral institutions, whether it operates with a multiparty coalition or single party rule.23 It is fair to argue that for a great many countries, state policies and political institutions have played an extremely powerful role in the construction of group identities, with long-lasting impacts. The third variant traces ethnic identity formation to the mass level when individuals respond to economic incentives and compete for scarce resources. For example, Michael Hechter argues that ethnic solidarity is primarily due to the existence of a hierarchical cultural division of labor that promotes reactive group formation. When one‘s life chances and social mobility are dependent upon inclusion in a particular ethnic group, such as occupational specializations, then the subjective significance of membership in that group might be strengthened.24 Suzan Olzak also talks about how job competition among different ethnic groups can heighten group differences and increase the chances for group antagonism and conflict.25 A different approach in this variant is to think of individuals who can pick and choose what identity they want to take, based on their instrumental calculations of different economic utilities coming together with these identities. For example, David Laitin uses a game theory model to map how different language regimes emerge in Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 24 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Michael Hechter, and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements," Ethnic and Racial Studies 2, no. 3 (1979). 25 Susan Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 23 45 various countries.26 In his more recent work, Laitin offers a rational choice model to explain identity changes among the Russian speaking population in the former Soviet Republics. He argues that the chances for Russians‘ assimilation into the titular societies are greater in the Baltic countries than in either Ukraine or Kazakhstan. People are more willing to change their personal identity, in this case taking up a new linguistic identity, when they perceive it is in their interest to do so and given that other people are perceived to be doing the same thing at the same time.27 Finally, the fourth variant highlights the role of political elites in the construction and reconstruction of ethnic identities. Political elites oftentimes manipulate and mobilize the mass along ethnic lines for their personal greed, such as power and money. It is indeed a very ―instrumentalist‖ treatment of ethnicity, since here ―ethnicity and ethnic politics are seen as a function of other pursuits, as a means by which people struggle for more mundane goods like power, material resources, security, or status.‖28 For example, John Mueller points out that during the genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, it was ―thugs‖ who fomented conflicts and committed violence simply for the purpose of alcohol, money, power, and status.29 Or as Benjamin Valentino points out, in most genocidal incidents it was always a small group of ―thugs‖ who carried out the killings, rather than neighbors killing each other based on so-called ―ancient hatred.‖30 In his study of communal violence in India, Paul Brass is very suspicious of arguments 26 David D. Laitin, Stathis Kalyvas, and Carlota Solé, "Language and the Construction of States: The Case of Catalonia in Spain," Politics and Society 22, no. 1 (1994); David D. Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 27 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 28 Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World, p. 25. 29 John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000). 30 Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). 46 utilizing ethnicity as an explanatory variable, because communal violence in India is most often carried out by ―specialists, who are ready to be called out on such occasions, who profit from it, and whose activities profit others who may or may not be actually paying for the violence carried out.‖31 One pitfall for such heavy emphasis on elites is the lack of sufficient explanation of why elites are capable of manipulating and mobilizing people along ethnic lines. Why would the public follow the calls from elites? Here scholars offer divergent interpretations. Some borrow from psychological research to argue that human beings are generally more biased towards their in-group members.32 Or perhaps elites have access to private information and control the media, which allows them to manipulate their followers‘ beliefs.33 Others also argue that elites can intentionally provoke violence so as to tie the hands of the group members. As a result, ―in-group leaders increase their co-ethnics‘ demand for protection from the out-group and at the same time make sure there is no alternative set of leaders to protect them.‖34 And there is also the possibility that the mass can be blinded by the whole discourse of ethnicity and ethnic conflict that they were made to believe in the naturalness of inter-group conflict, and even violence.35 To summarize, various constructivist approaches to ethnicity take seriously the constructed nature of ethnic identities, and treat the construction process as the main area of investigation. Certainly there are still disagreements among various constructivist Paul Brass, Theft of an Idol (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 9. Henry E. Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 4 (2004): p. 465. 33 Rui J. P. De Figueiredo, Jr., and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear," in Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Barbara F. Walter, and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Jack Snyder, and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security 21, no. 2 (1996); Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," p. 854. 34 Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," p. 855. 35 Bruce Kapferer, Legends of People/Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988); Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," p. 855. 31 32 47 schools about the stableness of ethnic identities. Some might argue that although entirely constructed in nature, ethnic identity once acquired tends to remain stable, at least in the short term. There are also others who would contend that one‘s ethnic identity can change even in a short period of time. Despite these disagreements, what the constructivists have in common is that they do not treat ethnic identity as a fixed entity. Rather, ethnic identity is conceptualized as fluid and can always change. For researches on ethnicity and ethnic politics, as Chandra advocates, attention should be paid towards the investigation of how different group categories are arrived at and the mechanisms of how group boundaries are drawn and redrawn in one way not the other.36 Ethnicity as A Category This constructivist consensus about the unstableness of ethnic identity has not been taken seriously by theories on ethnic politics, especially those that link ethnicity with political and economic outcomes, such as ethnic mobilization, democratic bargaining, ethnic conflict, and so forth.37 But when people start to talk about ethnic politics, the primordialist assumption about group stability and fixed boundary creeps into one‘s theorization. When we talk about group A and group B being in conflict with each other, how can we be sure that every member of group A and group B is actually in conflict with member of the other group? Or how can we assume that every member of a certain ethnic group has one single preference in ethnic bargaining? Indeed, Kanchan Chandra points out that many propositions coming out of the ethnic bargaining literature, such as the assumption of ethnic demands as indivisible and zero-sum cannot be sustained 36 Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics," p. 10. Ibid.: p. 7. Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability, and Social Choice Theory," Politics and Society 29, no. 3 (2001): p. 337. 37 48 because we cannot assume the uniformity of group interest, nor can we assume fixed and stable group boundaries.38 If we cannot assume the uniformity of group members and the stability of group boundaries, according to this view, it would be meaningless to talk about group interests and ethnic bargaining. However, new problems arise. Can we talk about ethnic groups and link them to political and economic outcomes? Or how can we explain anything related to ethnicity? These indeed are fair criticisms. But what does it leave us? Since nothing can be taken for granted, it seems meaningless to use the concept of ethnicity or ethnic groups. Shall we drop the concept of ethnicity altogether? For Chandra, it seems reasonable to discard the concept of ethnicity totally. She proposes redefining ethnicity as simply certain attributes based on descent. Thus defined, ―ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists.‖39 Or for Brubaker, we should not be talking about the concept of ―group‖ anymore, because by treating people as substantial groups would only reify them. Instead, ethnicity should be thought of as a cognitive perspective, or schema, of how people view the world.40 But are these propositions overstated? Have they gone too far? As Henry Hale contends, they seem to be ―throwing out the baby with the bathwater.‖41 Here I would suggest the value of using Fredrik Barth‘s concept of ethnic boundary to propose that we should think of ethnicity as a category. In his classic work 38 Chandra, "Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability, and Social Choice Theory," p. 338. Kanchan Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): p. 397. 40 Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," Archives europeenes de sociologie (European Journal of Sociology) 43, no. 2 (2002). Brubaker, "Ethnicity as Cognition." 41 Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World, p. 30. 39 49 on ethnic groups and boundaries, Barth proposes the view that it is ―ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.‖42 Barth criticizes the concept of ethnic groups as fixed cultural entities. Instead, he thinks that the cultural content of an ethnic group or even group members can change, but it is still meaningful to talk about the maintenance of group boundaries and the relevance of ethnic categories. He points out that, ―categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories.‖43 With this conceptualization of ethnicity, we no longer need to assume the stable and fixed nature of ethnicity, thus satisfying the primordialist view‘s constructivist critique. On the other hand, it also makes it possible to retain the concept of ethnicity. As a category, we can talk about group A or B without assuming the fixed cultural content, uniformity of group members, or stable group boundaries. Cultural features that signal the boundary among ethnic groups can change, and the cultural characteristics of the members can be transformed, but the categorical meaning of a specific ethnic group still remains intact. This concept of ethnicity as a category has two levels of meaning. One is internal ascription and the other is external categorization. It is a dialectic process involving selfidentification and external designation – ―what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is.‖44 It is a structure-agency dialectic that involves constant negotiations and definitions of what is entailed in being a member of a specific group. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, p. 15. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 44 Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," p. 154. 42 43 50 Each individual carries certain attributes that he or she can draw upon to identify self with a certain group. At the same time, the manifestation of the meaning of these attributes depends upon the situational context. In some instances it might be language, in others it might be religion, race, physical differences, customs, behavior, and so forth. Thus, within different situations and with different audiences, one can draw upon certain attributes to either identify with or distance oneself from a group. For example, a person from southern China can identify herself as Chinese when she meets someone who is also of Chinese origin. Or she might identify herself as Asian when she interacts with a multiracial audience in North America. Or by speaking a different dialect of Chinese, she can also differentiate herself from someone from northern China. Therefore, we can think of each individual as carrying a portfolio of identifiers, or a layering of identifications, and ―as audiences change, the socially-defined array of ethnic choices open to the individual changes.‖45 This pick-and-choose process of identification can be strategic and instrumental. Based on certain incentives one can strategically engage one level of her identity categories instead of another. As Nagel points out, ―the chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual‘s perception of its meaning to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings.‖46 Back to the example above about someone with southern China background, she can identify herself as Chinese to entice a bond feeling with someone of the same national origin, perhaps to get favor or gain preference in business dealings. Or in a university setting in North America, she can present herself as Asian to gain membership to some Asian 45 46 Ibid. Ibid.: p. 155. 51 organizations. Or she can emphasize her southern origin to distance herself from someone from northern China based on certain pre-held stereotypes or prejudices. Thus, in different situational contexts one can have some freedom in terms of which level of her identity repertoire she wants to engage, and which level of engagement is utilized can oftentimes be strategic. However, this is not to say that individuals can have total freedom in who they can identify with. There are certain limits to the identity repertoire one can engage. As Chandra and Wilkinson argue, all individuals have a repertoire of nominal ethnic identity categories, which ―consists of all the meaningful membership rules that can be fashioned from an individual‘s given set of descent-based attributes.‖47 Given the fact that every individual has a certain set of attributes, the choices are not totally free and random. Further, one‘s ability to engage one level of her identity repertoire is deeply shaped and constrained by external mechanisms such as classification and categorization. First, we need to emphasize the pivotal role of social encountering. Barth especially emphasizes the interaction aspect of group boundary construction. He argues that ―ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundation on which embracing social systems are built.‖48 Group boundaries are demarcated only when group members encounter others. During this process group members realize either how similar or how different they are from the people they come into interaction with. Thus, we need to realize that the external aspect is extremely vital for group boundary construction. Oftentimes, it is the ―other‖ that defines the ―self‖. Kanchan Chandra, and Steven Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect Of "Ethnicity"," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4/5 (2008): p. 520. 48 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, p. 10. 47 52 Richard Jenkins, in his discussion of how ethnicity should be understood and theorized, stipulates how the important role external categorization plays in the production and reproduction of ethnic identities is. In particular, he points out the need to pay special attention to the power and authority relationship in categorization.49 Or as Andreas Wimmer argues, external constraints from the structures of the social field, such as institutions, political power, and networks of political alliances influence how group boundaries are drawn.50 As we have seen above in our discussion of the constructivist literature on ethnicity, political institutions and elites can play extremely powerful roles in the construction process of one‘s ethnic identity through the practice of imposing classification and categorization to demarcate groups. For example, we can think of various nation-building efforts carried out by modern nation states as in fact a process of eliminating ―internal‖ boundaries while creating or maintaining ―external‖ boundaries.51 Various preferential treatments of ethnic groups would also create new boundaries or strengthen existing ones. In India, for example, the legislation to grant special representation for the ―Scheduled Castes‖ or ―Untouchables‖ not only led to the creation of a collective identity for the ―Untouchables,‖ but also contributed to the strengthening of commonality among the upper caste Indians who resent those preferential treatments for the former.52 And in situations where the pre-existing boundaries among groups are Richard Jenkins, "Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorization and Power," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 2 (1994): p. 197. 50 Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory," p. 990. 51 Daniele Conversi, "Nationalism, Boundaries, and Violence," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): p. 564. 52 Lloyd Rudolph, and Susanne Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture," p. 157. 49 53 porous, political elites can provoke violence against an ―out-group‖ so as to strengthen the boundaries between the ‗in-group‖ and the ―out-group.‖53 To treat ethnicity as a category and emphasize its boundary-based nature thus provides a fruitful approach to studying the politics of ethnicity. Its emphasis on both agency and structure offers a refreshing way to investigate why a certain ethnic identification is highlighted in what conditions. It allows certain strategic choices at the individual level but also pays great attention to the constraining forces set up by the external environment. Chandra and Wilkinson, in a similar fashion, propose that we treat separately ethnic structure and ethnic practice. The former refers to the repertoire of identity categories, and the latter refers to the activation of a certain category in specific conditions, such as in private life versus political life, institutionalized context versus non-institutionalized ones, electoral context versus non-electoral context, and so forth.54 It opens room for systematic theory building for studies on the politics of ethnicity, such as ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization. What follows is therefore an effort to use the ethnicity-as-category approach to explain ethnic mobilization; in particular, why are some ethnic groups more politically organized than others for more autonomy? The point here is not to refute that other theories on ethnic mobilization for more autonomy are wrong. Instead, it demonstrates the usefulness and applicability of the current approach. 53 Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): p. 81. 54 Chandra and Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect Of "Ethnicity"," pp. 525-6. 54 Ethnic Mobilization for More Autonomy Constructivist theories on ethnic mobilization for more autonomy vary according to where the key explanatory variable(s) are placed. As we have seen in our discussion of the four variants of the constructivist approach to ethnicity as laid out by Chandra, except for the first one that emphasizes meta-historical forces such as the modernization process which does not attempt to explain short-term changes such as ethnic mobilizations, the other three variants all attempt to explain under what conditions ethnic groups can be mobilized. For some, it is institutions, others emphasize the role of elites, and still others emphasize rational behavior at the mass level. Here I will illustrate how these three approaches to ethnic mobilization for more autonomy are consistent with the ethnicity-ascategory approach. The intent here is to look at how the interaction between internal ascription and external categorization produce incentives for boundaries to be drawn in a way that favors mobilization for more autonomy. Since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there has been a burgeoning literature linking institutional design and state dissolution. For example, Valerie Bunce, in her account of the demise of multi-ethnic states, such as the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, traces the roots of state dissolution in these three countries to the historical development of the national federal states. To Bunce, the reason these three states disintegrated while other former Communist countries did not should be attributed to the nature of the national federal states where minorities were endowed with institutional resources with clear boundaries and national leaders.55 It was the institutional structure of the national federalism that Valerie J. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 55 55 demarcated clear boundaries, both territorially and ethnically, among people that provided the foundation for secessionist movements.56 Dmitry Gorenburg, in his discussion of ethnic mobilization in the Russian Federation, argues that ethnic institutions not only shaped the preferences and tactics of the cultural elites, they also helped create social ties and networks of communications through which nationalist messages were spread and new activists were recruited.57 In a study of autonomous movements in the Caucasus, Svante Cornell also points out that ―the institution of autonomous regions is conducive to secessionism because institutionalizing and promoting the separate identity of a titular group increases that group‘s cohesion and willingness to act.‖58 Henry Hale also argues that it is far more likely for ethnofederal states with a core ethnic region to experience state breakdown than other ethnofederal states without a core ethnic region. It is much easier for a common vision of a clear bounded independent core nation state to occur in the former setting.59 Especially in the Soviet context, the state has also actively promoted titular national culture in various union republics. Moscow codified titular languages, promoted their use in administration, and used them for instruction in local schools.60 The same can be also said for example in Quebec, where French was designated for official usage 56 For similar arguments in the Soviet context, see Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991); Carol Skalnik Leff, "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States," World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999); Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). For a similar account on Canada, see Hudson Meadwell, "Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West," in Notions of Nationalism, ed. Sukumar Periwal (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995). 57 Dmitry Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 58 Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," World Politics 54, no. 2 (2000): p. 252. 59 Henry E. Hale, "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004). 60 Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World, p. 98. 56 as well as the language for schooling. Or as we have seen in the introduction chapter, since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government, despite not being a federal state, also actively promoted ethnic minority culture, codified ethnic minority languages, and set up separate ethnic minority language schools. Thus we can see those institutional structures help create a situation where clear cultural boundaries among various groups emerge. Together with the clearly demarcated territorial boundaries, ethnic groups are thus endowed with both territorial and cultural boundaries, separating them from the national majority group. If we were to borrow Gellner‘s concept of nationalism as an ideology to make the national and state boundaries congruent, then here we already have those ethnic groups with ample foundation to pursue separate statehood for themselves. Now let us examine theories that emphasize the role of political elites in promoting ethnic mobilization for more autonomy. Donald Horowitz, for example, argues that backward groups in backward regions are the most likely to pursue separatist movements. The reason is that educated elites from the backward group will gain from the opportunities provided by the creation of a new state, though the whole region will suffer if it opts for secession. Because of the negative stereotypes of the backward group and their relatively low educational achievements, elites from the group are more likely to lose out against elites from the center. As a result, elites from this group are most likely to mobilize the mass to achieve secession.61 If we use the ethnicity-as-category concept to interpret, we can argue that it was the block of elite mobility that created the boundary between the elites from the backward regions versus the ones at the center. It is Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (1981). 61 57 this sense of rejection that pushed the elites from the backward groups away from the center and mobilizes the mass to assert the group separateness. Similarly, David Laitin offers a model of elite mobility to account for variations in secessionist movements in various former Soviet Republics. Laitin points out that depending upon the role of elites at the time their territory was first incorporated into the Soviet state by the leading social and political strata at the center, we can differentiate two main models of elite mobility – most favored lord and non-most-favored lord. He then argues that because of the variations in elite mobility, different social cleavages will form within these groups, determining secessionist strategies. For example, for groups where elites received the most-favored lord status, such as the Ukrainians, the secessionist movements are marked by conflicts of interest among elites who identified with the center and those who did not, which will lead to competing strategies of advocating symbolic nationalism versus pushing thoroughly for self-determination. For groups that did not enjoy the most-favored lord status, such as the Kazaks and other Central Asians, elites from these groups are more likely to be excluded from the center, which subsequently inform those elites to push through the self-determination process.62 Political elites also have various resources to make their own ethnic group boundary more salient so that they can effectively mobilize their mass. One strategy is to frame the center-periphery relations in a way to suit the elite‘s interest to pursue their preferred outcome. For example, Henry Hale compared how different framing strategies used by leaders in Ukraine and Uzbekistan before the collapse of the Soviet Union led to different results in referendums on whether to stay within the union. Hale argues ―Ukraine‘s Kravchuk manipulated the working of referenda and exploited the ambiguity 62 Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad. 58 of words like ‗independence‘ to produce a referendum vote that he then interpreted as a mandate for complete secession. Uzbekistan‘s Karimov did nearly the opposite, exploiting terminological ambiguity and bending the wording of referenda and declarations so that he could later claim a unionist mandate.‖63 Also, political elites can use provocative methods to stir reactions from other groups to create clear group boundaries. Possibly ethnic minority elites can call for repression to provoke violence against the center so as to strengthen the boundary of its group members. All in all, elites‘ ability to mobilize the mass for more autonomy exactly lies in their use of various means to limit the choices available to the mass and to create a strong boundary between their in-group versus the out-group. Through these means, they can politicize and activate the layer of identifications for their in-group members and make it the most salient one for them, and mobilize them for more autonomy. Finally, we can also use the ethnicity-as-category approach to explain mass preference for more autonomy. There are political economy approaches that examine incentives provided by the domestic and international economic structure and probe ethnic groups‘ rational calculation of economic gains versus losses in situations of possible secession from the current state union. For example, Daniel Triesman found there is an association between ethnic separatism and advanced economic development, industrial wealth, export capacity, and natural resources in the Russian Federation. Henry Hale also points out that it is the richest, rather than the poorest, ethnic regions in the former Soviet Union which were the most eager to secede, because ―they have the Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World, p. 157. 63 59 most to lose should they be exploited by other groups who control the state.‖64 Ronald Rogowski also argues that the reason richer regions are more likely to secede is because it would be irrational for poor groups to seek statehood.65 Because of the wealth and the relatively advanced level of development in an ethnic region, it is rational for ethnic group members residing in that region to align their identification at the regional/group level. For fear of exploitation from the center, it makes great sense for the mass to emphasize their regional/ethnic identity over their union identity and rally behind the elites for more autonomy. On the other hand, if an ethnic region is poor and heavily dependent upon the center for subsidy, then individuals are less likely to favor secession.66 For example, the Baltic countries were the richest of the Soviet Union and faced the best prospect for joining the prosperous European Union. As a result they were the first to secede from the Soviet Union. Back to Hale‘s comparison between Ukraine and Uzbekistan, elites pursue different framing strategies to discern the interests of the mass, as the Ukrainians enjoyed higher levels of economic development and faced more danger of exploitation by the center than Uzbekistan.67 Thus, close examination of economic interests and rational calculation at the mass level can help explain why the mass would follow the elites to pursue more autonomy. So far we have examined various constructivist approaches to ethnic mobilization for more autonomy and we have seen that the ethnicity-as-category approach is capable of explaining why some groups are more likely to mobilize than others. It is the 64 Henry E. Hale, "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting," British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (2000): p. 32. 65 Ronald Rogowski, "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism," in New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation, ed. Edward A. Tiryakian, and Ronald Rogowski (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). 66 Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 38. 67 Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. p. 161-2. 60 interaction between institutional structure, elite strategies and mass preferences that generate clear and strong boundaries between ethnic minority groups and the majority group so as to pave the way for mobilization. Thus it is not naturally inevitable that ethnic minority groups would pursue strategies for more autonomy. Explanations are at the institutional, elite, and the mass level to examine how the ethnic group boundary is constructed and strengthened. However, there is a caveat here: it is difficult to pinpoint how much these specific variables work separately or in accordance with each other in specific cases. The situational nature of ethnicity and the complexity of ethnic boundary construction are very much dependent upon the specific contexts where ethnic groups are situated. This need to pay special attention to context also brings about a limit in the conventional literature on ethnic mobilization for more autonomy. Most theories on ethnic mobilization are concerned with domestic factors restricted within the sovereign state border. People talk about how domestic institutions, political maneuvering of elites and so forth influence the boundary construction process of ethnic groups. However, an approach to ethnicity that focuses upon context and treats ethnicity as a category should also take into account international factors. In particular, there is a need to think about how international dimensions interact with domestic ones in the identity construction process, and examine why certain layers of ethnic identification are activated instead of others. The following section attempts to combine the ethnicity-as-category approach with an aim towards international factors to theorize about ethnic mobilization, especially in situations where domestic ethnic minority groups enjoy extensive external kin relationships. 61 International Dimensions of Ethnic Boundary Construction and Group Mobilization Recently scholars have been increasingly aware of the need to look beyond domestic factors and to evaluate the role of external/international factors in inter-ethnic relations and ethnic mobilization.68 Indeed, the diffusion of ethnic conflict internationally is already a well-noted phenomenon and can have deep implications for international security. On the other hand, international factors can also influence domestic ethnic relations in profound ways. As observed by Timur Kuran, ―events and trends outside a country can have intended as well as unintended consequences for its own ethnic relations.‖69 Direct military intervention, international humanitarian aid, financial support, refugee inflows, or demonstration effects, can all have great impact on the boundary maintenance and construction process among ethnic groups and/or between the minority group and the state, which is oftentimes dominated and controlled by the majority group. It is thus meaningful and necessary to incorporate the external factors into our theorization and to examine how domestic factors interact with international ones in ethnic boundary maintenance and construction. Here I suggest that in order to understand the process of ethnic mobilization for more autonomy, it would be better to turn towards a triadic relationship model that involves domestic ethnic minorities, majority, and external kin of the minority groups. For example, see Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Lake and Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict." 69 Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Dissimilation and Its International Diffusion," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake, and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1998), p. 48. 68 62 In Nationalism Reframed, Rogers Brubaker introduces a conceptualization of nationalism as a triadic relationship between a set of new or newly reconfigured nationalizing states, the substantial, self-conscious, organized, and politically alienated national minorities in those states, and the external national ―homelands‖ of the minorities. To Brubaker, nationalism is not engendered by nations themselves, but rather should be considered as relational, and ―its dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not by the properties of collectivities.‖70 Brubaker argues that ―we should think about nation not as substance but as institutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical categories, not as entity but as contingent event.‖71 In order to understand the phenomenon of nationalism, such as why and how it comes about and what it involves, one has to look beyond the dyadic relationship between the domestic minority or minorities and the majority, towards a triadic and interactive framework that incorporates both domestic and international factors. In this conceptualization, there is a nationalizing state, where the ―core nation‖ – represented by the ethnic majority – uses state power to promote its specific interests in ethno-cultural terms, such as the promotion of its own language, culture or religion to be the national language, culture, religion.72 There is also the minority group, which tries to defend its cultural autonomy and resist the nationalizing and assimilating force coming out of the majority. Furthermore, the external kin of the minority group also purports to Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, p. 17. Ibid., p. 18. 72 In Brubaker‘s original model, the core nation is conceived as being in a weak cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This conceptualization is in a way derived from the specific circumstances of titular nations in the former Soviet context. However, it is reasonable to expand the conceptualization to include situations where there is a majority that enjoys predominant advantage in cultural, economic or demographic positions within the state, yet still tries to carry out a nation-building mission to assimilate the various ethnic minorities to conform to the dominant culture of the majority – the core nation. 70 71 63 ―monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert the rights, and protect the interests of ‗their‘ ethnonational kin.‖73 Thus, the minority group would try to mobilize to resist the nationalizing efforts of the ―host‖ state. Their external kin might offer material or moral support for the minority group and/or protest against the nationalizing ―host‖ state on their kin‘s behalf. And these protests and postures from the external kin would feed back to the nationalizing ―host‖ state in various ways. Those effects on the ―host‖ state ―will not necessarily dissuade it from its nationalizing projects, but they might even lead to their intensification.‖74 As a consequence, ―the minority might be accused of disloyalty,‖ and the external kin would be branded as ―illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of the nationalizing state.‖75 In this way, this tradic conceptualization of ethnonationalism opens up a venue to critically examine the complexities in ethnonational movements that involves both intergroup monitoring as well as intra-group struggles. It is therefore consistent with the ethnic-as-category approach that demands special attention to the political processes of how group boundaries are constructed, maintained, drawn or redrawn. The introduction of a third actor makes the existing strategic interaction between the minority and the majority more complex. Special attention should be paid towards the external kin and its role in the ethnic minority group‘s boundary construction and maintenance process. The triadic relationship model has indeed inspired many others to start to think systematically about the role of external actors in ethnic mobilization. The most common approach is to frame the triadic relationship in a bargaining model that probes the strategic interaction among three actors and seek explanations of under what conditions Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, p. 6. Ibid., p. 58. 75 Ibid. 73 74 64 ethnic movements would be mobilized and whether violence would break out and/or escalate.76 Pieter Van Houten, for example, constructs a game model to map what type of reference state – the external actor – would make it possible for the domestic minority and majority groups to overcome the commitment problem. He argues that the presence of a militarily strong but only moderately irredentist reference state is most likely to help overcome the commitment problem and prevent ethnic violence. The presence of either a weak reference state or a strong and highly irredentist reference state would not be able to prevent violence.77 Erin Jenne also offers a model of how an external actor can influence the process of ethnic bargaining between the minority and majority. She argues that minority radicalization is conditioned upon signals of behavioral intent from the host government and the external actor. Jenne points out, ―when the minority‘s external patron credibly signals interventionist intent, minority leaders are likely to radicalize their demands against the center, even when the government has committed itself to moderation.‖78 David Laitin also applies such a model to empirically test secessionist rebellions in six former Soviet Republics, and he points out that the model is far more convincing than competing theories. Laitin argues that ―under conditions of state breakdown, the threshold of support for the minority that is provided by the national This approach can also be traced to the application of the ―security dilemma‖ concept from International Relations theories on ethnic conflict. Barry Posen, for example, equates the collapse of the central state, such as the Soviet Union, with ―emerging anarchy,‖ and contends that the groups in such a situation would have the quest for security as their primary concern. In their competition for security, groups amass more power than needed for their security and thus start posing a threat to others. Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Also see James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, Escalation, ed. David A. Lake, and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Barbara Walter, "Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede," International Organization 60, no. Winter (2006). 77 Pieter Van Houten, "The Role of a Minority's Reference State in Ethnic Relations," Archives europeenes de sociologie (European Journal of Sociology) 34, no. Spring (1998): p. 112. 78 Erin K. Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 2. 76 65 homeland is the crucial difference between violent war and low-level conflict.‖79 Elsewhere, Harris Mylonas theorizes whether the identity of the external patron matters in majority/minority relations. He contends that if the external patron of the minority group is an enemy of the host government, then the host government would be more likely to use repressive tactics against the minorities.80 However, as we have seen in Chandra‘s critique of how primordialist assumptions sometimes ―creep‖ into theories of ethnic group mobilization, and how the constructivist taking on the fluidity of group boundaries and heterogeneity within ethnic groups are often ignored,81 we can certainly argue that problems with these bargaining theories on ethnic mobilization are that they do not question the cohesiveness of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are treated as unitary actors without questioning how the group boundaries are constructed and maintained in the processes of interaction between domestic and international forces. Instead, I argue attention should be paid to both intra-group and inter-group struggles in the drawing and redrawing of group boundaries. One key problem within the bargaining theories of ethnic mobilization is the assumption that the ethnic minority group wants to pursue a separatist strategy from the very beginning. The assumption or precondition that operates throughout the writings on ethnic bargaining is that the minority group is already committed towards a separatist goal, and its calculation is only about the risks and chances of pursuing such a strategy. What is lacking is an explanation of why the minority group would want to pursue such a strategy and how their preferences are formed. We can certainly argue that there are David D. Laitin, "Secessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union," Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 8 (2001): p. 860. 80 Harris Mylonas, "Assimilation and Its Alternatives: The Making of Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2008). 81 Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics." 79 66 situations where the ethnic minority group might not have such a separatism-prone preference. It is more useful to think about the preference formation process in the context of a triadic relationship framework and figure out the mechanisms under which the minority group develops its preference about whether group members want to have more autonomy, such as secession or cultural autonomy, or would rather pursue other strategies, such as acculturation or even assimilation. If we want to explain ethnic mobilization for more autonomy, we have to investigate how this pro-autonomy preference is formed in the first place. To explain why groups form different preferences and pursue different strategies, I suggest that we have to take into consideration political, economic and cultural variables that factor into the calculation of the minority group in their comparative framework that involves the external kin, the host state, and the group itself. In another word, we have to examine how a specific layer of group members‘ identification categories is activated and kept as the most salient for a pro-autonomy preference. External Kin and Ethnic Minority Preference Formation In Imagined Economies, Yoshiko Herrera critiques the conventional political economy approach towards the politics of separatism. She argues that the problem with conventional political economy approaches is that they only examine economic data in an ―objective way,‖ which means whether a certain region/group enjoys higher or lower levels of economic development according to a statistical calculation. However, Herrera points out that ―the relevant aspect of the economic conditions – the understanding of the economic conditions – may not be the same as what is being picked up in a data set that 67 focuses only on unmediated structural conditions.‖82 What the objectivist missed is the possibility that multiple local interpretations of economic conditions, which do indeed affect sovereignty movements, might not correspond to the data often used in large N statistical models. In her empirical study of regional sovereignty movements in the Russian Federation, Herrera concludes that the pattern of autonomy movements in Russia does not follow any obvious economic, demographic, or geographic relationship as picked up in data sets that focus only on objective structural conditions. Even though regions might share similar structural economic conditions, they nonetheless might perceive their economic condition in a totally different fashion, which ultimately would lead to their different political claims.83 For example, in her study of Samara Oblast and Sverdlovsk Oblast, Herrera finds that the differences between the two regions regarding whether to pursue greater sovereignty, ―ultimately depended on the propensity of local actors in Samara for more positive understandings of their own regional economic conditions.‖84 What we can get out of Herrera‘s theorization is her appreciation of the contextual preference for different groups. Based on historical experiences and interactions with other groups in the society – usually the majority group – different ethnic groups might develop different interpretations and understandings of their living conditions economic, social, and political - within the current state boundary. We cannot uniformly assume that all ethnic minority groups would hold a grudge or be dissatisfied with the central state. Instead we should investigate why some groups would develop a certain Yoshiko M. Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 9. 83 Ibid., p. 11. 84 Ibid. 82 68 perception and understanding of their living conditions and how the dissatisfaction with being part of the current state come into existence. In combination with the triadic relationship model discussed earlier, I propose that for ethnic minority groups that have external kin relations, their perception and understanding of their living conditions within the current state are channeled through a comparative framework that involves the minority groups, their external kin, and the current state where the ethnic minority groups reside. Here comes the notion that ethnic minority groups treat their external kin as a reference category.85 Due to the presence of external kin across the border and the common culture ties, such as language, religion, and so forth, the cross-border communications between the minority groups and their external kin can be frequent and intense. Encountering of their external kin can produce a feedback function on the ethnic minority group about their current living condition. As we have seen earlier in our discussion, the ethnicity-as-category approach pays special attention to the boundaryconstruction process between ethnic groups through encountering. Depending on the encountering of others and comparative assessment of each other, individuals can critically assess what layer of identification makes the most sense in that specific context. Thus we should specifically look at the encountering process between the ethnic minority groups and their external kin. 85 This concept of group reference can be traced to psychological research on group behavior. Political scientists have been borrowing from the psychology literature to explain group mobilization. For example, Gurr talks about how relative deprivation contributes to group mobilization for violence. Gurr specifically points out that a certain group‘s value standards are set against a reference framework that involves some other groups with which this group does or is thought to identify. Relative deprivation ―arises when individuals compare their own situation with that of a reference group which has what they want and things they should have.‖ Most importantly, Gurr notices that similar groups tend to be chosen as reference groups. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 105-6. 69 When ethnic minority groups encounter their kin, their critical assessment can occur at two ways. First is a strategic and instrumental one. If the minority group perceives their external kin enjoys higher living conditions and life opportunities than themselves, even though they might be ―objectively structurally advanced‖ – meaning economically advanced – within the current state, members of this group might still feel badly about their lives, become dissatisfied, and start demanding more from the state. Thus, because of these strategic calculations, the minority group members are more likely to align with their external kin, emphasize their common ethnic identity, play down their differences, and differentiate themselves further from the majority group and the state where they currently reside. On the other hand, even if a group is relatively poor and underdeveloped in the current state, if they realize their external kin‘s living conditions are even worse, then group members are more likely to emphasize the differences with their external kin, and align themselves more closely with the current state. As a result, group members are perhaps more likely to endure the current hardship, if there is any, and be content with what they have. The second way encounters with external kin can affect the ethnic minority group is designation from the external kin itself. The external kin might think seriously of their common ties with the ethnic minority group and take it as their responsibly to help and support their ―ethnic brethren‖. This support can come in various forms, such as direct military intervention, financing and organizing the ethnic minority mobilization, protesting internationally on the ethnic minority‘s behalf, and assisting cultural reproduction and maintenance for the minority group. On the other hand, the external kin of the minority group might not take seriously the conditions of their so-called ―ethnic 70 brethren‖. They might look down upon them as economically backward or culturally inferior. Or in some situations the external kin might be embroiled in its own affairs without the capacity or intention to care about their ethnic kin. What is most interesting is to examine how these two ways of perception and designations interact with each other. We can have four possible scenarios (See Table 2.1). The first scenario is when external kin enjoy better living conditions and also provide support for the ethnic minority group. It is here that the boundary of the ethnic minority group will be drawn in a way towards the external kin and away from the current state. And I argue it is here when these two levels are lined up in the same direction that we will be able to expect the ethnic minority group to be more likely to mobilize for more autonomy. The second scenario is when the external kin enjoy better living conditions but do not offer any substantial support for the ethnic minority group. Thus the ethnic minority groups will have no other alternative but either to emigrate out or adjust to the conditions within the current state. The third scenario is when the external kin have worse living condition and is willing to offer support for the minorities. Here the ethnic minority group will be less likely to respond to these supporting signals. The minority group might take advantage of this help to maintain some of their cultural autonomy but they would be less willing to sacrifice their current better living conditions within the current state. The final scenario is when the external kin enjoy worse living conditions and are also not able to offer support. As a result, the ethnic minority group is likely to keep the current status quo or might be more willing to assimilate into the majority group. 71 Table 2.1 Predictions for Ethnic Minority Group Strategies External Kin Enjoys Better Living Condition External Kin Enjoys Worse Living Condition External Kin Support Political Mobilization for More Autonomy Cultural Autonomy No External Kin Support Emigration Assimilation Concluding Remarks As we have seen, the ethnicity-as-category approach is very useful for us to understand what ethnicity means and how it matters. It helps us to understand why individuals take up one level of identification instead of another. In a triadic relationship model that involves the ethnic minority group, its external kin, and the current state where the minority group resides, this approach helps us understand the interactive process between the ethnic minority and their external kin, and how that interaction feeds back to how the ethnic minority perceives its current condition and whether it would want to mobilize for more autonomy. An ethnic minority group is most likely to mobilize in a situation where its external kin enjoy a higher standard of living and also offer support for the minority group. In other situations, an ethnic minority group is left with various other coping strategies, such as pursuing emigration, cultural autonomy, or simply assimilation. The ensuing four chapters are case studies of four ethnic minority groups in China – the Uighurs in Xinjiang, Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Dai in Xishuangbanna, and Joseonjok in Yanbian. The four chapters will examine the current conditions of these ethnic minority groups one by one and look at the interactive relationship with their respective kin abroad. In these four case studies, special attention will be paid to 72 minority groups encountering their external kin, and the mechanisms of how the boundaries between groups are drawn and redrawn in one way or another. 73 Chapter Three Mobilization and Violence in Xinjiang Introduction In My Far West, Your East Turkestan,1 author Wang Lixiong portrays a dire picture of the tense inter-ethnic relations in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China.2 For Wang, Xinjiang is heading in the direction of what he terms ―Palestinization,‖ in which the danger of the region devolving into protracted ethnic conflict and communal violence is imminent. As the pro-autonomy/independence Uighur nationalists and the Han Chinese nationalists clash, Xinjiang could potentially become another Kosovo or Bosnia, albeit on an even grander scale.3 Indeed, Xinjiang is perhaps the region where inter-ethnic relations are the tensest in all of China.4 Sporadic riots and violence have occurred during the past few decades. Especially in the early to mid 1990s, Xinjiang witnessed several armed uprisings, bombings, and assassinations. The most recent riot in the capital city Urumqi on July 5, 2009, led to the death of about 200 people, the majority of which were Han Chinese.5 It may very well signal that Xinjiang has entered a new 1 There is no standard spelling for names relating to the Uighurs and East Turkestan. The Uighurs sometimes is spelled as Uygurs or Uyghurs. East Turkestan sometimes is spelled as Eastern Turkestan or Eastern Turkistan. In this chapter, I use Uighur and East Turkestan unless in direct quotation. 2 The use of name for the territory of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is very controversial and politically charged. Xinjiang in Chinese literally means New Territory or New Dominion, which carries ―colonial‖ connotations and often is considered offensive to many Uighur nationalists. For some East Turkestan is preferable, for others it is Uighurstan. For the sake of convenience, I use the more commonly used name of Xinjiang, although this does not necessarily signal any specific political leaning. 3 Lixiong Wang (王力雄), My Far West, Your East Turkestan 的西域，你的 土 (Taipei 台 : Locus Publishing House 大块出版社 , 2007). From my personal experience of doing field research and traveling in various ethnic minority areas including Tibetan-inhabited areas. As an ethnic Han Chinese myself, I perceived the most tension when I was in Xinjiang. 5 For a good and balanced account of the riot in Urumqi, see Millward, "Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning Point?" 4 74 stage of the Uighur pro autonomy/independence mobilization.6 Resistance efforts by the Uighurs have inevitably brought harsh repression from the Chinese state, with mass arrests and executions of ―ethnic separatists, terrorists, and religious extremists.‖7 After September 11, 2001, and the US-led global War on Terror, the Chinese government strategically utilized the opportunity and started to portray the Uighur separatists as terrorists. It successfully managed to convince the US government and the United Nations to designate a certain East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization.8 Although not as prominent as the Tibetan proautonomy/independence movement in the West, the Uighurs have increasingly gained international media attention9, and their mobilization for more autonomy/independence is certain to gain momentum and intensity in the future. This chapter analyzes the Uighur-Han inter-ethnic relations in Xinjiang and the Uighur pro autonomy/independence mobilizations. Utilizing the ethnicity-as-category approach, it examines how inter-ethnic differences between the Uighurs and Han Chinese have been constructed and strengthened in various ways. The chapter focuses upon both domestic and international factors to explain the causes of Uighur grievances and their motivations to mobilize for more autonomy/independence. On the one hand, issues such 6 It is certainly difficult to gauge whether Uighurs want pure independence or would be satisfied with more autonomy within China. However, speeches made by Uighur exile leader Rebiya Kadeer explicitly state that Uighurs want independence. For example, see the interview of Ms Kadeer in the Christian Science Monitor, accessible at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0712/p06s07-wogn.html. Thus, judging by the views articulated by the group‘s self-proclaimed leader, the claims made by the Uighur exile community are even more ‗radical‘ than the Tibetan exile government. The Dalai Lama, for example, often publicly states he wants genuine autonomy for Tibetans and acknowledges Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. For example, see messages posted at Dalai Lama‘s official website, accessible at http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/statement-of-his-holiness. 7 The Chinese state designates three ―evil forces‖ that threaten the stability in Xinjiang: the forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism. 8 Recently, the US Department of Treasury announced another Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party as a terrorist organization. See http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm. 9 One controversy for example is related to the settlement of Uighurs captured by the US army in Afghanistan and imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay. 75 as in-migration of more and more Han Chinese, Uighur cultural and linguistic marginalization, religious restrictions, and heavy-handed government tactics towards dissent all contribute to the rising level of anger on the part of the Uighurs and their increasing discontent and their animosity towards both Han Chinese and the Chinese state. On the other hand, international factors have also played a significant role in how the Uighurs perceive themselves and their situation in China. In Chapter Two, we hypothesize that if an ethnic group‘s external kin enjoy better living conditions and also provide support for the ethnic group, the boundary of the ethnic group is more likely to drawn in a way towards the external kin and away from the current state. In such a situation, we shall be able to expect the ethnic group to be more likely to mobilize politically for more autonomy. As we will see in the Uighur‘s case, cultural and religious affinities with the Central Asian Republics and Turkey in particular have continuously pulled Xinjiang away from China‘s orbit towards the greater Turkic and Islamic world lying to its west. Economically, centuries of Russian, and later Soviet, rule provided the Central Asian republics with a certain level of development and modernity that Xinjiang has not experienced until much more recently. As the harbinger of modern Turkic nationalism, Turkey, with its proximity to Europe, has levels of economic development that surpass that of China. Thus in the Uighur‘s case, its external kin is defined broadly to include the wide Turkic community all the way across Central Asia. As a result of these factors, China has great difficulty in competing with these external sources and convincing the Uighurs of their ―rightful incorporation‖ within the Chinese state. Furthermore, the independence of various Central Asian Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided both inspirational as well as organizational support for the 76 Uighurs in their political action and mobilization. It is the combination of both domestic and external factors that has sustained the increasingly active and prominent Uighur mobilization for more autonomy/independence. This chapter starts with a brief review of the history of Xinjiang and its people. Then it will discuss the current situation in Xinjiang, and, in particular, political mobilizations since the 1980s. Following that, it will analyze how inter-ethnic boundaries are constructed and maintained in contemporary Xinjiang society. The last section focuses upon how external factors in Central Asia and beyond affect the process of political mobilization in Xinjiang. Xinjiang – Its People and History Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is the vast territory in the northwestern part of China having a total area of 1,664,900 square kilometers. It is one sixth of China‘s total geographic territory and is the size of Britain, France, Germany and Spain 77 combined.10 Contemporary Xinjiang shares borders with eight independent countries – Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Mongolia. Located along the Silk Road linking ancient China all the way to Europe, Xinjiang has historically been the nexus where the East meets the West. Before the Qing Empire started consolidating its power and adopted the name of Xinjiang, this area was loosely referred to as Xiyu (Western Regions) in pre-Qing Chinese history. Xiyu was the place where nomadic powers in the north competed with sedate agricultural powers based in northern China. Despite the PRC official claim that Xinjiang has been part of China for the past two millennia, a close examination of the historical records would falsify such claims.11 Depending on the strength of China-based dynasties, their control over Xiyu should be considered sporadic, corresponding to the ebb and flow of these dynastic powers. From the Han Dynasty‘s competition with Xiongnu (Hun) in the second century BCE to the Qing re-conquest of Xinjiang and designation of the area as a province in James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 4. Geographically, Xinjiang is a region separated from the outside and divided inside by several great mountain ranges and deserts. In particular, Tianshan Mountain effectively cuts Xinjiang into northern and southern halves. Located south of Tianshan Mountain are the Tarim Basin oases with the world‘s second largest desert, Taklamakan, in the middle. It is often called as Altishahr – ―six cities‖ – to refer to the six historically major oases (Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Uch-Turpan, Yangi-Hissar, and Aksu). Altishahr historically has been home to sedentary farming and trading peoples, and today it is where the Uighurs are the most concentrated. The area north of Tianshan Mountain is usually referred to as Zungaria, which served as a pasture to various nomadic powers, such as the Kazakhs and the western Mongols (Oirat). Furthermore, the geographical features of Xinjiang also have a centrifugal tendency - that is, communication among various regions within Xinjiang tends to be more difficult than with countries or areas across the ―border.‖ Thus, areas closer to China proper, such as Turpan and Kumul (Hami), were more affected by Han Chinese culture, while Zungaria was more affected by the Russian Central Asia, and Altishahr by Transoxiana and Hindustan. See Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 20, 39-41. Andrew Forbes also divided up Xinjiang in this way. See Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 11 For example see James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998); Gardner Bovingdon, and Nabijan Tursun, "Contested Histories," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 10 78 1884, various China-based dynasties‘ control over Xinjiang was not continuous.12 Thus, the more powerful Han and Tang Dynasties certainly had more control over Xinjiang than the less powerful Song and Ming Dynasties. Finally it was the Manchu Qing Dynasty that conquered the Zungar Mongols and included Xinjiang within its imperial domain.13 However, the Qing‘s rule in Xinjiang slipped during the late 19th century when Yaqub Beg, a warlord from Kokand in the Central Asian Fergana Valley, invaded southern Xinjiang. Taking advantage of Muslim rebellions in northern China that cut Xinjiang off from China proper, Yaqub Beg managed to establish an Islamic Emirate Although the Chinese government‘s official claims that China has controlled Xinjiang for more than two millennia is a bit facile, the argument that the Uighurs constitute a single group of indigenous people of Xinjiang is also a modern construction. The Uighurs originated in the steppes of modern day Mongolia and gradually some migrated from the steppes in the north to the oases in the Tarim Basin between the 7th and 9th centuries. Under the attacks from the Kirghiz in 840, the steppe capital of the Uighurs was destroyed and Uighurs were pushed out of Mongolia and settled down en masse in the south. One branch was dispersed in the oases surrounding the Tarim Basin of the Taklamakan desert and gradually intermarried with local people of eastern Iranian stock. These early Uighurs were Manichaean but also Buddhist and Nestorian Christian. The oases in the western Tarim Basin, especially Kashgar, started to convert to Islam en masse in the 10th century. As a result, local people stopped using Uighur as their identification. Instead, they took on identities based on their separate oases in a way to reject their Buddhist and other Central Asian religious traditions. Until the 16th century, it was only the Buddhist Uighurs around Turpan still called themselves Uighurs. However, with local people around Turpan finally converted to Islam in the 16th century, ―the term Uighur now completely dropped from the region in reference to the local inhabitants.‖ The name Uighur was only revitalized in the early 20th century after 500 years of non-usage, when Soviet ethnologists decided to call the oasis people of Xinjiang Uighurs. Under the Soviet influence, Xinjiang governor Sheng Shicai started to adopt the name and categorized the Turkic oasis dwellers as Uighurs in the 1930s. When the CCP moved into Xinjiang in 1949, they kept this practice, and officially categorized the Uighurs as one of the 56 nationalities in China. See Gladney, Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects, chapter 10, Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road, p. 6-7. 13 Before the Qing made its incursions, Xinjiang‘s political dynamic could be characterized by the powerful nomadic powers in the north exerting lordship over various oases in the Tarim Basin. The Zungar Mongols, the last nomadic confederation to rule over Xinjiang, were engaged in various state building efforts and its power started to grow with its alliance with the Gelugpa faction of the Tibetan Buddhist Church. The growing power of the Zungars started to become a threat to Qing in the east and eventually brought the two into open conflict during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor (1662-1722). After a long stalemate between the two, the Qianlong Emperor, the grandson of Kangxi, managed to launch a huge offensive against the Zungars and successfully defeated and eliminated the latter. Zungaria was literally depopulated and the entire Zungar Mongol population of nearly 1 million disappeared. See James A. Millward, and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 12 79 based in Kashgar in the late 1860s.14 It was not long before the Qing managed to regroup itself and the troops led by Zuo Zongtang marched and re-conquered Xinjiang. In 1884, Xinjiang was officially declared a province. After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, Xinjiang was immediately taken over by various warlords.15 In February 1933, rebellions against Chinese rule spread across southern Xinjiang. Soon the leadership of the rebellion went into the hands of the Uighur Nationalist Committee for National Revolution, which was founded by Muhammad Amin Bughra (Mehmet Emin Bugra), a prominent Muslim scholar, together with his two younger brothers Abdullah and Nur Ahmad.16 In November 1933, they proclaimed the establishment of a Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan.17 This is considered by many Uighur nationalists today to be the first East Turkestan Republic. However, the Islamic Republic was quite shortlived as Ma Zhongying‘s Dungan troops brought the regime into an end in 1934. Also, with the support of the Soviet Union, the new Xinjiang Governor Sheng Shicai started to consolidate his power in Xinjiang.18 In the fall of 1944, another major rebellion broke out in Ili. This rebellion, backed by the Soviets, established the second East Turkestan Republic (ETR). However, Stalin also pressured the ETR to form a coalition government with the KMT government in 1945, after the Republic of China signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union.19 For the best account of Yaqub Beg and his regime, see Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 15 The first one was Yang Zengxin, followed by Jin Shuren. 16 For the best account of Xinjiang during the Republic of China period, see Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949. 17 Ibid., p. 113. 18 Many would consider Sheng‘s regime in Xinjiang to be a Soviet satellite state, see James A. Millward, and Nabijan Tursun, "Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 79-80. 19 See Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 19441949 (Armonk, New York and London, England: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990); David Wang, Under the Soviet 14 80 Finally, when the CCP emerged as victorious after the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Soviet Union supported the new PRC in absorbing the ETR. Several main ETR leaders died mysteriously in a plane crash in the Soviet Union on their way to negotiate with Mao in Beijing. The history of the ETR was later rewritten by PRC historians as the Three District Revolution so as to legitimize it as part of the whole Chinese revolution.20 In 1955, Xinjiang was officially designated as Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Seypidin Ezizi, a Uighur, served as the chairman of XUAR‘s People‘s Council. Wang Enmao, a Han general, nevertheless held the top regional military and party posts with ‗ultimate authority.‖21 This pattern of leadership composition still persists today – that is, a Uighur as the chairman of the XUAR but the real power being a Han Chinese CCP party boss. At the same time, various lower level autonomous prefectures and counties were set up for various other ethnic minorities, to accommodate them in Xinjiang and to prevent the dominance of the Uighurs. The Chinese government carried out a divideand-rule strategy that carved up several autonomous prefectures and counties for other ethnic minorities, such as the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture, Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, and so forth. Thus, even though Xinjiang as a whole was designated as an autonomous region for the Uighurs, in many areas within Xinjiang autonomous rights actually reside in the hands of other ethnic minority groups. Because Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflict and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999). 20 Millward and Tursun, "Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," p. 86. 21 Ibid., p. 91. 81 of this strategy, many of these ethnic groups do not necessarily get along with the Uighurs. The Chinese government‘s policies towards Xinjiang and its people up until 1991 had been heavily conditioned upon the ups and downs of Sino-Soviet relations. In the first years after 1949, when Beijing‘s relationship with Moscow was still warm, Xinjiang received lots of aid and technological support from the Soviet Union. In return, the Soviet Union was allowed continual access to Xinjiang‘s oil and mineral resources.22 At this stage, many of the previous ETR officials and other pro-Soviet elements were tolerated in general. However, when Sino-Soviet relations started to sour in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union started to pull out its investment and personnel and China started to purge many non-Han cadres in Xinjiang for their pro-Soviet sentiments. The CCP‘s purge against these minority cadres, together with Soviet propaganda inciting people to flee to Soviet Central Asia, caused about an estimated 60,000 – 200,000 number of Uighurs and Kazakhs to cross into Soviet territory in 1962.23 Because of the exodus of so much of the local population, the Chinese government sealed off the Sino-Soviet border and stationed large numbers of PLA troops along the border. The Sino-Soviet border did not reopen until more than 20 years later, in the mid-1980s. Political movements such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were carried out in Xinjiang in similar ways as in the rest of China.24 During the Great Leap Forward, Xinjiang also experienced large-scale communization and famine. During the Cultural Revolution, armed conflicts between rival factions also severely destabilized Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 225. Sean R. Roberts, "The Uighurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation," Nationalities Papers 26, no. 3 (1998): fn. 21. 24 For a good account of Xinjiang during these radical political movements, see Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979). 22 23 82 the region. However, because of the ethnic dimension in Xinjiang and the constant threat of Soviet interference in Xinjiang, the extremism of red guards in Xinjiang was somewhat curtailed.25 During the Cultural Revolution, furthermore, ethnic minority cadres within Xinjiang were purged because of their alleged pro-Soviet sentiments and past connections with the ETR. As in other ethnic minority areas in China during this period, the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang also pushed the rhetoric of anti-local nationalism to the front and ethnic minority cultural expressions were hard-hit. For example, James Millward writes, ―there are many reports of Qur‘ans burnt; mosques, mazars, madrasas and Muslim cemeteries shut down and desecrated; non-Han intellectuals and religious elders humiliated in parades and struggle meetings; native dresses prohibited; long hair on young women cut off in the street.‖26 Generally speaking, during the politically chaotic years when Mao was in power, the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang endured great hardship, politically, economically, and culturally. Minority Policies in Xinjiang during the Post-1978 Era Deng Xiaoping‘s return to power after the Cultural Revolution heralded the change of policies towards ethnic minorities. The Chinese Constitution of 1982 and the 1984 Law of Regional Autonomy both specifically addressed ways to improve and fulfill the goal of ―minority autonomy.‖ In Xinjiang‘s case, policies on religion and Uighur language education were areas where moderate policies were observed, at least initially. The Chinese government has also put great emphasis on developing Xinjiang‘s economy. 25 26 Millward and Tursun, "Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," p. 96. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 275. 83 Together with this push for economic development came the large number of Han Chinese migrating into the region that has substantially changed the demographic structure in Xinjiang. Religion In the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, officially there was greater tolerance for the revival of Islam in Xinjiang. In 1980, the Xinjiang Islamic Association was re-established and the regional government started, allowing the restoration and construction of mosques across Xinjiang. For example, Gardner Bovingdon points out that in the 1970s there were only 392 usable mosques remaining in the Kashgar region, but by the end of 1981 the number of mosques in Kashgar increased to 4,700.27 Also, the 1980s witnessed a big wave of reopening of Islamic schools. According to a survey at the time, Xinjiang had 938 Islamic schools with over ten thousand students.28 However, the increasing popularity of these Islamic schools deeply worried the CCP because of the possibility that ―Islam might be taught as an ideology competing with Marxism.‖29 The most worrisome to the Chinese authorities was the fact that Islam gradually became a rallying point for the Uighurs in street demonstrations and other political mobilizations. As a result, the government retracted its previous more tolerant policies. The government started to crack down on ―illegal religious activities,‖ by ―defrocking suspect clerics, breaking up unauthorized scripture schools (madrasa), and halting the construction of mosques.‖30 The government also started to apply strict screening of religious clerics and Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, p. 33. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 324. 29 Ibid., p. 325. 30 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, p. 33. 27 28 84 only those ―judged patriotic and politically sound could continue to serve.‖31 The government specifically targeted two groups in its strict religious policy – CCP party members and students. These two groups were officially banned from attending religious activities.32 In recent years, due to the reopening of borders between China and the Central Asian Republics and better communication and transportation networks between China and Pakistan and Afghanistan, more conservative strands of Islam, such as Wahhabism, have also gradually come into Xinjiang and gained popularity. For example, Edmund Waite reports an incident where a certain imam, Abdul Hamid, introduced more Hanbali school (predominantly in Saudi Arabia) style teaching in one mosque in Kashagar, replacing the otherwise more traditional Hanafi legal school the Uighur used to follow.33 These days there are also reportedly large numbers of Uighurs studying at Islamic schools in Pakistan. Although it is difficult to gauge how popular Wahhabism has become among the Uighurs in Xinjiang, recently the Chinese government has been on high alert of ―those who embark on the path of orthodoxy, or who engage in proselytizing.‖34 Education Although during the early years of the PRC the XUAR government allowed more leeway for minority students to study their own languages, these kinds of policies did not last long due to either resource constraints or volatility during various political movements as Ibid. For example, at school students are taught atheism mandatorily and were forbidden to perform daily prayers or fast during Ramadan. Many in reality still do despite the official ban. 33 Edmund Waite, "The Impact of the State on Islam Amongst the Uighurs: Religious Knowledge and Authority in the Kashgar Oasis," Central Asian Survey 25, no. 3 (2006): p. 260. 34 Ibid.: p. 262. 31 32 85 discussed above. It was only after 1978 that real Uighur education became readily available for the Uighurs in Xinjiang.35 At this time, ethnic minority schools were also set up to provide education using minority language as the language of instruction, such as Uighur or Kazakh. In 1978, the XUAR government issued decrees ordering ethnic minority schools to teach the Chinese language only as a subject from the third grade onwards, to make every high school graduate proficient in both the minority and the Chinese languages.36 Thus, for example, in Uighur schools all subjects were taught in Uighur except Chinese, which is taught as a second language. Since 1986, the XUAR government started to experiment with the idea of ―bilingual education,‖ meaning that ethnic minority pupils were only taught in their native language during a transitional phase until they achieve competence in Mandarin Chinese.37 However, it should be noted that these bilingual education practices were only of experimental nature, and ethnic minority schools remained the norm. But things started to change in 2002, when all Xinjiang universities began using only Mandarin Chinese in instruction and textbooks.38 The most fundamental change to minority language education came in March 2004 when the XUAR issued a document titled ―Decision to Greatly Push for Bilingual Education Work‖.39 This decision states that for ethnic minority primary and secondary schools, gradually all subjects in science should be taught in Chinese; all 35 Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road, p. 58. 36 Aili Yimin (艾力·伊明), "Research on Uighur-Han Bilingual Education within the Context of Multiculturalism (多元文 整 教育 中的―维汉‖ 语教育研究 " (Doctoral Dissertation 博士论 文 , Central University for Nationalities 中央民族大学 , 2007), p. 49. 37 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, p. 35. 38 With the only exception being Chaghatay, an ancient Turkic language that used to be spoken in Central Asia, classes at Xinjiang University Eric T. Schluessel, "'Bilingual' Education and Discontent in Xinjiang," Central Asian Survey 26, no. 2 (2007): p. 257. 39 疆维吾尔自治区党委人民 府关于大力推 语教育工 86 的决定。 subjects were to be eventually taught in Chinese, with the ethnic minority language as one subject.40 Because of the need to conduct all teachings in Mandarin Chinese, ethnic minority school teachers are required to pass the Han Chinese Language Skill Test (HSK). This has put a lot of pressure on ethnic minority teachers, whose Mandarin Chinese is often very limited. At the same time, there have been concerted efforts to merge ethnic minority schools with Han Chinese schools in a way that improves interethnic interaction and assimilation. However, these policy measures are extremely controversial among the Uighur community, and are in many ways unrealistic due to resource constraints. On the one hand, many Uighurs are really worried that their mother tongue will not be able to survive this education system change. On the other, it is not realistic to expect many ethnic minority teachers to switch to Mandarin Chinese instruction, nor is it feasible to replace them with Han Chinese or minkaohan Uighur teachers.41 Aili Yimin, in his ethnographic study of bilingual education changes in Khotan, reports that many Uighur teachers could not really express themselves in Mandarin Chinese as well as in the Uighur language. As a result, many times Uighur pupils had great difficulty understanding their teachers. Eventually mutual frustration would force the teacher to switch back to instruction in Uighur.42 The gradual chipping away of Uighur education has also been accompanied by the increasing hegemonic status of Mandarin Chinese in the everyday life of Xinjiang, in 40 Yimin, "Research on Uighur-Han Bilingual Education within the Context of Multiculturalism (多元文 整 教育 中的―维汉‖ 语教育研究 ", p. 51. 41 Minkaohan refers to ethnic minorities who have gone through the Han Chinese education system and whose Chinese language ability is usually much better than those minkaomin – ethnic minorities educated in their own language. 42 Yimin, "Research on Uighur-Han Bilingual Education within the Context of Multiculturalism (多元文 整 教育 中的―维汉‖ 语教育研究 ", p. 66. 87 particular in urban settings. With large waves of migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and the deepening integration of Xinjiang economically with inland provinces, Uighurs these days are experiencing great linguistic and economic anxieties. Economic Development Policies Before the arrival of the CCP in 1949, Xinjiang‘s economy was predominantly agricultural with no substantial industries. During the early years of the PRC, with Soviet support, a series of infrastructures were set up, mainly in the natural resource extraction sector. Even after the overall Chinese reform in 1978, initially Xinjiang did not benefit from the new opportunities because its state farms and extractive industries were not specifically designed for market forces.43 The presence of the Soviet Union and the security threat it posed made Xinjiang an unlikely candidate for investment, and the region was still cut from the rest of China to act more as a buffer zone. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 heralded fundamental changes in the international environment surrounding Xinjiang. In terms of the economic aspect of the region, the independence of the Central Asian Republics brought a big opportunity for Xinjiang‘s economy because of the vacuum left by the disruption of Soviet internal trade.44 For example, in 1991 there were only five companies engaged in border trade with Central Asia, but by 1996 the number had increased to more than three hundred.45 Starting in the second half of the 1990s, the Chinese government re-oriented its economic development strategy towards the western regions. March 2000 was the official inauguration of the Calla Wiemer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 170. 44 Ibid., p. 171. 45 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 290. 43 88 ―Great Development of the West.‖46 Because of its key location connecting China with Central Asia and beyond, it appeared as if Xinjiang was about to regain its old Silk Road fame. By 2000, on a GDP per capita basis, Xinjiang ranked 12th among China‘s 31 provinces, which by the standard of inland provinces was quite good.47 Other than international trade, Xinjiang‘s internal developmental strategy is based on two pillars: ―One Black One White,‖ meaning oil extraction and cotton production.48 Xinjiang is estimated to have 35.7 billion tons of oil and 22 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which are about 30 percent and 34 percent of China‘s total on-land oil and gas reserves respectively.49 China‘s current strategy is to ship these oil and natural gas resources out of Xinjiang to the eastern provinces. For example, there is a 4,200 kilometers-long pipeline to transmit natural gas from Xinjiang all the way to Shanghai. Here lies the big controversy and one of the biggest complaints by Xinjiang local residents, mostly the Uighurs but also including the local Han Chinese. Because China considers natural resources a property of the state, all the revenue from natural resource extractions are in the hands of state-owned enterprises and the central government. Although Xinjiang does receive subsidies from the central government, local people often complain that they have benefited little from the extraction of these natural resources.50 On the other hand, the cultivation of cotton is supposed to benefit the local peasants by providing a stable income. However, according to some research, local Uighurs do not 西部大开发。 Wiemer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," p. 164. 48 Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," The China Journal 44 (2000): p. 80. 49 Yueyao Zhao, "Pivot or Periphery? Xinjiang's Regional Development," Asian Ethnicity 2, no. 2 (2001): p. 212. 50 Most recently in June 2010, the Chinese government introduced a 5% tax that the country's energy companies must pay on oil and natural gas produced in Xinjiang. It indicates the Chinese government is aiming to address this commonly held local grievance. See Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2010, accessible at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703561604575282181792884798.html?mod=djemITPA_t. 46 47 89 profit much from this because they have to sell to state-owned cooperatives at fixed prices, and many times they do not have independent choice in terms of what to cultivate.51 Demographic Change China‘s developmental strategy towards Xinjiang is accompanied by waves of migration of Han Chinese (as well as Hui) into Xinjiang in the name of ―Supporting Xinjiang.‖ Xinjiang was traditionally home to various Turkic-speaking and Persian-speaking Muslim oasis dwellers, as well as Mongolian-speaking and Turkic-speaking nomads roaming the grasslands in the north. After the Qing conquest of Xinjiang in the mid-18th century, waves of military personnel and settlers came to Xinjiang, which added various other ethnic groups to the demographic composition, such as Han, Hui, Manchu, and Xibe. Today Xinjiang is home to 13 ethnic groups – they are Uighur, Han, Kazak, Hui, Kirghiz, Mongol, Xibe, Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, Manchu, and Daur. According to data in 2008, the Uighurs are the most numerous at 9.65 million, Han Chinese second at 8.24 million, Kazakh third at 1.48 million, Hui at 0.94 million, Kirghiz at 0.18 million, and Mongols at 0.18 million, while the rest were relatively small in number (See Table 3.1). In 1953, the Han Chinese population was only about 6 percent of Xinjiang‘s total population, but by 2000 the percentage of Han Chinese jumped to 40 percent. In the meantime, the Uighur population dwindled from 75 percent in 1953 to 45 percent in 2000.52 Migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang can be roughly categorized in two stages. First was the government-sponsored transfer of Han Chinese professionals, 51 For a more detailed account of the peasant conditions in southern Xinjiang, see Ildikó Bellér-Hann, "The Peasant Condition in Xinjiang," Journal of Peasant Studies 25, no. 1 (1997). 52 Stanley W. Toops, "The Demography of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 246-48. 90 workers and farmers into Xinjiang before 1978. Many were employed at all levels of government and industry as well as in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. After the economic reform started, the Chinese government started to use more indirect methods, such as providing economic incentives to attract Han Chinese in-migration, for example, by granting contracts to farmers on reclaimed land.53 Especially since the 1990s with growing trade and business opportunities, more and more migrant workers have flooded major cities in Xinjiang by engaging in small business and other service jobs. Population distribution among different ethnic groups follows roughly the northsouth and urban-rural divides. These days, Han Chinese are usually concentrated in the urban areas and in the northern part of Xinjiang, while the Uighurs are mostly concentrated in the southern rural areas. In the capital city of Urumqi for example, 73 percent of its residents are now Han Chinese. The Uighurs have so far been reduced to absolute minorities in the northern part of Xinjiang. Only in the southern regions like Kashgar and Khotan do they still constitute an overwhelming majority (See Table 3.2). 53 Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," p. 76. 91 Table 3.1 List of Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang and Their Respective Population (2007)54 Ethnic Group Population Uighur 9,650,629 Han 8,239,245 Kazakh 1,483,883 Hui 942,956 Kirghiz 181,862 Mongol 177,120 Tajik 44,824 Xibe 42,444 Manchu 25,626 Uzbek 16,138 Russian 11,609 Daur 6,678 Tatar 4,728 Total 20,951,900 Table 3.2 Uighur/Han Distribution in Xinjiang (In Percentage)55 Han Uighur Chinese Others Urumqi City 12.3 73 14.7 Karamay City 15.2 75.5 9.3 Turpan 70.5 23 6.5 Kumul (Hami) 20.2 66.7 13.1 Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture 4.6 74.4 21.1 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 16.2 43.8 40 Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 12.7 67.3 20 Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 32.7 57.5 9.8 Aksu 78 20.7 1.3 Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture 63.5 7.4 29.1 Kashgar 91.1 7.3 1.6 Khotan 96.5 3.5 0.2 Total 46.1 39.3 14.6 54 55 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2008, accessible at http://chinadataonline.org/ Ibid. 92 One direct outcome of this in-migration of Han Chinese is the increasing hegemony of the Han Chinese language in the job market. As everywhere else in China since the 1990s, the state gradually retreated while market forces started to take a leading role in restructuring Chinese society. In Xinjiang, because Han Chinese are predominant in the private sectors in the urban areas, job hires are clearly in favor of Han Chinese or ethnic minorities who can speak the Chinese language well. For example, many job advertisements explicitly say that only Han Chinese can apply. Thus Uighurs who have gone through the Uighur education system have a strong disadvantage in finding jobs in the private sector. Even in the public sector, where government still reserves certain quotas for ethnic minority candidates, oftentimes preferences are given to minkaohan ones, meaning those who have done their schooling in Chinese and have linguistic competence and more adjusted cultural expressions. As a result, the unemployment rate among the Uighurs is reportedly much higher than among Han Chinese. Many Uighur university graduates cannot find jobs. Another side effect is that more and more Uighurs are sending their kids directly to Han Chinese schools, which has caused great linguistic and cultural anxiety among certain Uighurs who fear for the eventual assimilation of the Uighurs by Han Chinese. Faced with these challenges, the Uighurs have mobilized politically since the 1980s in their efforts to resist the Chinese state and demanded more autonomy or even independence. Political Mobilizations since the 1980s After the great exodus of ethnic Uighur and Kazakhs into the Soviet Union in 1962 and the subsequent sealing of borders, little was known about whether any major mobilization 93 of the Uighurs occurred during the Cultural Revolution years. Partly due to the turbulent and repressive nature of the Chinese state during these years and partly due to the shutting off of Xinjiang from external influences, Uihgur opposition to Chinese rule only gradually became more overtly nationalistic during the 1980s.56 In January 1981, a so-called Eastern Turkestan Prairie Fire Party was secretly formed to the east of Kashgar to ―establish an independent Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic by means of armed force and to drive out the imperialist unbelievers, in other words the Han Chinese.‖57 Several protests and riots were also reported during the 1980s. For example, a riot broke out on October 30, 1981 in Kashgar where 600 people were attacked, over 200 were injured and two people died.58 In December 1985, university students in Urumqi protested against the replacement of Ismail Amat by Tomur Dawamat as the chairman of XUAR59, during which protest they chanted slogans such as ―Han out of Xinjiang,‖ ―Independence, Freedom and Sovereignty for Xinjiang‖ and ―Long Live Xinjiang Independence.‖60 In Beijing in November 1985, Uighur students protested against the Chinese government‘s use of Lop Nor in Xinjiang as nuclear testing base. In 1989, a big number of Muslims protested in Xinjiang over the publication of a book called Sexual Customs which was alleged to contain blasphemous information about Muslims. However, one might argue that political mobilizations in Xinjiang during the 1980s were quite sporadic and of limited scale. It was in the 1990s when political movements, often of violent nature, gradually spread throughout the Michael Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 59. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 60. 59 Tomur Dawamat was a protégé of Wang Enmao. Even though he is an ethnic Uighur, many people by then considered Ismail Amat, who was from Khotan, as more likely to represent their interests. Ibid., p. 80. 60 Ibid., p. 60. 56 94 region.61 The starting point is the Baren Incident in Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture in southern Xinjiang.62 The Baren Incident of 1990 Baren township is located in the Akto county of the Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture, close to the Pamir border area between China and Afghanistan. On April 5, a group of Uighur men at a local mosque started to criticize the Chinese government‘s birth control policies, nuclear testing, and China‘s resource exploitation in Xinjiang. A big protest followed with calls for ―a jihad to drive the Han unbelievers out of Xinjiang and to establish an East Turkestan state.‖63 What is striking about the Baren Incident is its pre-meditated nature. A rebel group led by Zeydin Yusuf with the name ―Islamic Party of East Turkistan‖ planned a series of synchronized attacks on government buildings.64 The rebels reportedly ambushed the police force, seized weapons, took hostages, and exchanged fire with the armed police. After the rebellion broke out, troops had to be airlifted into the area to put down the uprising. According to some reports, hundreds of people were killed in clashes with the Chinese police force. The scale of the rebellion notwithstanding, the rebels during the Baren Incident also seemed to have propagated separatist ideologies and organized the rebellion through the channels of local mosques. After the incident the Chinese state started to clamp down on unofficial religious schools and banned foreign preachers in Xinjiang. In Atko County, fifty mosques were closed Ibid., p. 62. Although it was designated as Kirghiz autonomous prefecture, the Uighurs are demographically the majority in Kizilsu. 63 Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 62. 64 James A. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), p. 14. 61 62 95 down and all imams were required to write letters to the government to pledge their loyalty.65 Bombings and Assassinations66 After the Baren Incident, political activities among the Uighur separatists became increasingly violent. On February 5, 1992, there were two explosions on buses in Urumqi. Three were killed and twenty-three injured. From February to September 1993, there were explosions in Yining, Urumqi, Kashgar, and several other cities. Targets of these attacks were mainly hotels, department stores, and markets etc. From April to June 1996 bombings were reported in the Kucha area.67 On February 27 1997, bombs exploded on three buses in Urumqi, coinciding with the memorial ceremony for Deng Xiaoping‘s death. There was also a bus bombing in Beijing on March 7, for which an exiled Uighur group claimed responsibility but XUAR chairman Abdulahat Abdurishit denied it.68 From February to March 1998 six explosions were reported targeting economic and industrial facilities in Xinjiang, including a pipeline near Qaghiliq.69 Also during this period, a series of assassinations were carried out throughout Xinjiang. Targets were usually Uighur government officials and cooperative religious clerics, who were considered to be ―traitors‖ by the radical Uighur separatists. For example, one man who served as representative at the Sixth National People‘s Consultative Conference in Beijing was killed along with three family members at home in Kucha in 1996. In the same year, the senior Imam Aronghan Haji at the Id Kah Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 73. For a more comprehensive list of violent events in Xinjiang, see the dataset provided by Brent Hierman. Brent Hierman, "The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988-2002," Problems of Post-Communism 54, no. 3 (2007): p. 53-56. 67 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, p. 15-16. 68 Ibid., p. 18. 69 Ibid. 65 66 96 Mosque in Kashgar also barely survived an assassination attack.70 Meanwhile, there was also a series of attacks on Chinese overseas interests in the Central Asian Republic and Turkey.71 Yining (Ghulja) Incident 1997 In 1994, Uighurs in Yining city and its surrounding areas started a traditional form of social gathering called mashrap, which utilizes strict Islmaic rules to discipline young men‘s behavior. The rationale for the revival and popularity of this mashrap was the local Uighur community‘s worry about drug and alcohol abuse among young Uighur men. Mashrap was to provide moral guidance for its members.72 These mashrap even effectively boycotted liquor sales in Yining and its surrounding areas. Later they expanded to include organizing activities such as boys‘ soccer leagues.73 However, such organized community activities were not tolerated by the Chinese state; soon they banned mashrap in the city. Following the ban and the Strike Hard Campaign in 1996, which targeted illegal religious activities and private Quranic schools, in early 1997, police arrested two Uighur religious students (talips) around the time of Ramadan. As a result, several hundred people demonstrated, which led to a riot. According to Millward, ―rioters torched vehicles and attacked police and (Han) Chinese residents; their banners and slogans included calls for Uighur equality and independence as well as religious sentiments.‖74 The Chinese government official figure put the casualties for the riot at 198 injured and 7 dead, while the Uighur exiles gave a much higher number - up to 300 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 330. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, p. 19-22. 72 For a very detailed account of the mashrap revival among the Uighurs, see Sean R. Roberts, "Negotiating Locality, Islam, and National Culture in a Changing Borderlands: The Revival of the Mashrap Ritual among Young Uighur Men in the Ili Valley," Central Asian Survey 17, no. 4 (1998). 73 Jay Dautcher, Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 277-78. 74 Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, p. 17. 70 71 97 dead.75 Although both the Chinese government and the Uighur exile groups have their own interests in either playing down or exaggerating the number of casualties, it is certain that the scale of protests and the subsequent riot was unprecedentedly large. Urumqi Riot 2009 According to many Xinjiang scholars, violence and separatist activities in Xinjiang peaked in the 1990s and ―have in fact declined since the late 1990s.‖76 Indeed, ever since the Yining (Ghulja) Incident in 1997, there have not been any large scale mobilizations reported in Xinjiang, except for a few sporadic bombings, assassinations, and some small-scale protests. For example, there was an armed attack on police forces in Kashgar right before the 2008 Olympic Games. Also, most of these activities occurred in the southern part of Xinjiang where Uighur enjoy numerical dominance. Thus it was a huge surprise to many Xinjiang watchers to witness the scale of the riot and the large number of casualties in Urumqi on July 5, 2009.77 It all started with an ethnic brawl in a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong province in the south of China. About 800 Uighur workers were brought in from Xinjiang, mainly from Kashgar, to work in this factory as part of a governmentsponsored program to encourage migrant workers from Xinjiang to work in the more prosperous coastal provinces as a way to close economic gaps between regions.78 A rumor started that two Han Chinese girls in the factory were raped by a group of Uighur men. Then, a group of Han Chinese workers ganged up on the Uighurs in a battle that Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 93-94. Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, p. ix. 77 For example, see the interview given by Dru Gladney at Al Jazeera, July 07 2009, accessible at http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/07/20097761931298561.html. 78 Jonathan Watts, ―Old Suspicions, Magnified Mistrust into Ethnic Riots in Urumqi.‖ The Guardian, July 10, 2009, accessible at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/10/china-riots-uighurs-han-urumqi. 75 76 98 killed two Uighurs. Information about this incident got transmitted back to Xinjiang and was exaggerated in all accounts. On July 5, hundreds of Uighurs demonstrated in Urumqi, which turned into a deadly riot. Perhaps frustrated with police forces that tried to stop the demonstration, many protestors turned violent by attacking innocent Han Chinese passers-by. According to the official statistics, of the 184 dead, 137 were Han Chinese, 46 were Uighur and 1 was Hui. Thousands of troops were immediately brought in to impose order with mass arrests. Two days later, frustrated and angered by the loss of so many Han Chinese lives, thousands of Han Chinese vigilantes marched in Urumqi, armed with sticks and iron bars, ready to fight back at the Uighurs. Police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd and a curfew had to be imposed to separate the two ethnic communities from each other. It seemed mistrust and hatred towards the other group had run too deep for any possibility of an easy reconciliation. In order understand how such mistrust and hatred between the Han Chinese and the Uighurs developed, we need to examine how the rigid inter-ethnic boundary between the two groups has been constructed in Xinjiang. Inter-ethnic Boundary Construction and Maintenance in Xinjiang The most striking characteristic of inter-ethnic group relations in Xinjiang is the clearly demarcated group boundaries between the Uighurs and Han Chinese in political, economic and social spaces. For anyone who has travelled in Xinjiang, especially in urban areas, it is hard not to notice the clearly demarcated boundaries between the Han Chinese and the Uighurs. The ―segregation‖ between the two groups is so thorough that it makes communication between groups extremely limited, and as a result mistrust and 99 hostility between groups runs rampant. It is thus necessary to probe how exactly such rigid inter-ethnic boundaries are constructed and maintained in Xinjiang, and how the Uighurs are mobilized against Han Chinese and the Chinese state. Very rarely do Uighurs and Han Chinese socialize in Xinjiang unless it is unavoidable, such as in work places. It is commonly explained that cultural differences between the two are huge. The Uighurs are Muslims while Han Chinese eat pork, thus it is impossible for Uighurs to visit Han Chinese households, let alone for them to dine together. Similarly, all restaurants in Xinjiang are separated between the ones that are halal79 and those that are not. Although Han Chinese do occasionally dine in these halal restaurants, Uighurs would never do so in non halal ones. Sometimes Uighurs would even not go to non-Uighur operated halal restaurants due to suspicion that Han Chinese might be involved and thus the restaurants are not good enough. Thus for Han Chinese, whose cultural expressions and friendships often surround eating and drinking, it is hard to make friends with the Uighurs. The same can be said about the Uighurs; some of them will not form friendships with non-Muslims.80 Furthermore, inter-marriage between Han Chinese and the Uighurs is almost non-existent. There are stories that if a Uighur marries a Han Chinese he or she would get disowned by his or her family, and would constantly be harassed and scolded within the Uighur community. Once I asked a Uighur man in his early twenties whether he would ever marry a Han Chinese and he abruptly said ―No‖ without much hesitation. I asked him why and he said it is just impossible – the cultural differences between the two are just too huge and his parents would never allow it to 79 Halal is an Arabic term to describe things that are permissible to use and eat according to Islamic law. In Chinese, it is called 清真 (clean and pure). 80 During my field research, I was told more than once by Uighurs that unless I converted to Islam it was not possible for us to be friends. 100 happen. Joanne Smith, for example, similarly comments on this situation that ―rather than religio-cultural differences per se, it is the threat of disapproval from within the Uighur community that rules out intermarriage at present.‖81 Similar refrains against inter-marriage also exist in the Han Chinese community. There is also spatial and even temporal segregation between the two groups. During the time when China had a centrally planned economy, housing was often provided and allocated through the work unit. This allocated housing allowed some intermixing between Han Chinese and Uighurs in residential complexes. Those days are long gone. Now with the privatization of the urban housing market, residential areas are also starting to be segregated. In Urumqi, for example, most of the Uighurs are concentrated in the Erdaoqiao district in the south of the city. In other oasis cities, usually there is an ―old town‖ where Uighurs are concentrated, while Han Chinese live in the ―new town,‖ which is often constructed on non-settled land adjacent to the ―old town.‖ Even though there are instances where Uighurs, usually minkaohan, might live in the Han residential areas due to better facilities, the overall pattern of residential segregation is clear throughout the region. Furthermore, even in areas both groups share the residential quarters, children are often discouraged from playing with their peers of the other group.82 The other sign of clear boundary between the two groups is the different time zone they respectively ―inhabit‖ in Xinjiang. Because of the large size of the Chinese territory, Xinjiang is topologically two time zones behind Beijing. However, the ―unity‖81 Joanne N. Smith, "'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese," Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2 (2002): p. 163. 82 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, "Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur - Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China," in Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, ed. Gunther Schlee (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 65. 101 obsessed Chinese government officially only allows one time zone for all of China. Thus, for example, 8 AM in Beijing is in fact 6 AM in Xinjiang. Thus people usually push the hours back for 2 hours, for example by going to work at 10 AM instead of 8 AM. However, in private life, which time zone people choose is clearly a choice that correlates strongly with group identity. The Uighurs tend to use the unofficial Xinjiang time, while Han Chinese often stick to the Beijing time. For visitors recently arrived in Xinjiang, sometimes it is confusing to figure out exactly what time people are talking about. When people across ethnic boundaries schedule meetings, they need to specifically emphasize which time zone they are referring to. What is surprising is Han Chinese, some Hui too83, stubbornly stick to the Beijing time, despite inconveniences, in order to show their loyalty towards the Chinese state and their separation from the Uighurs. One Han Chinese woman told me that ―we have our own time, they have theirs, and we do not intermingle with each other.‖ And for the Uighurs, it is a way to resist the Han Chinese and the Chinese state‘s hegemony in Xinjiang. Furthermore, the linguistic barriers between the two groups are huge. Most Han Chinese in urban areas in Xinjiang rarely speak the Uighur language. On the other hand, Uighurs from the south such as Kashgar and Khotan can barely communicate in the Chinese language either. According to a survey carried out in Urumqi by Herbert Yee, half of the Han Chinese surveyed cannot speak Uighur at all, and only 3.2 percent report they are good at the language. For Uighurs, 14.2 percent cannot speak any Chinese, and For example, Joanne Smith notes ―like the Han Chinese, the Hui consider Beijing time the standard time for Xinjiang as for all regions of China. This is probably one factor contributing to the mutual mistrust between Uighurs and Hui Muslims in Xinjiang.‖ Smith, "'Making Culture Matter': Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese," p. 161. 83 102 47.9 percent are pretty good at it.84 In southern Xinjiang where the Uighurs still enjoy numerical majority, Han Chinese often are able to speak the Uighur language. However, in northern Xinjiang and especially in urban areas where Han Chinese are predominant, few Han Chinese people have the incentive or interest to study the Uighur language. The pressure is often on the Uighurs to conform linguistically. Because of the need to survive in the urban job market that is dominated by the use of Han Chinese language, many Uighurs these days do have some command of the language. Yet in private settings the Uighur language is often preferred. Many times one‘s Uighur language skills are used as a scale to measure how good or pure you are as an ethnic Uighur. This is a reaction towards the emergence of more and more minkaohan Uighur in Xinjiang, who are more comfortable speaking the Han Chinese language than the Uighur language. Oftentimes the minkaohan are looked down upon by their minkaomin counterparts, who deem them culturally too similar to Han. On the other hand, to ordinary Han Chinese, the minkaohan and minkaomin are often lumped together simply as Uighurs and both are treated with equal suspicion and dislike.85 There is one satirical saying that the minkaohan Uighurs are the 14th ethnic group in Xinjiang, because officially there are only 13 ethnic groups. Thus linguistic competence and purity are constantly emphasized by the Uighur community to keep its distance from the Han Chinese. It is here the ethnicity-as-category approach is extremely useful for understanding the construction and maintenance of the Uighur ethnic identity. Both internal ascription and external categorization work in tandem to reinforce each other and strengthen the 84 Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur-Han Relations in Urumqi," p. 436. Because of the racial differences, it is essentially impossible for a Chinese-speaking Uighur to pass as Han Chinese. 85 103 boundary between the Uighurs and other ethnic groups, the Han Chinese in particular, in Xinjiang. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the manifestation of one‘s ethnic identification depends upon the situational context. Herein lies the pivotal role of social encounters in demarcating and maintaining group boundaries. This is particularly the case in Xinjiang where multiple ethnic groups interact with each other regularly. As we have seen earlier, in the ethnic composition of Xinjiang‘s population, Xinjiang is not a place where we can simply draw a dichotomous line between groups. Other than the Uighurs and Han Chinese, there are also the numerous Hui, who are a Muslim group but ―racially‖ Chinese and are also Sinic-speaking. There are also Kazakhs, a Turkic group nomadic in its traditional lifestyle. When a Uighur encounters a Hui, often the emphasis is on linguistic and racial differences despite their common religious faith. The Hui Muslims are greatly mistrusted and resented by the Uighurs and often accused of simply being the same as the Han Chinese.86 When the Uighurs encounter the Kazakhs, often the emphasis is put on their different lifestyles, with the former being agricultural and the latter nomadic. The Kazakhs are also often considered by the Uighurs to be less ―authentic‖ Muslims because of their shamanistic tradition. However, the greatest differences lie between the Uighurs and Han Chinese, where linguistic, religious and cultural differences all line up together in one direction without ―cross-cutting cleavages.‖ During the past few decades as large numbers of Han Chinese migrated into Xinjiang, the Uighurs came into direct contact and ―confrontation‖ 86 This also might have some historical reasons. During the ROC period, the Hui troops under various warlords at times would heavily repress the Uighurs. One might even argue that Hui Muslims played a significant role in keeping Xinjiang within China‘s fold. See Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949. 104 with the Han Chinese. Many Han Chinese migrant workers and peasants have started these days to penetrate into small towns and rural areas that were traditionally strongholds for the Uighurs. This intensified encountering with the other group has made the Uighurs realize and emphasize how different they are from the Han Chinese. Those perceived differences have made both communities consciously keep a distance from each other. At the same time, external categorizations have also increasingly eliminated internal differences among the Uighurs from difference oases who might speak different dialects and have different cultural habits. In Oasis Identity, Justin Rudelson argues that the Uighurs have strong centrifugal tendencies as strong centuries-old oasis-based identifications pull people apart. Rudelson argues that Uighur identity was on the one hand fragmented by social groups, for example, ―intellectuals‘ conceptions of the Uighur nationalist ideology often contrasted dramatically with those held by peasants and merchants, and there were wide gulfs separating all these social groups from one another.‖87 On the other hand, historically strong oasis-based identifications constantly undermine intellectuals‘ efforts to shape a uniform Uighur nationalist ideology.88 To Rudelson, Uighurs in the eastern Turpan oasis, for instance, are more likely to see themselves as citizens of China because of their extensive economic ties with China proper. On the contrary, people from the southern oases whose historical links and cultural ties oriented more towards Central and South Asia, such as Kashgar or Khotan, ―over time have tenaciously held to anti-Chinese sentiments.‖89 Perhaps there are some merits in Rudelson‘s argument about the fragmented nature of the Uighur identity. In Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road, p. 8. Ibid. 89 Ibid., p. 46. 87 88 105 fact most of the disturbances such as riots, protests and other separatist activities have mostly occurred in southern Xinjiang. One common account is that northern Xinjiang is more stable than southern Xinjiang. Even during the most recent riot in Urumqi, according to some reports, most of the riots and violence were perhaps committed by migrant workers from the south. However, there are reasons to question the continued validity of Rudelson‘s argument today. Rudelson supposedly was the first western anthropologist allowed to conduct field research in Xinjiang since the PRC was founded. However, he conducted his research in the mid to late 1980s, and people might argue that things have changed greatly since then. Instead, one might argue that a more uniform identification among the Uighurs has emerged since the 1980s. There are several reasons for this. In addition to the reasons discussed above that emphasize social encounters, two other external variables need to be explored here. First is the role of the government‘s ―preferential policies‖ towards the minorities. Second is the role of repression and violence in hardening inter-group differences and smoothing over intra-group variations. Starting in the 1980s, the Chinese government began to implement a set of preferential policies towards ethnic minorities. In Xinjiang, two issue areas stand out as particularly relevant to the Uighurs. The first is education and the second is family planning policies. Linda Benson, for example, points out that in the 1990s about 50 percent of the quotas for Xinjiang University were reserved for ethnic minority students, who were mostly Uighurs.90 Also for Uighurs who went through the Uighur language education system – minkaomin – scores for university admission are usually significantly Linda Benson, "Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 208. 90 106 lower than those set for the Han Chinese students.91 On the issue of family planning, the first compulsory family planning laws only went into effect in Xinjiang in 1988, ten years later than the rest of the country.92 According to this law, urban Uighur couples are allowed to have two kids while rural ones can have three. These preferential policies are deeply resented by the Han Chinese, yet this differential treatment of the Uighurs arguably has contributed to the strengthening of the common Uighur identification. Just as preferential policies usually strengthen group identity elsewhere in the world, the Uighurs in Xinjiang are no exception. The other important factor is the role of state repression against the Uighurs and inter-ethnic violence between Han Chinese and the Uighurs since the 1990s in hardening inter-group division and strengthening intra-group solidarity. As I have discussed earlier about the growing mobilization on the Uighurs‘ part since the early 1980s, one immediate outcome was the Chinese state‘s heavy-handed and indiscriminate repression of the Uighurs altogether. At the end of April 1996, the Chinese government launched its first ―Strike Hard‖ campaign. In Xinjiang, the goal of the campaign was not only to crack down on criminal activities in general, but also to target political dissenters and, in particular, Uighur separatists‘ activities. Michael Dillon writes, ― the Xinjiang party committee explicitly linked separatism with what it termed ‗unlawful religious activities‘ and launched a campaign to reduce their effect in schools in publishing and throughout the region.‖93 As a result, some Uighur pro-independence organizations claimed that between April and June 1996, some 4000 talips – students of Islam – were arrested and Ibid. William Clark, "Childbearing Strategies among the Uighur Urban Educated Elite in Urumqi," Asian Ethnicity 2, no. 2 (2001): p. 229. 93 Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 85. 91 92 107 sent to prison camps.94 There were also claims that thousands of people were arrested throughout the region during the campaign, of which the overwhelming majority were Uighurs.95 After the terrorist attachs on September 11, 2001 in the US, China also started its own anti-terrorism campaign that specifically linked Uighur pro-independence movements and organizations with the Taliban and terrorists. In January 2002, the Chinese State Council Information Office published a document about East Turkestan terrorist forces operating in China.96 The result of this effort was certainly to conflate all Uighur pro-autonomy/independence movements with existing Uighur terrorist movements, for example the East Turkestan Independence Movement and the East Turkestan Islamic Party. As a result, a big wave of ―justified‖ repression against Uighur dissidents across the region has occurred. The repression treats all Uighurs as potential separatists or terrorists. For example, there have been reports that it is very difficult for the Uighurs to get hotel rooms in major Chinese cities. This kind of repressive and discriminatory measure would certainly have alienated even more Uighurs and contributed to its intra-group solidarity. In addition to state repression of the Uighurs, inter-group violence between the Uighurs and Han Chinese has also played its part in the hardening of inter-group boundaries. Scholars writing on ethnic conflict have already discussed in length the role of violence in strengthening group differences.97 In certain cases, extremist actors can purposefully instigate violence to prevent the moderates from compromising with the Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p. 87-88. 96 Nicolas Becquelin, "Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression in Xinjiang," China Rights Forum, no. 1 (2004): p. 39. 97 For example, Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity"; Conversi, "Nationalism, Boundaries, and Violence." 94 95 108 other group. When we look at the situation in Xinjiang, whenever the Uighur rioted against the Chinese government violence was often committed towards the Han Chinese. In the aftermath of the 2009 Urumqi riot, one can argue that inter-ethnic division will become even more significant, as we can see from the retaliation of Han Chinese mobs against the Uighurs two days after the initial riot. Thus, we can argue that the series of violent mobilizations since the 1990s has certainly strengthened the inter-ethnic boundaries between the two groups, and pushed the Uighur community further away from the Chinese state. External Factors Chinese government policies in Xinjiang remain repressive. Restrictions on the Uighur language and Islam as a religion continue to alienate the Uighur people. Discrimination in daily life as well as increasing hostility and violence between the Uighur and Han Chinese community further contributes to the strengthening of the Uighur identity and the consolidation of boundaries between the two groups. Important as these ―domestic‖ factors are, it is nevertheless not the whole picture if we want to understand fully how the Uighur identification is mobilized away from China. In order to explain the political mobilization for more autonomy/independence among the Uighurs, we have to take into consideration the role of external factors. On the one hand, the Soviet Union (Tsarist Russia before that) and the post-Soviet Central Republics, together with Turkey, have all historically and concurrently presented an alternative model of modernity and development for the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Furthermore, the independence of the Central Asian Republic after the collapse of the Soviet Union had led to great hope and aspiration 109 for the Uighurs who strive to achieve the same destiny. Therefore, belonging to the same culturally Turkic community makes those Turkic countries west of Xinjiang models against which the Uighurs can evaluate themselves. On the other hand, Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations and groups operating outside of China, often with the tacit support from hosting countries in Central Asia, Turkey and increasingly the West, have become the main force in terms of disseminating information, petitioning for help from the international community, and organizing protests and rallies both within and outside of China. It is these external organizations and groups that are the most vital and active in the mobilization of their fellow kin within China. In an interview given at Azerbaijan-based Azeri Press Agency (APP) on July 21 2009, Rebiya Kadeer, the President of the World Uighur Congress based in Washington DC, pleaded to the Turkic world for support. Her statement is worth quoting here: ―First of all I am greeting my Azerbaijani brothers … Our lands – the Eastern Turkistan – is a homeland of all Turks over the world – Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kyrghiz and others. The Eastern Turkistan is a cradle of Turkic culture. If this culture disappears, the Turks will lose their homeland. Therefore all need to support the Uighur Turks…‖98 What is significant in Ms. Kadeer‘s statement is the explicit acknowledgement of the Turkic solidarity between the Uighurs and other Turkic countries. Indeed, great efforts have been made to construct the Uighur pro autonomy/independence movement with ethnic and religious ties towards central and western Asia where the Turkic and Muslim world stretches from China all the way to Europe. 98 The interview can be accessed at http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=105282. 110 Soviet Central Asia Historically speaking, Xinjiang‘s economic, political, and cultural orientation has always oriented towards its west, particularly so in the pre-Qing periods. As Hasan Haider Karrar points out, ―Xinjiang‘s western oases were economically integrated in the citystate system of Islamic Central Asia, the steppe belt north of the Tianshan was part of a macroeconomic region that extended into the Kazakh steppes …‖99 After Tsarist Russia‘s conquest of Central Asia and its signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881 with the Qing, the border between Russian Turkestan and Chinese Turkestan, or what people often call western Turkestan and eastern Turkestan, was finalized.100 After this point, although Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union became the overlord of Central Asia, the local Turkic population in Xinjiang, especially the Uighurs, still looked towards Central Asia for economic and political inspiration. The Soviet Union, as the emerging superpower, played a significant role in modern Xinjiang history. With its fast-paced industrialization and modernization, the early years of the Soviet Union attracted many Uighur people from Xinjiang to seek education in the Soviet Central Asia, for example at the Central Asia University and the Central Asia Military Academy in Tashkent.101 Some estimate that by 1935, 10,000 Uighurs from Xinjiang were studying in the USSR, Turkey and Egypt.102 Modern ideologies such as Marxism and Leninism also travelled from the Soviet Union into Xinjiang that greatly inspired the local population to aspire toward progress and selfdetermination. The Soviet Union was also actively involved in spreading propaganda 99 Hasan Haider Karrar, "The New Silk Road Diplomacy: A Regional Analysis of China's Central Asian Foreign Policy, 1991-2005" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, McGill University, 2006), p. 20. 100 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 135. 101 Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road, p. 56-57. 102 Ibid. 111 into Xinjiang. Soviet publications and other propaganda materials were widely circulated in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. Russian schools were established in Xinjiang with Soviet textbooks, and Soviet films were also frequently shown.103 One of the main messages of this Soviet propaganda was the claim that ―China was a colony of imperialism, Xinjiang was a colony of a colony.‖104 According to Wang‘s quote of Soviet scholar Khakimbaev, Soviet propaganda ―influenced the national liberation movement of the Xinjiang people in the 1930s and 1940s.‖105 Other than propaganda, the Soviet Union was directly involved in the Ili Rebellion in 1944 that led to the establishment of the Eastern Turkestan Republic between 1944 and 1949. According to Wang‘s account, the Soviet Union smuggled weapons into Xinjiang and provided military training for the local Muslim population.106 Andrew Forbes concurred with Wang on this argument, saying, ―[I]t is now possible to state with certainty that the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the establishment of the ETR.‖107 One of the main reasons for the Soviet support of the ETR, according to Wang, was Stalin‘s desire to force Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the Yalta Agreement that acknowledged the independence of Mongolia and conceded port usage and railway rights to the Soviet Union in northeastern China.108 However, the Soviet Union‘s treatment of Xinjiang was extremely opportunistic. After Stalin got what he wanted and when the CCP emerged victorious at the Chinese Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflict and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949, p. 93. 104 Ibid., p. 95. 105 Ibid., p. 92. 106 Ibid., p. 97. 107 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949, p. 170. 108 Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflict and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949, p. 63. 103 112 Civil War, the Soviet Union abandoned the ETR and forced it to be absorbed by the PRC. Yet again, after the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union started its propaganda to attract Uighurs and other Turkic people to emigrate to Soviet Central Asia. During the last years of the1950s and 1960s, the number of emigrants from Xinjiang into the Soviet Union increased dramatically. In the context of the Great Leap Forward in China, ―the Soviet Union, at least according to its propaganda, appeared to be a land of plenty where Uyghurs lived well and thrived.‖109 Also during this period many participants of the ETR were particularly invited to emigrate to the Soviet Union. It all came to a dramatic climax in the spring of 1962 when the Soviet Consulate in Xinjiang started to hand out passports and immigration papers to the Uighurs and other Turkic people, and virtually opened up its border for ―refugees‖ to come to Soviet Central Asia. Hundreds of thousands of Uighurs and other Turkic people fled into the Soviet Union from the Ili and Tarbagatay area.110 Ablet Kamalov comments on this, ―before leaving Xinjiang the Soviets arranged a political action, which was to demonstrate the failure of the Chinese national minorities policy and cause internal problems for Chinese rule in Xinjiang.‖111 One estimate of the number of Uighurs who emigrated into the Soviet Union between 1954 and 1963 is 200,000.112 Between 1963 and the mid 1980s the Sino-Soviet border was sealed off. Yet Soviet propaganda into Xinjiang continued, and during the Cultural 109 Sean R. Roberts, "Uyghur Neighborhoods and Nationalisms in the Former Sino-Soviet Borderland: An Historical Ethnography of a State-Less Nation on the Margins of Modernity" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2003), p. 226. 110 This mass exodus was dubbed in Chinese as the Yi-Ta Incident. 111 Ablet Kamalov, "Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics: Past and Present," in China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century, ed. Colin Mackerras, and Michael Clarke (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 117. 112 Roberts, "Uyghur Neighborhoods and Nationalisms in the Former Sino-Soviet Borderland: An Historical Ethnography of a State-Less Nation on the Margins of Modernity", p. 228. 113 Revolution, propaganda aimed at Xinjiang Muslims was intense.113 Roberts writes that these propaganda programs were mainly about ―the progress of the U.S.S.R towards socialism and about the history of the Uyghurs‘ struggle for independence from Chinese rule.‖114 Also there was the Eastern Turkistan People‘s Revolutionary Party, founded during the Cultural Revolution years in Xinjiang due mainly to Soviet propaganda.115 Although the Soviet Union‘s policies towards ethnic minorities in Central Asia were equally assimilative and Russification of the Central Asian people was very high, the Soviet Union was politically and economically more stable and modern compared with Maoist China. These policies probably gave positive incentives for loyalty among the local population. In Xinjiang‘s case, China could not provide such positive incentives for its Turkic population. No systematic education was provided for the Uighurs. Lack of resources and industrialization subjected local people to great poverty. Political chaos and repression also further alienated them. Therefore, compared with the Soviet Union, China failed substantially to socialize the Uighurs into the socialist system.116 In a documentary Waiting for Uighurstan made by Sean Roberts, some of the Uighurs in the Soviet Union who returned to Xinjiang in 1991 reported that Uighurs‘ living conditions in Xinjiang were very bad, with no jobs or education, and in great poverty.117 Thus, for Uighurs in Xinjiang, Soviet Central Asia had been the model of modernity and progress that many deemed lacking in China. In an essay written by a Uighur trader from Xinjiang in Central Asia, he ―portrays areas outside Xinjiang, former Soviet Central Asia Ibid., p. 238. Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid., p. 241. 117 Sean R. Roberts, "Waiting for Uighurstan: A Documentary," (Sean R. Roberts and the Center for Visual Anthropology, USC, 1996). 113 114 114 and Turkey in particular, as clean and civilized in contrast to the poor and unclean conditions of his homeland.‖118 Turkey Other than Soviet Central Asia, Turkey has remained as symbol of Turkic nationalism and a role model of modernity in much of the Turkic and Islamic world for its embracement of western liberalism and democracy. Dating back from the late 19th century, Uighur merchants who travelled to Ottoman Turkey brought back enlightenment ideas to set up modern education in ―subjects outside the traditional Islamic school curriculum, including mathematics, history and geography.‖119 This so-called jadidist movement represented the first wave of efforts to push for reform and modernization among the Uighurs in Xinjiang. For example, in 1913 a delegation from Kashgar was sent to Istanbul to request that teachers be sent to Xinjiang to ―promote pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideas.‖120 After the two World Wars, Turkey emerged as an ally of the United States and the West. It joined the US-led UN force in the Korean War, fighting head to head with Chinese soldiers fighting on North Korean‘s behalf. In 1952, Turkey also joined NATO.121 Also due to its geographical proximity to Europe, Turkey has enjoyed quite substantial economic development and modernization during much of the post-WWII period. Economic Disparity between Xinjiang, China, and Turkic Countries Because of Soviet Central Asia and Turkey‘s experiences with modernization and industrialization, albeit with substantially different economic models and social systems, Roberts, "A "Land of Borderlands": Implications of Xinjiang‘s Trans-Border Interactions," p. 228. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, p. 171. 120 Yitzhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations (Honolulu, HI: EastWest Center, 2009), p. 7. 121 Ibid., p. 9. 118 119 115 these countries were way ahead of China and Xinjiang in terms of economic development by the time China emerged from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution in 1978. In 1980, for example, China‘s GDP per capital PPP was 523 dollars, while Turkey‘s was more than 10 times that at 5908 dollars (See Table 3.3). From Table 3.3, we can see that Turkey has always been far ahead of China in terms of economic development. In 2007, China‘s GDP per capita PPP was 5083 dollars, while Turkey‘s was 11824 dollars. In Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan was much more developed than China. In 1990 when Kazakhstan‘s data was available, its GDP per capita PPP was 7089 dollars, seven times than China‘s at 1099 dollars. Other poorer Central Asian Republics also did much better than China and Xinjiang, at least during Soviet times. Although lately China‘s economy has taken off fast, there is still a significant gap between China‘s GDP per capita and Kazakhstan‘s, let alone that of either Turkey or Russia. Table 3.3 Comparative GDP Per Capita PPP (US Dollars) 122 Year China Xinjiang Kazakhstan Turkey Russia 1980 523 463 5908 1990 1099 1146 7089 7797 12653 2000 2664 2500 5406 9275 8615 2007 5084 4551 10259 11825 13873 122 World Bank World Development Indicators Database, accessible at http://ddpext.worldbank.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=6. Xinjiang‘s GDP per capita PPP are estimated from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2008. 116 Table 3.4 Regions in Xinjiang where the Uighurs Constitute more than 50 Per Cent of the Population and Their GDP Per Capita PPP in 2004 (US Dollars)123 Percentage of Absolute Number of GDP Per Capita Uighurs Uighurs PPP Region Khotan 96.54 1,710,673 636.6 Kashgar 89.96 3,252,470 910.6 Aksu 72.67 1,618,740 1763.1 Turpan 69.84 444,186 4397.1 Kizulsu 63.51 297,273 795.2 Xinjiang Average 45.73 8,976,741 3413.1 Although Xinjiang‘s overall economic development remains about the average of China‘s national account, and it seems its regional economic data is comparable to the other Central Asian Republics, the overall data for Xinjiang as a region covers up the enormous economic disparity within Xinjiang and especially between the Uighurs and the Han Chinese. For Uighur concentrated areas of Xinjiang, GDP Per Capita is significantly lower than the average in Xinjiang. For example in Table 3.4, we can see that Khotan, where 96.54 percent of local residents are Uighurs, has a GDP per capita PPP of merely 636.6 USD, which is far below the Xinjiang regional average and is much lower than any of the Central Asian Republics. The same can be said about Kashgar, where almost 90 percent of the population is Uighur. Its GDP per capita PPP was only 910.6. For Aksu, where 72.3 percent of local population is Uighur, it has a GDP per capita PPP of 1763.1. Together, Khotan, Kashgar and Aksu account for about three quarters (73.3 percent) of the Uighur population in Xinjiang. Therefore, it is apparent that overall Uighurs in Xinjiang enjoyed very low levels of economic development. Uighurs in Xinjiang in general have not benefited much from China‘s economic 123 Data are calculated from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2005. No more recent data are readily available. 117 development in recent decades. Although Xinjiang as a region is doing relatively well, the majority of Uighurs who live in the southern part of the region live in great poverty. Trade and Modern Consumption At the same time, increased trade between China and Central Asian Republics has provided the local Uighurs in Xinjiang with an alternative choice in daily consumption. These days, China‘s trade with Central Asia has grown substantially. Most of Xinjiang‘s foreign trade has been with its Central Asian neighbors. In 2007, China‘s trade with Kazakhstan was 12385 million dollars, and its trade with Uzbekistan was 1608 million dollars, and its trade with Kirghizstan was 984 million dollars.124 In particular, Kazakhstan has become Xinjiang‘s biggest trading partner; accounting for 50.84 percent of Xinjiang‘s total foreign trade in 2007.125 As a result, ―Uyghurs, as well as other Turkic-speaking minorities in Xinjiang, now have nearly unlimited access to products from Turkey, Russia and Central Asia, areas they feel culturally and historically associated with.‖126 Increasing numbers of Uighur consumers are choosing Turkic and Russian products over Chinese-made ones. This preferential consumer behavior demonstrates that for the Uighurs it is possible to enjoy a modern life style that is not necessarily dependent upon China, and they can express their choice through the historical and cultural linkages with the Turkic world. In Erkin‘s words, ―Current trends of Uyghur consumer choice show that Uyghurs relate their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities to Turkic cultures to their West, especially that of Central Asia and Turkey. At the same time, the availability of products and services from the West that Sadykzhan Ibraimov, "China-Central Asia Trade Relations: Economic and Social Patterns," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 7, no. 1 (2009): p. 48. 125 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2008. 126 Adila Erkin, "Locally Modern, Globally Uyghur: Geography, Identity and Consumer Culture in Contemporary Xinjiang," Central Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (2009): p. 421. 124 118 are culturally associated to Uyghur values further strengthens the Uyghur identity as a whole.‖127 Thus we can argue that the Uighurs in Xinjiang continue to look towards Central Asia and Turkey as models of how economic development and modernity can and should be achieved instead of looking east towards Beijing. Implications of the Independence of Central Asian Republics Furthermore, we have to take into consideration the implications of the independence of Central Asian Republics on the Uighurs in Xinjiang and their political mobilization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of these five Central Asian Republics had a great demonstrative effect on the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The collapse of the one-time super-power the Soviet Union certainly raised hopes for the Uighurs that they might be next to achieve independent statehood because China would not hold itself together for long either. It is commonly believed among the Uighurs that now that the Kazakhs have Kazakhstan, the Kirghiz have Kirghizstan, and the Uzbeks have Uzbekistan, it is time for the Uighurs to have their own Uighurstan or East Turkestan.128 Besides, the independence of the Central Asian Republics has fundamentally changed the international world order in Central Asia, and has provided new opportunities and resources for mobilization in the Uighurs‘ pursuit of more autonomy/independence from China. Uighurs now can receive ideological as well as military/material support from the Central Asian States.129 It is no wonder that the 1990s was the time when Uighur mobilization was the most active. During the initial years of independence, the political and economic transactions in Central Asian Republics were not stable or smooth. In particular, the authority of the Ibid.: p. 426. See for example, Roberts, "Waiting for Uighurstan: A Documentary." 129 Russell Ong, "China's Security Interests in Central Asia," Central Asian Survey 24, no. 4 (2005): p. 429. 127 128 119 state encountered a great challenge in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. A prominent feature of both the civil war in Tajikistan and the insurgency in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s was the rise of militant Islam to challenge the new states.130 The Ferghana Valley between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan, which had become a haven for radical Islamists, was also not very far from Southern Xinjiang. Also, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan during this period also provided opportunities for military training and ideological indoctrination for many Uighurs. For example, Michael Dillon notes that ―there is evidence that Uyghurs fought with Juma Namangani‘s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan based at Mazar-e-Sarif in northern Afghanistan.‖131 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was extremely attractive to the Uighurs who wanted to stage a holy war against the Chinese state.132 The unstable nature of Central Asian countries and the increasingly porous border between China and Central Asian countries (including with Afghanistan and Pakistan) made it possible to smuggle arms into China. And indeed when the Shanghai Five (which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) was first formed in 1996, clause 5 of the joint statement particularly stated that states need to ―take steps to fight against international terrorism, organized crime, arms smuggling, the trafficking of drugs and narcotics and other transnational criminal activities…‖133 Having said that, one has to note that militant radical Uighur groups are still quite small in number and remain on the fringe of the whole pro autonomy/independence movement. In fact, the majority Uighur pro 130 Karrar, "The New Silk Road Diplomacy: A Regional Analysis of China's Central Asian Foreign Policy, 1991-2005", p. 122. 131 Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 139. 132 Perhaps it has to do with the cultural and linguistic affinity between the Uighurs and Uzbeks. Supposedly these two groups are the closest culturally and linguistically among the Central Asian Turkic people. 133 Quoted in Dillon, Xinjiang - China's Muslim Far Northwest, p. 148. 120 autonomy/independence movements are not militant in nature and often prefer political means to achieve their goal.134 The majority of these Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations and groups are located in Central Asia, in particular Kazakhstan, Turkey, and increasingly in Western Europe and North America. Uighur Pro Autonomy/Independence Organizations beyond the Border There are certainly Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations that exist and function within Xinjiang.135 However, due to the heavy presence of the Chinese state apparatus and its draconian approach to any forms of dissent, it is arguably extremely risky and costly for any meaningful organization to function within Xinjiang. Even if such groups exist, they would have to be extremely secretive to escape state surveillance. Thus, it is nearly impossible to know the detailed operation and organization of these groups. Because the cost of collective action within Xinjiang is so high, the most active and influential Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations are based beyond the Chinese border. 134 Although some groups would not relinquish the possibility of using force. See for example, Dru C. Gladney, "Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 387. 135 For example, Thomas Kostrzewa argues that there are five major separatist organizations operating within Xinjiang. They are the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party, the Eastern Turkestan People‘s Party, the Eastern Turkestan Grey Wolf Party, the Eastern Turkestan Independence Organization, and the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Front. Thomas Kirk Kostrzewa, "Separatist Nationalism in Xinjiang" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1996), p. 210. 121 Table 3.5 Uighur Population in Central Asia and Turkey136 Country Number Year Kazakhstan 350,000 2000 Kyrgyzstan 47,000 2001 Tajikistan 3,580 1996 Turkey 40-50,000 1999 Uzbekistan 37,000 2000 Central Asia The Uighur diaspora in Central Asia, in particular in Kazakhstan, can be categorized as three groups because of the time they migrated out of China (See Table 3.5). The first wave of migration occurred when Tsarist Russia occupied the Ili Valley in the late 19th century and many Uighur families moved to the Russian side of what it is today Kazakhstan. The second wave occurred mainly after the establishment of the PRC and before the split of the Sino-Soviet Alliance that sealed the border in 1963. The third wave is more recent and occurred after the re-opening of China to the outside world when many Uighurs moved to Central Asian countries mainly for economic reasons but also as political refugees. Today most members of the Uighur diaspora live in Central Asia, and are most predominant in Kazakhstan and its former capital Almaty. Because of their large numbers and the historical support they garnered from the Soviet Union, the Uighurs in Kazakhstan are very well organized politically and many served in the Soviet propaganda machine that targeted Xinjiang.137 136 Data for this table is adapted from Yitzhak Shichor, "Virtual Transnationalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence," in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, ed. Stepano Allievi, and Jorgen Nielsen (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003)., p. 286. 137 Kamalov, "Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics: Past and Present," p. 120. 122 The first official Central Asian Uighur organization was set up in 1984 in Soviet Kazakhstan with the name of United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan.138 Its goal was ―a restoration of the Uyghur state on the territory of the so-called Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.‖139 With the beginning of perestroika, many legal public organizations were formed to openly promote Uighur education and culture.140 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an Inter-Republican Organization of Uighurs was set up to coordinate various Uighur cultural centers and other political organizations in Central Asia.141 In June 1992, a new organization Uyghurstan Azatliq Taskilati (Organization for the Freedom of Uyghurstan) was established in Almaty with its main aim being ―promotion of restoration of Uyghurstan‘s independence using political means.‖142 During the Yining (Ghulja) Incident in 1997, these Uighur organizations in Kazakhstan were the most active in disseminating information out of Xinjiang and broadcasting it towards the outside world.143 However, one common feature of various Uighur organizations is their internal disunity and the fast pace of name changes and re-organization. After the establishment of the Shanghai Five (later Shanghai Cooperation Organization), various Central Asian governments came under great pressure from China to clamp down or at least restrain the activities of these Uighur organizations. The situation became even worse after September 11, 2001 when China started to designate various Uighur groups as terrorist organizations, and as a result many Central Asian governments followed suit. Despite all Ibid., p. 125. Ibid. 140 Ibid., p. 127. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Roberts, "Uyghur Neighborhoods and Nationalisms in the Former Sino-Soviet Borderland: An Historical Ethnography of a State-Less Nation on the Margins of Modernity", p. 298. 138 139 123 these internal and external difficulties, there are still many Uighur organizations existing and operating, primarily in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. For example, after the recent riot in July 2009 Uighurs in Almaty organized a big rally, apparently with the tacit approval of the Kazakhstan government.144 Turkey As the claimed symbol for Turkic Nationalism and the leader of pan-Turkism, Turkey was naturally an ideal destination for many Uighurs who fled or migrated out of China. Since the 1950s, Turkey has provided political asylum for thousands of Uighurs and other Turkic people from Xinjiang.145 In particular, two prominent leaders of the ETR – Muhammad Amin Bughra (Mehmet Emin Bugra) and Isa Yusuf Alptekin, fled China and ended up in Turkey in the early 1950s. Mehmet Emin Burga was the Prime Minister as well as Military Commander of the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933. Isa Yusuf Alptekin was the Secretary General in the coalition government between ETR and the KMT provincial government in 1947.146 Both became leaders of various Uighur nationalist organizations to preserve Uighur collective identity within the community and promote the cause of East Turkistan independence.147 In particular, Alptekin became a public figure in Turkey until his death in 1995.148 ―Kazakh Uighurs Hold Mass Protest‖, The New York Times, July 19, 2009, accessible at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/07/19/world/AP-AS-Kazakhstan-Uighur-Protest.html?_r=1. 145 Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, p. 15. 146 Ibid., p. 14. 147 Shichor, "Virtual Transnationalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence," p. 288. 148 For example, Alptekin was buried next to the graves of former Turkish presidents Turgut Ozal and Adnan Menderes at the Topkai Cemetery. Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, p. 31. 144 124 The first organization set up by them was the East Turkestan Refugee Committee, which also published a journal called Dogu Turkistan (Eastern Turkestan).149 Later, another National Center for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan and Eastern Turkestan Foundation was founded. The Eastern Turkestan Foundation especially has had a great impact because it provides links to friendly governments as well as NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.150 Later there were also efforts to form an international organization representing the Uighurs across the globe, which led to the establishment of the Eastern Turkestan World National Congress in Istanbul in 1992.151 Six years later, another Eastern Turkestan National Center was established in Istanbul, which became ―an embryonic de facto Eastern Turkestan government-in-exile, headed by Mehmet Riza Bekin.‖152 Although in recent years Turkey has also come under pressure from Beijing to restrain the activities of these Uighur organizations on its soil, Turkey still remains one of the most critical toward Beijing‗s Xinjiang policy and is one of the most sympathetic countries towards the plight of the Uighurs. After the recent Urumqi riot, Turkey emerged as the most vocal in criticizing Beijing. Its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan even labeled the riot as ―tantamount to genocide.‖153 Thousands of people who burned Chinese flags and attacked Chinese embassy protested in Istanbul. Turkey‘s trade minister also threatened to boycott Chinese products. Thus, although officially Turkey acknowledges China‘s sovereignty over Xinjiang and vows not to 149 Shichor, "Virtual Transnationalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence." 150 Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, p. 18. 151 Ibid., p. 19. 152 Ibid., p. 20. 153 ―China Demands Turkish Retraction,‖ BBC News, July 14, 2009, accessible at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8149379.stm . In response to the Turkish criticism, China released the ethnic breakdown of the riot casualties, of which the majority were in fact Han Chinese. Later Turkish Foreign Ministry officials apologized. 125 support Uighur separatists, unofficially Turkey still tolerates Uighur activists who carry out anti-Chinese demonstrations, publications, and meetings with government officials.154 Therefore, Turkey is one of the most important shelters for the Uighurs and plays an important role in the Uighurs‘ pursuit of more autonomy/independence from China. Beyond Turkey In recent years, many Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations have moved their centers of operation to Western Europe and North America. Because of better economic conditions than in either Central Asia or Turkey and with more available funding for their operations,155 and due to the relatively low capability of the Chinese government to put pressure on Western governments, Uighur organizations have become increasingly active and vocal in the West. Currently two Uighur organizations are the most prominent. The first is the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which was founded in April 2004 and is based in Munich, Germany. Erkin Alptekin, the son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, became the first president of the WUC. After Erkin Alptekin stepped down, Rebiya Kadeer was elected. The second organization is the East Turkistan Government in Exile, which is based in Washington DC. According to Shichor, this bifurcated nationalist movement offers a good chance of combining pragmatism and pursuing the ultimate goal of independence.156 The WUC is particularly active in terms of disseminating information, promoting the Uighur cause, and mobilizing the Uighurs both inside and outside of China against the Chinese state. After the Uighur factory workers‘ death in Guangdong and before the Urumqi riot occurred, the WUC actively Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, p. 49. For example, the World Uyghur Congress is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy in the US. 156 Yitzhak Shichor, "Limping on Two Legs: Uyghur Diaspora Organizations and the Prospects for Eastern Turkestan Independence," Central Asia and the Caucasus 6, no. 48 (2007). 154 155 126 disseminated information and organized rallies around the world to protest against the Chinese government for the factory deaths. Since the riot, Ms Kadeer has been very active in giving interviews to the media and propagating their side of the view about the riot. Trips to Japan and Australia and testimony in the US Congress and so forth would certainly improve the profile of the WUC and the Uighur pro autonomy/independence movement around the world. Conclusion In the case of Xinjiang, we have seen how Uighur national identity is constructed and maintained as different from the Han Chinese and the Chinese state. Here both domestic and external factors combine to make the mobilization of the Uighurs for more autonomy/independence possible. Alternative explations for the political mobilization by the Uighurs are plenty, which I will briefly discuss here. Certainly the Chinese government‘s policies towards the Uighurs have played a big role. The restrictions on the Uighur language use and tight control over its religious expression keep alienating the Uighurs. Large waves of migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang also feed into Uighur‘s rising levels of anxieity about its fuure and the demographic balance in the region. We can also argue that the relatively high concentration of the Uighurs in Xinjiang make its mobilization more likely.157 Repression against Uighur dissent has further intensified group grievance and the sense of resistance towards the Chinese state. In addition, inter-communal violence between the Han Chinese and the Uighurs keeps the boundaries between two groups rigid and About the relationship between group concentration and ethnic mobilization, see Monica D. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 157 127 politically salient. These set of variables in themselves are important to understand why the Uighurs are politically mobilizing for more autonomy or even secession from the Chinese state. However, these domestic variables are just one side of the picture. External factors also matter significantly here. The Uighur case demonstrates the general validity of our theoretical framework identified in the theory chapter. As a group with economically superior external kin, and with explicit support from the latter, the dominant strategy for the Uighurs is to mobilize and demand for more autonomy or even independence from the Chinese state. As we have seen in this chapter, linguistic and religious ties with the Turkic world keep the Uighurs oriented towards Central Asia and Turkey and take their ethnic kin as their model of comparison. The lack of economic development in Xinjiang, particularly in Uighur concentrated areas, has meant that a great number of Uighurs still live in poverty. This is especially so when the Uighurs compare their lives in China with their ethnic Turkic kin in Central Asian Republics and Turkey. It is this huge economic disparity between the two that has fueled the Uighurs‘ discontent and frustration with their economic conditions. Furthermore, political changes in Central Asia and the rising activities of Uighur pro autonomy/independence organizations in Kazakhstan and Turkey have provided both opportunities and resources for mobilization within Xinjiang. It is thus no coincidence that political mobilization was extremely active and violent during the 1990s. Therefore, in order to explain fully how Uighur pro-autonomy/independence movements can sustain themselves and intensify their activities, we have to look at both domestic and external factors and the interactions between the two levels. 128 Chapter Four Inner Mongolia – Resistance for More Autonomy? Introduction Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) is one of the five autonomous regions in China, with a territory of 1,183,000 square kilometers, making it the third largest provincial level entity within China. According to the 2000 National Census, IMAR has a total population of 23.3 million, of which Han Chinese represent 79.2 per cent while the titular national group, the Mongols, are about 17.1 per cent. IMAR borders Mongolia and Russia to the north and is a long stretch of land from the China‘s west to northeast. The IMAR was first established in 1947 as an autonomous region for the Mongols, two years before the People‘s Republic of China was founded. The Mongols were granted certain levels of autonomy, especially in education, language, and culture. However, the fate of IMAR was tied deeply to the political circumstances within China since 1949, and the Mongols suffered greatly during the politically turbulent years when Mao Zedong was still in power. In the post-Mao years, although the legal status of the Mongols‘ autonomous region was recognized through The Constitution and the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, in reality the Mongols have experienced great pressure from both the Chinese state and society to assimilate on both a cultural and linguistic level. Fastpaced economic development and markertization within China during the past few decades has been especially detrimental to the Mongolian culture and language. The Mongols face new challenges as changes in their traditional pastoral way of life threaten their culture. 129 The Mongols are deeply embedded in the history of China, such as the Mongol Yuan Dynasty during the 13th century and the deep alliance between the Mongols and the ruling Manchus during the last Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). However, in modern times, with the exception of the independence of Outer Mongolia as a sovereign state after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the other half of the historical Mongolia – Inner Mongolia – has been deeply integrated with China throughout both the Republican Era (1911-1949) and well into the People‘s Republic of China period. Divergent from the situations in Tibet or Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia has not been highlighted in the international news, and the Mongols have not demonstrated significant political movements for more autonomy in recent decades. This lends itself to the question: why haven‘t the Mongols been mobilizing? It is this important question that this chapter answers. This chapter points out that the lack of aspirations for mobilization for more autonomy on part of the Mongols is in part due to the relationship between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia as an independent kin state. It was the different trajectories of national identity construction in these two places as well as the perception of better living conditions in Inner Mongolia that have made the Inner Mongols less anxious about their current incorporation within the Chinese state. In Chapter Two, our theoretical framework indicates that, for an ethnic group that enjoys a higher standard of living than its external kin, and there being no external support for this ethnic group, it is more likely for the group to seek integration or even assimilation within the majority-dominated society. In the Inner Mongolia case, I argue that this theoretical proposition explains quite well the current situation among the ethnic Mongols in China. 130 This chapter is organized as follows. First, it provides a historical review of the Mongols, with special attention being paid to the political history of Inner Mongolia since the PRC was founded. The chapter then provides a detailed portrayal of the current situation in Inner Mongolia and the challenges faced by ordinary Mongols. Following that, it offers explanations for the lack of political mobilization among the Mongols, with special attention paid to the relationship between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia. History of the Mongols and Inner Mongolia since PRC Ever since the Western Han Dynasty of the 3rd Century B.C.E., a series of nomadic powers has played a tremendous role in Chinese history over the span of two millennia. From the earlier Xiongnu (Hun), Xianbei, Kitan, Jurchen, and later the Mongol and Manchu, they all had a great share in the historical process which has come to constitute China as we know it. 131 With the rise of Genghis Khan and his powerful army, the great Mongolian Empire was founded in 1206. It expanded and conquered a huge landmass stretching from China to Europe. In 1260, Genghis Khan‘s grandson Kublai Khan moved the capital to Dadu, a new city which would later be called Beijing, declared himself the Son of Heaven and founded the Yuan Dynasty.1 The Yuan Dynasty lasted for a hundred years, giving way to the newly formed Ming Dynasty (1368). The last Yuan emperor fled north, installing himself as the leader of the Northern Yuan Dynasty. The Northern Yuan Dynasty lasted until 1635, when Ligdan Khan‘s son submitted to the Manchu Khan Abahai (Huang Taiji), who declared himself emperor and founded the Manchu Qing Dynasty.2 The Qing Empire, despite its Manchu core, maintained a deep alliance with the Mongols, especially the Horchin & Harchin tribes of Eastern Mongolia.3 Through intermarriage between Manchu royal family members and Mongol nobles, the Mongol aristocracy enjoyed a high status during the Qing Dynasty, especially in military opportunities.4 The Manchu court introduced a new administrative system to divide and 1 Weimin Hao, Qimudedaoerji 通 郝维民，齐木德道尔 , General History of Inner Mongolia 内蒙 要 (Beijing 京 : People's Press 人民出版社 , 2006), chapter 2. David Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 8. 3 The Mongols are traditionally divided along tribal lines. For example, the independent country Mongolia is primarily composed of the Halh tribe. And in Inner Mongolia, there are Horchin, Harchin, Chahar, Bagar, etc. 4 Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, 8. The Manchu court was also an important patron of yellow-hat (Gelug-pa sect) Tibetan Buddhism, which was prominent among the Mongols. Here, the intentions were to pacify the militant spirited Mongols, thus leading to the 2 doctrine of the Qianlong Emperor for ―promoting yellow religion to pacify all Mongol tribes (兴黄教，即 所以安众蒙古).‖ With the popularity of Tibetan Buddhism, Mongol society underwent tremendous change. It became less ―militant‖ and more ―peace-loving‖. Also, large numbers of males went to monasteries to become lamas, which had great consequence for the Mongols‘ population growth. See for example Sechin Jagchid‘s discussion of the history of Buddhism in Mongolia. Sechin Jagchid, Essays in 132 rule the Mongols. The territorial division of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia (Mongolia today) was a clear political distinction made by the ruling Manchu court. Previously understood as simply geographical difference5, the Manchu court started to institutionally entrench this division. Inner Mongolia was the term given to include areas close enough to Beijing and to be ruled directly through the Lifanyuan (The Court of Dependencies), while Outer Mongolia, due to its distance from the capital, was to be ruled indirectly via the military governor of Urga (Ulaanbaatar today), Uliasutai, and Khobdo.6 Also, Outer Mongolia was allowed to have its own unified Buddhist church under the various reincarnations of Jetsundamba Hutagt, while in Inner Mongolia, the Qing court directly controlled the Buddhist churches by placing them under the imperial teacher Janjiya Hutagt.7 Other than the division between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, the Manchu court also divided the Mongolian land into several large administrative units known as leagues, each made up of a number of divisions called Aimags8. Aimags were further subdivided into a number of banners, which were to be ruled by a hereditary prince.9 The Mongol princes ruled the banners quite independently of each other owing to the fact that heir allowances were directly allotted by the Manchu court, serving to deepen each prince‘s personal loyalty to the Qing emperor. Thus, ―two and a half centuries of stringent divide-and-rule policies not only imbued each Mongol banner with a territorial Mongolian Studies (Provo, UT.: David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University, 1988), p. 136-7. 5 Outer Mongolia is north of the Gobi desert, and Inner Mongolia is south of the Gobi Desert. Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, p. 9. 7 Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonialization and Ethnicity Building," p. 86. 8 Christopher Atwood, "Statement at China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session, April 11," (2005), p. 89. 9 Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, p. 9. 6 133 location in which Mongols exercised a high degree of autonomy but also made Mongols pledge fealty to the Qing.‖10 Earlier in the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu court also prohibited the cultivation of Mongol lands and banned immigration of Han Chinese. This was intended to maintain the area as a military reserve.11 However, by the middle of the 19th century, the Qing was defeated by the English in the First Opium War (1839-1842) and by the Anglo-French army during the Second Opium War (1857-1860). At the same time, the Qing also suffered greatly from the traumatic Taiping Rebellion in the South, and faced the continual incursion of Tsarist Russia in the North. All of these pressures resulted in the Qing switching its previous policy, and opening up the Mongol land for immigration and cultivation by the Han Chinese.12 As a result, millions of Han Chinese flowed into the newly opened Mongol lands. These immigrations dramatically changed the demographic composition of Inner Mongolia, due to its geographic proximity to China proper, having enormous implications even to this day. Thus, after centuries of Qing rule, the Mongols became more ―pacified,‖ their lands divided among various ―independent‖ nobles, and swamped by millions of Han Chinese migrating into the steppes to cultivate and settle the land. In 1911 the Qing Dynasty collapsed. Revolutionary anti-Manchu forces gained power in China proper, leading the Mongol nobles and religious leaders in Outer Mongolia to seize the opportunity to expel the Manchus and Han Chinese from their territory and declared the independence of Outer Mongolia (later named Mongolia 10 Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonialization and Ethnicity Building," p. 86. Jagchid, Essays in Mongolian Studies, p. 87. 12 On the one hand, this effort encouraged cultivation of more lands and helped pay for the war retribution demanded by the English and French imperial powers. On the other, it strengthened the northern border against Russia by populating the area with Han Chinese migrants. 11 134 People‘s Republic). Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, due to its geographic proximity to Beijing and its nobles‘ close ties with the Manchu court, was intricately intertwined with the political developments in China and caught between Japanese expansion in the area and the power struggles between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The situation of Inner Mongolia during the Republican era was extremely complex. Different Mongol elites emerged during this period for the cause of Inner Mongolia autonomy. Some, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu13, Bai Yunti and Li Shouxin, aligned with the KMT and the Republican government. Prince Demchugdungrub14, on the other hand, sought support from the Japanese for Inner Mongolia Autonomy. There was also people such as Ulanhu (Yun Ze)15 who joined the communist camp and sought revolution in Inner Mongolia. However, because of the general power weaknesses of various Inner Mongolia autonomous movements by themselves, without the backing of 13 Prince Gungsangnorbu was the prince of Kharachin. His domain was located right outside of the Great Wall and was thus very close to Beijing, both geographically and politically. After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, despite his initial resistance to the abdication of the Qing emperor, Prince Gung was brought into the new Republican government of Yuan Shikai as the director of the Tibetan Mongolian Affairs Bureau (蒙藏 务局), and later he was also appointed as a member of the governing committee of the KMT. Jagchid, Essays in Mongolian Studies. 14 Prince Demchugdungrub was born in Sunid Right Flank Banner of Shilingol League in 1902. His father was the Jasak of Sunid Right Flank Banner and also a descendent of Genghis Khan‘s Borgchid family line, which legitimized Prince Demchugdungrub in the eyes of many of his followers of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement. In October 1933, Prince De organized a conference at Beyile-Yin Sumu (Balingmiao) calling for Inner Mongolia autonomy. Later he was also involved in the Japanese-supported Mengjiang regime. See Sechin Jagchid Inner Mongolia 札奇 钦 , The Prince De That I Know and the Contemporary 所知道的德王和 时的内蒙 (Beijing 京 : China Culture and History Press 中 文 出版社 , 2005); and Jagchid, Essays in Mongolian Studies. 15 Ulanhu was born into a sinicized Tumed Mongol family right outside of Hohhot in 1906. He graduated from the Mongolian Tibetan Academy in Beijing, and in 1925 he became a CCP member. In 1941, he joined the CCP base in Yan‘an and soon became directly involved with the CCP‘s strategies to win over various ethnic minorities in its power struggle with the KMT. By 1945, Ulanhu emerged as an alternative member of the CCP Central Committee. In 1947 he became the president of the newly founded IMAR. For a good account of Ulanhu‘s involvement in the CCP, see Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006). 135 their powerful neighbors – be it the Soviets, the Japanese, the KMT or the CCP – it was not possible for any local forces to seriously contend for power and achieve the glorious goal of ―self determination‖. In the end, it was the inter-ethnic alliance between the Ulanhu force and the CCP that emerged victorious. On May 1 1947, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government was established with Ulanhu as the chairman. The founding of the IMAR, even before the establishment of the PRC, was significant because it provided a model for the CCP for ―solving‖ ethnic minority ―problems‖ in the peripheral areas of China and provided a potential modicum for creating the legitimacy needed to achieve the unification of territories since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. However, the IMAR was soon challenged by both the demographic imbalance between the Han Chinese and the Mongols (which in 1949 was already 5:1), and also the contradictions between agrarian and pastoral modes of economic production. When western commentators talk about China‘s economic and political strategies toward various ethnic minority regions, Michael Hechter‘s term ―internal colonialism‖ is often applied to describe the division of ethnicity and class, and domination and resistance between the majority Han Chinese and the ethnic minorities.16 Yet, the situation in Inner Mongolia defies such a strict application. As Uradyn Bulag notes, ―colonialism presupposes the clear-cut (ethnic) identity of the colonial self vis-à-vis a colonized other, the (political-economic) domination of a subaltern by a ruling elite, as well as the confluence of these processes.‖17 However, in Inner Mongolia at the time the IMAR was founded, the division of ethnicity and class did not correspond very well. Different from either the case of Xinjiang, where most Han Chinese were transferred by Barry Sautman, "Is Xinjiang an 'Internal Colony'?," Inner Asia 2, no. 2 (2000). Uradyn E. Bulag, "From Inequality to Difference: Colonial Contradictions of Class and Ethnicity in 'Socialist' China," Cultural Studies 14, no. 3/4 (2000): 532. 16 17 136 the state post-1949 to work in the urban sectors and various industries in the name of helping the peripheral people to ―develop‖, the majority of Han Chinese were desolate peasants who fled from famine and warfare in China proper into Inner Mongolia for almost a century. They rented land and worked for various Mongol lords, who owned vast territories of pasture lands. Here we have a paradox: on the one hand, the establishment of IMAR was a result of the Mongols‘ aspiration to achieve self rule from the domination of the previous ROC government and various warlords, but on the other hand, Han Chinese peasants demanded ―revolutionary justice‖ from their exploitative Mongol lords.18 This contradiction between the principle of ethnic self-determination and class emancipation characterizes the nature of political development of the IMAR for the immediate post-1949 years and the subsequent political movements and violence which occurred during the Cultural Revolution. As the paramount leader of IMAR, Ulanhu had to serve two separate ―constituencies‖. He was the first secretary of the IMAR Party Committee, Commander and Political Commissar of the Inner Mongolia Military Region, and the Chairman of the IMAR. Not only was he a member of the Standing Committee of China‘s Political Consultative Conference and Deputy Commissioner of the Nationality Affairs Commission, but he was also elected as vice-Premier of the State Council in 1954, and became an alternate member of the Politburo, the only ethnic minority in the highest power organ of the CCP.19 Thus he had to tread two different lines and balance the intricate role assigned to him as both a Mongol nationalist and a communist, which proved quite difficult. Ibid. Uradyn E. Bulag, The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2002), 223. 18 19 137 During the early periods of land reform or the so-called Democratic Reform, Ulanhu was quite successful in resisting pressure from the center and radical leftists in the IMAR who were calling for drastic measures of class struggle. He managed to tailor central policy guidelines toward the special circumstances of Inner Mongolia and the particular mode of production in pastoral communities. In agricultural areas, where land reform was the most pertinent, the official IMAR policy guideline was to struggle against Han Chinese landlords first and Mongol landlords second. Also, during the struggle secession against Mongol landlords, primary participants should have been Mongols. Furthermore, in terms of land redistribution, Mongol peasants were to receive 10-20% more land than their Han Chinese counterparts.20 In pastoral areas, Ulanhu demanded that the experiences from agricultural areas should not be applied. Except for the princes, noblemen, and high lamas, the idea was not to draw clear class lines. He also promoted the policy of ―Three Nos and Two Benefits,‖ that is, ―no struggle, no redistribution, no class labeling, and mutual benefits for herdsmen and herdslords.‖21 And, there was no effort to collectivize property as the herds remained the property of their owners but were to be herded jointly by the members of the community.22 However, Ulanhu‘s preferential treatment of the Mongols inevitably drew criticisms from people, especially the Han Chinese cadres in IMAR. In their eyes, what Ulanhu was doing was local nationalism, and the interests of the majority (the Han Chinese) were ignored. Following the Hundred Flower Campaign (1956-1957), the party launched the Anti-Rightist Movement, which purged half of the Inner Mongolia 内蒙 通 要 , p. 571. 20 Hao and Qimudedaoerji, General History of Inner Mongolia 21 两利 策： 斗 分， 划阶级，牧工牧 两利. Ibid. Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, p. 70. 22 138 Communist Party Committee. Although Ulanhu himself was too powerful to be directly denounced, he ―could not prevent his critics from beginning to argue for the need to combat local nationalism, and from accusing cadres of minority nationalities, particularly Mongolians, on these grounds.‖23 However, it was the Cultural Revolution that brought an end to Ulanhu‘s balancing acts between IMAR and the central government. It also caused great havoc and even ethnic violence in Inner Mongolia. With the political storm looming on the horizon, Ulanhu‘s policies started to attract more and more criticisms. His ―Three Nos and Two Benefits‖ policy was branded as anti-class struggle, which was a significant crime during the years of Mao‘s frenzy. His special treatment of the Mongols and the pastoral economy was also interpreted as intention to build an independent kingdom and promote ethnic separatism.24 At a meeting at Qianmen Hotel in Beijing May 1966, Ulanhu was officially accused of being anti-party, anti-socialist, anti-Mao, and of actively promoting ethnic separatism. As a result, most of his official positions were removed.25 Following Mao‘s call for red-guards to seize power from the reactionaries within the party, red-guards descended into Inner Mongolia demanding full control of the regional government. On November 1, 1967, the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee was formed under the leadership of General Teng Haiqing and started a series of movements to purge Ulanhu‘s supporters. Teng accused Ulanhu and his supporters of organizing a new Inner Mongolian People‘s Party (Neirendang), with 23 Ibid., p. 76-7. 要 , p. 605. Hao and Qimudedaoerji, General History of Inner Mongolia 内蒙 通 Ulanhu managed to retain his position as the Chairman of IMAR, alternate member of the Politburo, and Vice-Premier of the State Council until 1967. Fortunately, he was not physically harmed during the Cultural Revolution since he was protected by the military first in Beijing and later in Hunan province. Bulag, The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity, p. 227. 24 25 139 the aim of splitting Inner Mongolia from China to merge with the MPR.26 During the anti-Neirendang movement, torture and extreme measures were used to extract confessions from suspects, and a vast number of people were killed or crippled, most of them Mongols. According to the official recount in 1979, there were 346,000 people labeled as Neirendang members. Of this, 16,222 people were killed, 120,000 were injured or crippled, and over one million were affected in one way or another.27 According to unofficial statistics, about 100,000 people died either directly or indirectly from the anti-Neirendang movement, and between 350,000 and 500,000 people were arrested.28 The Neirendang incident and the associated ethnic cleansing left a great scar on the Mongols and created resentment and even hatred on the part of many Mongols towards the Han Chinese, who were blamed for organizing their suffering.29 As one of my informants, a Mongol, noted, ―Before the Cultural Revolution, the relationship between the local Mongols and Han Chinese were quite cordial. Intermarriage and friendship between the two groups were quite common. But because of the suffering of the Mongols during the Cultural Revolution, the relationship between the two communities deteriorated greatly. My mother was tortured during the Cultural Revolution, and afterwards she did not want to talk to any Han Chinese and forbade us kids from marrying Han Chinese. It wasn‘t until recent years that the situation has been 26 Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, p. 110-1. 要 , p. Ibid., p. 114-5. Hao and Qimudedaoerji, General History of Inner Mongolia 内蒙 通 610. 28 William R. Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 19/20 (1988): p. 276. 29 Another way to interpret the mass violence against the Mongols is to think of it as revenge by the local Han Chinese, who had long held grudges over the preferential treatment of the Mongols during Ulanhu‘s time. When the political situation became anarchic, revolutionary frenzy took over and led to the mass suffering of the Mongols. 27 140 getting better when the memory of that period started to fade away a bit among younger generations.‖30 When the revolutionary frenzy and Maoist radicalism started to fade, Ulanhu was rehabilitated in 1973, and in 1977 he once again became a Politburo member. In 1978 the CCP Central Committee issued several documents which declared that the Neirendang never existed, and all the accusations against Ulanhu and other inflicted parties committed during the Cultural Revolution were false and fabricated. At the same time, the CCP Central Committee acknowledged the achievements made in IMAR when Ulanhu was still in power, and issued guidelines on how to rehabilitate and compensate for those who suffered during the Cultural Revolution.31 In 1980, Hu Yaobang issued Article 31 to specifically address the problems in Tibet and called for stricter control of Han Chinese immigration to Tibet. In 1982, Hu issued Article 28 for Inner Mongolia, but it did not address the immigrant problems in the area and even encouraged them by saying IMAR should settle those Han Chinese immigrants who had flocked to the IMAR during the Cultural Revolution.32 The issuance of Article 28 caused a great stir among the Mongols in IMAR. The Mongols were generally disappointed that no genuine measures were taken to promote autonomy in 30 Personal interview. Hao and Qimudedaoerji, General History of Inner Mongolia 内蒙 通 要 , p. 625-6. Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, p. 127. 32 In Mao‘aohai‘s autobiography, he provides a good critique of Article 28. The main points of the Article 28 are: 1) the center is satisfied with the work in IMAR, and it need to work harder on economic development; 2) IMAR should compete with MPR and outperform the latter in economic development; 3) IMAR should improve its economic development; 4) in ten years IMAR should have more than 100 million herding animals; 5) immigrants into IMAR should not be stopped, rather they should be settled well; and 6) for government jobs, in Han Chinese majority areas Han Chinese should be preferred, while in Mongol 31 majority areas the Mongols should be preferred. Mao'aohai 幻人生-回忆录 (Hong Kong (香港): Tianma Books 141 茂敖海 天马出版社 , Life as a Dream -a Memoir 梦 , 2003), p. 261-6. IMAR. In universities, students were outraged and mobilized to demand that the regional government reconsider Article 28. On September 13 1981, more than 3,000 students marched in downtown Hohhot, distributing leaflets that criticized Article 28 and demanding a stop to Han Chinese immigration to IMAR for the protection of the Mongols‘ interests.33 Students picketed and besieged the IMAR government. They also sent representatives to petition the central government in Beijing. But their petitions were simply rejected. Once Beijing‘s response became clear, the students did not know how to respond and simply returned to school. Later, the party secretary of IMAR, Zhou Hui, made a public speech clarifying the issues relating to Article 28, and promised that students involved would not be punished.34 This student movement in 1981 was perhaps the last large-scale movement in IMAR demanding more autonomy, which William Jankowiak dubbed as the ―last hurrah.‖ Current Situation in Inner Mongolia Ever since the student movement in Hohhot in 1981, there have not been any large political movements in Inner Mongolia. In contrast to the situations in either Tibet or Xinjiang, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia have not made much ―noise‖ either in contesting the PRC‘s sovereignty over Inner Mongolia or by mobilizing en masse for more autonomy/independence. As Uradyn Bulag comments, ―the Mongols apparently 33 The main demands made by the students were: 1) save our motherland; 2) stop the immigration of Han Chinese; 3) promote minority population interests by increasing the quota of minority students from 25 per cent to 90 per cent; 4) increase the proportion of Mongol officials; 5) in the future only Han Chinese experts should be allowed, for a short time, into IMAR; afterwards they should leave; 6) the party secretary and the regional commander must be Mongol; and 7) return to Ulanhu‘s policy of promoting livestock first. Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia," p. 279-80. 34 The government‘s reaction was in general quite restrained, and it only punished some student leaders and purged the supporters within the IMAR government and university administration. 142 exhibit no such independent spirit … the Mongols aspire not only to maintain an ethnic political entity but also to live as normal citizens of the Chinese state.‖35 Indeed, currently, economic and cultural concerns of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia are the most pressing, rather than the grand strategies for self-determination. There are two interrelated issue-areas that are the most prominent in the Mongols‘ ongoing negotiation between their ethnic identity and national identity, and their struggle against the challenges posed by globalization and market economic integration. The first issue is the diminishing space of the traditional pastoral way of life. The second is the threat of the fast-paced sinicization/assimilation process among the Mongols, especially the younger generation. Environmental Degradation and the Diminishing Pastoral Way of Life Every spring, northern China suffers from serious sandstorms. The blame is often laid on the fast-paced desertification taking place in the region. Although the land desertification rate in China was 1560 square km per year in the 1970s, it increased to 2100 square km per year by the 1980s, 2460 square km per year by 1995, and 3436 square km per year in 1999.36 This rapid increase rate is generally caused by the degradation of rangeland, particularly in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese government began issuing laws to protect these rangelands in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over-grazing is blamed for this degradation, and herdsmen in Inner Mongolia, predominantly Mongols, are often singled out for their lack of ‗scientific‘ knowledge of rangeland management.37 As a result, the government designed policies to either ban grazing for several months throughout the 35 Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonialization and Ethnicity Building," p. 84-5. Meizhen Liu, Gaoming Jiang, Linghao Li, Yonggeng Li, Leiming Gao, and Shuli Niu, "Control of Sandstorms in Inner Mongolia, China," Environmental Conservation 31, no. 4 (2004): p. 269. 36 37 退耕还林，退牧还草. 143 year or to ban grazing altogether. Furthermore, the government wants herding families to raise their animals in stables, or to resettle families in urban areas. These policies have inspired complaints and resistance from herdsmen across the IMAR. Below is an ethnographical narrative of the grazing bans in Da‘erhan and Maomin‘an Joint Banner (Damao Banner), where field research was conducted in Spring 2008. Damao Banner is under the jurisdiction of Baotou Municipality. It borders Ulanchab Municipality in the east, Bayannur Municipality in the west, and shares a border with Mongolia in the north. According to the 2000 census, the whole banner has a total population of 98,325 people, of which 82,595 (84%) are Han Chinese and 15,093 (15%) are Mongols. In August 2007, the Baotou Municipal Government issued a policy decision totally banning grazing within its jurisdiction. Following this policy, the Damao Banner Government started to ban grazing in agricultural areas in August 2007 and in pastoral areas in January 2008.38 When I arrived in Damao Banner in March 2008, the banner government was actively enforcing this policy in pastoral areas. According to Batu, the head of Dulaan Aula Gacha (village) of Ulaan Khada Sum (township), the term of the grazing ban will last for 10 years and every year of the ban the banner government will compensate each household 4.8 yuan per mu.39 After 10 years, herdsmen can come back, but during this time grazing will be totally banned. The government encourages herding families to relocate to a herding community area in Bailingmiao, but the government only subsidizes 30,000 yuan for the purchase of the housing unit and remaining costs would be borne by each household. The government also allocates 20 mu land for each household so that they can raise their animals in an 38 39 http://www.dmdj.gov.cn/llyj_article.asp?id=8 1 Mu ≈ 0.165 Acre, and 1 yuan ≈ 0.143 USD. 144 enclosed space. Also, the government promises to give people over the age of sixty 200 yuan per month as part of a pension package. The deadline set by the banner government was the end of May 2008, by which time the banning task should have been accomplished. These policies were, however, considered inappropriate and unsatisfactory by most herding families, leading to complaints and resistance. Following are portraits of local herdsmen (women), their complaints and coping strategies. Chimüge is a 30-something Mongol woman. She and her husband live in a brick house with their daughter, who is 10 years old and goes to the Mongolian boarding school in Bailingmiao. They have about 8000 mu of pastureland and more than 200 sheep and goats. In recent years, due to the rising price of cashmere and mutton, they earned about 80,000 to 90,000 yuan (about US$ 10,000) in annual income. In short, life is relatively decent. Although she said that overall she did not disagree with the grazing ban, she was very dissatisfied with the compensation policies. First of all, she felt that 4.8 yuan per mu in compensation was too low. Their pasture is 8000 mu, so theoretically they would only receive about 30,000 yuan in compensation, much less than their current annual income. Furthermore, their pasture is collectively owned with two of her brothers-in-law. They both have jobs in Bailingmiao, but when the compensation money arrives they would certainly come to demand their share. So in the end, Chimüge‘s family may only receive around10,000 yuan for their land, far lower than their current annual income. Second, the terms of the compensation plan are set for ten years but will not adjust for inflation. With food prices rising quickly, the money they are due under the scheme might be insufficient in the future. Also, the money is to be given once every three months, and Chimüge is worried that the 145 government could suddenly stop giving the money after a few years. It would be best if they could get all 10 years‘ compensation money at once so at least they could invest some of it. Third, although it might be possible to find a job in the urban sector in Bailingmiao, Chimüge and her husband were worried about employment in the future because, according to her, ―we have been herdsmen for all our lives and really we do not know anything about working in those jobs.‖ To Chimüge, the deadline for the grazing ban set by the banner government was also ignorant of pastoral conditions. In May, when the ban was slated to take effect, the sheep were still thin without a summer‘s pasturage, so that they will not fetch good price at market. Thus she hoped that the banner government would consider postponing the ban until at least after the summer so that the sheep can be sold at a higher price. Chimüge was also pessimistic about the idea of moving to the relocation community in Bailingmiao. Although the government promised to subsidize 30,000 yuan per household, they would still need to pay an extra 50,000-60,000 yuan to cover the costs of a new housing unit. Furthermore, if they were to move to the relocation community, Chimüge‘s family would basically be abandoning their brick house on the pasture. In any event, the 20 mu of land provided at the relocation community is too small to sustain any significant number of animals. These herdsmen do not really know how to farm, and would have no way of feeding their animals if they decided to keep any. Chimüge‘s complaints were mostly economic in nature. She was indignant about the financial loss her family would suffer but was resigned to taking some form of approved action. In her own words, ―as an ordinary citizen what can we do?‖ 146 Bayantala is a 50-something Mongol male living with his wife on the pasture. All their children have already moved to urban areas, with one living in Bailingmiao, the other in Baotou. He believes the younger generation would never come back to lead a herdsman‘s life since it was boring for them. For him, the ban on grazing signaled the end of the pastoral life-style, a strong marker of Mongol identity. Bayantala‘s family owns about 5,000 mu pastureland and more than 100 sheep and goats. Like Chimüge, Bayantala was also indignant about the financial loss they would suffer. However, he was totally resistant to the idea of moving to the resettlement community in Bailingmiao. He said that Mongols grow up eating meat. By his logic, moving to the resettlement community would mean having to buy meat from the market, which they cannot afford, so how would they survive? Bayantala and his wife have lived on the pastureland all their lives. Although they would occasionally visit their children in urban areas, they have never liked city life: ―too many people and too noisy. It is not like here very quiet and the air is fresh…‖ What was saddest for Bayantala is the idea that the Mongol culture will soon disappear following the grazing ban: ―we Mongols are historically herding people. If we do not herd animals any longer and move to urban areas, we would not be Mongols anymore but become the same as the Han Chinese? My grandson grows up in Baotou, and already he cannot speak the Mongolian language anymore. If we all move to the urban area, sinicization (hanhua) will only intensify. In the future there would no longer be any Mongols.‖ When I asked him what he plans to do when the government people come to ban grazing, he said, ‗I am not going to move. What else they can do to an old couple like us?‘ 147 Öljei is a Mongol male in his forties. He lives in a brick house with his wife. He has two children, both of whom study in the Mongolian middle school in Bailingmiao and come back home only on weekends. His family owns more than 4,000 mu pastureland and more than 200 sheep and goats. Öljei was completely opposed to the grazing ban. He says that, although in early years there were times when quantity was emphasized over quality, now people have started to reduce their herds and improve the breed quality. Since many herdsmen already realized that over-grazing was a problem, they had started to take action. And Öljei could not understand why the government wanted to cut off their economic lifeline. Yet, he was most angry about the way the local government conducted business. He said, ―they only care about fulfilling the quota from above and do not care a bit about the life and death of ordinary herdsmen. We have no say at all, and the local government never ever came to consult with us about the best strategy to preserve the pastureland.‖ According to Öljei, a total ban on grazing all year long is actually not necessarily good for the pastureland. For grasslands to flourish, he said, animals need to tread on them occasionally and they also require fertilization from animal manure. Without these conditions, the grazing ban will not achieve its intended goals of pastureland protection. The best strategy, to his mind, was to only ban grazing for a few months in the summer, rather than the current draconian measure.40 Furthermore, Öljei pointed out the hypocrisy of local government concerning environmental protection. Although they want to ban grazing in the name of protecting 40 This opinion is also echoed by many other Mongolian herdsmen that I interviewed. Also see Gegengaowa 葛根高娃 , "Some Discussion About Ecological Relocation in Pastoral Areas of Inner Mongolia - Using Sunid Right Flank Banner of Shilingol League as an Example (关于内蒙 民 策的探讨-以锡林郭勒苏尼特 (2006). 旗生 移民 例)," Academic Exploration (学 148 牧区生 移 探索) 164, no. 3 the environment, they still allow and even encourage mining companies to invest in the pastureland. These mining activities pose a much graver threat to the pastureland than animal grazing. Öljei was also indignant about the corruption of the local government officials; although many of these officials are Mongols, Öljei called them ‗bad Mongols.‘ When I was visiting his house, Öljei and some other herdsmen of the same gacha were in the process of writing a petition letter. He said they would first go to Hohhot and then to Beijing to petition. The stories of these three herding families are examples of the challenges that pastoral communities face all across Inner Mongolia.41 Ordinary Mongol Herdsmen have suffered greatly during this process, both economically and culturally. No consistent strategies have been adopted by herdsmen to cope with this challenge. Many have simply given up and moved to resettlement communities. Others perhaps have resisted and petitioned, but getting much response from the higher levels of government is questionable.42 The grazing ban‘s total impact on Mongol pastoral society remains to be seen. Mongols’ Struggle against Sinicization The diminishing space for Mongol pastoral society and the government‘s policies aiming at restricting, or even eliminating, the pastoral way of life, constitute a great assault on Mongols‘ cultural identity.43 However, it is a minority of the Mongols who still lead this pastoral lifestyle. The majority of Mongols have either switched to agricultural farming 41 The grazing ban is not carried out uniformly in every locality. One common fate is that those herdsmen who want to petition would seldom reach Hohhot let alone Beijing. Oftentimes they would be stopped by local officials before they embark on the petition trip. 43 Almaz Khan, for example, talks about the political process of making pastoralism the symbol for Mongols‘ ethnic identity in China. Almaz Khan, "Who Are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity, and the Politics of Representation in the PRC," in Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1996). 42 149 or have lived in urban areas for quite some time. Indeed, these days one often hears about the three groups of Mongols in Inner Mongolia: pastoral Mongols, agricultural Mongols, and urban Mongols. In contemporary Inner Mongolia, despite their titular status, the Mongols have already become an absolute minority of about 17 per cent of the total IMAR population. Swamped in a sea of Han Chinese, how the Mongols will keep their cultural integrity and resist the force of assimilation will not be an easy task. When visiting any big cities in IMAR, such as Hohhot, one cannot fail to notice the ubiquitous Mongolian and Chinese bilingual street signs. All government buildings and most private businesses have clear bilingual signs. However, under this façade of bilingualism, it is common knowledge that many urban Mongols, especially the younger generation, do not read or speak Mongolian at all. Despite the official recognition of the Mongols‘ titular status in IMAR and certain efforts devoted to demonstrate the government‘s concern for multicultural diversity and sensitivity, it is undeniable that the Mongols in IMAR are losing their cultural repertoire very quickly. We have seen the case of the diminishing pastoral Mongol society, and the other more pressing issue facing the Mongols is how to deal with the intensifying assimilative force coming from both the Chinese state as well as the increasingly marketized economy. There are great worries among the Mongols, especially certain intellectuals, about the survival of Mongolian culture and language and whether the Mongols are on the path of total sinicization just like the Manchus before them. According to Uradyn Bulag, ―as more Mongols lose their language, arguably the last bastion of their ‗nationality‘ status, they face the prospect of 150 becoming a deinstitutionalized, depoliticized, and deterritorialized ‗ethnic group‘ in a racialized ‗Chinese nation‘.‖44 In the Language Usage Survey published by the National Language Commission in 2006,45 the percentage of Mongols within the sample that can speak the Han Chinese language is 71.38 per cent. Although the same survey reports that 75.52 per cent of people interviewed can speak Mongolian too, one has to point out that this uneasy balance of bilingualism among the Mongols is increasingly tilting towards monolingual Han Chinese speaking. For example, in two surveys conducted by Yamin Hao in four Mongol villages, one in 1996 and the other in 2005, we can note the declining rate of Mongols‘ ability to speak Mongolian and their increasing proficiency in speaking Han Chinese (See Table 4.1).46 Uradyn E. Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China," American Anthropologist 105, no. 4 (2003): p. 753. 45 The China Language Usage Survey can also be accessed online at http://www.chinalanguage.gov.cn/LSF/LSFrame.aspx 44 46 Yamin Hao(郝亚民), "The Current Situation and Changes in Language Usage among Rural Mongols - Using Village Surveys in City T of Inner Mongolia as an Example 内蒙 t 市村落调查 民族学院学 例 村蒙 族语言使用现状 ," Journal of the Second Northwest University for Nationalities 82, no. 4 (2008). 151 变迁-以 西 第 Table 4.1 Language Usage in Four Mongolian Villages in 1996 and 200647 Village A Village B Village C Village D Percentage of 98.40% 97.50% 82.30% 45.90% Mongols Year 1996 2005 1996 2005 1996 2005 1996 2005 Mongolian Fluent 99.70% 99% 100% 99.10% 60.20% 42.10% 10.40% 5.90% Language Capability Han Chinese Language Capability Fair 0.30% 0.80% Fluent 17.60% 25.80% Fair 0.00% 1.30% 0.80% 6.70% 23.80% 3.10% 8.90% 10.20% 90.00% 91.40% 97.30% 98.40% 42.20% 63.50% 29.80% 49.40% 3.80% 8.40% 2.70% 1.60% From this table, we can observe that the overall the percentage of people in all four villages witnessed a decline of Mongolian language capability and increase of Han Chinese language capability during the 10-year time span. The rate of decline of Mongolian language proficiency in villages C and D, where Mongols and Han intermingle, is extremely fast. However, in both villages A and B, where the village populations are more homogenous, the retention levels of Mongolian language are very high despite those people‘s rising fluency in Han Chinese. If one put the situation of these four villages in the wide context of the whole IMAR, given the general dispersed nature of the Mongols – that is overall the Mongols do not have strong concentration areas across the whole region – one can argue that the trend for linguistic assimilation into Han Chinese language among the Mongols should be very high. Hao also reports that there is a negative correlation between age and language capability. Younger people generally speak less Mongolian and more Han Chinese than the older generation.48 There 47 48 Ibid.: p. 19. Ibid.: p. 20-1. 152 is also a negative correlation between education and language capability. Better education level leads to better Han Chinese language capability and worse Mongolian language capability.49 Hao‘s findings confirm the general perception that the Mongolian language is fading quickly among the younger generation. Better education and thus more exposure to the Han Chinese environment, since Chinese is taught throughout IMAR schools, also leads to the same outcome – linguistic assimilation. This trend of linguistic assimilation can also been seen in reports on student enrollment in the IMAR and the number of Mongolian schools. There are three types of schools in IMAR: first is Mongolian as language of instruction plus Chinese as a subject (MC), second is Chinese as language of instruction plus Mongolian as a subject (CM), and third is Chinese in all subjects without Mongolian language class (CC). In 1980, the number of students at MC primary schools was 252,446, in 1995, the number changed to 241,675; the number of students at CM primary schools was 31,279, and in 1995 the number changed to 16,407.50 In total, the absolute number of students enrolled in Mongolian language schools decreased 25,643 people. However, if one controls for population growth and expansion of the education system, the percentage of Mongol primary school students studying Mongolian decreased from 73.3 per cent to 49.6 per cent in 1995.51 The same can be said about middle and high school enrollment. The absolute number decreased for 8663 people, and the percentage dropped from 66.8 per 49 Ibid.: p. 21. 50 Wulantuke ( 兰 克), "The Most Prominent Problem in Minority Education in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Its Causes and Policy Recommendations 其产生原因及对策 51 Ibid. ," Minority Education Research 153 内蒙 民族教育研究 自治区民族教育最突出的问题， 2 (1997): p. 12. cent to 46.6 per cent.52 Meanwhile, with the drop in enrollment, the number of Mongolian schools, including both MC and CM, also experienced a dramatic drop. In 1980, there were 4,387 Mongolian primary schools, and in 1995 the number decreased to 2,978, or 32.1%.53 In 1980, there were 501 Mongolian middle and high schools, and in 1995 the number again decreased to 359, or 28.3%.54 By 1995, already half of the Mongol students in IMAR went to Han Chinese schools. Continuing along this line, for example, by the end of 2005, the percentage of Mongols enrolled in Mongolian schools was 38.2 per cent.55 There are two important questions we can ask in this context. The first is, why are so many Mongol families ―discarding‖ their own language by sending their kids to Han Chinese schools? And the second is, what implication will this ―linguistic assimilation‖ pose to the Mongols as a minority group in China? The first question will be examined from two angles: government policies and economic interest. In IMAR, choices for colleges and higher education for Mongolianeducated students are generally much fewer than for those educated in Chinese. Most Mongolian-educated students can only apply to colleges and universities within the IMAR and other universities within China, but outside of IMAR, higher education institutions generally do not accept students that do not have command of the Chinese language.56 Even within IMAR, many university programs simply do not accept or Ibid. Ibid. 54 Ibid. 52 53 55 Inner Mongolia Bureau of Education (内蒙 Statistic Book 2000-2006 教育 ), Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education 内蒙 自治区教育统计 要 2000-2006 (Hohhot (呼和浩特): Inner Mongolia Education Developement Planning Bureau (内蒙 教育发展规划署), 2007). 56 Although in recent years some top universities in China started to enroll Mongolian-educated students. Still some restrictions apply. They usually recruit from top high schools in IMAR, and Mongolian-educated 154 restrict the number of students educated in Mongolian. Thus, these students educated in Monoglian can only choose education, Mongolian medicine, agriculture and husbandry and so forth as their major, rather than the more popular economics, law, engineering and so forth.57 Related to these educational policies are also changes within the Chinese state/society relationship in general. During the prime time of planned economy, the higher education institutions were controlled completely by the government. The government not only funded them but also set up quotas and targets that all universities were required to fulfill. During the 1980s within IMAR, the quota for minority students was set at between 20-25 per cent and the specific quota for Mongolian educated students was 12 per cent.58 However, since the reforms of higher education in the mid 1990s, the government started to cut its budget for universities so that these universities had to find other sources of funding: one common method was to raise tuition and expand enrollment. Because of these changes, the previously-set quotas became less stringent and the percentage of students educated in Mongolian enrolled in universities dropped to 6.45 per cent in 1994.59 Also with the expansion of university enrollment, the percentage of ethnic Han Chinese students increased. For example, at Inner Mongolia University for Nationalities, the institution which primarily trains ethnic minorities – especially the students would have to go through one year of prep-school in Chinese to be fully enrolled in regular university courses, which means those students need 5 years instead of the regular 4 to finish university. 57 Wulantuke, "The Most Prominent Problem in Minority Education in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Its Causes and Policy Recommendations 及对策 ," p. 13. Jing Li Recommendations (内蒙 李晶 内蒙 自治区民族教育最突出的问题，其产生原因 , "Current Situation of Inner Mongolia Minority Education and Policy 民族教育发展现状及对策)," Heilongjiang Ethnic Studies Journal (黑龙江民 族 刊) 95, no. 6 (2006): p. 108. 58 Wulantuke, "The Most Prominent Problem in Minority Education in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Its Causes and Policy Recommendations 及对策 59 Ibid. 内蒙 ," p. 13. 155 自治区民族教育最突出的问题，其产生原因 Mongols – in 2006, more than half of the student population was Han Chinese and the percentage of Mongolian-educated students was only 24 percent.60 The percentages of Mongol students in other ―regular‖ IMAR universities are much lower. We can argue that Mongolian language education has become more difficult to sustain itself in higher education, and its quality is also supposed to be declining.61 Furthermore, during the time of planned economy, the government was also responsible for allocating jobs to university graduates. Even if the jobs might not be completely satisfactory, at least one needed not worry too much about the prospect of post-graduation job market competition. However, since the 1990s with the increasing pace of market reform and the gradual retreat of the state from involvement in society and the economy, the government is no longer responsible for meting out jobs to university graduates. This change hit the Mongolian-educated students the hardest, because they had to compete head-on with Han Chinese students and other Han Chineseeducated Mongol students in a job market that predominantly favors people who have command of the Chinese language. So far, the government has not issued any legislation to guarantee or at least provide a quota for employment of these Mongolian-educated students. The prospects of employment after graduation for these Mongolian-educated students are not very good. These days Inner Mongolia is also deeply integrated economically with the rest of China. Given that the Mongols are already an absolute minority within IMAR, most businesses and trade etc are dominated by Han Chinese and require proficiency in 60 Ying Chen (陈英), "Current Situation of Minority Higher Education in Inner Mongolia and Policy Recommendations 内蒙 蒙族高等教育现状及发展对策研究 Mongolia University of Agriculture (内蒙 61 Ibid., p. 27. 农 " (Masters Thesis (硕士论文), Inner 大学), 2008), p. 16. 156 Chinese. Everywhere in IMAR, although shops might have a Mongolian script written outside, the commodities sold are the same sold everywhere else in China and in most cases do not provide bilingual packaging. Modern media, such as TV and radio, are also dominated by Chinese programs. Although there are a few Mongolian language TV channels in IMAR, the programs are usually very dull and many TV shows are simply translated from Chinese ones and dubbed in Mongolian. An even more frightening case is the internet. For the younger generation, most internet games are in either English or Chinese. Thus one has to learn Chinese in order to have fun and be cool. As well, pop culture is dominated by Han Chinese stars, no matter whether they are from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the mainland. Although there are some popular Mongolian singers, they also sing in Chinese. For example, a popular Mongolian band called Erguna‘s recent album Hongyan includes three songs in Mongolian and the other nine are in Chinese. Because of these government policy changes and the inadequate measures of current government legislation to protect the use of the Mongolian language in the job market, the decline in popularity of the Mongolian language translates into an economic issue. Given that Mongolian language does not bring good educational prospects or employment opportunities, and that the entire society is dominated by the use of the Chinese language, no wonder more and more Mongol families send their children to Han Chinese schools. As Naran Bilik points out, ―with business booming and spreading from metropolitan areas into remote areas, a language hierarchy is forming in Inner Mongolian region, whereby English or some other foreign language ranks at the top, Chinese comes second and Mongolian at the bottom. It is a long-standing view among the Mongols, especially intellectuals, that knowing Mongolian, Chinese and a major foreign language 157 has different implications for social advancement or achievement: i.e. Mongolian is mainly used in local areas and for much less challenging public and private functions like ethnic symbolism and family chat; Chinese is the omnipotent medium across the country for political promotion and economic procurement; whereas foreign languages represented by English are for top ranking accomplishments all around the world.‖62 In this way, the Mongolian language situation mirrors what David Laitin describes in Identity in Formation. In this book, Laitin explains how a language change cascade can occur when people perceive interest to do so and when they see people around them doing the same.63 If Laitin‘s assessment is correct, we can perhaps predict that the Mongols in Inner Mongolia will lose their language repertoire down the road and be assimilated by the Han Chinese. Here is a story told to me by a Mongolian intellectual and what happened to his son. I met Professor Bater at a university in IMAR. Professor Bater is a renowned scholar of Mongolian literature and history. When his son was very young, Professor Bater sent him to a Mongolian language kindergarten. His rationale was to provide a Mongolian language environment for his son when he was young so that he would not grow up forgetting the Mongolian language. However, because they live in an ethnically mixed apartment complex, his son‘s playmates were either Han Chinese or other Mongol kids who spoke only Chinese. As a result, his son picked up the Chinese language much faster than Mongolian. Later, because of the concern for a better future for his son, Professor Bater sent him to a Chinese primary school, and now his son is studying at a university in Beijing. According to Professor Bater, his son speaks perfect Mandarin Naran Bilik, "The Mongol-Han Relations in a New Configuration of Social Evolution," Central Asian Survey 17, no. 1 (1998): p. 73. 63 Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad. 62 158 Chinese, and although he still understands some kitchen Mongolian he usually does not like to speak it. When he and his wife talked to their son in Mandarin, his son would sometimes laugh at their accent. Every year when Professor Bater‘s mother comes to visit them from the pastoral areas, it is very difficult for his son to communicate with his grandmother, who does not speak much Han Chinese. When Professor Bater told his story about his son, I could sense that on the one hand he was lamenting the fact that such stories happen everywhere in Inner Mongolia and the younger generation of Mongols would not be able to speak their own language. However, I could also tell he was also individually satisfied that his son was getting a good education and had a bright future in Beijing. A different story was conveyed to me by another Mongolian professor Mandula. Although he sent his son to the local Mongolian schools until high school, after finishing high school, his son got into Tsinghua University in Beijing. After one year of prep school, his son is adjusting well to the new environment in Beijing and is doing quite well in his studies. When Professor Mandula told me about his son‘s life in Beijing, one of his colleagues jumped in and said ―but surely your son will not come back to Inner Mongolia after graduation right?‖ This professor was a bit embarrassed but did not try to defend his son‘s possible career choice. It was obvious to people that as the national capital Beijing offers better employment prospects for career development. Certainly, if his son stays on in Beijing, the next generation will be highly unlikely to be able to speak Mongolian, since in cities like Beijing no Mongolian language schools are available. These two stories are symbolically significant in reflecting the situation of the Mongolian language in Inner Mongolia. These two professors are both intellectuals 159 studying and teaching Mongolian language and history. Thus, in a way they represent defenders of the Mongolian language and culture. However, if people such as these are joining the tide of switching to the Chinese language, what can we say about ordinary Mongols? As Uradyn Bulag laments the loss of Mongolian language in IM, ―many Mongol-speaking Mongols are forced to ‗collaborate in the destruction of their instrument of expression‘‖64 Under this tremendous pressure from the Chinese state and economy, what alternative strategies do ordinary Mongols have to resist assimilation? Mobilization (or the lack of it)? With the political pressure to end the Mongol‘s traditional pastoral way of life and the intensifying pace of sinicization, what strategies have the Mongols in Inner Mongolia adopted for resistance and protection/promotion of more autonomy? Are there any massbased mobilizations by the Mongols? There are several political organizations that claim to represent the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and almost all of them are based overseas, such as in the United States, Japan, and Europe. One of the most prominent organizations is the Inner Mongolian People‘s Party (IMPP), and the other is the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC). The IMPP was founded on March 23, 1997 at Princeton, New Jersey, United States. According to its constitution, its guiding principles are: ―The IMPP upholds the principles of democracy and peace in fighting to end the Chinese Communist Party‘s colonial rule in Inner Mongolia.‖ Its ultimate goal is to achieve independence for Inner Mongolia, and the immediate goal is to establish a ―confederated 64 Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China," p. 754. 160 union with China in the course of the future social development in China‖.65 The SMHRIC is an organization based in New York with the following principles: ―To gather and distribute information concerning Southern (Inner) Mongolian human rights situation and general human rights issues; to promote and protect ethnic Mongolian‘s all kinds of rights, such as basic human rights, indigenous rights, minority rights, civil rights, and political rights in Southern Mongolia; to encourage human rights and democracy grassroots movement in Southern Mongolia; to promote human rights and democracy education in Southern Mongolia; to improve the international community‘s understanding of deteriorating human rights situations, worsening ethnic, cultural and environment problems in Southern Mongolia; and ultimately, to establish a democratic political system in Southern Mongolia.‖66 Every year these groups organize campaigns and protests, for example, the campaign to call on Chinese authorities to release Mr. Hada from jail.67 However, one has to point out the small scale of their activities and the lack of visibility of their campaigns, if we compare them with those large organizations and social movements associated with the Tibetan or the Uighur causes. So why have the Inner Mongols not risen up in protest? Or why have these pro Inner Mongolia autonomy/independence movements not garnered much support? To answer this question, we have to consider how inter-ethnic boundaries are constructed and maintained in Inner Mongolia. IMPP‘s constitution can be accessed online at www.innermongolia.org SMHRIC‘s mission state can be accessed online at www.smhric.org 67 Mr. Hada is the organizer of the Southern Mongolian Democracy Alliance. He and some other Mongols organized several peaceful demonstrations in Hohhot in 1995 and were later arrested and jailed by the Chinese government. 65 66 161 Inter-ethnic Boundary Construction and Maintenance in Inner Mongolia The first factor is the dispersed nature of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia and their absolute demographic minority status. The Mongols are also dispersed across the vast territory of IMAR. Only in the eastern part of IMAR are there a few concentrated areas, such as in Tongliao Municipality (previously the Jirim League) and Chifeng Municipality (Juuda League) (See Table 4.2). Even in these places, the Mongols represent less than half of the local population. Furthermore, the Mongols in the eastern parts of IMAR are the ones who came into contact with Han Chinese quite early on, and they already adopted an agricultural way of life and have been quite heavily influenced by Han Chinese linguistically and culturally. Erin Jenne et al. argue that the group‘s concentration level is highly correlated with the group‘s bargaining power and group mobilization.68 If Jenne et al. are right in their analysis, the low concentration level of the Inner Mongols explains the lack of coordinated group mobilization. Table 4.2 Some Mongol Concentrated Areas Regions in Inner Percentage of Mongolia Mongols Tongliao 36.6% Chifeng 19.5% Xingan 17.6% Xilinghaote 7.7% Ulanchabu 7.6% Inner Mongolia Average 17.1% The second factor is the lack of prominent leadership for Inner Mongols. The Mongols do not have a charismatic international celebrity leader such as the Dalai Lama 68 Erin K. Jenne, Stephen M. Saideman, and Will Lowe, "Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization," Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 5 (2007). 162 for the Tibetans or even a symbolic leader such as Rebiya Kadeer for the Uighurs. The overseas Inner Mongolia organizations, leaderships are overall much lower profile. The only person who had overall leadership authority in IMAR for the past half century was Ulanhu, but he was also a staunch communist leader. And in the post-Ulanhu IMAR, leadership at the regional government is imbued with factional fights between the eastern Mongols and the western Mongols, which can be traced back to pre-PRC days.69 For example, the position for the chairman of IMAR is usually rotated between eastern and western Mongols. One can argue that the Mongols in IMAR are geographically divided and no overarching leadership has yet emerged. The third factor is that the Mongols in Inner Mongolia do not have a strong religion to resist the assimilative power of the Chinese state and society. Although historically the Mongols practiced Tibetan Buddhism, the lamaist church was quite effectively removed in both Inner Mongolia and Mongolia during various revolutionary movements.70 And perhaps because of the Manchu Qing court‘s manipulative policy of using Tibetan Buddhism to ―pacify‖ the Mongols, some Mongols blamed Tibetan Buddhism for the lagging development of the Mongols in past centuries. Thus, Tibetan Buddhism, as an ―alien‖ religion, does not have the same level of authority and appeal among the Mongols as among the Tibetans. In recent years, there has been a revival of pre-Buddhism Shamanism in Inner Mongolia, but still the Inner Mongols do not have a strong religious faith to act as a resisting weapon. 69 Atwood, "Statement at China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session, April 11." 70 In Mongolia, the lamaist church was purged in the 1930s during Stalin‘s Great Purge, although in recent years there has been a revival of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia. In Inner Mongolia, the lamaist church was eliminated during the Cultural Revolution. Although the government started to allow religious freedom by restoring Buddhist monasteries, the scale of influence of the lamaist church is very limited. 163 The fourth factor is the geographical proximity of Inner Mongolia to Beijing, the political center of China. Most Inner Mongolian cities are within about 10 hours‘ train range from Beijing, such as Hohhot, Tongliao, Chifeng, Ordos, Baotou and so forth. Compared with the more remote Tibet or Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia‘s geographic closeness to the China proper makes it more susceptible to influence from Han Chinese as well as relatively defendable to Chinese forces. Related with the geographical proximity is the historical connection of the Mongols with central dynastic powers in China. Mongols, together with the Manchus, were the only existing minority groups that historically ruled China and produced emperors claiming to be the Son of Heaven. Even the current Chinese capital Beijing was initially established by the Mongols. As we have seen in our earlier discussion of Inner Mongolia history, the Inner Mongols, in particular the Horchin and Kharchin of eastern Inner Mongolia, were very closely affiliated with the Manchu court and had contributed greatly in building the Qing Empire. One can argue that it would be much easier for the Mongols to accept the concept of the Chinese state and its claims to sovereignty over Inner Mongolia than other peripheral groups such as the Tibetans or the Uighurs. Even during the most turbulent ROC period, leaders such as Prince De fell short in calling for Inner Mongolia independence and always settled for the more moderate claim for Inner Mongolia autonomy. An additional factor was that Inner Mongolia was also ―liberated‖ by the Inner Mongol communists themselves, and the Inner Mongols participated actively in the state building process during both the ROC and PRC periods. One interesting story conveyed to me during my field research in Inner Mongolia was that many Mongols were quite proud of the military power of the Mongols 164 and how the Inner Mongolia cavalry defeated the Dalai Lama‘s uprising in 1959. Rumor has it that to this day Mongol and Tibetan students do not get along very well at the Central University for Nationalities because of this. In some Inner Mongolia internet forums, one can sense the strong anti-Han Chinese chauvinism or anti-CCP sentiment, but not so much of disputing the reality of being part of the Chinese state. All these factors matter and in one way or another affect the Inner Mongols‘ lack of formal resistance and organized mobilization for more autonomy against the Chinese state. That being said, I argue one particular factor requires special attention. That is the relationship between Inner Mongolia, as an autonomous region, and Mongolia, as an independent sovereign state to the north. The perception of the Inner Mongols towards Mongolia, their ethnic kin state, plays a big role in how they perceive their current situation and their view of the Chinese state. The Relationship between Mongolia and China When the Qing Empire collapsed in 1911, Outer Mongolia took the opportunity to declare independence by setting up a theocratic state with the Eighth Jebtsungdamba Hutagt as its monarch. However, in 1915 the Outer Mongols were forced to sign a treaty with the ROC government to secure their ―autonomy,‖ after numerous rounds of negotiations between the Russians, the Mongols, and the ROC government. In 1921, Outer Mongolia was to declare independence again and finally in 1924 it proclaimed the founding of the Mongolian People‘s Republic (MPR).71 Since its independence, the MPR was effectively incorporated into the Soviet Empire and remained a Soviet satellite Shakti Madhok, Sino-Mongolian Relations, 1949-2004 (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 2005), p. 37. 71 165 state until 1991. During WWII, MPR joined forces with the Soviet Red Army in fighting against the Japanese. It was through the 1946 Yalta Agreement that the ROC government finally recognized the independent status of MPR. After the victory of the CCP on the mainland, during the early years, due to similar communist ideologies and the ―brethren‖ feeling together under the leadership of the Soviet Union, MPR maintained a cordial relationship with Beijing. However, after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, MPR joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and aligned itself very closely with the Soviet Union. As a result, the MPR-PRC relationship was hostile and frozen for nearly 20 years. It was Gorbachev‘s announcement of the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolian territory in July 1986 at Vladivostok that signaled the normalization of relations between the MPR and PRC.72 In Soviet times, MPR was heavily dependent upon its northern neighbor, and its economy relied heavily upon massive Soviet loans and aids.73 The collapse of the Soviet Union was thus tremendously painful for Mongolia. As a landlocked country sandwiched between Russia and China, Mongolia had little alternative but to look south for economic support. This also coincided with the time when the Chinese economy really started to accelerate in the early 1990s. As a result, the economic vacuum left by the departed Soviet Union was soon filled by China. Mongolia now exports most of its natural resources to China while China provides electronic appliances, agricultural products, clothes, and other daily necessities to Mongolia. Since 1999 China has been the largest trading partner of Mongolia: China is the largest recipient of Mongolian exports and is the second largest Sharad K. Soni, Mongolia-China Relations: Modern and Contemporary Times (New Dehli: Pentagon Press, 2006), p. 193. 73 Sergei Blagov, "Mongolia Drifts Away from Russia toward China," China Brief, A Journal of the Jamestown Foundation 5, no. 10 (2005). 72 166 source of imports for Mongolia. Since 1998, China has remained the biggest investor in Mongolia, providing about half of Mongolia‘s total foreign investment (See Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).74 Country Table 4.3 Mongolia‘s Major Export Destinations, 200775 China Canada USA Russia Italy Export Amount (In Million USD) 1413 178.6 99.9 58.5 56.7 South Korea 41.26 Percentage of Overall Export 74.1% 9.16% 5.13% 3% 2.9% 2.13% Table 4.4 Mongolia‘s Major Import Sources, 200776 Country Russia China Japan South Germany USA Korea Import Amount (In 745 674.3 140.2 119.6 76.5 58.6 Million USD) Percentage of Overall 34.6% 31.07% 6.46% 5.5% 3.53% 2.7% Import Given this close economic relationship between Mongolia and China, it is poignant to point out the extremely important role played by Inner Mongolia. Ever since the 1980s, trade between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia has always been more than half of the total share of Mongolia-China trade. Many Chinese investments in Mongolia are also from Inner Mongolia. The IMAR has actively been pursuing a better economic cooperation environment with its northern neighbor. For example, it provided loans and financial support for investment in the mining and energy sectors in Mongolia. It also 74 Nalin (娜琳), "The Important Part of Mongolia-China Relationship - Economic and Trade Cooperation between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia 蒙中经贸关系的重要部分-内蒙 Bimonthly of Mongolia and Tibet Situations 75 Ibid.: p. 36. 76 Ibid. 蒙藏现况 167 刊 和蒙 的经贸 17, no. 5 (2008): p. 37. ," opened up 11 trading ports along its long border with Mongolia, with Erlianhaote as the hub. The IMAR has also been actively promoting infrastructure investment in Mongolia to better connect the two through railway and highway systems/networks. In addition, there has been a high level of cultural exchange between the two neighboring states.77 For example, in 2005 Mongolia and China jointly proclaimed Intangible Cultural Heritage for the Mongolian traditional Long Song – Urtiin Duu from UNESCO.78 Inner Mongols’ Perceptions of Mongolia Because of the Soviet military stationed in the MPR territory, the Sino-Mongolian border was heavily guarded and almost all communications between Inner Mongolia and MPR were cut off. Before the thawing of the relationship between the two in the mid 1980s, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia had literally no contact with their ethnic brethren in the north. Put into the context of the tremendous suffering that the Mongols in Inner Mongolia underwent during the Cultural Revolution, there was a strong desire among them to communicate with the Mongols in Mongolia and Inner Mongolians had developed very much an idealized image of Mongolia ―where Mongols live in happiness, where genuine Mongolian culture is developed without restriction, and Mongols can walk shoulder to shoulder with any nation in the world.‖79 Indeed, in Uradyn Bulag‘s words, Mongolia was like Mecca to many Inner Mongols before the 1980s. However, after the two sides came into more frequent contact since the mid 1980s, the previously imagined transnational pan-Mongol affiliation on the part of the Inner Mongols did not bear much fruit. One can argue that there are two main reasons Ibid.: p. 43-5. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?RL=59 79 Uradyn E. Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 2-3. 77 78 168 for this ―dashed‖ idealization of Mongolia: the divergent conceptualization of national identity and citizenship in both places; and the economic advantage of Inner Mongolia over Mongolia. These two factors combined contribute to a realization and reassessment of what it means to be Inner Mongol and the relationship between Inner Mongolia and China. The first factor is the sense of rejection of the Inner Mongols by the Mongols in Mongolia. This has to do with the different processes of national identity construction in Mongolia and China. In China, as to its nature of a multiethnic society, the Chinese state has been constructing the national identity issue on a diversity-but-unity basis – ―China is a unified multinational state (统一多民族 家).‖ Despite the increasing tendency of the Chinese state to assimilate its various ethnic minorities, institutionally the Chinese state still allows room for various ethnic minority groups to express and assert their ethnic identities. For example, everyone‘s ID card in China has a column stating one‘s ethnic background, whether it is Han, Mongol, Tibetan and so forth. Especially for peoples of ethnic minority origin, the sense of being a minority can be quite strong and would be constantly reaffirmed through state affirmative action policies. However, in Mongolia, the state has constructed itself more along the line of a nation-state, which equates the majority Halh Mongol as Mongolian. As a former tribal denominator, Halh Mongol has been designated as the most authentic Mongolian in Mongolia. In his study of the nationalism of modern Mongolia, Uradyn Bulag writes, ―Halh is generally accepted as coterminous with Mongol in Mongolia … The idea that Halh equals ‗proper Mongol‘ is further facilitated by the adoption of the Halh dialect as the standard language enshrined 169 in the Cyrillic Mongolian script adopted in the 1940s.‖80 This exclusive construction of the Mongolian national identity based on the core Halh Mongol has effectively shut off the chances for other Mongol people outside of Mongolia to be considered proper Mongols. As a result, many Inner Mongols who went to Mongolia initially as a pilgrimage and feeling fellow Mongol co-national-ship came back with great shock and disillusionment. As Bulag remembers about his first trip to Mongolia as an Inner Mongol in 1990, ―there in Mongolia, for the first time I realized I was not Mongol, but an Inner Mongol and a citizen of China. Worse still, I was sometimes regarded as Chinese.‖81 It is the emphasis of the purity of the Halh Mongol that dissociated Mongolia from Mongols from outside. Inner Mongolia as well as other Mongol-inhabited regions are considered as ―lost land, not much different from any other distant territory of the old Mongolian Empire.‖82 This rejection of the Inner Mongols and the denial of their Mongolness have on the one hand strengthened the Inner Mongols‘ identity of being ―Inner Mongol.‖ For example, Wurlig Borchigud points out that ―among many Inner Mongolia Mongolianspeaking urban Mongols, the present ethnicity based Obor Mongolcuud83 regional identity has already replaced their previous pan-Mongolian transnational dream.‖84 This separation of the Inner Mongol identity from the independent Mongolia in a way ―enhanced the national boundary of the Chinese state to which it belongs.‖85 Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 4-5. 82 Ibid., p. 183. 83 Obor Mongolcuud is Mongolian for Inner Mongol people. 84 Wurlig Borchigud, "Transgressing Ethnic and National Boundaries: Contemporary "Inner Mongolian" Identities in China," in Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press 1996), p. 178-9. 85 Ibid. 80 81 170 On the other hand, it has also led to a backlash from the Inner Mongols about what it means to be ―authentic Mongol.‖ When together, oftentimes there would be verbal combats on this issue between Mongols from Mongolia and Inner Mongols.86 For example, some Inner Mongols would point out that they are in fact more Mongol than the Mongols in Mongolia because they still use the traditional Mongolian script, while Mongolia had already adopted a Cyrillic script; or the Inner Mongols still keep many of the traditional Mongol customs while the Mongols in Mongolia have been very much ―russified‖ in their demeanor. This contentious issue can be seen in Nalan‘s account of his perception of Mongolia. Nalan is a 30-something Mongolian-speaking Mongol whom I met in Hohhot. He is originally from Jirim League and got his BA in Mongolian language and literature from Inner Mongolia Normal University. After he graduated from college, because he speaks fluently both Chinese and Mongolian, he got a job at a Chinese trading company that has frequent business with Mongolia, mainly importing natural resources from the latter. Nalan needs to travel to Ulaanbaatar for business once in a while. He told me what he felt when he first went to Mongolia: ―I first went to Mongolia in 2000. To be frank, I was very excited at the time that I had an opportunity to go there, because as a Mongol it‘s a wonderful thing to travel to Mongolia to see how as an independent country Mongolia is doing. Also I had great expectations to feel the common cultural bond with my brothers and sisters in the north, because after all we are all descendents of Genghis Khan. Certainly there are good things in Mongolia, for example, the environment is much better and there is not as much pollution as here in China. And everywhere people speak Mongolian, which to a Mongol growing up in Inner Mongolia 86 Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, p. 175. 171 was also emotionally touching. However, after contacts with the Mongols there, my initial warmth towards them died down or disappeared. People over there do not like me very much. For example, whenever I talked to people and when they hear my accent, their attitude towards me would change and became very strange. In general the Mongols in Mongolia are not very friendly towards people from China, including Inner Mongols. They thought we were going to take back Mongolia. To them, I am already like Han Chinese and I certain cannot tolerate that. At least here in China we still use the traditional scripts, and to me those people in Mongolia have been very heavily influenced by Russia and do not behave like Mongols any more. They are sneaky and always want to trick us. At dinner tables we would get into those arguments about who are real Mongols and what is real Mongolian culture, and they would accuse us of being sinicized and we would call them russified. It is sad. These days I am not that enthusiastic about going to Mongolia anymore. If I have to go, it is just work, and I don‘t think I would want to stay there for long.‖ The second factor is economic and utilitarian. This has to do with the fact that Mongolia to this day remains a poor and less developed country while Inner Mongolia has enjoyed quite high levels of economic development within China for the past few decades. Below is some data on GDP per capita PPP of Mongolia and China from 1981 to 2007. As we can see from Table 4.5, Mongolia‘s economy since the1980s has been in stagnation, and its GDP growth rate is very low and has not changed much during the past three decades. On the other hand, China has experienced fast economic development. By 2007, China‘s GDP per capita PPP has already surpassed that of Mongolia‘s. The same can also be said about Inner Mongolia. In 2007 Inner Mongolia‘s 172 GDP per capita PPP has has already surpassed China‘s national average, is already more than double that of Mongolia‘s.87 Table 4.5 Comparative GDP Per Capita PPP (In Constant 2005 International Dollars)88 Year China Inner Mongolia Mongolia 1981 544 449 1848 1990 1099 988 2332 2000 2664 2204 2029 2007 5084 6818 3056 The different levels of economic development between Mongolia and Inner Mongolia are reflected in Inner Mongols‘ perception of differences in economic wellbeing between these two places. For example, Wurlig Borchigud reports, ―most Inner Mongolia urban Mongols have come to realize that their own regional economy is much better than Outer Mongolia‘s. Because of their regional economic perspective, an increasing number of urban Mongols in inner Mongolia hold a more flexible attitude toward both local Inner Mongolian regional identities.‖89 We can also see Inner Mongols‘ view of Mongolia‘s economy from the following personal account. Buhe, who is the head of the village that I stayed in for my field research in Damao Joint Banner recalled his trip to Mongolia: ―Our banner is a friendship region to one region in Mongolia, so we local government officials were invited to visit them in 2005. It was quite poor there frankly, especially in the rural areas. In Ulaanbaatar the road conditions were really bad, and the whole city‘s level of development was almost like a second-tier 87 Nalin, "The Important Part of Mongolia-China Relationship - Economic and Trade Cooperation between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia 蒙中经贸关系的重要部分-内蒙 和蒙 的经贸 ," p. 38. World Bank World Development Indicators Database. Inner Mongolia‘s GDP per capita PPP is estimated from Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbook 2008, accessible at http://chinadataonline.org/ 89 Borchigud, "Transgressing Ethnic and National Boundaries: Contemporary "Inner Mongolian" Identities in China," p. 178-9. 88 173 city in Inner Mongolia, much worse than Hohhot. I heard everything is imported to Mongolia, and people cannot afford enough food sometimes. It is not like here we produce everything, they do not produce anything other than dairy products. People in general say corruption is bad in China, then they should go visit Mongolia because it is much worse there. The gap between rich and poor in cities like Ulaanbaatar is astonishing.‖ I conducted a questionnaire in May 2008 among 100 Mongol students at a university in Inner Mongolia. Among them, half were Mongolian-educated and the other half were Chinese-educated. The differences in schooling among these 100 Mongol students allows me to see the different impact of one‘s language of education can have one issues related to their viewpoint on various issues. In the questionnaire, there was an open-ended question asking students interviewed to identify factors to compare Mongolia with China. For example, many Mongol students would point out the environment is better in Mongolia or Mongolian culture is better-protected in Mongolia, but 48 out of the 63 students who answered this question identified the fact that economic development is faster in China than in Mongolia. Thus three out of four Mongol students interviewed point out the economic differences between Mongolia and China when they compare these two countries. Also there was one question asking them to rate their satisfaction level about life; about 70 per cent of these students selected satisfied or relatively satisfied (See Table 4.6). 174 Table 4.6 Are you satisfied with your life? Number Percentage Not satisfied 27 31.40% Relatively 36 41.90% satisfied Satisfied Total 23 87 26.70% 100% A different question asked students where they would want their kids, if they have them to grow up in the future (see Table 4.7). The idea is to test people‘s perception of the future. More than half picked staying in China, 30 per cent picked other countries, and only 17 per cent picked Mongolia. Table 4.7 If you have kids, where do you want him/her to grow up? Place Number Percentage Inner Mongolia 33 38.37% Beijing or other southern cities Mongolia Other countries 12 13.95% 15 26 17.44% 30.23% Total 86 100% Inner Mongolian Identity In an article tracing the development of Inner Mongolian identity, Wurlig Borchigud argues that Inner Mongols have increasingly linked their ethnic identity to a Chinese national identity.90 In Uradyn Bulag‘s analysis of Inner Mongols‘ resistance to the Chinese state, he points out that the concept of Chinese state sovereignty over the 90 Ibid., p. 180. 175 Mongols has been accepted, and they have not ―questioned the state‘s legitimacy in ruling the Mongols, only its method of rule.‖91 Colin Mackerass also writes about his opinion on Inner Mongolia that ―Mongolian ethnic consciousness there is not particularly strong. It has been, with some variations at particular times, in long-term decline since the early years of the twentieth century.‖92 These evaluations of the Inner Mongolian identity question and the relationship between Inner Mongolia and China are also confirmed with my own questionnaire among the Mongol university students (See Table 4.8). Table 4.8 Mongol students of different language of education and their views on Inner Mongol‘s Identity Language of Mongolian Chinese Total Education Educated Educated Mongols are part of 10 25 35 the Multiethnic Chinese nation Mongols are Chinese Citizens 0 1 1 Mongols are part of the Mongolian nation All the above arguments are the same 32 8 40 3 8 11 42 87 Total 45 Pearson chi 2(3) = 24.0246, Pr = 0.0000 In one question, these Mongol students were asked to pick one of the following arguments they agree with the most: 1) Mongols are part of the multiethnic Chinese Uradyn E. Bulag, "Ethnic Resistance with Socialist Characteristics," in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, ed. Elizabeth Perry, and Mark Selden (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 178. 92 Colin Mackerras, China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalization (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 47. 91 176 nation; 2) Mongols are Chinese citizens; 3) Mongols are part of the Mongolian nation; 4) All the above arguments are the same. As we can see their responses from Table 4.8, 40 of the students picked a more nationalistic choice that Mongols are part of the Mongolian nation, but 35 of them picked the multiethnic Chinese identity, 1 picked Chinese citizenship, and 11 are ambivalent about the identity question, since they equate the Mongolian national identity with the Chinese national identity. Thus we can see that more than half of the students in the questionnaire accept the notion that in one way or another Inner Mongols are part of the Chinese nation. And if we break it down into students who have gone through different language of education, we can tell there is a statistically significant difference between language of education and choice of identity (the Pearson‘s r for the chi square test is significant at the 0.01 level). Those Mongol students who are educated in Chinese are much more likely to pick the multiethnic Chinese national identity than their Mongolian-educated counterparts. Given our earlier discussion of the education trend in Inner Mongolia that more than half of Mongol students are already educated in Chinese schools and the number is fast increasing, our questionnaire would tell us that the overall trend for identification with the Chinese nation among the Inner Mongols can be quite strong. A different question addressing the identity issue asked these Mongol university students to pick which team they would support at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: 1) Chinese national team; 2) Mongolian national team; and 3) both countries. We can see from Table 4.9 that more than about half of the students picked both, 34 picked China, and only 10 voted for Mongolia. The same can be said about the relationship between 177 language of education and choice of country for support – it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level too. Table 4.9 Which country would you support in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games? Language of Mongolian Chinese Total Education Educated Educated Support China 7 27 34 Support 8 2 10 Mongolia Support Both 30 13 43 Total 45 42 87 Pearson Chi2(2) = 22.0084, Pr = 0.000 Concluding Remarks Since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Inner Mongolia has been heavily incorporated into China. Despite efforts to achieve political autonomy during the Republican period, the general weakness on the Mongols‘ part predetermined that they had to seek support from various political powers vying for control in Inner Mongolia, whether it was the Japanese, the Russians, the KMT or the CCP. It was eventually the victory of indigenous Inner Mongolian communist forces that achieved autonomous status for Inner Mongolia, albeit with the support of the CCP and subsequently incorporated into the People‘s Republic of China. The great suffering the Mongols experienced during the politically frantic years of Mao had planted seeds of deep division between the Mongols and the majority Han Chinese. However, in recent years that memory is also receding gradually. Faced with challenges to change their traditional pastoral way of life and the tremendous pressure for sinicization, the overall resistance of the Mongols is at best restricted within local boundaries, if not political acquiescence at the individual level. So far, there have 178 not been any major groups or movements mobilizing for more autonomy on the Mongols‘ behalf. As we have discussed in this chapter, there are a few factors that limit the Mongols‘ opportunity and resources for mobilization. The Mongols‘ low demographic concentration in Inner Mongolia, its lack of prominent leadership and strong religious cohesion, as well as Inner Mongolia‘s geographic proximity to the China proper and Mongols‘ historical connections to the political developments in China perhaps have all exerted contraints on the Mongols‘ political aspiration. Having said that, this chapter also points out that the Inner Mongolia case demonstrates the validity of our theoretical framework identified in Chapter Two. Our theoretical hypothesis claims that if an ethnic group perceives their external kin enjoys higher living conditions and life opportunities than themselves, members of this group would be very likely to feel dissatisfied about their lives and start demanding their justified share of economic wellbeing from the state. However, if the opposite rings true – that is if the ethnic group‘s living conditions are better than their external kin, then group members are more likely to feel content about their incorporation within the current state. Furthermore, if no external support is available, there is also no opportunity nor resources that members of the ethnic group can take advantage for mobilizational purposes. As we have seen in the Inner Mongolia case, as a group with economically inferior external kin, and without explicit support from the latter, the dominant strategy for the Mongols in China has been to seek integration with the Chinese society. Thus, despite the similarities in autonomy status and the fact that both groups have suffered political repression from the Chinese state, especially during the radical Mao years, the Mongols have not been engaging in similar political 179 mobilization strategy as the Uighurs, discussed in the previous chapter. The changing perceptions of Mongolia, as the kin state for the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, have been documented in this chapter as affecting how the Mongols perceive their own ethnic and national identity and the relationship between Inner Mongolia and China. With the development of an Inner Mongol identity located within the boundary of China, and the general perception of better economic conditions and life opportunities in Inner Mongolia than in Mongolia, the Inner Mongols have been more relaxed about their national identity. In reality, more and more Mongols have joined the linguistic assimilation process and the survival of the Mongolian language and culture is of great concern, especially to certain Mongol intellectuals. Yet again, without political mobilization and large-scale support for such movements, it is unlikely that this limited cultural autonomy would be preserved for Inner Mongols in the future. The plight of the Inner Mongols and their cultural and linguistic anxiety are classical examples of how the modernization process and nation-building process go hand in hand in creating a huge pressure for assimilation. Without enough state regulations to protect the cultural rights of minorities, market competition and economic interest prove to be of tremendous power to make people conform. And sadly, this might be the future for the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. 180 Chapter Five Cultural Revival and National Identification in Xishuangbanna1 Introduction Located at the southwestern corner of the People‘s Republic of China, Xishuangbanna (also spelled elsewhere as Sipsongpanna) Dai2 Autonomous Prefecture, for the past few decades, has often been portrayed in the Chinese media and public discourse as an area of exotic culture and colorful minority people. Due to the geographical and cultural proximity of the region to mainland Southeast Asia, Xishuangbanna became a popular tourist destination for domestic Chinese tourists, mainly Han Chinese from other provinces, to experience a sense of Southeast Asia in the tropics without the need to go abroad.3 The growth of the tourist industry comes with the commercialization of the Dai culture in those newly constructed ethnic theme parks. Touted for their sensuality and femininity, the sensualized images of Dai women bathing naked in the Lancang River (Mekong River) has become a symbol that draws millions of tourists to visit 1 I use Xishuangbanna instead of Sipsongpanna throughout this chapter mainly because it is consistent with the official PRC translation of the name. There are disagreements in terms of whether Xishuangbanna or Sipsongpanna should be used in western academic writing. Sipsongpanna, as a transliteration close to the original Dai pronunciation, is preferred by some to emphasize the region‘s cultural connection to mainland Southeast Asia. For others, to use Xishuangbanna instead of Sipsongpanna is to recognize the political changes and integration of the region into China‘s geopolitical body. For example, Hsieh Shih-Chung uses ―Sipsong Panna‖ to refer to traditional, cultural, historical and ethnic Sipsongpanna, but uses Xishuangbanna to signify it as a Chinese territory. Shih-Chung Hsieh, "Ethnic-Political Adaptation and Ethnic Change of the Sipsong Panna Dai: An Ethnohistorical Analysis" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1989). 2 I use Dai instead of Tai to refer to the Dai people in China. However, I will use the commonly used Tai to refer to Tai communities across mainland Southeast Asia. The reason for this use is also multiple. First, it is the official name for the ethnic group in PRC. Second, the pronunciation of Dai is actually close to the actual pronunciation of the ethnic group, because the ―t‖ in ―tai‖ is a voiced ―t‖. 3 These days with Chinese tourists becoming more affluent, many are going directly to Thailand or Malaysia to experience the ―real‖ Southeast Asia. Also, with the ongoing construction of a highway connecting Kunming and Bangkok, future tourists can drive through Xishuangbanna into Laos and Burma. 181 Xishuangbanna every year.4 Indeed, different from Tibet and Xinjiang and some other ethnic minority populated areas, Xishuangbanna has always seemed to be politically loyal and the Dai people ―quiet and docile.‖ At the same time, the Chinese government in recent decades has behaved relatively moderately towards the Dai. It seems to be more willing to tolerate and even support the cultural expressions by the Dai. With official toleration and support, the Dai in Xishuangbanna have been experiencing a wave of cultural revival through contacts and communications with their ethnic kin across the border in mainland Southeast Asia. Dai oral poets, monks, and tradesmen have been quickly weaving together a trans-border community with the other Tai communities abroad, especially in Burma (Myanmar)‘s Shan State but also northern Thailand.5 Through pre-existing or newly established kin relations and dense Buddhist networks, there has been a revival of Buddhist teachings and religiosity among the Dai in China. In the meantime, these exchanges and communications also make the Dai reflect on the meanings of being Dai, their ethnic identity, and their national identification with China. Generally speaking, the cross-border communications with their ethnic kin and the cultural revival going on among the Dai seem to be quite peaceful and are overall lacking in explicit ethnopolitical connotations. There has not been any explicit demand among the Dai for more political autonomy from the Chinese state, despite the fact that Xishuangbanna historically used to be a semi-independent kingdom that paid loyalty and 4 According to Dru Gladney, the exoticization and eroticization of ethnic minorities such as the Dai represents the officially sanctioned effort by the Chinese state to reconstruct and strengthen the modernity image that is to be affiliated with the majority Han Chinese. See Dru C. Gladney, "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities," The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): p. 103. 5 For example, see Sara L. M. Davis, Song and Silence: Ethnic Revival on China's Southwest Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 182 tribute to both the Chinese empire and the Burmese empire.6 It seems that the Dai have managed to find a medium where they enjoy their cultural revival but also strive for political and economic integration into the Chinese state and society. The sense of belonging politically to China is overall quite strong among the Dai as people often clearly differentiate themselves from those across the border in either Burma or Laos, despite their cultural, religious and linguistic affinities. For the Dai, previously the international border between China and Southeast Asia was very much an alien concept imposed arbitrarily by powerful empires and states in the region. Yet these days, the existence of an international border has been overwhelmingly accepted and internalized by the local people. Certainly, the Chinese state‘s efforts at indoctrinating and propagating among its ethnic minority population the concept of citizenship and sense of belonging to China might have been successful in this case. Yet I would argue that these ―patriotic education‖ efforts do not explain the whole picture of what is going on at the ground level. The frequent cross-border communication and interaction between the Dai and their external kin in Burma, Laos and northern Thailand have in recent decades made the Dai in Xishuangbanna realize the relative political stability and economic prosperity they enjoy in comparison with the chaotic and desperate situations associated with their external brethren. Especially in Burma‘s Shan State, where civil war, poverty and political repression by the Burmese military government have made the lives of the Shan (Burmese for Tai) and other ethnic minority groups quite unbearable, the knowledge and Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier. Elsewhere, Hsieh Shih-Chung insists that the Sipsongpanna Kingdom was totally independent of the Chinese empire. ShihChung Hsieh, "On the Dynamics of Tai/Dai-Lue Ethnicity: An Ethnohistorical Analysis," in Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle: University of Washinton Press, 1995), p. 304. 6 183 perception of the differences between China and Burma has been quite salient among the Dai in Xishuangbanna. At the same time, there is also no explicit movement among Dai‘s external kin that is mobilizing on the Dai‘s behalf. The Dai is thus very similar to the case of the Mongols discussed in the previous chapter. As an ethnic group that enjoys a higher standard of living than its external kin, even though the area it inhabits is still considered as poor and underdeveloped, group members are more likely to feel content with their current situation after a comparison with their less well-off kin members across the border. As a result of this comparison, group members are thus more likely to emphasize the differences with their external kin, and align themselves more closely with the current state. Furthermore, there is also no explicit external source that can provide Dai means and resources for mobilization. Our theoretical framework predicts in such situations, the dominant strategy for the ethnic group is to seek integration or even assimilation within the majority-dominated society. In the following pages, we can see why ethnic Dai people overall seem to be quite content with their incorporation into the Chinese state and society while trying to negotiate a small cultural space within such a political and economic framework. This chapter is organized in the following sections. The first section is a review of the Dai people and Xishuangbanna in historical perspective. Emphasis will be put on Xishuangbanna‘s ambiguous relationship with Chinese dynastic powers and the changes that have occurred in Xishuangbanna since the incorporation and establishment of the Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture in 1953. The historical review is followed by an examination of the current situation in Xishuangbanna, paying special attention to the cultural and religious revival going on among the Dai. It also depicts how the 184 Chinese state has been working together with the Buddhist Sangha7 in Xishuangbanna in response to this cultural and religious revival. The third section looks in detail at interethnic relations in Xishuangbanna and the negotiation over national identification of the Dai with the Chinese state. It is followed by an analysis of the cross-border ties between the Dai and their external kin (primarily) in Burma‘s Shan state, and provides several personal accounts of how the Dai perceive Burma and their lives in China. The chapter concludes with some thoughts about the Dai, their cultural revival, and their increasing integration and identification with the Chinese state. Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture 7 Sangha means the community of ordained Buddhist monks and nuns. 185 The Dai People and Xishuangbanna in Historical Perspective The Tai8 is a valley-dwelling and rice-growing people historically living on a strip of land stretching from southwestern China to upper mainland Southeast Asia, and furthermost to Assam in India. The Tai of various branches speak languages/dialects that are part of the Tai/Kadai linguistic family, and most use a variety of written scripts that are Pali based, which were imported in tandem with their religious belief in Theravada Buddhism.9 During pre-modern times, there had been four prominent Tai Kingdoms existing in upper mainland Southeast Asia, including Lanna in contemporary Chiang Mai, Thailand, Kengtung in Burma, Luang Prabang in Laos, and Xishuangbanna in China.10 These various Tai domains eventually were carved up and absorbed into the geo-body of these four countries. In a way we can say that various Tai people do not have independent statehood for themselves. It is only in the Burmese Shan state that the Shan have been fighting for independence from the Burmese state on and off during the past half century. The overall Dai population in China, according to the official 2000 census, is about 1.16 million. The Dai in China can also be roughly divided into two main subgroups: the Dai Nue who mainly live in Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture and Dai Lue in Xishuangbanna, both of which are located in the southern Yunnan province.11 This chapter is mainly concerned with the Dai Lue in Xishuangbanna since Xishuangbanna, before the PRC, used to be ruled by a Dai royal family, while the Dai 8 See footnote 2 for the use of Tai instead of Dai here. Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier, p. 6. 10 Ibid. 11 One can certainly argue that the label Dai was officially imposed by Chinese authorities to group these two sub-groups together as part of the ethnic identification project. Some would argue that previously these various Dai sub-groups in China randomly had contact with each other. However, these days this identification of Dai has been very much internalized by the Dai people in China. There is strong mutual interest in knowing more about each other, and connections have been built between these two main Dai sub-groups. 9 186 Nue in Dehong never had the same level of political organization and cohesion as the Dai Lue. The Dai population in Xishuangbanna is estimated at 297,000 according to statistics from 2004, which is roughly one third of the whole Dai population and also one third of the whole population in Xishuangbanna. In Xishuangbanna, the Han Chinese migration during the past half century has also made it one third of the local population. The other third is composed of Hani, Blang, Lahu, Jinuo and other smaller ethnic groups. Today in Xishuangbanna, although Dai is officially designated as the titular nationality, the demographic balance has totally changed with the massive influx of Han Chinese into the region during the past half century, as we can see in Table 5.1. Today the demographic structure of Xishuangbanna is like a triangle with Dai, Han, and the rest ethnic minority groups, each being about a third of the total population. The Chinese government also oftentimes tries utilizing the smaller ethnic minorities, in particular the Hani, to balance the traditional dominance of the Dai in local politics. That said, interethnic relations in Xishuangbanna are more complicated, which will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. 187 Table 5.1 Population Changes in Xishuangbanna since 1953 (In thousands)12 Ethnic Group 1953 1964 1982 1993 Dai 123.4 149.1 225.5 279 Han 14.7 83.1 185.9 206.5 Hani 32.8 60.3 113.8 151.4 Yi 9.1 5.5 22.4 30.9 Lahu 0.5 20 33.4 45.1 Blang 12.4 19.8 27.6 33.4 Jinuo 3.9 6.5 11.9 14.4 2004 297 217 186 58.8 55.5 36.5 20.2 A tip of land on China‘s southwestern frontier, Xishuangbanna borders both Burma and Laos, and is also not very far from the Golden Triangle, an area between Thailand, Burma and Laos that used to be the world‘s prime opium production base. Xishuangbanna has a total geographical territory of about 20,000 square kms, roughly the same size as Israel or Slovenia. It is composed of two counties – Menghai and Mengla, and one city – Jinghong. Its terrain is very mountainous and is covered by tropical rain forests, which are disappearing quickly due to deforestation and rubber plantations. Historically, ethnic distribution in Xishuangbanna followed a topographical pattern; the Dai often dwell in lowland river valleys, while other ethnic minorities such as the Hani, Lahu and so forth live on the hills and higher elevations.13 The Dai, as the ruling people of the region, generally regarded these hill people as barbaric and inferior, and often referred to them as ―ka,‖ meaning slaves. 12 Population data from 1953 to 1993 are from Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer. Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer (西 方志编辑委员会), Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer 版 傣族自治州地 西 版 傣族自治州志 (Beijing ( 京): Xinhua Press 华出版社 , 2002), p. 372. Data for the year 2004 are from Xishuangbanna Statistical Yearbook 2005. Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Statistical Yearbook (西 版 年鉴编辑委员会), Xishuangbanna Statistical Yearbook 2005 (西 版 年鉴 2005) (Jinghong (景洪): Xishuangbanna Prefecture Government (西 版 州人民 府), 2007), p. 50. 13 Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier, p. 21. 188 Before ―liberation‖ by the People‘s Liberation Army in 1950, Xishuangbanna was ruled by a King, called Chao Phaendin (Lord of the Earth). The King‘s power however was not as absolute, and below him there were several Chao Meaungs (Lord of the State), who ruled directly and sometimes independently over a certain domain. The historical relationship between the Xishuangbanna Kingdom and various Chinese dynastic powers is ambiguous at best. As a place far away from China proper, and also because of its rugged terrain and proliferation of tropical diseases such as malaria, it was virtually impossible for Chinese military power to be present for long in these pre-modern periods.14 Thus, although there was a tributary relationship to China, various imperial Chinese courts did not have direct control of the area. In the meantime, Xishuangbanna also paid tribute to Burma; the kingdom often referred to China as father and Burma as mother (haw bien paw, man bien mae).15 For much of the pre-modern period, therefore, the Xishuangbanna Dai kingdom managed to keep its autonomy by paying loyalty to multiple sources. Ever since the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese state has tried to assert domination in Xishuangbanna, as efforts were made to chip away power of the local Tusi (the King in Xishuangbanna)16 by setting up a separate civilian Chinese administration.17 However, in C. Patterson Giersch, "The Sipsong Panna Tai and the Limits of Qing Conquest in Yunnan," Chinese Historians 10, no. 17 (2000). 15 Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier, p. 36. 16 The Tusi system was an indirect administration first set up by the Mongol Yuan Dynasty to manage the relationship between the central Chinese state and frontier ethnic elites in the southwest. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the Tusi system was further institutionalized, and the emperor often bestowed a Tusi title on a local lord to symbolize authority, although the central government did not have any direct involvement in local administration. By the mid Qing Dynasty, the Manchu Emperor Yongzheng had started to gradually set up a separate Chinese civilian administration alongside or replacing the Tusi system. For a good analysis of the Tusi system, see John E Herman, "The Cant of Conquest: Tusi Offices and China‘s Political Incorporation of the Southwest Frontier," in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2006). 14 189 Xishuangbanna, the Dai King continued to rule the region until the CCP and the PLA ―liberated‖ Xishuangbanna in 1950. The Dai King perhaps was the last Tusi who managed to keep his power until the Communist Revolution came to this peripheral border region. The ascendance of the CCP and its conflict with the KMT engulfed Xishuangbanna too. With the approaching CCP and the PLA, the Dai royalty and aristocracy were forced to pick sides between the KMT and the CCP.18 The chairman of the external cabinet named Zhao Cunxin joined the CCP to fight against the Dai royal regents, who were supported by the KMT. When the CCP troops emerged victorious, many of the Dai royalty and aristocracy fled to Burma with the KMT troops.19 After CCP‘s victory, Zhao Cunxin became the head of the Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Region (later the CCP changed the region to a prefecture). At the same time, the Dai royal family was stripped of their royal status.20 To better monitor their activities, the royal family was to be based in Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan Province and far from Xishuangbanna, preventing them from coming back to take government offices.21 改土 流 At the time, the newly enthroned King Chao Mhoam Gham Le was still very young and was at school in Sichuan province. The daily administration in Xishuangbanna was managed by two of the previous king‘s brothers, Chao Mhoam Kang and Chao Mhoam Siang Meeng, as regents. Chao Moham Gham Le is the adopted son of the previous king. His real father is Chao Mhoam Siang Meeng, who later became the 17 18 regent. For a good read of this part of history, see Peng Zheng (征鹏), Secret History of the Dai Palace 傣王宫秘 (Kunming (昆明): Yunnan Art Press (云南美术出版时), 2006). Although Chao Mhoam Siang Meeng later returned to China after CCP‘s propaganda and persuasion, many others still remain in Burma and many later migrated either to Thailand or to Taiwan. 20 Chao Mhoam Siang Meeng became a member of the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the Vice Chairman of the Yunnan branch of the CPPCC. The last king Chao Mhoam Gham Le became a professor at Yunnan Institute of Ethnicity and also Vice Chairman of the Yunnan branch of the CPPCC. 21 Hsieh, "Ethnic-Political Adaptation and Ethnic Change of the Sipsong Panna Dai: An Ethnohistorical Analysis", p. 182. 19 190 On January 23, 1953, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Region was established and in July 1955, its name changed to Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture due to its relatively small size compared to other autonomous regions in China.22 During the early years of the PRC, the newly installed communist government approached local administration quite cautiously. In an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Dai, especially its aristocratic class, the CCP refrained from carrying out rigid land reforms, and ―many preexisting cultural and political structures were left intact and even subsumed into the party-state structure.‖23 Facing the challenge of the KMT troops stationed in Burma24, which was supported by the United States, the CCP had to worry about infiltration and espionage. As a result there was a need to maintain the loyalty of the Dai elites. Many of the previous Chao Meaungs and other aristocrats retained significant influence at either the prefectural or the county level government during the first years of the PRC. Accordingly, to the ordinary Dai people, nothing major had changed that directly affected their daily life. The only difference is that the previous Chao Paending has now been replaced by Chao Gongchan (Lord Communist).25 Overall, the CCP proceeded cautiously and gradually to solidify its control of this border region, as many of its radical land reform measures employed in other parts of China were not implemented immediately in Xishuangbanna. 22 Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer 西 版 傣族自治州志 , p. 100. Susan K McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), p. 53. 24 Intitially, the KMT intended to use Burma as the second front in their grand strategy to retake mainland China from the CCP. 25 McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, p. 56. 23 191 Since the second half of 1957, the political wind has changed.26 In particular, the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Dai people in Xishuangbanna was tremendous. The spread of the Red Guards in the region and the fierce class struggles carried out by them have caused widespread conflict and great human suffering.27 Many of the previous Dai aristocrats and elites were severely struggled and many indeed died during the Cultural Revolution. Also during the Cultural Revolution, the issues of cross-border ethnic ties were politicized. Due to their extensive kin relations, many Dai were accused of being ―liaisons with foreign countries‖ and working as ―spies‖ for the KMT troops stationed in Burma and the Golden Triangle. As a result, many were labeled as counterrevolutionaries and persecuted.28 The Cultural Revolution also brought a big cultural onslaught against the Dai, especially its institutionalized religion – Theravada Buddhism. Most Buddhist temples and monasteries were ransacked and torn down. Monks and novices were also forced to disrobe and return to secular life. According to a survey carried out by Hasegawa Kiyoshi, the number of temples in Xishuangbanna in the 1950s was 574, but in 1981 there were only 145 left. The number of monks in the 1950s was 889, and in 1981 there were none left. There were more than 5000 novices in Xishuangbanna in the 1950s, and 26 The radicals in the CCP started to gain more power and decided that land reform in the border regions, including Xishuangbanna, had not gone far and thorough enough. Consequently, a second land reform was carried out in Xishuangbanna. Despite the lack of distinct class divisions in many Dai villages, random classification of people as landlord and/or rich peasants occurred. The following Great Leap Forward continued and further intensified these radical policies. There was political persecution of the former Dai elites. Also, the disastrous economic policies regarding grain production produced wide-spread famine. Xishuangbanna experienced a mass wave of exodus of Dai people into the neighboring countries of Burma, Laos and northern Thailand. Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer 西 版 傣族自治州志 , p. 442. At one point in 1967, Martial Law was implemented in Xishuangbanna. Ibid., p. 101. 28 Ibid., p. 448. The atmosphere in Xishuangbanna remained tense throughout these years, and the Dai and other ethnic minorities were constantly under surveillance. Despite this strict border control, there was also further exodus of the Dai and others crossing into mainland Southeast Asia. 27 192 that number dwindled to a mere 655 in 1981, when Dai villagers started to be able to send their sons to the monasteries once again.29 Religious life in Xishuangbanna came to a dramatic halt during the Cultural Revolution, and a whole generation of Dai males lost their access to monastery life and education, which had serious implications for the survival of the Dai culture. Most Dai men who grew up during these years, for example, had difficulty reading the old Dai scripts, which were only taught in the monasteries. Another issue significant for Xishuangbanna was the transfer of tens of thousands of Han Chinese youth from China proper into Xishuangbanna. According to official statistics, during the Cultural Revolution, more than 50,000 Han Chinese youth were sent to work in the state plantation in Xishuangbanna.30 The big influx of Han Chinese into the region greatly changed the demographic balance in Xishuangbanna. After the Cultural Revolution, the local Han Chinese population became almost at par with that of the dominant Dai, as we have seen in Table 5.1. The Cultural Revolution ended in 1978, and many of the radical policies of the past decade were revoked. Gradually, the previously strict control of this border area loosened. With the shift from political struggle to economic development as the priority, the CCP designed and promoted the tourist industry in Xishuangbanna to attract both foreign tourists and the fast expanding domestic ones. Touted as a paradise in the tropics with exotic culture and people, Xishuangbanna was promoted by the state as a tourist destination where Han Chinese can come to Xishuangbanna without the need to go to 29 Kiyoshi Hasegawa, "Cultural Revival and Ethnicity: The Case of the Tai Lüe in the Sipsong Panna, Yunnan Province," in Dynamics of Ethnic Cultures across National Boundaries in Southwestern China and Mainland Southeast Asia: Relations, Societies, and Languages, ed. Hayashi Yukio, and Yang Guangyuan (Chiang Mai: Ming Muang Printing House, 2000). 30 Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer 西 版 傣族自治州志 , p. 449. 193 Southeast Asia.31 As a result of these initiatives, the Xishuangbanna prefectural government started to invest heavily in Dai cultural restoration and promotion. It built several Dai ethnic theme parks, restored the old palace garden and reopened it as Chunhuan Park. The prefectural government restored many Buddhist temples so they can become tourist destinations.32 These promotions of the local tourist industry have been overall successful. Especially during the 1990s, Xishuangbanna was one of the hottest tourist destinations in China. According to government statistics, in 1993 about 1 million domestic tourists visited Xishuangbanna.33 In 2004, that number increased to 2.7 million.34 Now the capital city of Jinghong has a relatively decent-sized airport with frequent flights to domestic destinations, but also international flights to Thailand, Laos and Burma. According to Susan McCarthy, before the tourist boom, Xishuangbanna ranked at the bottom third of all prefectures and municipal districts in Yunnan province in terms of tax revenue per capita. However, from the mid 1990s to 2003, Xishuangbanna joined the top three ranking of that indicator.35 Perhaps because this boom in tourism is tied closely with the commercialization of the Dai culture, and the handsome revenues it generates are beneficial for the local government, the Xishuangbanna government has generally tended to be more tolerant of the revival of Dai cultural expressions, such as in religion and education. With that, let us look at some snapshots of the current situation in Xishuangbanna. In 1981, the Xishuangbanna prefectural government edited a ―Xishuangbanna Tourist Resource Report,‖ and submitted it to the State Council. The following year, Xishuangbanna was approved as being one of the first batch of major tourist destinations in China Ibid., p. 980. 32 Ibid., pp. 983-84. 33 Ibid., p. 998. 34 Editorial Committee for Xishuangbanna Statistical Yearbook, Xishuangbanna Statistical Yearbook 2005 31 (西 版 年鉴 2005), p. 588. McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, p. 84. 35 194 Current Situation in Xishuangbanna Generally speaking, Xishuangbanna has been closely integrated politically and economically with the rest of China. Overall, for ordinary Dai, the sense of being Chinese citizen is not as much questioned as accepted. For most of the local elites, both religious and secular ones, the aim of most of their activities is to carve up a space that does not challenge the Chinese state but at the same time can manage to revive and celebrate Dai religion and culture. Certainly, to do that is no simple task. Oftentimes relationship with the Chinese government can be complicated and difficult. However, one has to point out that the non-confrontational and cooperative gestures taken by the Dai elites have by and large managed some compromises with the Chinese state. Here I will especially talk about the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna, and look at how it has managed to work together with the Chinese state, on issues such as HIV/AIDS charity work, monastery education versus state education, and Buddhist festivals and celebrations. The Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna The relationship between the Buddhist Sangha and the Dai royal court before the PRC was a very close one. The King was the sponsor and supporter for the Buddhist Sangha; conversely, the latter helped legitimize the former‘s rule in the eyes of laymen.36 That means the Buddhist Sangha was an important religious as well as political force in Xishuangbanna before its incorporation into the PRC. The revolution inflicted by the CCP fundamentally changed the religious landscape in Xishuangbanna. As an atheist party, religion was one of the ―old evil forces‖ that the CCP worked hard to eliminate. In Thomas Adams Borchert, "Educating Monks: Buddhism, Politics and Freedom of Religion on China‘s Southwest Border" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006). 36 195 Xishuangbanna, Buddhist monasteries were either closed down or destroyed. Monks and novices were forced to disrobe or fled across the border into Southeast Asia. The entire Buddhist Sangha was eliminated and a generation of Dai did not have access to religious education. Thus, after the Cultural Revolution, when the Chinese government loosened its control on religion, the first priority of the local Dai was to restore the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna. However, because of the lack of qualified monks, invitations had to be extended across the border to lure back the Dai monks who fled in early decades. Responding to these invitations, many Dai monks returned to Xishuangbanna in the 1980s. At the same time, the Buddhist Sangha of Thailand and Burma‘s Shan State also provided both material resources and monks to serve as preceptors and abbots in the monasteries in Xishuangbanna.37 The restoration of the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna was heralded with the rebuilding of Wat Pajie (Zong Fosi in Chinese) in 1990. As the central temple, Wat Pajie was to be not only the center of the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna but also the location for the Buddhist Association of Xishuangbanna, which serves as the liaison between the Buddhist Sangha and the Chinese state. 38 The current abbot of Wat Pajie is Khuba Meuang Long Jom.39 The overall relationship between the Buddhist Sangha and the Chinese state since 1978 has been cooperative. Both sides realize the need and benefits of working together. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid. 39 There are commonly three ranks within the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna: pha – novice, du/dubi – 37 38 monks, and khuba – a higher monk. See Chengzhang Cao (曹 村社文 研究 章), Studies on Dai Village Culture 傣族 (Beijing ( 京): Central University for Nationalities Press 中央民族大学出版社 , 2006). Khuba Meuang Long Jom was born in Menghai County in Xishuangbanna, and fled to Burma with his parents during the Cultural Revolution. He was ordained in Kungteng, Burma‘s Shan State, and also studied in Dharma schools in Thailand. In 1985, he was invited back to be the abbot for a temple in Menghai County and quickly moved up the ranks and became the abbot for Wat Pajie as well as the head of the Buddhist Assoication in Xishuangbanna. Later he was also promoted to be Vice President of China‘s National Buddhist Association. For a profile on Khuba Meaung Long Jom, see this report at Sina, accessible at http://ent.sina.com.cn/h/2007-10-15/18271749836.shtml 196 Not seen as politically rebellious, the Chinese state has been more at ease in dealing with the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna. Conversely, the Buddhist Sangha also realized the best way to achieve its goal of preserving the Dai culture and reviving Theravada Buddhism is not to challenge the CCP but to work together with it. Certainly there are other reasons for such cooperative attitudes. For example, Thomas Borchert noticed the economic utility of a cordial relationship between the two: the local government derives revenue from ethnic tourism and need cooperation from monks at Wat Pajie; likewise, such cooperation is rewarded with more government funding for the Buddhist Sangha.40 Other than these utilitarian concerns, I would like to point out here that the Chinese government increasingly has come to the realization that it can make use of the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna to achieve some of its own social agendas. It is a realization that there are certain policy goals can be achieved much more easily with the help of the Buddhist Sangha among the devout Dai. One excellent example is the organization Home of Buddha‘s Light, set up by the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna and supported by the Chinese government in the campaign for HIV/AIDS prevention. Home of the Buddha’s Light41 To educate the public to raise awareness about HIV/AIDs is no easy task in China. People often equate HIV/AIDS patients with immoral behavior, and thus hold strong fear and prejudice against them. Oftentimes, people would be shunned away as a result of these stigmas, which makes infected people less likely to come out and seek professional medical treatment. For many years, to talk about HIV/AIDS in Xishuangbanna was very much a taboo. People either did not realize the immediate threat to them or felt scared or Borchert, "Educating Monks: Buddhism, Politics and Freedom of Religion on China‘s Southwest Border", p. 122. 40 41 Information for the Home of the Buddha‘s Light ( 光 197 家) can be accessed at www.fgzj.org. awkward talking about it.42 The disease control bureau of the local government found it difficult to carry out its work because of these sensitivities. In the late 1990s, some successful stories of Buddhist charity organizations in HIV/AIDS education and prevention in Thailand became known to the monks in Xishuangbanna, mainly due to Dai monks‘ continuing ties to the Buddhist Sangha in Thailand. Specifically, there was an organization in Chiang Mai called Sangha Metta (Compassionate Monks) that provided training and support to a growing body of Thai monks and nuns about HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness education. The United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) spotted this initiative and decided to use the Sangha Metta as a model for its HIV/AIDS campaign in the Mekong Sub-region, which includes China‘s Yunnan Province due to the similar Theravada Buddhist heritage among various ethnic minorities, such as the Dai. Thus, starting in 1997, the UNICEF Yunnan Mekong Sub-region HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project started to train Dai monks from Xishuangbanna in HIV/AIDS awareness and counseling.43 In the year 2000, monks from the Sangha Metta visited Wat Pajie in Xishuangbanna to help train Dai monks. In 2003, with financial support from UNICEF and institutional support from the Xishuangbanna Buddhist Association, a Buddhist charity organization called Home of Buddha‘s Light was set up in Xishuangbanna, headquartered in the central temple - Wat Pajie. The purpose of this charity organization is to combine the social authority of Buddhist monks among the Dai with the local government‘s institutional resources to help combat drug use and educate the public about HIV/AIDS. 42 For a good analysis of prostitution and HIV/AIDS prevention in Xishuangbanna, see Sandra Teresa Hyde, Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of Aids in Southwest China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2007). 43 People’s Daily, October 26, 2005, accessible at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/26/eng20051026_216985.html. 198 The Monks from Wa Pajie make educational leaflets and illustrative pictures using Dai scripts and Buddhsit teachings, and then distribute them among the Dai with government assistance. Oftentimes, monks and government officials work in teams. First, the monks would make a public speech about Buddhist teachings and precepts, then government officials would follow up with information about HIV/AIDS, how it spreads and how to prevent infection. Other than these educational works, the Home of the Buddha‘s Light also provides shelter for HIV patients, and offers instruction in meditation and Buddhist teachings to provide spiritual as well as material support for them. Overal, the actions of the Home of Buddha‘s Light have been quite effective and messages well received by ordinary Dai people. According to a report by Wenweipo from Hong Kong, one reason for its success is that the Buddhist teachings that emphasize compassion can propel the general society to symphasize and understand the HIV/AIDS patients, greatly helping with HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention. Furthermore, because of the high religious status of the Dai monks, the messages delivered by them carry strong social authority. According to the head of Home of Buddha‘s Light, ―for Buddhist followers, what monks say oftentimes has more authority than government officials or policemen.‖ 44 Because of this authority, many young people are afraid of being called upon by the monks who criticize their indecent behavior such as taking drugs or practicing unprotected sex, so they listen to the monks and behave accordingly. 45 Indeed, what the monks say is also most likely to be accepted by the Dai as the truth, which is a task government education campaigns find difficult to achieve.46 Wenweipo, December 3, 2007,accessible at http://paper.wenweipo.com/2007/12/03/NS0712030001.htm. Personal interview. 46 Nanfengchuang, April 2, 2008, accessible at http://www.nfcmag.com/articles/695. 44 45 199 During my field work in Xishuangbanna, I came across several times the Chinese Communist Party Youth League working together with the Home of Buddha‘s Light on campaigns to educate Dai youth on drug use and HIV/AIDS prevention. There was also similar cooperation between the Home of Buddha‘s Light and the government‘s Health and Disease Control Bureau. Xiao Jin, an official at the Xishuangbanna Buddhist Association and also a volunteer at the Home of Buddha‘s Light, told me, ―in general, the government has taken the back seat regarding our work on HIV/AIDS prevention. Of course, at the very beginning when monks from our organization went to villages to preach on these issues, the village heads and other government officials were a bit uncomfortable because they felt that we were trying to do their work and steal their authority. However, after a while they came to realize that our work was complementary to theirs, and would in fact make their work much easier. So these days, they have no problems with us anymore. In some cases, for example, if a village is to have a big ceremony during holidays, the local government would come to Wat Pajie to ask our organization to go and get involved.‖ This conciliatory gesture by the Chinese government towards this Buddhist charity organization is indeed very interesting. The fact that the officially atheist party state has been able to tolerate and even support the activities of a religious organization is still surprising. The Chinese government is notorious about repressing religious organizations, as we can see from the examples of the Falungong and Christian underground churches.47 In particular, when religion is combined with issues of ethnic For example, see James W Tong, Revenge of the Forbidden City: The Supression of Falungong in China, 1999-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Jason Kindopp, and Carol Lee Hamrin, ed., God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2004). 47 200 minorities, it becomes even more sensitive. The Tibetan monks are famous for their rebellious actions against the Chinese state, and the Chinese state has often been blamed for repressing religious freedom in Tibet. It is thus intriguing to think about why the Home of Buddha‘s Light in particular and the Buddhist Sangha in general in Xishuangbanna have been able to win toleration and support from the Chinese government. Answering this question might tell us a lot about the issues of ethnicity and religion in Xishuangbanna and the relationship between the Dai and the Chinese state. Monastery Education versus State Education When CCP came into power in Xishuangbanna, it tried to promote state education among the Dai, which is the teaching of the Han Chinese language and modern science and social science. However, these efforts were met with great resistance from ordinary Dai people. Because of the Theravada Buddhist tradition for Dai parents to send their sons for education in the monasteries, state education initially had difficulty competing with the monasteries, although the state school system does provide opportunity for Dai girls to go to school for the first time.48 For most Dai parents, ―the prospect of having a child educated in a Chinese school was not economically or culturally attractive and was considered irrelevant to daily life.‖49 Only during the radical Mao years did the Chinese state manage to increase its enrollment of Dai pupils through total elimination of religious education in Xishuangbanna.50 Yet, when the state loosened up its religious policy after 1978, Dai parents once again started to send their sons to monasteries instead of state schools. This is one of the reasons why the literacy rate among the Dai, 48 Monastery education among the Dai is still gender-stereotyped till today, because only males are allowed to study Buddhism and the Dai scripts at temples. 49 Mette Halskov Hansen, Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), p. 105. 50 Ibid. 201 measured in the number of years in Chinese state schools, has been relatively low. For example, in 1990, the literacy rate for Dai was merely 58.88%.51 Only in recent years, the literacy rate among the Dai is improving. Thus, for the Chinese state, how to achieve its education policy goal is quite tricky. On the one hand, it does not want to alienate the Dai people by abolishing the monastery education. On the other, it also has an invested interest to see the Dai to get state education so that pupils can be indoctrinated and assimilated into the mainstream Chinese society. The practice of sending sons to study in the monasteries is an ancient tradition for the Dai. Often when kids reach the ages of 7-9, they would enter the monastery to become novices. During their time as novices, they usually study the Dai scripts and Buddhist teachings. Thus, this practice is at the core of the Dai‘s cultural reproduction.52 By sending their sons to the monasteries, presumably the parents would gain merit and have good karma, which is another reason why Dai parents have vested interest in continuing this practice. Meanwhile, for Dai kids, monastery education and state education are two drastically different experiences. As novices, they enjoy high regard from the villagers. But if they go to state schools, they often get scolded by teachers for not working hard enough. In addition, to study in the Han Chinese language environment can be very challenging for kids with limited Han Chinese language capabilities, which makes them even less interested to go to state schools. This set of reasons altogether 51 Tingrui Dao (刀 瑞), Strategic Report of Xishuangbanna Dai Educational Development 现实的交汇点 云南美术出版社 52 Ling Zhao Education 赵玲 传统文 -西 版 傣族教育发展战略研究 告 透视：站在 (Kunming (昆明): Yunnan Art Press , 2006). , "Traditional Culture and Modern Economy: Rational Reflection on Dai's Traditional 现代经济：对 傣族传统教育的理性思考 探索), no. 3 (2001): p. 86. 202 ," Academic Exploration (学术 makes the dropout rate for the Dai, especially male students, particularly high. As a local saying goes, ―for the first year, people go to school; for the second year, they start to drop out; and by the third or fourth year, none is left.‖53 To encourage Dai kids to go to school and complete their state education is thus a tough challenge facing the Chinese state. To achieve this goal, these days the Chinese state has been working together with the Buddhist monasteries in Xishuangbanna to find a mutually beneficial solution. Initially, the Chinese state did try to ban Dai male kids entering monasteries, and different townships in Xishuangbanna do have regulations saying that Buddhist monasteries should not recruit boys between 7 and 15 years old to become novices.54 However, these rules are either ignored by the Dai or the government has no genuine interest in enforcing them. What has happened is a compromise between the Chinese state and the Buddhist monasteries. That is, the state now allows Dai kids to enter monasteries under the condition that they can go to state schools in Buddhist robes. Novice students are also allowed to take absences for Buddhist holidays and ceremonies. According to a report, there were now more than 4000 Dai novice students in Xishuangbanna in 2009.55 It is very common these days to see pupils in classrooms wearing the saffron-colored Buddhist robes. The idea is that novices should combine state education and monastery education. They can study at state schools during the weekdays, and continue to stay at the village monastery and study Buddhism in the 53 ―一年入， 年跑， 年四年没 了。‖ Xiaopei Shen (沈小 Multicultural Education in Ethnic Dai Areas (傣族地区 ), "Curriculum Construction for 础教育多元文 课程的建构)" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southwest University (西南大学), 2006). 54 55 西 版 傣族自治州民族教育条例。 http://www.cnedu.com.cn/news/integration/otherintegration/2009/11/11/58394.shtml 203 evenings or during the weekends and holidays.56 Despite these compromises, the conflict of interest between the two education systems persists. The burden on novices now has doubled and many of them still do not find state school interesting. The absence rate for novices remains very high. So far, the Chinese government has tried to make the novices‘ parents and monastery abbots responsible. For example, if the novice does not show up at school, parents get a fine. Or, the abbot would be summoned to the local education bureau to explain the low attendance rate for the novices from his temple. How effective these measures are is still an open question. Buddhist Ceremonies Another important feature of the politics of religion in Xishuangbanna is the official toleration and endorsement of the Buddhist Sangha, as government officials and CCP party secretaries often feel the need to participate in various Buddhist festivals and ceremonies. Here I will illustrate with the example of the opening ceremony of the Wat Meaung Lue Monastery57 on the outskirts of Jinghong, the capital city of Xishuangbanna. On November 3, 2007, the biggest Buddhist monastery, Wat Meaung Lue in Xishuangbanna, had its opening ceremony with great fanfare. Buddhist leaders from all over China and mainland Southeast Asia, as well as political dignitaries from the Yunnan provincial government and the Xishuangbanna prefectural governments, attended the ceremony. Overall, there were more than ten thousand people present. The ceremony itself was particularly religious in nature, as three Buddhist groups, including the 56 For example, a typical schedule for a novice is to get up at 5:30 AM, chant Buddhist sutra for an hour, then go to state school. After school, he returns to the monastery, has supper, and then chants sutra for another hour. 57 Wat Meaung Lue is exactly the same tourist project that Grant Evans mentioned in his article on the cultural transformation of Jinghong. However, it seems that the temple did not turn out to be exactly the ―Disneyland‖ that Evans predicted. See Grant Evans, "Transformation of Jinghong, Xishuangbanna, PRC," in Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social & Cultural Change in the Border Regions, ed. Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton, and Kuah Khun Eng (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2000 ). 204 Theravada Buddhist monks from Xishuangbanna, Tibetan monks from northern Yunnan, as well as Mahayana monks from Kunming, all chanted and prayed at the opening ceremony. The ceremony was also very political. The abbot of the monastery Khuba Meaung and the governor of Xishuangbanna prefecture both made speeches in turn, one in Dai with translation provided and the other in Mandarin, about the significance of this monastery for Xishuangbanna and the Dai people.58 Watching this ceremony, one cannot help but come away with the impression of how religion and politics manage to coexist with each other in Xishuangbanna and the compromise that each side, the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna and the Chinese state, has managed in order to achieve this. The Wat Meaung Lue is located 5 km outside the city of Jinghong, and was rebuilt on the site of an old temple called Wat Jingpiao. Other than the temple, it will also be the host to the Xishuangbanna Dharma School and the Buddhist Association of Xishuangbanna. However, the construction itself was funded as a business investment to make the monastery also a popular tourist destination. A real estate company from northern China is the primary investor that invested 350 million RMB in the project.59 The deal is that the company will reap the revenue from the entrance fee for the temple, although the local Dai would be exempt from the fee. In return, the monks can stay at the monastery for free to ―prove‖ the authenticity of the place. It is thus a cooperative effort between capital and religion, and it represents a further commercialization of the Dai‘s 58 Videos of the ceremony can be watched at http://video.sina.com.cn/ent/s/2007-11-12/18054385.shtml. Fenghuangwang, November, 8 2007, accessible at http://fo.ifeng.com.news/200711/1108_14_47309.shtml. 59 205 religion and culture.60 For the Dai, they have to sell out their religion so as to get financial and political support for their religious revival.61 What is particularly significant is that during Khuba Meaung‘s speech, he needed to pledge the loyalty of the Buddhist Sangha to the Chinese state. By emphasizing that Xishuangbanna Dai‘s Buddhism is a patriotic force that combines loving the religion and loving the country - that is China, his speech reinforced the idea of Dai as part of the Chinese nation. In his speech, Khuba Meaung referred to China as Pathet Zhongguo as in the same league with Pathet Thai (Thailand), Pathet Man (Burma) and Pathet Lao (Laos). The use of Pathet Zhongguo, using the official name for China, is a big change from the past. Traditionally the Dai in Xishuangbanna referred to China as Meaung Haw (Han Chinese‘s country). This change of names symbolizes the Dai‘s change of perception of the nature of the Chinese nation-state, which has changed from an ethnic nation (Meuang Haw) to a civic one (Pathet Zhongguo). By emphasizing and acknowledging China as a civic nation, the head of the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna puts the Dai directly as part of this political entity. On the other hand, it is also significant to note that the officially atheist CCP party state needs to actively get involved in the promotion of Buddhism in Xishuangbanna. Other than the economic agenda mentioned above regarding the revenue coming from the ethnic tourism industry, we might also argue that the party state realizes it needs the cooperation and blessing from the Buddhist Sangha. It realizes the need to seek support from the Buddhist Sangha in certain policy areas, such as the case of HIV/AIDS 60 A similar example is the Dai Nationality Park in Manchunman village at Ganlanba. At this park, a few Dai villages leased out their land to build a Dai theme park, while the park is managed by a Han Chinese company. See for example, Monica A Cable, "Ethnicity Lived and (Mis)Represented: Ethnic Tourism among the Dai in Southwest China" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Tulane University, 2006). 61 Hyde, Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of Aids in Southwest China, pp. 117-18. 206 prevention and education. It also is behaving in the same way as the old Dai King – that is by endorsing the Buddhist Sangha, it can reap legitimacy in the eyes of devout Dai. Inter-Ethnic Relations in Xishuangbanna and the Construction of the Chinese National Identity After the foregoing examination of the current situation of state religion relationships in Xishuangbanna, now let us to turn to look at the inter-ethnic boundaries among various ethnic groups. Looking back at the incorporation of the Dai Kingdom by the CCP and the chaotic times during the Mao period, one might have expected that the Dai would hold great grievances against the party state and Han Chinese. The cultural destruction during the Cultural Revolution years and the recent political, economic and cultural domination by the Han Chinese are certainly causes for such grievance. Indeed, ordinary Dai people still lament what happened during these chaotic years and regretted how those beautiful temples were destroyed and how monks disrobed. For many people old enough to remember these days, it is still a very traumatic experience, especially for older Dai males who were monks before the Cultural Revolution. One Dai villager told me his experience as a former monk who disrobed during the Cultural Revolution. He said that after his disrobement he became a farmer and was forced to join the local militia in the public sessions of the ―Destroy the Four Olds.‖ He said he shouted slogans, but did not actually do the destruction work. For him, it was sad to see those cultural relics destroyed. However, when I asked him about who were the main ethnic groups that did the destruction, he said there were Han, Hani but also Dai involved, so he does not really hold any one particular group accountable. For him, it was the whole period and the Mao 207 regime was to blame rather than any single ethnic group. So how is the overall interethnic relationship in Xishuangbanna? Now we will discuss inter-ethnic dynamics in Xishuangbanna. Overall, one has to say that inter-ethnic relations in Xishuangbanna are generally amiable. Tensions are not high, for example, between the titular nationality Dai and the Han Chinese. In fact, daily interactions between the Dai and Han are quite friendly and the intermarriage rate between the two groups is relatively high.62 Certainly conflict of interest exists between two groups. For example, many urban Dai businesses in the city of Jinghong are losing out against the Han Chinese newly arrived from other provinces.63 Many Dai people also complain about the intensification of Hanification and the gradual disappearance of authentic Dai culture. The commercialization of the Dai culture often comes at the cost of the presentation of the Dai as erotic objects. For example, in one of these Dai theme parks, there is daily performance of the Dai New Year celebration for the Han Chinese tourists.64 Or as Hyde‘s observation of the sex industry in Xishuangbanna points out, many Han Chinese prostitutes dress up as Dai women so that they can be consumed by Han Chinese businessmen who come to Xishuangbanna to experience the exotic Dai women.65 There are also rumors that busloads of Han Chinese go to the banks of the Lancang River to have a peek at Dai women bathing naked. Thus, there are legitimate complaints from the Dai about how their culture should be represented and how the current practices are really distortions and corruptions. 62 For an example of Dai-Han intermarriage and the rituals and symbols involved, see Antonella Diana, "Re-Configuring Belonging in Post-Socialist Xishuangbanna, China," in Tai Lands and Thailand: Community and State in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew Walker (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009). 63 Hyde, Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of Aids in Southwest China, p. 117. 64 ―China‘s Han Flock to Theme Parks Featuring Minorities,‖ New York Times, February 23, 2010, accessible at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/world/asia/24park.html 65 Hyde, Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of Aids in Southwest China, chapter 3. 208 That said, there have not been the same levels of discriminatory attitudes and mutual distrust between the two ethnic groups, as we have observed in Xinjiang between the Uighurs and Han Chinese for instance. To understand the complexities and dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Xishuangbanna, and the ambiguous attitudes of Dai towards the Han, we have to introduce into our discussion a third group – Hani66. The Hani, or as locally called Aini (Akha in Thailand), are the third largest group in Xishuangbanna. The Hani, together with the much smaller mountain dwelling groups, such as Lahu or Blang, were historically ruled by the Dai. Often, the Dai consider these mountain people inferior and backward and simply referred to them as slaves, ―Ka.‖67 Derogatory attitudes toward the Hani still remain within the general psyche of the Dai. During my field work, I often heard about the Dai complaining about Hani as ―dirty‖ and ―uncivilized,‖ and people would warn me not to go to a Hani village or eat Hani food. There is also a general taboo among the Dai against inter-marriage with the Hani. In a questionnaire that I compiled in Damenglong township, south of Jinghong city, of the 70 Dai villagers I interviewed, 52 (75 %) of them expressed disagreement over intermarriage between the Dai and Hani. When asked for the reason, people would say older people or their parents would not allow it or simply refer to it as a tradition. In contrast, 65 out of the 70 (96%) people interviewed expressed positive attitudes towards Dai and Han intermarriage. In comparing the Han with Hani, the Dai feel they are more similar to the Han – both have whiter skin compared with the darker Hani, and both groups are more ―civilized‖ and ―cultured‖ while the Hani are considered ―barbaric‖ and ―wild.‖ What is interesting about this triangular relationship is that the Dai show their contempt and 66 Or other mountain people, such as Lahu or Blang. It is just the Hani is more sizable and prominent. Hsieh, "Ethnic-Political Adaptation and Ethnic Change of the Sipsong Panna Dai: An Ethnohistorical Analysis", p. 57. 67 209 group differentiation most forcefully not against the dominant Han Chinese but to the ―inferior‖ but threatening Hani. Even though the Han Chinese are the late-comers and are politically and economically dominant, the Dai mostly felt the need to demarcate the ethnic boundary against their historical ―subjects‖ instead. This triangular relationship defines very much the inter-ethnic dynamics in Xishuangbanna. As the titular nationality for the region, the Dai feel the need to differentiate itself from Hani and other inferior mountain-dwelling people. And many times it does lead to clashes between the two groups, although of limited intensity.68 Meanwhile, the Han Chinese and the Chinese government often play the role of broker between these two groups, and perhaps also play one off against another in terms of government official promotions and allocations of government funds and investment opportunities. Despite this particular way of demarcating ethnic differences, it is necessary to note that for the Dai in Xishuangbanna, the sense of being a Chinese citizen is not questioned but embraced. It fact we can argue that the Chinese national identity is quite strong among the Dai. In the questionnaire that I distributed among 70 Dai villagers, when asked whether they consider themselves Chinese citizens (zhongguo ren), people unanimously understood the concept and answered yes. Questions were further asked regarding whether they consider themselves Chinese citizen first or Dai first; 42 (60%) people answered Chinese citizen first, 24 (34%) answered Dai first, while 4 people think the two concepts are essentially the same. This overall identification with China also corresponds to the general favorable view of the Hanification process among the Dai. 68 One informant told me when Dai youth get drunk at night, they would go and pick up fight with Hani youth on the street. 210 Although 66 (94%) people interviewed said they mainly speak Dai at home, 69 (98.5%) people consider it necessary for kids to learn more Han Chinese. When asked directly about what people think about the overall situation of the Hanification process going on in Xishuangbanna, 48 (69%) people considered it a positive phenomena, 5 (8%) considered it neutral, and 16 (23%) thought it as negative. It seems that the majority of people interviewed at least do not think of the Hanification process as negative and threatening. See Table 5.2 for a summary of responses. Table 5.2 Questionnaire of Dai Villagers in Damenglong No Answer or Yes No Neutral Do you think Dai and Hani can get married? 17 52 1 Do you think Dai and Han can get married? 65 5 0 Do you think you are a Chinese citizen? 70 0 0 Do you think you are a Chinese citizen first or Dai first? Do you speak Dai at home? Do you think it necessary for kids to learn the Han Chinese language? Do you think the Hanification process is good? 42 (Chinese citizen first) 66 24 (Dai first) 4 69 48 16 Total 70 70 70 4 (same) 0 70 70 1 70 6 70 Having said that, we also need to note that this general acceptance of being a Chinese citizen and the overall positive view of the Hanification process among the Dai do not mean the Dai are trying to reject their own culture and identity. On the contrary, most people interviewed do not feel the two are contradictory – that is, one can learn the 211 Han Chinese language but that will not make a Dai a lesser Dai. A Dai male Ai Long69 summarizes his opinion on this issue as follows, ―these days younger people all can speak well the Han Chinese language, including both the Yunnan dialect and Mandarin. But this is not necessarily a bad thing. The younger generation can still speak Dai and most of them observe the Dai cultural tradition both at home and at the temple. By incorporating some Han Chinese culture, it is like a bonus, something we can add on to the Dai tradition, which means people can speak both languages and understand both cultures.‖ Given the relatively recent incorporation of Xishuangbanna into the Chinese state, it is difficult to trace exactly when Chinese national identification started to take hold. When asked about this, different people offer different explanations. The official rhetoric is of course to say that the Dai have always been Chinese and emphasize the historically tributary relationship and the symbolic rule through the Tusi system, conveyed to me by the head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau of the Xishuangbanna Prefecture.70 However, many Dai people think that is highly unlikely because before the PRC was founded, local people would only know their Chao Meaung and Chao Paending. There would have been no such idea about Chinese citizenship yet. Yi Gaew, whose family used to have aristocratic status in Damenglong, thinks this process of identifying with China must have occurred after 1950. To her, it was the state education and various government propaganda teams who came to Xishuangbanna in the early 1950s that started to instill this concept of citizenship among the Dai for the first time. Indeed, at the local primary school, one can often see a huge Chinese map on the wall with bold 69 There is no family name for Dai. For a male, it is common practice to start the name with Ai, and for women it is common to start with Yi. For older men, it is Bo, and for older women Mae. 70 Personal interview. 212 words underneath, saying ―Looking towards the World, Keeping the Motherland in Heart.‖71 The purpose of displaying the map so prominently and the message coming with it is to constantly remind the locals, specifically students, that they are Chinese citizens and over the border there are foreign countries – that is Burma and Laos. Thus, even though Burma is only 20 kilometers away, it is imperative for the Dai to remember that Burma is a foreign country, and China is the real motherland. Education and state indoctrination certainly can and have done some of the trick. However, education and propaganda alone do not mean that the Dai would blindly accept this version of national belonging. In fact, in other parts of China, such as in the Tibetan areas or among the Uighurs in Xinjiang, similar state education and indoctrination have not produced this same level of national identification with China. To understand and explain how the Dai would accept and internalize this specific message and start imagining itself being part of China, we need to look across the border. Indeed, 20 km south is Burma‘s Shan State, where Dai‘s external kin resides. The comparative framework that the Dai engage in comparing life in China versus the one in Burma informs their perception of the Chinese state. The Dai’s Perception of the Shan State and Their External Kin Xishuangbanna enjoys 288 km of border with Burma‘s Shan State. Although it also has a long border with Laos, the territory across the Sino-Laotian border is not heavily populated, and thus historically Xishuangbanna‘s interaction has been mainly with Burma‘s Shan State. The Shan is the Burmese name for the Tai. The Shan State is one of 71 眼世界，胸 祖 。 213 the largest administrative units in Burma and is about one fourth of Burma‘s land territory. During British colonial rule, the Shan State was ruled separately from the Burma proper under the Frontier Area Administration created by the British colonial authority.72 Although various ethnic groups in Burma reached an agreement at Panglong in the Shan State in 1947, which paved the way for independence for a unified Burma, after independence Burma had several internal ethnic rebellions. Especially after the coup in Rangoon in 1962, Burma‘s Military Junta73 has been fighting with ethnic rebels ever since.74 Although the Burmese military Junta has so far signed a series of ceasefire treaties with various ethnic rebel groups, there are still many parts of upper Burma, including the Shan State, controlled by ethnic rebel groups.75 For example, along the Sino-Burmese border, there are four Special Regions (SR) of the Shan State that are pretty much independent from the Burmese government: the Northern Shan State Special Region No. 1 – Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (Kokang), Shan State Special Region No. 2 – United Wa State Army, Shan State Special Region No. 3 - Shan State Army, and Eastern Shan State Special Region No. 4 - National Democratic Alliance Sai Aung Tun, History of the Shan State: From Its Origins to 1962 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), p. xviii. 73 The original name for the Burmese Military Junta was State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1997, it changed its name to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). 74 Ian Holliday, "Voting and Violence in Myanmar: Nation Building for a Transition to Democracy," Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008): p. 1043. For a comprehensive reading on ethnic rebellions in Burma, see Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999). 75 Many of the ethnic rebel groups were previously affiliated with the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, which collapsed in 1989 due to the stop of support from the Chinese Communist Party. See Bertil Lintner, The Rise and the Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (BCP) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Also, the retreat of the KMT into Burma after their defeat in China also contributed to the fragmentation and militarization of the Shan State. See Robert H Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the Kmt Intervention in Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973). 72 214 Army (Shan/Akha).76 In these special regions, ethnic rebels are not disarmed even though they have signed the ceasefire treaty with the Burmese military government. Also because of its proximity to China, the Chinese currency RMB is widely circulated there. The Special Region No. 4 populated mainly by the Dai and Hani is right across the border from Xishuangbanna, which I will discuss in detail later. Because of the need to support themselves economically, many ethnic rebels, particularly the Wa, cultivated poppy, which made the region the main source of world-wide narcotics production. In recent years, the Chinese government has put pressure on these special regions to eradicate poppy plantations, and as a result these ethnic rebels started to open casinos to attract Chinese tourist money. The relationship between these ethnic rebels and the Burmese military government is still volatile. Recently, due to the Burmese military government‘s pressure demanding that these ethnic rebels totally disarm, military clashes have already started.77 Another full-blown civil war in Burma is in the making. Despite the complex situation in Burma, it is safe to say that the Shan State, for the past half century, has been politically unstable and economically dilapidated due to constant warfare. As Andrew Walker comments on the situation of the Shan State, ―[D]ecades of conflict between armed groups and Burma‘s dictators have been sustained by the narcotics industry and the other illegal activities … ongoing military action against Shan armed groups deprives the populace of personal and livelihood security.‖78 Thus, turbulent Burma and its poverty-stricken people provide a negative comparison for the 76 For information on different special regions in Burma, see http://www.irrawaddy.org/research_show.php?art_id=444. 77 For example, in August 2009, thousands of refugees from Special Region 1 flooded into China due to fresh conflict between the Kokang Army and the Burmese military. See ―Burmese Refugees Flee to China Town,‖ BBC NEWS, September 30, 2009, accessible http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8229120.stm. 78 Andrew Walker, "Tai Community on the Move," in Tai Lands and Thailand: Community and State in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew Walker (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009). 215 Dai across the border in Xishuangbanna. See Table 5.3 for a comparison of economic development between China and its Southeast Asian neighboring countries. Table 5.3 Comparative Economic Development in Burma, China, Laos and Thailand (GDP Per Capita PPP)79 Year Burma China Laos Thailand 2000 1500 3600 1700 6700 2001 1500 4300 1630 6600 2002 1660 4400 1700 6900 2003 1900 5000 N/A N/A 2004 1700 5600 1900 8100 2005 1600 6300 1900 8300 2006 1100 4900 1900 7900 2007 1200 5500 2000 8200 2008 1200 6000 2100 8500 What is most interesting is how the local Dai people in Xishuangbanna know quite a lot about the constant warfare in Burma between ethnic rebels and the Burmese military government. Because of the border‘s proximity and the easy means to cross, 41 of 70 (59%) Dai people I interviewed at Damenglong say they have been to Burma. People also seem to know clearly the distinction between the special regions and those controlled by the Burmese military. Here I will present personal accounts from three Dai people that I came across during my field research about their relationship with Burma‘s Shan State and their perceptions of the situation there. Ai Wan, a 40-something Dai trader who frequently crosses the official SinoBurmese border, points out to me, ―look here, across the official Sino-Burmese border checkpoint, it is not really Burma yet, but the Special Region No. 4, and it is controlled 79 Data are estimates from CIA World Factbook. Ideally, I should use World Bank data so as to be consistent with data in other chapters. However, since data on Burma is not available at the World Bank Development Indicators, I decided to use the CIA World Factbook instead. Note, however, there are discrepancies in the estimates provided by the CIA World Factbook and the World Bank data. 216 by the People‘s Army.‖80 He continues, ―People living in Special Region No. 4 are mainly Dai, but also Hani, although the leadership of the region is Han Chinese who fled to Burma during the Cultural Revolution to fight with the Communist Party of Burma. Over there, they use the Chinese RMB, Chinese cell phone systems, and all their electricity and supplies come from China. For us local Dai, we do not need to get official visa to go there but only a temporary border pass.‖ According to Ai Wan, there are quite extensive economic and social ties between Xishuangbannna and the Special Region No. 4, ―I sometimes sell small appliances to a relative of mine who owns a shop there. Also during times of festivals, marriages or funerals, we would go over there. Or when we have new house built here, my relatives would come and visit too. Basically, we all speak the same languages, either Dai or the Yunnan dialect, so no need to speak Burmese at all. Life there I think is quite poor, and roads are dusty and bumpy. People‘s mentality also is totally different from us here. Over there, everyone has guns, so it is definitely not as safe as in Xishuangbanna. They would probably have another war soon. You know, when they have a fight, many wounded People‘s Army soldiers would be taken to the hospitals here in Xishuangbanna for treatment.‖ When I asked him whether he is worried about the possibility of war spreading into the Chinese territory, Ai Wan laughed and shook his head, saying ―No way, they do not dare to come to China because our soldier are much stronger and better equipped. You know, before 2003, it was the Chinese Border Patrol Armed Police stationed along the border, but now a real army has replaced it against possible escalation of conflict there. So I am not worried at all. However, I do not know what is going to happen with my business if a real war starts again.‖ The exact words in Chinese he used was 人民军. It is how the locals refer to the National Democratic Alliance Army, perhaps because it was used to be part of the Communist Party of Burma. 80 217 Yi Dan is a 30 something Dai female, who teaches at the local primary school at Damenglong. Yi Dan is well educated and went to a teacher‘s college in Kunming, so she speaks very good Mandarin, and dresses up quite fashionably as in jeans. Her dress style is thus different from her parents‘ generation where older women still dress up in the traditional Dai style long wrap-around longyi. Yi Dan has a girlfriend who is now working at a casino across the border in Special Region No. 4. Therefore, she sometimes goes there to visit her girlfriend, and perhaps do some gambling too. She described to me how she felt about Burma, ―Although I go there sometimes, but every time I go, I am a little scared. I would worry whether I would catch disease such as malaria or something.81 Also when I go, I usually do not wear my best clothes because I heard that people, especially soldiers, would ask for money if they see you dress up nicely. Other than the casinos, there is not really much to do there. The town is very small and the buildings are old, dirty and shabby, so usually I only go there for one day and come back right away. There are lots of Dai people there, although I do not really have direct relatives living in Burma now. Many probably are the ones who fled Xishuangbanna during the bad times, but now they regretted that they left. It is impossible to come back to live in China anymore because they cannot get back the hukou (Chinese household registration card). I know some local Dai men got married with Dai women from Burma, but they have problems with getting the official hukou, so they are basically illegal immigrants. I think these are the main reasons preventing cross-border marriage, otherwise, many women from Burma would flock to Xishuangbanna.‖ 81 Indeed, along the side of the Chinese border, there are big posters warning people about contracting malaria in Burma. 218 Bo Tao is the grandfather of Ai Hanxiang, whose family I stayed with during my field research. Bo Tao is from the previous aristocratic family in Damenglong, and he used to be a prominent monk before he disrobed during the Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution, because of his prominent status, he was invited to be a member of the local CPPCC until he retired in the mid 1990s. Since his retirement, he has made several religious pilgrimages to Laos and Burma. Although he professed the religious affinity between Xishuangbanna, Laos and Burma, Bo Tao is unequivocal about his satisfaction with life in Xishuangbanna, ―Life these days is much better in Xishuangbanna than in either Laos or Burma. Here we have nice roads and clean environment. People eat and dress up well. We also have stable electricity and clean water, which are not available in Laos and Burma. In Laos, there are not many people and we would see only one village after a long drive. In China, we have many people and everywhere there are villages. These days the Chinese government has helped building electric facilities and roads in Laos and Burma, and there are also lots of people, both Dai and Han, doing business there. However, because of the instability and incompetence of their governments, I do not see how much improvement can be achieved. It is true that life used to be hard in China too, but at least now we are over that. There are of course lots of big and prestigious temples in Laos and Burma, so I will go and pay my tribute once awhile, but I do not think I, not even to mention the younger generation who is not as religious as me, would want to live in either Laos or Burma. I am getting older now, so I only want peace in life. For the younger generation, they cannot endure the hardship there. Plus, opportunities are more abundant in China.‖ 219 These three personal accounts of Dais‘ perceptions of Burma‘s Shan State and their comparisons of life conditions between the two are representative of opinions that I came across in Xishuangbanna. They represent three different social sectors within the Dai community. For the Dai trader Ai Wan, the border and kin ties provide business opportunities, but the instability in the Burma‘s Shan State make him uncertain about the future. Yi Dan, the well educated school teacher, has developed a sense of superiority and aversion to the dangerous and poor Burma. Finally, for Bo Tao, although he enjoys the religious connections provided by both Burma and Laos, he thinks economic life and political stability trump religious and cultural ties. It is true that during the early years of the PRC when life became unbearable, many local Dais simply voted by foot by crossing into Burma or Laos. Yet, for the past three decades of economic reform in China, the economic prosperity and political stability have provided the local Dai a reason to be content about their lives in China. Elsewhere, Antonella Dianna also provided a similar account of her observations comparing two border towns along the Sino-Laotian border.82 Diana puts it squarely, ―[T]he orientation of Dai … to the new political and economic context of globalization is informed more by a sense of belonging to the modern Chinese national community than it is by transnational ethnic community.‖83 Concluding Remarks For the past 60 years, Xishuangbanna has transformed itself from a semi-independent Kingdom into an integrated part of the Chinese state. The early traumatic years of the 82 83 Diana, "Re-Configuring Belonging in Post-Socialist Xishuangbanna, China." Ibid., p. 212. 220 PRC had revolutionary impact on Dai society. Its royal and aristocratic classes were eliminated. Its Buddhist Sangha was also disbanded until the relaxation of religious control during Deng Xiaoping‘s reign. However, in Xishuangbanna, we have not observed the type of grievance and tension among the Dai towards either the Chinese state or the dominant Han Chinese. The Dai have tried to carve up a space for their cultural revival without directly challenging the Chinese state. Because of the Dais‘ demonstrated loyalty the Chinese state, the Chinese state has also rewarded it with toleration and support for the maintenance of some of the Dais‘ culture and religion, which of course has its limits. Yet, we also notice that the Chinese state has realized the need to utilize the Buddhist Sangha in Xishuangbanna to improve its governance and boost its legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary Dai. In addition, we have also observed the general acceptance among the Dai of their national identification with the Chinese state. With this internalization of the Chinese citizenship, the inter-ethnic relationship between the two in Xishuangbanna did not have ethnonationalist characteristics. Inter-ethnic boundary demarcation was done in a way not to be against the dominant Han Chinese, but rather towards the ―inferior‖ Hani. However, we also noticed that construction of Chinese national identity among the Dai should not be taken for granted. State education and propaganda certainly are important, yet by themselves they do not account for the whole identity construction process. Therefore, we can argue that the reasons for the lack of political mobilization in the Dai case are twofold. First, the Chinese state‘s policies towards the Dai‘s cultural revival and reproduction are overall more tolerant. Second, the specific triangular demographic and power balance among the Dai, Hani, and Han Chinese makes the 221 boundary division in Xishuangbanna fall between the Dai and Hani, rather than between the Dai and the Han Chinese. Having said that, as we have seen in this chapter, the other reason the Dai started to identify with China was because of the comparative framework ordinary Dai engages with their external kin across the border in Burma‘s Shan State as well as to a lesser extent Laos. With frequent cross-border communications, images of the chronic instability and poverty in Burma‘s Shan States have made the Dai realize their lives in Xishuangbanna are actually quite decent. Because of these interactions and comparisons with their external kin, the Dai people tend to emphasize the boundary between themselves and their external kin in Burma or in Laos, for example, by emphasizing they are ―Chinese Dai‖ while the others are ―Burmese Dai‖ and the so forth. These comparisons provide incentives for the Dai to re-orient themselves away from their pre-modern ties with the bigger Tai communities in mainland Southeast Asia. These comparisons with their external kin also make the Dai more likely to feel content about their life in China. In addition, there is also no coherent external support that tries to mobilize the Dai against the Chinese state. These two variables together paved the way for the Dai to seek for more integration within the Chinese state and society. 222 Chapter Six Emigration and Fragmentation of the Joseonjok in Yanbian Introduction Most people are familiar with the existence of the two Koreas – the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (North Korea). These are the two independent states that cut the Korean Peninsula into halves. Little is it known that across the border from North Korea in China there is also a ―third Korea,‖ which is a nickname some people use to describe the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China‘s northeastern Jilin province, where ethnic Koreans in China, called Joseonjok, are designated as the titular nationality.1 Yanbian has a territory of 427,000 sq kms, which makes it roughly the same size as Denmark or Switzerland. Other than Yanbian, there are also a few smaller Korean autonomous units, such as the Changbai Korean Autonomous County in Jilin province and various autonomous townships designated for the Joseonjok throughout three northeastern provinces – Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. Overall, the Joseonjok population in China numbers about 1.92 million according to the 2000 National Census, and less than half that number reside in Yanbian. Different from other ethnic minority groups in China who can often claim indigenous status for themselves, the Joseonjok are relative newcomers to China. Most of the Joseonjok today can trace their ancestry to waves of Korean migration into 1 Note on names and transliterations: in this chapter, I use Joseonjok instead of ethnic Koreans in China to refer to the group, which I intended to avoid confusion between South Koreans and North Koreans. There are also different spellings for the name; some use Choseonjok, or Chosonjok, or Chaoxianzu. To be consistent, I use Joseonjok in this chapter. In terms of transliteration, for people and places within China, I use pinyin as the method for transliteration. For North Korean and South Korean names and places, I use conventional English spellings. 223 Northeast China (Manchuria) since the mid to late 19th century. Early migrants were poor peasants fleeing famine in Korea who settled in Northeast China. The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 also drove waves of Koreans into China to escape Japanese colonial rule. Later Japan used Koreans in its forced relocation programs to cultivate land in Northeast China. Thus, the Joseonjok‘s history in China is relatively short, and as a group it maintains strong emotional as well as physical ties to their kin in the Korean Peninsula.2 Despite their recent immigrant status, Joseonjok participated very early on in the communist movements in Northeast China and also were the first to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They actively participated in the CCP‘s revolution in China and served in the Korean War as members of the People‘s Voluntary Army, fighting against US-led UN troops. These experiences gave the Joseonjok strong revolutionary credentials in the eyes of the CCP, and the Joseonjok were subsequently rewarded with much political, economic and cultural autonomy, and were touted in the PRC official discourse as the model ethnic minority group. As a result, Joseonjok tend to a have higher percentage of CCP membership and many of its socio-economic indicators, such as life expectancy and educational achievements, which also exceed those of the majority Han Chinese. Furthermore, due to the traditionally compact nature of their agricultural communities, Joseonjok generally practice strict endogamy, and have maintained high levels of linguistic and cultural autonomy, especially in areas such as Yanbian. As an ethnic group with deep ties to the Korean Peninsula, the vicissitudes of the Joseonjok community in China have been significantly conditioned upon the political and 2 There is also a settlement pattern for the Joseonjok in China relative to their ancestral homes in Korea. In Yanbian, most Joseonjok can trace their ancestors to North Korea, while the ancestors of many Joseonjok in Heilongjiang were from South Korea. 224 economic changes in their kin countries – both South and North Korea. Before 1992, China and South Korea did not have diplomatic relations, and North Korea was the only source of connection that the Joseonjok had with their external kin. However after 1992, exposure to South Korea made Joseonjok people realize the economic prosperity in South Korea compared to China. Dubbed as the ―Korean Wave,‖ South Korea‘s developed economy has drawn tens of thousands of Joseonjok people to South Korea to chase their ―Korean Dream.‖ Through marriages with South Korean nationals, and working legally and illegally in South Korea, the Joseonjok community has experienced a huge wave of emigration. In the meantime, with the expansion of South Korean investments in big cities along China‘s coast, more Joseonjok people migrated out of their traditionally compact communities to work for those South Korean businesses. This ―Korean Wave‖ has brought significant economic and cultural benefits to the Joseonjok community, but also has posed serious challenges that threaten the fragmentation of the Joseonjok community, such as depopulation of the traditionally Joseonjok-populated areas and a series of collateral social problems. In the meantime, there was also another ―Korean Wave‖ that came to affect the Joseonjok community – that is North Korean refugees who came to China in search of food and shelter since the mid 1990s. Through those refugees, the image of extreme poverty and dictatorial rule in North Korea was further strengthened in the minds of the Joseonjok when they compared North Korea and China. As a result of these ―Korean Waves,‖ the Joseonjok community has been in intensive interaction with their external kin since the 1990s, especially with the South Koreans. However, these interactions did not necessarily produce a rosy relationship between the two. Many Joseonjok migrant workers in South Korea work in the ―3D‖ 225 (Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult) sectors, and are often the subjects of discrimination and mistreatment by the South Koreans. Encountering the South Koreans has also made the Joseonjok people realize the significant social and cultural differences between them. Thus, even though there is a major wave of emigration to South Korea and a general trend of chasing anything South Korean, there is also a counter-wave that has led the Joseonjok community to reassess their ethnic and national identity, and their relationship with China versus both North and South Korea. The Joseonjok case represents a scenario where an ethnic group‘s external kin enjoy higher living conditions yet their external kin do not offer the group any substantial support. As our theoretical framework points out in Chapter Two, if an ethnic group perceives that its external kin enjoys higher living conditions, group members are more likely to feel discontent about their current situation within the state they inhabit. Indeed, in the Joseonjok case we can see that the economic disparity between China and South Korea makes the Joseonjok people very much dissatisfied with their living conditions in China. However, also as prosited by out theoretical framework that in such situations, if no substantial support from its external kin is available to mobilize the ethnic group, the dominant strategy for the group is more likely to be emigration. As we will see in in this chapter is that the dominant strategy for the Joseonjok is to emigrate to South Korea and reap the economic benefits of the South Korean economy, rather than to mobilize politically and demand more autonomy from the Chinese state. Thus, the Joseonjok case fits our theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two relatively well. This chapter is organized in the following way. The first section traces the history of the Joseonjok community in China and the making of the group as a model ethnic 226 minority group since the founding of the PRC. Then it analyzes the ―Korean Waves‖ and their impact on the Joseonjok community since the 1990s. The third section examines the interaction between the Joseonjok and the South Koreans, and discusses the ―bittersweet‖ relationship between them. Finally, the chapter explores how the interaction with their external kin has produced a reassessment of Joseonjok‘s ethnic identity and its national belonging. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Migration and Citizenship Some scholars trace the history of the Koreans in Northeastern China back to kingdoms such as Koguryo and Bohai more than one thousand years ago.3 Recently there have been some disputes between the Chinese and the South Korean governments over the Bernard Olivier Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces (Los Angeles: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), pp. 16-17. 3 227 nature of these early Korean political entities in contemporary Northeastern China.4 However, it is commonly accepted that these earlier Korean people were largely assimilated, annihilated or went to the Korean Peninsula. For the Joseonjok today, their forefathers came to China mainly through waves of migration dating back to the mid to late 19th century. As a result, the history of the Joseonjok community in China is relatively short, and many of the Joseonjok people are only the third or fourth generation of immigrants who came to China during the past century and half. Generally speaking, there were three major waves of Korean migration into China. The first one started from the mid 19th century to the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1910. The second was after Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. And the third wave was during period when Japan occupied Manchuria and set up the Manchukuo regime in the 1930s and 40s.5 The Manchu Qing Dynasty implemented a strict prohibition policy against nonManchu settlement in Manchuria. Treating the area as the ―sacred homeland‖ for the Manchus, the Qing court prohibited migration of Han Chinese into the region. At the same time, it also signed treaties with the Korean government to seal off the Sino-Korean border along the Yalu and Tumen rivers.6 However, because of the encroachment by Tsarist Russia in the north, the most feasible strategy available to the Qing court to defend this territory was to encourage migration and settlement, which eventually opened the door for migration of Han Chinese as well as Koreans into Manchuria.7 In the 1860s, 4 For example, see Peter Hays Gries, "The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today," East Asia: An International Journal 22, no. 4 (2005). 5 Zhehuan Lin (林哲焕), "Studies on the Social Changes and Development among the Chinese Joseonjok (中 朝鲜族社会变迁 发展研究)" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Central University for Nationalities (中央民族 大学), 2007 ), pp. 4-5. 6 Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 18. 7 Ibid. 228 the northern provinces of Hamgyong and Pyongan in Korea were devastated by severe flood and famine, so many poor Korean peasants started to migrate into China in search of land for cultivation. In 1885, the Qing government set aside a strip of land 350 km long and 25 km wide specifically for Korean settlement, which later became Yanbian. It was estimated that by 1909, there were a total of about 210,000 Koreans settled in Northeast China.8 About half of those were in Yanbian.9 The second wave of Korean migration into Manchuria occurred during the years between 1910 and 1930. After Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, many Koreans fled the Korean Peninsula to escape the Japanese colonial rule. During this period, not only poor peasants migrated to China, but also Korean nationalists and independence fighters, who relocated to Northeast China to try to get rid of the Japanese colonial government in Korea. By 1930, the total Korean population in Northeast China was estimated to exceed 600,000.10 Finally, in 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria and established the puppet Manchukuo regime with the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Puyi as the regent. As the colonizer, Japan considered itself the protector for the Koreans and proclaimed all Koreans as Japanese imperial subjects. Japan thus encouraged and organized Korean immigration and settlement in Northeast China for the purpose of solidify Japanese 8 Although the Qing government tried to grant citizenship to these earlier Korean settlers under the condition that the males shave their heads and people change their style of dress, that is to assimilate, most Korean settlers remained citizens of Korea. Mingzhe Xu (许明哲), Policy Analyses of the Social Changes among the Contemporary Yanbian Joseonjok 阳 9 代 边朝鲜族社会发展对策分析 (Shenyang 沈 : Liaoning Ethnic Press (辽宁民族出版社), 2001), p. 20. Jing Li (李晶), "Studies on Chinese Joseonjok‘s Self-Identification (中 朝鲜族的认同意识研究)" (Ph.D.Dissertation, Central University for Nationalities (中央民族大学), 2007), p. 40. 10 Chenglü Li (李承律), Joseonjok Society in the Era of Northeast Asia ( Cui Houze (崔厚泽) (Beijing ( 亚时代的朝鲜族社会), trans. 京): World Knowledge Press (世界知识出版社), 2008), p. 62. 229 imperial control. The Japanese used Korean peasants to cultivate wet paddy lands, which generated handsome revenues for the Japanese imperial coffer.11 By 1945 when Japan was defeated in World War II, the total Korean population in Northeast China was estimated at about 2.16 million.12 Perhaps due to their status as impoverished peasants and political refugees in China, communist ideologies had an easy and big following among the Koreans in Northeast China. Originally there were two distinct groups of Korean communists; one group were people who belonged to the Korea Communist Party in Korea, the other Koreans who fought together with the Chinese Communist Party. After the Commintern decided that only one communist party is allowed to operate in one country, all previous Korean communist groups were disbanded and encouraged to join the CCP.13 This, according to Olivier, ―reinforced the ties between Korean and Chinese communists and deepened the degree of involvement of the Korean communists within the Chinese revolution.‖14 Korean cadres participated in the CCP‘s Long March and were also heavily involved in the CCP‘s operation in Yan‘an.15 After the defeat of Japan, many Koreans did indeed return to the newly liberated Korea, but many chose to stay in China. These people were the forefathers of the contemporary Joseonjok. The Joseonjok once again sided with the CCP in the Chinese Civil War against the KMT in the founding of the PRC. Overall, Joseonjok in China were generally enthusiastic about the communist cause, and reported high numbers of 11 Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 36. 12 Changyu Piao (朴昌昱), Studies of Joseonjok History (中 朝鲜族 研究) (Yanji Yanbian University Press ( 边大学出版社), 1995), p. 30. 13 Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, pp. 33-34. 14 Ibid., p. 34. 15 Ibid., p. 43. 230 : CCP members. In 1949, in Yanbian, there were a total of 5,244 CCP members; 3,824 of them were Joseonjok, which accounted for 73.1 percent.16 Soon enough the Korean War broke out, and many Joseonjok joined the People‘s Volunteer Army to fight against the UN troops led by the USA. In Yanbian, about 6,000 Joseonjok youth joined the army, and more than 100,000 people were involved in the logistics of the war.17 The Korean War also had double meanings for the Joseonjok. As Olivier points out, for Joseonjok people, ―[i]t was their duty to defend the People‘s Republic of China, their adopted country, and was also their moral obligation, as Koreans, to help their brethrens in their ancestral homeland, Korea.‖18 However, at this time, the citizenship issue for most Joseonjok in China was still not clear, as to whether they should be granted Chinese citizenship or should be considered citizens of the newly established Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, which did enjoy a brotherly relationship with the PRC. Eventually, through negotiations with Kim Ilsong‘s regime, Beijing decreed that all Koreans living outside of the Shanghaiguan pass – that is in the three Northeastern Provinces – would automatically be granted Chinese citizenship; while those living inside the pass, which was only a small number of people, would become citizens of DPRK, although they can still legally reside in China.19 Thus, the overwhelming majority of the Korean migrants in China became Chinese citizens - Joseonjok, and were officially recognized as one of the 55 ethnic minority groups in China and granted autonomous status. In 1952, Yanbian was 16 Xu, Policy Analyses of the Social Changes among the Contemporary Yanbian Joseonjok 代 边朝 鲜族社会发展对策分析 , p. 50. Li, "Studies on Chinese Joseonjok‘s Self-Identification (中 朝鲜族的认同意识研究)", p. 58. Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 59. 19 Ibid., p. 61. 17 18 231 designated as an autonomous region for the Joseonjok. Similar to the Dai in Xishuangbanna, the name ―region‖ was later changed to ―prefecture‖ to reflect its relatively small size compared to the provincial level autonomous regions, such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. When Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture was first established, its total population was 763,763, of which the Joseonjok population was 538,243, 70.5 percent of the total. The Han Chinese population was 207,560, or 27.2 percent.20 By 1958, the Joseonjok population in Yanbian was 579,906, which was 56.9 percent of the whole population. The Han Chinese population increased to 421,346, which was 41.3 percent. The percentage of Han Chinese in Yanbian has further increased. By 1980, the percentage of Han Chinese in Yanbian became 57.8%, which means a clear majority.21 In 2003, the Joseonjok population in Yanbian was 829,053, which was only 39.7 percent. See Table 6.1 for the population distribution and change in Yanbian since 1953. Table 6.1 Population Distribution and Changes in Yanbian Group 1953 1958 1964 1982 1990 2003 Joseonjok 538243 579906 623136 754706 833998 829053 Han Chinese 207560 421346 643855 1073985 1172363 1291870 Total 763763 1019077 1314362 1873819 2069562 2185660 In 1958, the Dunhua county from the Jilin Special District was added to Yanbian‘s territory. This move, although it increased the geographic size of Yanbian, managed to dilute the high concentration of Joseonjok, since Dunhua was a Han Chinese majority county. According to Olivier, this move came perhaps in an effort to make Yanbian more economically viable by increasing the scale of its economy. Also, the move was not opposed by the Joseonjok, as Dunhua already had a sizable Joseonjok population, and people thought they would eventually create an autonomous region with all areas outside of Yanbian that have sizable Joseonjok populations. See Ibid., pp. 117-18. 20 21 Editorial Committee for Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Gazette 编委会 , Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Gazette ( 边朝鲜族自治州志) (Beijing ( 京): Zhonghua Book Company (中华书局), 1996), p. 256, pp. 77-80. 232 边朝鲜族自治州地方志 The Making of a Model Ethnic Minority It is safe to argue that the Joseonjok‘s early involvement with the CCP and its active participation in CCP‘s various wars and political movements had given the group strong revolutionary credentials in the eyes of the CCP. Also, due to their previous status as poor and landless peasants, most Joseonjok welcomed the land reforms carried out by the CCP in Yanbian. They joined the Mutual Aids Teams for wet paddy rice cultivation, and collectivization proceeded more smoothly in Joseonjok areas than in many Han Chinese areas.22 Joseonjok also reported a high percentage of CCP party membership. At the time Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture was established, 78 percent of party cadres at all levels were Joseonjok, and these percentages were higher than the actual percentage of the Joseonjok population in Yanbian.23 Zhu Dehai, a Joseonjok, became the first chairman as well as the CCP secretary for Yanbian in 1952. Aftterwards, except from 1971 to 1973, all first party secretaries in Yanbian were Joseonjok until the 1990s.24 Joseonjok has also produced high-profile officials represented within the upper realms of the CCP, the Chinese government and the Chinese military. Zhu Dehai was an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee in the 8th CCP National Party Congress. During the Cultural Revolution, a Joseonjok radical Cui Hailong was first an alternate member of the 9th CCP Central Committee, and then in 1973 became a regular member of the 10th CCP Central Committee. At the 11th CCP Central Committee Jin Minghan was an alternate member. Zhao Nanqi was a regular member of the 12th to 14th CCP Central Committees. Zhao also has a prominent military background and became the Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 80. Ibid., p. 78. 24 Editorial Committee for Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Gazette, Yanbian Korean Autonomous 22 23 Prefecture Gazette ( 边朝鲜族自治州志), pp. 364-66. 233 Chief of Logistics of the PLA. He achieved the status of general, and was a member of the CCP Central Military Commission. As Lee points out, Zhao was ―one of the most important individuals in the central PLA hierarchy and the highest minority general in China.‖25 After Zhao Nanqi, there was Li Dezhu, who became a regular member of the 13th to 16th CCP Central Committees. Li also was made head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission from 1998 to 2008.26 Indeed, the Joseonjok has a disproportional representation within the Chinese political hierarchy, given that its population was less than 2 million and thus is a relatively small ethnic minority group. Joseonjok‘s enthusiasm and loyalty towards the CCP was awarded with more toleration and support for their cultural and linguistic autonomy and reproduction. In the area of education, Joseonjok was permitted to set up a school system from primary school to university with the Korean language as the main language of instruction. For example, Yanbian University, opened in 1949, was the first minority university in China with the Korean language as the main language of instruction. In the National University Entrance Exam, Joseonjok students also have the option of testing in Korean. Outside of Yanbian, Korean schools were also set up in other Joseonjok-populated areas in the Northeast.27 There are also many Korean-language newspapers and magazines circulating in Yanbian as well as in the three northeastern provinces, such as the Yanbian Daily News and Heilongjiang Daily News, the two biggest newspapers published in Korean in China. The Yanbian TV station also has several Korean language channels, broadcasting daily news and also carrying TV shows, many of which now are direct Chae Jin Lee, "The Political Participation of Koreans in China," in Koreans in China, ed. Dae-Sook Suh, and Edward J. Shultz (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), p. 109. 26 Data on Joseonjok representation in the CCP Central Committee are derived from the CCP website, accessible at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html. 27 Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 92. 25 234 imports from South Korea.28 Because of these tolerant policies towards the Korean language and culture, and also due to Joseonkok‘s traditional ethos that emphasizes education, the Joseonjok have had great educational achievements. Joseonjok was the first ethnic minority group in China to achieve 9-year compulsory education. Also, according to the 2000 National Census, the percentage of Joseonjok high school graduates was 23.9 percent, higher than the majority Han Chinese.29 Jodseonjok also has the highest rate of tertiary education among all major ethnic groups in China.30 As elsewhere in China, during the radical years of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Joseonjok was not exempt from the political turmoil; it suffered greatly, as many of its political and cultural elites were purged and persecuted.31 The Joseonjok also endured attacks on their culture and language. As the majority Han Chinese exerted their cultural chauvinism towards ethnic minorities during the Cultural Revolution, the Korean language and culture were deemed backward and unworthy, and people who tried to promote cultural and linguistic autonomy for the Joseonjok were officially branded as cultural revisionists. As Olivier commented on this issue during the Cultural Revolution, ―the use of Korean language came to be extremely neglected in public life and its study was officially discouraged.‖32 28 29 Personal observation. Chengxue Cui, and Jin Changlu (崔 Hundred Years (跨越百年路尚 Ethnic Education (中 30 学,金昌录), "Reflection on Joseonjok Education for the Past -对朝鲜族近代教育百年 程的回顾 思考)," Chinese Journal of 民族教育) 12 (2006): p. 16. Guizi Lu (卢贵子), "Analysis of Joseonjok‘s Education Achievements (中 朝鲜族教育发展探悉)," Heilongjiang Ethnic Studies Journal 黑龙江民族 刊 103, no. 2 (2008): p. 166. 31 For example, Zhu Dehai, the Joseonjok revolutionary leader, was accused of working as a spy for the Soviet Union and the DPRK, and was sent down to a labor camp in Hubei in 1969. He died in 1972. 32 Olivier, Implementation of China's Nationality Policy in the Northeastern Provinces, p. 154. 235 Despite these excesses and hardships, the Joseonjok people kept their faith in the socialist system, and people still expressed revolutionary enthusiasm. One reason for this, as pointed out by Olivier, is that ―the socialist system granted the Koreans a feeling of equality and security no competing capitalist market economy could give a politically and economically dependent minority nationality.‖33 Another explanation is that for the Joseonjok, there was no clear alternative. Socialism and the Communist Party were the only things imaginable because the Joseonjok were only exposed to China and North Korea, both are communist countries. Before the 1980s, there was no contact with South Korea, as the latter was branded an enemy state and accused of being a puppet regime for the American imperialists. Thus, despite their suffering during the radical years of Mao, there was not a big backlash against the CCP afterwards. However, China‘s economic reform and opening the country to the outside world changed all that. In particular, opening up to South Korea proves to have caused fundamental changes within the Joseonjok community. The idea of South Korea being economically prosperous compared to the lack of development in China became too strong an incentive, so Joseonjok jumped on the bandwagon of South Korea‘s developed economy. Large waves of Joseonjok started to emigrate out to South Korea, mostly as cheap labor but also to seek marital partners. With South Korean businesses now starting to invest in China, there has also been another wave of migration of Joseonjok to big cities in China along the coast where South Korean businesses tend to concentrate. Termed the ―Korean Wave,‖ it provided a golden opportunity for the Joseonjok to chase the ―Korean Dream‖ and to reap handsome economic and cultural benefits from it. At the same time, the Joseonjok community also needs to face a series of challenges brought about by this 33 Ibid., p. 163. 236 ―Korean Wave.‖ Now let us look at how this ―Korean Wave‖ came about and analyze its implications on the Joseonjok community. The “Korean Wave” China and North Korea have always managed to maintain a cordial relationship because of their similar political systems and the revolutionary bond they developed during the Korean War. Thus, before the 1980s, all contacts and relations that the Joseonjok could have with their external kin were with the North Koreans. Incidentally, the majority of the Joseonjok in China can trace their ancestors to North Korea, and thus the overall identification and ethnic attachment were oriented towards Pyongyang. In areas such as Yanbian this is especially the case because Yanbian is right across the border from North Korea, and more than 80 percent of the Yanbian Joseonjok‘s ancestors came from North Korea.34 The Cold War environment also meant that little or no information about South Korea was available for the Joseonjok. After China began opening up, information about and contacts with South Korea were gradually permitted and made available. In 1984, both the Chinese and the South Korean government allowed citizens to visit relatives in the other country.35 Later, the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul made the Joseonjok realize that the ―Cold War enemy‖ actually had achieved great economic development and high international status. This heralded the change of perception among the Joeonjok towards South Korea, and people started to identify and 34 Outi Luova, "Mobilizing Transnational Korean Linkages for Economic Development in Yanbian, China," E-Journal Japan Focus (2007), accessible at http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_McNeill/2388. 35 Shanyu Cao (曹善玉), "Analysis of Emigration among the Joseonjok in the Three Northeastern Provinces since the Economic Reform (改革开 后 省朝鲜族的海外移民问题初探)," Studies of Overseas Relations (侨务工 研究 ), no. 1 (2005), accessible at http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/122/152.shtml. 237 orient more towards the South than the North. After 1992, when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations, waves of Joseonjok started to emigrate out of China to South Korea to seek their ―Korean Dream.‖ The first wave of Joseonjok immigrants came to South Korea mainly under the name of visiting relatives and then overstayed their visa.36 Later, more Joseonjok flocked into South Korea as cheap and mostly illegal labor. Since the 1960s, South Korea has experienced high levels of economic development as one of the newly industrialized countries. In 1962, South Korea‘s GDP per capita was USD 104, and in 2008, its GDP has reached USD 19,115.37 In 1996, South Korea became a member of the OECD and has thus entered the club of economically developed countries. South Korea has also become a destination for immigrant labor, especially from poorer East and Southeast Asian countries, because of its comparatively higher wages. At the same time, South Korea‘s small and medium-sized enterprises started to experience labor shortages of unskilled workers, especially jobs considered ―3D‖ (Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult).38 To fill these labor shortages, Joseonjok became one of the main groups that started to come and work in South Korea. Most importantly, Joseonjok were also favored, at least initially by the South Korean state and employers because of their similar linguistic and 36 At the time, many Joseonjok people realized that the South Korean public had a strong belief in Chinese medicine, and decided to sell Chinese medicine on the streets of Seoul. From this lucrative practice many realized how easy it was to make money and more and more Joseonjok started to join this business. However, the South Korean government soon issued a quality analysis report of these medicines and pointed out that many were fake. Media exposure of this issue caused an uproar among the South Koreans and greatly affected their impressions of the Joseonjok. Heh-Rahn Park, "Narratives of Migration: From the Formation of Korean Chinese Nationality in the PRC to the Emergence of Korean Chinese Migration in South Korea" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1996), p. 198. 37 World Bank World Development Indicators. 38 Helene Kim Lee, "Bitter-Sweet Homecoming: Ethnic Identity Construction in the Korean Diaspora" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009). 238 cultural background and because of the perception that their physical similarities ―would least disturb Korean homogeneity.‖39 Generally speaking, wages in South Korean are almost ten times that of China, which means that working for one year in South Korea is worth working for ten years in China. This huge gap in wages thus offers a strong economic incentive for the Joseonjok people to come to South Korea through whatever means possible.40 The 1990s in China were also the toughest time for the Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), as the economic restructuring led to a big wave of workers being laid off. The situation was particularly acute in the three Northeast Provinces because of the heavy concentration of SOEs there. This economic reshuffle has effectively made the Northeast the ―dust belt‖ of China.41 Thus, both the pull from South Korea and the push from China were the reasons for the mass exodus of Joseonjok to seek fortune in South Korea. See Table 6.2 of the comparative economic development between China and South Korea.42 39 Katherine H. S. Moon, "Strangers in the Midst of Globalization: Migrant Workers and Korean Nationalism," in Korea’s Globalization, ed. Samuel Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 157. 40 There are multiple ways through which Joseonjok come to South Korea to work. Some come to visit relatives, often with fake documents, and overstay their visa. Others come through tourist or business visas and then become undocumented illegal laborers. Also, there are programs for trainees that many Joseonjok can use to enter South Korea. Lee, "Bitter-Sweet Homecoming: Ethnic Identity Construction in the Korean Diaspora", p. 85. 41 Caren Wendy Freeman, "Forging Kinship across Borders: Paradoxes of Gender, Kinship and Nation between China and South Korea" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2006), p. 171. 42 Data on North Korea are not available through World Bank. The estimate that is available through CIA Factbook puts the GDP Per Capita PPP in North Korea in 2008 at USD 1800. 239 Table 6.2 Comparative Economic Development between China and South Korea43 GDP Per Capita (In GDP Per Capita PPP (In Constant Current USD) 2005 USD) South South China Korea China Korea 1960 92 156 1970 112 279 1980 193 1674 523 5544 1990 314 6153 1099 11383 2000 949 11347 2664 18730 2008 3267 19115 5515 25498 According to Freeman‘s estimate, there are currently more than 200,000 Joseonjok working or living in South Korea, both legally and illegally.44 If this estimate is correct, it represents about 10 percent of the whole Joseonjok population who have migrated to South Korea, temporarily or permanently. Most of these Joseonjok migrants in South Korea work in the so called ―3D‖ sectors. Men are usually employed in the construction sector, women in the restaurant businesses. Other than those working in South Korea‘s labor market, there are also a lot of Joseonjok women marrying South Korean men in recent years. Because South Korea is so much more prosperous than China, ―marrying up‖ to a South Korean is arguably an easy ticket for many Joseonjok women. Due to demographic changes and urbanization, South Korean rural men had considerable difficulty locating suitable marital partners. In order to appease its rural voters, the South Korean government started a match-making program searching for Joseonjok women for these rural bachelors.45 The rationale behind it is that the Joseonjok are ethnically Korean, so they are the most suitable as they would 43 World Bank World Development Indicators. Freeman, "Forging Kinship across Borders: Paradoxes of Gender, Kinship and Nation between China and South Korea", p. 101. 45 Ibid., p. 2. 44 240 cause little linguistic and cultural disruption in South Korean society. As a result of these programs and efforts, tens of thousands of Joseonjok women have stepped up and married into South Korea. For example, among foreign brides marrying South Korean men, about 50 percent of them were Joseonjok women, in the numbering thousands every year.46 In Yanbian, from 1991 to 2001, there were 13,881 intermarriages between Joseonjok and South Korean nationals, and the overwhelming majority were Joseonjok women marrying South Korean men.47 According to an estimate, as many as 1 in 4 Joseonjok women of marriage age have married South Koreans.48 From 1990 to 2005, a total of 70,000 Joseojok women were estimated to have married South Korean men.49 There are multiple reasons for Joseonjok women to marry South Korean men, and it might be difficult to separate one from another. However, aside from romance, it seems that for many Joseonjok women, it is the easiest way to move up the international economic hierarchy from relatively poor China to more prosperous South Korea. As Freeman comments on her interviews with Joseonjok brides in South Korea, ―if not motivated by specific monetary goals…many of the migrant brides I interviewed were propelled into the marriage market by a vague but nevertheless enticing sense of the wealth and material comfort that could be enjoyed in South Korea.‖50 In an effort to 46 Xinzi Quan (全信子), "Studies of Joseonjok Women‘s International Marriages (中 朝鲜族女性涉外婚 姻研究 )" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Central University for Nationalities (中央民族大学), 2006), p. 20. 47 Mingxian Lin, and Shen Shunfen (林明鲜,申顺芬 , "Resource and Exchange among Marriages - Using International Marriage among Joseonjok Women as an Example (婚姻行 族女性的涉外婚姻 48 例)," Demography Studies (人 中的资源 交换-以 边朝鲜 研究) 30, no. 3 (2006). Li, Joseonjok Society in the Era of Northeast Asia ( 亚时代的朝鲜族社会), p. 174. Quan, "Studies of Joseonjok Women‘s International Marriages (中 朝鲜族女性涉外婚姻研究 )", p. 155. 50 Freeman, "Forging Kinship across Borders: Paradoxes of Gender, Kinship and Nation between China and South Korea", p. 60. 49 241 achieve life comfort in South Korea and to gain South Korean citizenship through marriage, there are also lots of cases of fake marriages and fake divorces, which have caused great social discord both in South Korea and among the Joseonjok communities in China. We will return to this point later in the chapter. Other than this mass exodus to South Korea, there is also another big wave of Joseonjok migration to big Chinese cities along the coast where South Korean businesses and investments are concentrated. Because they know both Chinese and Korean, Joseonjok has stepped up to play the role of middleman between the South Koreans and the Han Chinese, and many Joseonjok work as interpreters between the two. Joseonjok people have also found a niche economy in these big cities by setting up small businesses, such as restaurants, Karaoke bars and other service businesses that cater to the growing South Korean population in China. For example, according to estimates in 2006, there were 180,000 Joseonjok living in big cities in Shandong province, 170,000 in Beijing and Tianjin, 85,000 in Shanghai and surrounding areas, and 60,000 in Guangzhou and Shenzhen in southern China. A total of 500,000 Joseonjok are now living in these big cities along the coast, which is about a quarter of the whole Joseonjok population in China.51 This mass population movement has led to a serious population depletion problem in the traditionally Joseonjok-concentrated areas, which has led to great concern about the future of Joseonjok in Northeast China. 51 Li, Joseonjok Society in the Era of Northeast Asia ( 242 亚时代的朝鲜族社会), p. 162. Impact of the “Korean Wave” The impact of the ―Korean Wave‖ on Joseonjok society has been deep and fundamental. The opportunities and benefits opened up by the ―Korean Wave‖ for the Joseonjok are unprecedented. Likewise, the challenges are also unmistakably huge. In this section, I will discuss in sequence the positive and negative impact of the ―Korean Wave‖ on the Joseonjok in China for the past two decades. The Joseonjok case demonstrates how an economically superior external kin can exert a strong pulling force for the ethnic group. The economically developed South Korea has become the source of inspiration and admiration as well as the means for the Joseonjok to improve their socio-economic conditions. Because of the drastic economic disparity between China and South Korea, Joseonjok people have managed to reap great fortune by crossing the border from a developing country to a developed one. Even though the working conditions are terrible in South Korea, many people still think that it is worthwhile to stay there. The economic incentive has been huge enough for Joseonjok people to endure the hardship they would encounter in the South Korean labor market. As with international migrant communities everywhere, the remittance back to China from Joseonjok working in South Korea has been huge in amount. For example, in Yanbian, the remittance from overseas migrant labor has reportedly exceeded the prefecture‘s annual revenue.52 Overseas remittance thus has become one of the biggest sources of income for the Joseonjok community, especially for families who have one or two family members working in South Korea. With this large influx of capital, Joseonjok people have also had the chance to invest money in small and medium-sized enterprises 52 Xu, Policy Analyses of the Social Changes among the Contemporary Yanbian Joseonjok 鲜族社会发展对策分析 , p. 238. 243 代 边朝 or other service sector businesses. These all contribute to the Joseonjok‘s fast-growing consumer economy. In areas such as Yanbian, real estate and other commodity prices are often higher than in other areas in Northeast China.53 At the same time, South Korean investment and the growing number of South Korean nationals in China have also provided employment opportunities for Joseonjok who choose to stay in China. According to the estimates by the South Korean embassy in China, in 2002 there were about 35,000 South Koreans issued official residential permits by the Chinese public security bureau. Also there are estimated to be more than 130,000 South Korean nationals living or studying in China.54 Many of these South Korean nationals depend upon services and other assistances provided by the Joseonjok community. This further presents economic benefits and social mobility for the Joseonjok people. The economic prosperity and vibrant culture in South Korea have also given the Korean language and culture more ―social prestige‖ in China. With China importing movies, TV shows and music from South Korea, Korean culture has gained an increased following from the Chinese public. As more and more people get interested in learning the Korean language and culture, the Joseonjok take great pride in their cultural heritage. There are now more than 30 universities in China offer classes in the Korean language, and there is also demand among the Han Chinese to learn the Korean language. In Yanbian during my field research, I came across instances where some Han Chinese parents are sending their kids to Korean language schools, a phenomenon unprecedented in other ethnic minority areas in China. At the same time, the easy availability of 53 From my personal observation, for example, in Yanji, the capital city of Yanbian, prices are often higher than in Changchun, which is a much larger city and is capital city of Jilin province. 54 Kim, "The Economic Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in China," p. 123. 244 language materials from South Korea also makes it more possible for the Joseonjok people to keep alive their own language and culture. It thus offers them strong resources for resisting the assimilative power of mainstream Chinese society. However, the ―Korean Wave‖ has also led to changes and even crises within the Joseonjok community, which ironically is threatening its existence. These challenges are multiple. The first and most glaring one is the population decline among the Joseonjok. It happens in two ways. One is overall stagnation and decline of the Joseonjok population. Second is the relative decrease of Joseonjok in their traditionally concentrated areas, because of the mass exodus to either South Korea or big Chinese cities. As a result, in some rural areas, there has been a depletion of the Joseonjok population. According to the 2000 National Census, the total number of Joseonjok in China was recorded at 1,923,842. Compared to the National Census in 1990, however, we would notice that during the ten years the whole Joseonjok population almost did not change, because the Census in 1990 put its total population at 1,923,361. That means in these ten years the Joseonjok population in China only increased by a mere 481 people.55 This stagnation in Joseonjok‘s total population cannot be attributed simply to low birth rate among the Joseonjok. As we have seen, one big reason for this population stagnation among the Joseonjok is the mass migration of Joseonjok to South Korea, especially young women. The consequence for such a gendered emigration is that there are not enough young Joseonjok women in China to sustain the birth rate for the whole 55 Xinzhe Zheng (郑信哲), "Implication of the Joseonjok‘s Population Decline on Economic Development (朝鲜族人 自然增长率 no. 1 (2006): p. 35. 降对发展的影响)," Heilongjian Ethnic Studies Journal (黑龙江民族 245 刊 ) 90, community. According to some research, because of these overseas marriages, there are estimated to be 20 percent fewer babies born to Joseonjok women in China.56 In places like Yanbian, the Joseonjok population has experienced both absolute decline and relative decline compared to the Han Chinese. Table 6.3 Joseonjok Population Growth in Yanbian57 1990 1995 2000 Total Joseonjok Population 0.839 million 0.86 million 0.842 million Percentage 40.50% 39.50% 38.60% Annual Growth Rate 7.09‰ 0.03‰ -1.62‰ From Table 6.3, we can see not only that the percentage of Joeonjok in Yanbian is on the decline, but that the absolute number of Joseonjok is also decreasing. Although the earlier decline of population density was mainly due to the influx of Han Chinese into the region, it is now the Joseonjok‘s population decline that is diminishing its percentage in Yanbian. Recent mass migration out of Yanbian has greatly precipitated this downward trend. Some people even predict that, if the current trend continues, by 2020, the percentage of Joseonjok population in Yanbian would be reduced to 20 percent, and by 2050 down to 15 percent.58 The reduction of the Joseonjok population in Yanbian thus poses great challenges for the group to keep its autonomous political structure and maintain its cultural and linguistic autonomy.59 56 Ibid.: p. 37. 57 Yujin Liang, and Cai Zhuyi (梁玉今，蔡洙一), "Problems of Negative Population Growth among the Joseonjok in Yanbian and Some Policy Suggestions ( 策)," Yanbian University Journal ( 58 Zhongguo Jin (金钟 边大学学 边朝鲜族人 负增长所引发的 要问题及其对 ) 36, no. 2 (2003): p. 41. ), "Reflections and Projections About the Chinese Joseonjok (对中 朝鲜族的 思及展望)," Yanbian University Journal ( 边大学学 ) 32, no. 3 (1999): p. 88. These days there are talks that the Chinese government should issue policies to encourage Joseonjok women to have two or even three children. 59 246 Already, with the Joseonjok‘s population decline and especially population depletion in the rural areas, Korean language schools are having great difficulty recruiting enough students. As a result, many rural schools had to close down or merge with others in more populous areas because there are not enough students in the area. For example in Yanbian, from 1990 to 2002, the number of Korean primary schools dwindled from 386 to 162, a 58 percent decrease. The number of Joseonjok primary school students has diminished 42 percent, and new student body has shrunk almost 64 per cent during this period.60 The reduction of Korean primary schools has also caused a chain reaction in the reduction of Korean middle schools, which further threatens the sustainability of the whole Korean language education system (See Table 6.4). The reduction of Korean language schools has also led to a situation where many Joseonjok parents are sending their kids to Han Chinese schools instead, which has led to a vicious cycle. It seems in the autonomous areas such as Yanbian it is increasingly difficult for Korean language education to sustain itself, especially in rural areas, which threatens cultural and linguistic reproduction for the Joseonjok people. Furthermore, for the large amount of Joseonjok people who migrated to big cities along China‘s coast, it is almost impossible to send their kids to Korean language schools, because such schools rarely exist if at all in these big cities. Hence, the situation for the Joseonjok who have migrated out of their autonomous areas is even more worrisome. Immersed in a sea of Han Chinese in these big cities, those Joseonjok, and especially their kids, face the challenge of losing their Korean linguistic capability, if they have not already done so. The fragmentation of the previously compact Joseonjok community as a result of the mass 60 Liang and Cai, "Problems of Negative Population Growth among the Joseonjok in Yanbian and Some Policy Suggestions ( 边朝鲜族人 负增长所引发的 247 要问题及其对策)," p. 42. out-borne migration thus indicates precipitation of their assimilation into the majority Han Chinese society. Table 6.4 Changes at Korean Schools in Yanbian 1990 2002 Primary Schools Number of Schools 386 162 Number of Students 80762 46725 Number of New Students 13755 4974 Middle Schools Number of Schools 112 82 Number of Students 40789 38224 Number of New Students 14267 11761 Changes -58.03% 42.15% -63.84% -26.79% -0.63% -17.57% Other than this population decline problem, the ―Korean Wave‖ has also caused other significant social problems for the Joseonjok community. First is a direct outcome of the gendered migration of Joseonjok women to South Korea. With so many Joseonjok women marrying South Korean men, it is extremely hard these days for Joseonjok men to find local wives. During my field research, one common concern among the older generation of Joseonjok is that it is so difficult for their sons to find wives. Because Joseonjok men in general have less opportunity to migrate than their women counterparts, many of them stay behind in the countryside without upward mobility potential. These unmarried Joseonjok men would potentially cause great social instability for the whole community. These days, with North Korean refugees flooding into China, many do manage to get married with those North Korean women. However, because of their illegal status, those North Korean women had no chance of obtaining Chinese citizenship and household registration cards (hukou), and face the constant worry of being deported back to North Korea. At the same time, even the kids born in such 248 marriages have great difficulty in getting hukou, which led to further problems such as lack of access to Chinese state education and all other social benefit programs.61 In a way, we can argue that the losers in the ―Korean Wave‖ are those less educated rural Joseonjok men who had been generally left out, and they bear the cost of the fragmentation of the Joseonjok community. Another problem relates to Joseonjok children‘s education and care. With so many Joseonjok migrating out to South Korea and big Chinese cities to work, people often go without their children. Thus, it is often only one parent or grandparents who are taking care of them. In Yanbian, there were 31,405 such children in 2007.62 In my interviews at a Korean middle school in Hunchun, a city bordering both North Korea and Russia, teachers told me that almost half of the students at the school had either one or both parents working outside of Yanbian. Many of these students, because of their lack of parent care, often proved difficult to manage by their teachers. Also, the divorce rate for these separated Joseonjok families tends to be very high, which also adversely affects the Joseonjok students‘ social behavior. Teachers constantly complain that it is very difficult to deal with those students, as many are extremely rebellious and also do not do well in their studies. Thus, the issue of adolescent delinquency has become a big problem. It is hence one of the big social concerns regarding the future generations of the Joseonjok community. Human Rights Watch, Denied Status, Denied Education: Chilren of North Korean Women in China (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008). 61 62 Jinhai Piao, and Zheng Xiaoxin (朴今海，郑小 Joseonjok Children in Yanbian ( Journal ( 边大学学 ), "Problems of Education for the Left-Behind 边地区朝鲜族留守儿童的教育 ) 42, no. 1 (2009): p. 103. 249 监 问题)," Yanbian University To summarize, as predicted by our theory that if the external kin of an ethnic group is more well-off, the former is likely to become the goal of aspiration, and makes the latter more likely to feel dissatisfied with their current economic conditions. As we have seen in the ―Korean Wave‖ from South Korea, the disparity between China and South Korea is one crucial reason for the Joseonjok to feel lacking of material comfort, so that they seek whatever means they can find to improve the whole community‘s welfare. The ―Korean Wave‖ thus has given the Joseonjok in China a golden opportunity to make a fortune through either migration to South Korea or working in big cities in China for South Korean businesses. Through their hard work, the Joseonjok community overall has benefited greatly in material means. The vibrant South Korean culture and the import of cultural products into China have in another way provided a venue for the Joseonjok to keep alive their culture and language. That said, there are also negative side effects, as we have seen how the ―Korean Wave‖ and the subsequent mass-migration of the Joseonjok people have led to a serious population decline in their traditionally concentrated areas. The decline of the Joseonjok population in the officially designated autonomous areas thus threatens the continuation of autonomy policies in language and cultural reproduction. Furthermore, the gendered migration and the separation of families as a result of migration also have caused great pain for the whole community. The Other “Korean Wave” As a consequence of the geopolitical configuration of the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War, the Joseonjok in China have two independent external kin states – the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (North 250 Korea) – that are drastically different from and strongly hostile towards one another. Before the 1990s, similar revolutionary experiences and communist political system between PRC and DPRK meant that the Joseonjok people were more in touch with their external kin in DPRK, especially considering the fact that the most people in Yanbian came originally from the north of the Korean Peninsula, and many even still have relatives there. However, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, the Joseonjok community has been dramatically affected by the socalled ―Korean Wave‖ from the latter. We can also talk about a different ―Korean Wave‖ and its impact on the Joseonjok community – that is the flood of North Korean refugees into China since the mid 1990s. Interactions with these North Korean refuges have in their own way affected Joseonjok‘s view of the plight of their other external kin and the dismal situation in North Korea. While China‘s economy has been developing rapidly since the early 1980s, North Korea‘s economy has gotten into serious trouble. The gap between the two is increasing and demonstrates striking contrast in terms of living standards.63 At the same time, since the mid 1990s, catastrophic floods and famine in North Korea have led to a humanitarian catastrophe and pushed many impoverished North Koreans to cross the Yalu and Tumen rivers into China to seek food and shelter. The exact number of North Korean refugees in China today is hard to come by, but the modest estimates put it at about 100,000 from 2001 to 2003.64 Most of these refugees came to China for economic reasons. However, 63 For a good account of the contrast of living standards between China and North Korea along the SinoNorth Korean border, see Andrei Lankov, "Two Countries, Two Systems, One Porous Border," Asia Times, August 14, 2007, accessible at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IH14Ad01.html. 64 Andrei, Lankov, "North Korean Refugees in Northeast Asia," Asian Survey 44, no. 6 (2004). 251 they face the prospect of imprisonment if deported back to North Korea.65 Many of these refugees, at least when they first came to China, received support from the Joseonjok, and many also stayed within the Joseonjok community. Also, because of the lack of brides for Joseonjok men, many North Korean women became the alternative for the local men to get married, which in many instances also increased human trafficking of North Korean women.66 It was impossible for me to get access to North Korean refugees when I was in Yanbian, so I will not be able to directly present a story from the North Korean perspective. Here I would instead use a testimony by Refugee International (RI) to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the economic differences between North Korea and China: ―What is especially shattering for North Koreans is the contrast between their life of misery and the life enjoyed by Chinese of Korean ethnicity across the narrow border. The Tumen River, which marks the northernmost part of the border between North Korea and China, is no wider than 100 yards and shallow enough to walk across in certain spots in summer. Yet it marks an Amazonian divide in living standards and economic freedom. When RI asked a 35-year-old North Korean man who had arrived in China just three days earlier his initial impression of China, his eyes welled up. He bowed his head and he began sobbing. The stunning contrast between his life of fear and deprivation in North Korea and the relative wealth he found on the other hand of the 65 Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, "Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidences from China," in Working Paper Series 08-4 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008). 66 Lankov, "North Korean Refugees in Northeast Asia," p. 860. 252 Tumen River was shattering. Even refugees who had been in China longer could not help expressing their gratitude and amazement that in China they ate rice three times a day.‖67 The impression of the North Korean refugees about the contrast in living standards between North Korea and China had also informed the Joseonjoks in Yanbian concerning what is going on in North Korea. In addition, many Joseonjok people travel back and forth from North Korea, either visiting relatives or doing small trade. Thus, people in general are quite aware of the conditions in North Korea. An old woman I interviewed in Yanbian, who I would call grandma Li, told me that her brother still lives in North Korea. Grandma Li‘s family migrated to China during the 1930s and settled down in Wangqing, a county of Yanbian. During the Korean War, her elder brother joined the People‘s Volunteer Army and went to North Korea to fight the Americans. After the Korean War, her brother decided to stay in North Korea to help with construction of the new DPRK. They have been separated ever since. These days grandma Li‘s brother usually comes and visits her every three years, although he can only come to China with letters of invitation and cannot legally reside in China. Every time he came, she would give him money and other gifts to bring back to North Korea. She said although her brother was a government official, the situation was still quite bad for him and his family. Now he regretted that he made the decision to stay in North Korea at the time, but there is no way he can reclaim his Chinese citizenship. The only way grandma Li can help is give him money within her means. The impact of this ―North Korean Wave‖ of refugees on the Joeonjok community is certainly not as significant as the wave from South Korea. Through intensive United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Korean Refugees in China: The Current Situation and Strategies for Protection, Testimony by Refugees International, November 4, 2003. 67 253 interaction with these North Korean refugees, as well as through their relatives, Joseonjok people get updated information on the horrible conditions in North Korea, which leads to their changing views on the North Korean regime as well as towards China. In general, the Joseonjok people in Yanbian now hold ambiguous views towards North Korea. On one hand, people sympathize with the North Koreans, and they see from them images of their own past. On the other, people also show contempt and frustration with the North Korean regime and lament its stubbornness against economic reforms along the Chinese style.68 Their negative views of North Korea subsequently have informed Joseonjok‘s perceptions of life in China. As one of my Joseonjok informants puts it, ―yes it is true that China is not as rich as South Korea, but surely we are much better than North Korea.‖ Interaction and Perception of the External Kin The two ―Korean Waves,‖ and in particular the one from South Korea, have had a great impact on Joseonjok society. The economic prosperity in South Korea and the opportunities made available by South Korean capital and business have propelled the Joseonjok to reap the benefits provided through their kin relations. Yet at the same time, great challenges have also emerged for the Joseonjok community from mass migration out of their traditionally compact autonomous areas in Northeast China. At the same time, the Joseonjok community has also come into direct and intensified interaction with their external kin, again particularly with South Koreans. It is these intensified interactions between the two groups ironically that have made the Joseonjok realize the Andrei Lankov, ―The Gentle Decline of the ‗Third Korea‘.‖ Asia Times, August 14, 2007, accessible at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IH16Ad01.html. 68 254 differences in social and cultural characteristics that they have in contrast with the South Koreans. Indeed, more than half a century of socialization in China has left strong imprints on Joseonjok‘s social and cultural norms that are quite distinct from their external kin in their ―ancestral homeland.‖ The economic hierarchy between China and South Korea has once more put the Joseonjok in a position to be cheap labor and the underclass, which makes them susceptible to discrimination and mistreatment by the South Koreans. In addition, political barriers enforced by the South Korean government on immigration and citizenship have further alienated the Joseonjok people. Thus, in this case, the lack of support from their external kin has limited the chances for the Joseonjok to politically mobilize. All these forces together have led the Joseonjok to reevaluate their ethnic and national identity, and to make sense of their changing relationship and belonging with Korea and China. We discussed earlier that since the early 1990s tens of thousands of Joseonjok women have married into South Korea to fulfill the shortage of brides in South Korea, especially for males in rural areas and of lower social economic status. However, many if not most, of these marriages did not end on good terms. Many Joseonjok women could not tolerate the rigid patriarchal society in South Korea. Married life in South Korea did not turn out to be what they had expected. The divorce rate for these transnational marriages is reportedly very high.69 There are many instances where Joseonjok women could not tolerate their married life with South Korean men and simply ran away.70 Certainly there are many instances where Joseonjok women simply manipulated those marriages as their tickets to South Korea, as they are more interested in money or South 69 Freeman, "Forging Kinship across Borders: Paradoxes of Gender, Kinship and Nation between China and South Korea", p. 89. 70 Ibid. 255 Korean citizenship rather than conjugal relationships.71 However, one element that arguably led to these unhappy marriages, as pointed out by Freeman, is the differences in gender norms between the two groups.72 The Communist Revolution in China and its social engineering from the 1950s to 1970s have injected a powerful discourse of socialist women that emphasizes the equality of men and women in the socialist new China. The discourse that ―women hold half of the sky‖ extols women to actively participate in the workplace alongside men. The discourse mandates that, ―[i]deally, a ‗revolutionary couple‘ were ‗social activists‘ and a revolutionary husband had no right to demand that his wife stay at home all day working after his own comfort, any more than a women should desire to spend her time serving her husband.‖73 This gender discourse, even though in reality it perhaps has never been realized in its perfect form, has nonetheless informed the Joseonjok women about the ―rightful‖ relationship between husband and wife as well as between domestic life and the work place. This gender discourse which originated in socialist China is quite distinct from the one in the more traditionally patriarchal Confucian society of South Korea, whereby a model wife is one that stays at home and remains outside the formal economy.74 Because of this difference, many Joseonjok women could not adjust easily to the new and different expectations they encounter when they marry into South Korean households. Many Joseonjok women complain about the rigid hierarchy between husband and wife in South Korea, and find the subordinate role expected of them Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 122. 73 Harriet Evans, "Past, Perfect or Imperfect: Changing Images of the Ideal Wife," in Chinese Femininities , Chinese Masculinities, ed. Susan Brownwell, and Jeffery Wasserstrom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 337. 74 Freeman, "Forging Kinship across Borders: Paradoxes of Gender, Kinship and Nation between China and South Korea", p. 133. 71 72 256 unbearable. For example, Freeman reports many instances where Joseonjok women could not understand why South Korean men do not do housework and forbid their wives to work outside the home.75 Therefore, the reason that the majority of marriages between Joseonjok women and South Korean men ended in failure for many Joseonjok women was because of the differences in gender relations in such transnational families.76 The difference in general norms is only one aspect of the broader social cultural differences between the two groups. There are also significant differences in language use. The Korean language that the Joseonjok speak retains many Chinese-origined vocabularies, while the South Korean language has absorbed many English loan words. There are also differences in dialect and tones. As one of my Joseonjok informants told that the Joseonjok‘s spoken dialect is more similar to the one in North Korea and tends to have stronger tones, while South Korea‘s dialect is generally softer. These differences many times do lead to misunderstandings in communication. Furthermore, traditional South Korean society still maintains strong Confucian rituals and ethos while the Chinese Revolution has significantly done away with these traditional cultural expressions, especially during Mao‘s various political campaigns. In general, despite the claim of kinship, the intensive interactions have made the Joseonjok realize the cultural differences between them and their kin in South Korea. Economically, the hierarchy between China, as still a relatively poor developing country, and South Korea, as a prosperous developed one, has also predetermined the class differences between the two groups. For those Joseonjok working in South Korea as migrant laborers, often illegally, their experiences of working in the ―3D‖ sectors 75 76 Ibid., chapter 4. Ibid., p. 122. 257 make them easily susceptible to discrimination and mistreatment. Many Joseonjok workers in South Korea report the high levels of hardship, discrimination and mistreatment they endured in the South Korean workplace.77 This sort of discrimination certainly is not unique to South Korea. Migrant communities around the world are susceptible to discrimination from the hosting society. In China, rural migrants in cities are often subjects of contempt and ridicule by the urbanites. However, those bad experiences have in general made the Joseonjok resistant towards South Korean society. In Yanbian, many Joseonjok people told me that these days only older and less educated people go to South Korea for work, while the younger generation with a better education tends to stay in China. Young Joseonjok tend to find jobs and relocate to big cities in China where South Korean investments and businesses are concentrated, rather than going to South Korea as migrant laborers. However, even these middlemen positions taken by the Joseonjok in South Korean businesses in China have led to friction and mutual distrust between the Joseonjok and South Korean nationals, because of the different economic, social and cultural norms discussed above. Thus many South Korean businesses in China today are getting wary of hiring Joseonjok.78 Finally, the political barriers imposed by the South Korean government regarding immigration and citizenship have also made the Joseonjok further alienated from their external kin. In 1999, the South Korean government passed an Overseas Korean Act that granted special privileges to overseas Koreans with one big condition –eligibility is only 77 Min Kee Ha, "Shattering the Korean Dream: Korean Chinese Experiences in Seoul, Korea" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Biola University, 2001), p. 103. 78 Hyejin Kim, "International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Ethnic Trust and Its Demise among Koreans in China" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - Newark, 2006), p. 19. 258 open to former South Korean nationals who are now citizens of foreign countries.79 However, because South Korea was founded in 1948, and because most Joseonjok migrated from the Korean Peninsula to China before that time, Joseonjok were effectively excluded from the benefits of this Overseas Korean Act.80 Thus, for example, most Korean Americans who migrated to the US after 1948 are eligible for the overseas Korean F-4 visa, which allowed for multiple entries and granted holders rights ―nearly on par with South Korean citizens including access to medical care, the right to buy and sell real estate, and working legally.‖81 For Joseonjok, these privileges are nonetheless deprived. Because the Joseonjok are from a poor country such as China, they were put under the hierarchy of South Korea‘s definition of nationhood that preferred ethnic Koreans in the West over ethnic Koreans in poor countries such as China and the postSoviet countries.82 After complaints and protests from the Joseonjok community in South Korea, in 2004 a revised act was adopted with a slightly more expansive definition, yet the implication for the Joseonjok still remains the same.83 The South Korean state, in its nation-building process, effectively shut out the Joseonjok from the South Korean nation. This lack of support and the push from South Korea have left the Joseonjok with only one option –Chinese citizenship. In order to assess the Joseonjok‘s perception of their ethnic and national identity as well as their external kin relations, I ditributed questionnaires among 96 Joseonjok 79 Lee, "Bitter-Sweet Homecoming: Ethnic Identity Construction in the Korean Diaspora", p. 77. John D. Skrentny, Stephanie Chan, Fon Fox, and Denis Kim, "Defining Nations in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Return Migration Policy," International Migration Review 41, no. 4 (2007): p. 800. 81 Lee, "Bitter-Sweet Homecoming: Ethnic Identity Construction in the Korean Diaspora", p. 76. 82 Dong-Hoon Seol, and John D. Skrentny, "Ethnic Return Migration and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea," Ethnicities 9, no. 2 (2009): p. 157. 83 Jaeeum Kim, "Incorporating the ‗Nation Abroad‘: The Politics of Membership in South Korea," accessible at www.yale.edu/scr/kim.doc. 80 259 people in two communities in Hunchun city of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.84 According to the responses in the questionnaire, 64 percent of respondents had relatives in North Korea, and 38 per cent reported having relatives in South Korea. Also, 51 percent of the respondents had been to either North or South Korea. Furthermore, 84 percent of respondents said that they had relatives currently working in South Korea. The high percentages in these responses demonstrate the intensity of the relationship between the Joseonjok community and their external kin. At the same time, the Joseonjok respondents also showed strong identification as Joseonjok and Chinese citizens. 98 percent of the respondents consider themselves Chinese citizens. Also, when asked whether they would support China or North Korea and South Korea in a national soccer game, the overwhelming majority, 89 percent, reported that they would support China, instead of their external kin countries. Furthermore, 18 percent identifed themselves as Joseonjok first, 33 identified themselves as Chinese citizens first, and 49 percent thought these identifications are the same. This shows that for the majority of Joseonjok in the questionnaire, the sense of being Chinese citizens was strong, and most people thought of being Joseonjok and being Chinese citizen as compatible. Thus, we can argue that Joseonjok people recognized their ethnic identification but also accepted it as being part of the Chinese nation (in a civic sense). In the questionnaire, the majority of people consider that the best future for their children would be in China, a total of 95 percent. 47 percent of the respondents hoped their children would stay in Yanbian, while another 48 percent wanted their children to go to big cities in China. Only 3 percent 84 The two communities were identified, and access to them facilitated, by a research connection that I established in Yanbian. Therefore, the selection of these two communities was not random. 260 wanted their children to go to South Korea. See Table 6.5 for a list of questions and responses. In order to assess what factors shape people‘s propensity for hoping the future for their children to be either in Yanbian or in big cities in China, I did a logit analysis, using a binominal variable (0 for staying Yanbian, and 1 for going to big cities in China) as my dependent variable. Independent variables include the respondents‘ logged annual income, their levels of education, their self identifications (whether as Joseonjok first or Chinese citizen first), while controlling a set of variables about their external kin relations. As consistent with our discussions above, people with more education and who are more economically well-off tend to think the future for their children would lie in the big cities in China. See Table 6.6 for the reported statistics. Also it is interesting that people who have relatives in South Korea or who themselves want to work in South Korea tend to prefer big cities in China for their children to settle rather than Yanbian. One possible explanation for these correlations might be that South Korea is a place to make a quick fortune so that people can provide for their children a better future in big cities in China. This corresponds to my interview feedbacks that most people nowadays only consider South Korea a place to make money rather than a place to live. In the questionnaire I also asked people to compare China with both North Korea and South Korea with open-ended responses. Almost nobody considered North Korea good in any respect, and only a few thought it was easier for men to find wives in North Korea. This illustrates the daunting problem for Joseonjok men of finding suitable brides in China. For comparisons with South Korea, people mostly acknowledged the high economic development in South Korea, and reported South Korea cleaner and more 261 civilized than China. However, people also tended to note that life was easier in China as food was cheaper and more plentiful. Also many people thought China was a bigger country with more resources, and there were diverse ethnic groups and cultures, which they consider as an advantage. 262 Table 6.5 Joseonjok's Opinions on Citizenship and Kinship Frequency Percentage Do you have relatives in North Korea? Yes 61 64% No 34 36% Do you have relatives in South Korea? Yes 35 38% No 57 62% Have you been to Korea? Yes 47 51% No 46 49% Do you have relatives working in South Korea? Yes 80 84% No 15 16% Do you have relatives working in big cities in China? Yes 48 51% No 47 49% Do you think you are a Chinese citizen (Zhongguoren)? Yes 94 98% No 2 2% Do you think you are Joseonjok first or Chinese citizen first? Joseonjok 16 18% The same 44 49% Chinese citizen 30 33% If China competed with both North and South Korea in soccer, which team would you support? China 85 89% North Korea and South Korea 3 3% Both 7 7% Where do you hope your children will settle, if you have any? Yanbian 43 47% Big cities in China 44 48% South Korea 3 3% Other countries 2 2% 263 Table 6.6 Logit Analysis of Joseonjok's Future: Yanbian or Big Cities in China Independent Variables Log Income Education Relative in South Korea Relative in North Korea Been to Korea Self Identification Want to go to South Korea to work Relative working in South Korea Relative working in big cities in China Autonomy for Joseonjok in China Constant Number of Observations Pseudo R-square Coefficient 2.2** 1.8*** -2.8** -0.2 1.5 -0.3 3.0** 1.3 1.4 0.5 -29.1*** 66 0.48 Standard Error 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.7 9.6 P Value 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.804 0.135 0.836 0.022 0.219 0.141 0.51 0.002 Conclusion In one significant way the Joseonjok are different from other ethnic groups in China; they are a relatively recent immigrant group, in contrast to most other ethnic groups who can claim indigenous status in the land their inhabit. Most Joseonjok today can still trace their ancestors to the Korean Peninsula, and many indeed still have relatives living in either North or South Korea. However, despite their recent immigrant status in China, they participated actively in the Chinese revolution and became enthusiast supporters of the Chinese Communist Party in its various war campaigns and political movements. Joseonjok were extolled as a model ethnic group and rewarded with significant latitude for keeping their political and cultural autonomy. Therefore, in the Joseonjok case, we can argue that its status as an immigration group perhaps limits the chance for the group to claim legitimate control of the land they currently inhabit in China. Furthermore, its early and enthusiastic participation in the CCP has also made the party to review the 264 group more positively, which subsequently influenced how the party‘s ―rewarding‖ policies towards the Joseonjok. Other than these domestic explanations, we have also seen in the Joseonjok case an ethnic group with extensive external kin relation, and the Joseonjok community is closely tied to the changes happening in its kin states. South Korea‘s economy soared to the status of a developed country while North Korea remains in political and economic mayhem. Joseonjok has also come under significant pressure and incentive to reassess its relationship with its external kin. With the arrival of the ―Korean Wave‖ from South Korea, many Joseonjok people have chosen to emigrate to South Korea to seek their fortune. Many others have opted to migrate to big cities in China to benefit from the growing South Korean investment and business there. Yet this mass migration has also signaled the possibility of fragmentation of the previously compact Joseonjok community. The economic calculation among the Joseonjok is indeed a powerful indicator of how people re-evaluate their ethnic and national belonging. For many, the prospect of going to South Korea and making money is a strong incentive. Therefore, tens of thousands of people migrated to South Korea as cheap labor and stayed there, often illegally. In the meantime, many Joseonjok women also use marriage as their tickets to gain access to that economically well-off country. On the other hand, in comparison with impoverished North Korea, many Joseonjok also appreciate their lives in China as decent, especially in the context of waves of North Korean refugees flooding into Northeast China. In such a complex web of interactions and comparisons with their external kin, many Joseonjok who remain in China start to re-evaluate the relationship between China 265 as their host country and both Koreas as their ancestral land. There have been several powerful discourses circulating among the Joseonjok to make sense of this relationship. One is to treat both Koreas as their motherland (故 ), and China as their fatherland (祖 ). There is also an analogy in comparing Joseonjok to a Confucian family relationship, saying that Joseonjok is like a daughter marrying into China. Thus it is natural for her to have emotional ties to her maternal family – both Koreas, but she should also show allegiance towards the new family that she marries into – that is China.85 These discourses indicate how the Joseonjok community is negotiating its ethnic identity and its national belonging. Thus, the Joseonjok case demonstrates the validity of our theoretical framework identified in Chapter Two. As a group with economically superior external kin, yet without explicit support, the dominant strategy for the group is to seek emigration and to reap economic benefits from such a kinship relation. Certainly there are nuances and complexities involved such as the interaction between the ethnic group and its external kin but overall it is quite clear that the economically superior external kin can wield significant attracting force for its less well-off kin. The disparity between the host state and the external kin state certainly has made the Joseonjok dissatisfied with their current economic conditions in China. Yet without much political support from South Korea, the issue has not been politicized. Instead, most Joseonjok people have chosen out-bound migration from their traditionally compact communities, and in this process we have 85 Li, "Studies on Chinese Joseonjok‘s Self-Identification (中 266 朝鲜族的认同意识研究)", pp. 102-03. observed the constant negotiation of their ethnic and national identity – as being ethnically Korean and nationally Chinese. 267 Chapter Seven Conclusion This dissertation started with two puzzles: one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical puzzle asks why some ethnic groups are politically mobilized for more autonomy while others are not. In the empirical case of China, there are discrepancies among various ethnic minority groups in terms of political strategies that they adopt towards the Chinese state. Some seek overtly to gain more autonomy or even independence from the Chinese state, some others choose to assimilate instead, and still others are more ambivalent and adopt strategies between these two poles. This dissertation advances an argument that we should take into account the role of ethnic groups‘ external kin in explaining such strategy discrepancies. This conclusion chapter starts with a brief summary of the argument of the dissertation. In addition, in order to see the generalizability of my argument outside the China context, this chapter also uses the Minority At Risk (MAR) dataset from 19501995 to test the key hypothesis: Ethnic minority groups are more likely to mobilize if their external kin enjoy higher levels of economic development than the minority group. Following the generalizability test, this chapter lays out this dissertation‘s theoretical contribution. It ends with a brief discussion of policy recommendations and possible future research. 268 Summary of Arguments Adopting an approach that treats ethnicity as a category and looks at inter-ethnic relations in a triadic model, this dissertation argues that the interplay between both domestic and external forces are crucial in the construction and maintenance of ethnic group boundaries. In a situation where an ethnic group perceives that its external kin enjoy higher living conditions and life opportunities, this group is more likely to feel grieved about its membership within the current state union, and is more likely to align with its external kin and differentiate itself from the state where the group currently resides. In this situation, if an external patron (or patrons) is willing to offer both material and ideological support, we expect this group to be more likely to politically mobilize for more autonomy. If no such support is available, group members would have no alternative but to emigrate or adjust to conditions within the current state. On the other hand, when the ethnic group‘s external kin have worse living conditions, two scenarios are predicted. One is when external kin does offer support despite its lack of economic appeal; here the minority group might take advantage of this support to maintain some cultural autonomy but would be less willing to sacrifice the current better living conditions to mobilize politically. Finally, if neither condition is present, the ethnic group is likely to either keep the current status quo or simply join the tide of assimilation into the politically, economically and culturally dominant majority group. This dissertation examines in detail four big ethnic minority groups in China: the Uighurs in Xinjiang, Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Ethnic Koreans (Joseonjok) in Yanbian, and the Dais in Xishuangbanna. The Uighur case represents the prototype of active political mobilization for more autonomy from the Chinese state, and its recent 269 history has been marred with sporadic eruptions of inter-ethnic violence against the majority Han Chinese. As this dissertation demonstrates, other than domestic factors, international factors have to been included for a satisfactory explanation of the Uighurs‘ political mobilization. Chapter Three argues that, for the Uighur people, nationalist movements were tied deeply to similar ones in Central Asia in the late 19th century. In the 20th century, it was the Soviet Union—followed by the independent Central Asian Republics—and Turkey that have provided a modern and much more advanced alternative model of development than has China. For the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, the dominant strategy is trying to maintain some cultural autonomy, though linguistic and cultural assimilation is gaining speed. Chapter Four points out that the independent country of Mongolia has not been able to present a strong and appealing model for the Mongols in China. Thus, despite the existence of some fringe groups claiming to politically mobilize the Mongols, the Mongol mass have not responded in the same way as the Uighurs. Similar to the Mongols, the Dai in Xishuangbanna, as shown in Chapter Five, have also gained further incorporation into the Chinese body politic, while making any talks for autonomy purely within cultural domains. The political and economic chaos in neighboring countries of Burma and Laos has made the Dai realize the benefit of being a Chinese citizen, thus strengthening their aspiration for assimilation. Finally, the ethnic Korean – Joseonjok discussed in Chapter Six, because of the strong economic appeal of South Korea, have emigrated out in large droves to either South Korea or major Chinese cities where South Korean investments are concentrated. Yet, because of the lack of support and their suffering discrimination from the South Koreans, many Joseonjok 270 people have developed ambivalent views about the relationship between their ancestral homeland – Korea and their current host state – China. In chapter Two, I presented a theoretical model of four scenarios of what political strategies ethnic groups would adopt under various configurations if external kin were doing well and being supportive (See Table 7.1). For the four ethnic minority groups in China that are covered in this dissertation, certainly we need to acknowledge the complexities and ambiguities in different groups‘ strategies, and indeed many times groups do adopt bifurcated strategies. Overall, the Uighurs fit the first scenario of political mobilization for more autonomy. For the Joseonjok, a big percentage of its population indeed have pursued emigration to South Korea, but there are many who decide to stay in China and seek some cultural autonomy. On the other hand, the Mongols and Dai have not shown significant inclination to mobilize politically or emigrate. Instead, both groups‘ efforts have been to keep some cultural autonomy yet also to assimilate into the majority Han Chinese society. Throughout the case studies, this dissertation has tried to present a holistic view of these four groups, and has shown how external forces have provided different incentives for each group. Thus, our theoretical model has guided our empirical inquiry, and has contributed to a better understanding of these four cases of ethnic groups‘ changing relationships with the Chinese state. It is nevertheless necessary to emphasize that the main argument put forward in this dissertation is not to be read as the causal explanation for the divergence of group behavior. The particular attention focused on the external forces is not equal to a dismissal of domestic factors. As I noted in the Introduction Chapter, the nature of the 271 theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation is a catalystic one. It means the comparative framework between the ethnic minority group and its external kin would either intensify or diminish the propensity for the ethnic minority group to feel grievance and mobilize politically. It thus does not deny the multiple factors that lead to the construction of group grievances. Throughout the dissertation, various domestic factors, such as the Chinese state‘s repression of these groups throughout the years, and group specific variables, such as religion, group concention, and demographic changes, have all been discussed in detail. What this dissertation has done is its presentation of an angle of inquiry that has not been taken up in studies on ethnic politics in China. The purpose of this dissertation is thus not to refute the validity of competing arguments, but rather to highlight an alternative level of analysis that should be combined with existing explanations. Table 7.1 Predictions for Ethnic Minority Group Strategies External Kin Support No External Kin Support External Kin Enjoys Political Mobilization for Emigration (Joseonjok) Better Living More Autonomy Conditions (Uighurs) External Kin Enjoys Cultural Autonomy Worse Living Status Quo/Assimilation (Dai/Joseonjok/Mongols) Conditions 272 Generalizability Test1 The four case studies in this dissertation have demonstrated the general validity of our theoretical framework in the Chinese context. It is desirable to see how far this argument travels outside of China, and whether we can derive a general pattern for ethnic group mobilization around the world. To that end, a generaliability test using the Minority At Risk Dataset is included here. The main hypothesis for our statistical testing is: An ethnic group is more likely to mobilize if their external kin enjoys higher levels of economic development than the minority group.2 A between-effect estimation3 for a panel data including 221 politically active groups around the world from 1950 to 1995 is presented below.4 For this generalizability test, I would like to thank Joseph O‘Mahoney for his generous contribution. It is part of our co-authored paper, which we presented both at the International Studies Association 2010 Annual Conference in New Orleans and at the Midwest Political Science Association 2010 Annual Conference in Chicago. See Enze Han, and Joseph O‘Mahoney, "Keeping up with the Jones‘: The Role of Constructed Economic Interests in Ethnic Group Mobilization," (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2010). Permission for the inclusion of the generalizability test in this dissertation is granted by O‘Mahoney. 2 Since in this particular testing, we are only interested in how our main theoretical arugment travels, only the main hypothesis is included in the main text. The other variables are mainly included for the purpose of controls, thus the relavant hypotheses are listed only in the footnotes. 3 By ―between-effect estimation,‖ we mean estimation of ―between-cluster‖ effects. This is because we are interested in differences in average levels across groups. This is one of the effects that Bartels identifies as something potentially ignored in other estimation techniques. Only estimating between-cluster effects has drawbacks. The effects estimated are relatively coarse-grained, and we cannot say whether a future decrease in disparity might lessen the potential for rebellion. In terms of assessing the generalizability of the idea that the comparison of external kin income with one's own can be an important source of grievance or a strategic resource used by minority elites, the link between average disparity in PGDP and average level of rebellion can only be suggestive. However, we can get such a suggestion from the estimation of between cluster effects.3 Estimating between cluster effects is equivalent to taking the mean of each variable for each case across time and running a regression on the collapsed dataset of means. This does mean a small loss of information. Given the coarse-grained nature of the available data, this does not invalidate the findings. There are also benefits. Even though the original dependent variable is ordinal, the mean group rebellion score is an interval variable. This means that any concerns with using linear regression rather than a non-linear procedure are vitiated. Also, interpretation of the coefficients is relatively simple and intuitive. See Brandon Bartels, "Beyond ‗Fixed Versus Random Effects‘: A Framework for Improving Substantive and Statistical Analysis of Panel, Time-Series Cross-Sectional, and Multilevel Data," (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2010). 4 MAR has observations on this variable from 1945-1995. However, the Penn World Table GDP data only has observations from 1950 onwards so we have 46 years of data. 1 273 Operationalizing Economic Disparity Since our theoretical framework centers on the economic disparity between the ethnic minority group and its external kin, we use per capita gross domestic product (PGDP) in order to construct a measure of economic disparity between the host country, i.e. the country in which the ethnic minority group resides, and the kin country, i.e. the country in which the external kindred group is. Since we are interested only in ethnic groups having external kin relations, groups that do not have such relations are dropped from the dataset.5 The key independent variable was generated by subtracting the logarithm of the host state's PGDP from the logarithm of the kin state's PGDP (this is equivalent to logging the ratio), using figures taken from the Penn World Table (Heston et al 2009). We took the natural logarithm of the PGDP variables in order to narrow the range of the variable, making our estimate less sensitive to extreme observations. PGDP disparity = log(Kin state PGDP) – log(Host state PGDP) So, the higher the value of the variable, the richer the kin state relative to the host state. 5 The kin country for the ethnic minority group is identified by using MAR variable GC10B, which is the country where the largest kindred group for the ethnic group resides. This measure is imperfect to say the least. The social construction of meaning, framing dynamics, and the mobilization of political issues by political entrepreneurs are all contingent and not necessarily linked to raw measures of PGDP. Also, average PGDP may not capture idiosyncratic features of national income distribution. Income data broken down by minority/majority group is not available. However, one reason to value using aggregate state GDP figures is that people's sense of economic well-being is plausibly a function of the general economic opportunities available to them. There are issues with measurement error. Given the definition of the disparity variable, there is potential for biased estimates of the coefficients if the self-perceived economic well-being of the minority groups are systematically overestimated by using aggregate host country per capita GDP as a proxy. In this case, the coefficients are biased upwards; that is, we would overestimate the magnitude of the coefficients. Using kin state GDP when kin groups are always poorer than the state in which they reside results in an underestimation of coefficient magnitude. Without more fine-grained data, there is no way to determine the overall bias of the estimates in this paper. Of course, measurement error in the independent variables generally results in attenuation bias, an underestimation of the coefficients. See Jeffrey M Wooldrige, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Pantal Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. 75. 274 Other Variables The dependent variable used in the test is the extent of rebellious activity participated in by a group. There are two sets of control variables, one representing potential factors underlying traditional grievance-based arguments, the other representing factors that might affect the opportunities groups have to participate in rebellion.6 One potential generator of grievance is difference between minority and majority groups.7 MAR includes several measures of difference between the minority group and the majority group in the same country. We include the scaled composite indices for political, ethnic, and economic differences.8 We also included a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the group has been historically autonomous.9 For our variables on group opportunity for mobilization, we include in our model the following three variables – group concentration, rough terrain and oil. The group 6 The grievance versus opportunity control variables are commonly used in studies on ethnic mobilization. For example, see Jenne et al, "Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization"; Walter, "Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede." 7 There is a set of approaches that focuses squarely on an ethnic group‘s grievance construction as the motivations for mobilization and rebellion. The key explanatory variables are the injustices and inequalities within a given society that feed into an ethnic group‘s discontent. For example, see Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).. 8 All three variables are from the MAR dataset. The political difference variable (POLDIFXX) measures the differentials in political status and positions between the minority group and the majority group in a given society. The ethnic Difference variable (ETHDIFXX) measures the ethnic differences, including language, custom, belief, and race, between the minority group and the majority group. The economic difference variable (ECDIFXX) measures the differentials in economic status and positions between the minority group and the majority group. The hypothesis is that an ethnic group is more likely to mobilize for more autonomy if the political, ethnic, and economic differentials between itself and the majority group are bigger. 9 An ethnic minority‘s grievance within the current state can also be dependent on whether the group has historically been autonomous or independent. For a group that historically enjoyed its own freedom, it is presumably more difficult for group members to make sense of the current domination by others, which certainly foments grievance and demand for greater autonomy. Alternatively, autonomous structure might also provide resources for groups to overcome the collective action problem. For example, see Svante E Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus - Cases in Georgia (Uppasala: Uppasala University, 2001). The hypothesis here is that for an ethnic group that is historically autonomous, it is more likely for the group to mobilize for more autonomy. 275 concentration variable measures how geographically an ethnic group is concentrated.10 This variable only takes on four values and it is plausible that the changes from one level to another are not consistent or even in the same direction.11 We also included two variables on rough terrain and oil, which are both from Fearon and Laitin‘s piece on civil war.12 The variable rough terrain measures the amount of mountainous terrain in a country, which could be used as a base of operations.13 The oil variable on the other hand indicates whether a country is an oil-rich country or not.14 Other than these variables, we also include a variable that measures the political status of the external kindred groups.15 Finally, we use a measure of democracy from the Polity IV project (polity2) and include both a measure of the host country's polity score and a measure of the difference between the host and the state of the external kin. Results First, we estimated a simple bivariate model, regressing rebellion on the disparity between host and kin state PGDP.16 In this simple model, the coefficient on disparity is 10 This is a factor that has been noticed by scholars that is supposed to correlate strongly with group mobilization. The argument is that groups that are geographically concentrated enjoy higher levels of political, social and economic self-sufficiency. See Jenne et al, "Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization," p. 542. Also, it is much easier for such groups to justify their claims for independence based on ethnic homogeneity. See Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. The hypothesis here is that an ethnic group is more likely to mobilize for more autonomy if it enjoys higher group concentration. 11 As a result, we did not treat the group concentration variable as an ordinal one. When included in a model, group concentration was disaggregated into dummy variables to account for this. 12 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 1 (2003). Data for these two variables are downloaded from James Fearon‘s website, accessible at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/. 13 The hypothesis here is that an ethnic group is more likely to mobilize for more autonomy if it is located in a country with mountainous terrain. 14 The hypothesis regarding oil is that an ethnic group is more likely to mobilize for more autonomy if it is located in a country with rich oil resources. 15 This variable indicates the extent of political status the external kin group enjoys, whether it dominate the ruling coalition, part of the ruling coalition, or outside of the ruling coalition. 16 While it may seem at first that bivariate results are open to confounding by omitted variables, observational data are always open to omitted variable bias and there are benefits to interpretation with simple models. Also, there are practical ramifications of a bivariate model. Given the aim of establishing 276 0.39 and is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (p < 0.01). So, as average levels of disparity increase, average levels of rebellion also increase. Specifically, for each 0.01 increase in average disparity, the average level of rebellion increases by 0.0039 (rebellion is measured on an 8 point scale, 0-7). This effect does not appear to be a large effect at levels of a 1 per cent marginal change, but at larger levels of disparity increase, the change in average rebellion score seems more substantial. The difference between the predicted rebellion score for a group whose average disparity is 0 (i.e. the PGDP is the same for the kin and host state) and that for a group whose log average disparity is 0.69 (i.e. the kin state PGDP is double that of the host state) is 0.27. It means that in situations where an ethnic group‘s external kin‘s PGDP is double that of the host state, the predicted ethnic group‘s rebellious activity is to increase 0.27 on a scale from 0 to 7. Given the prominence of the group concentration hypothesis, we controlled for group concentration for the rest models. The coefficient on disparity increased (0.45) and remained significant. Even holding group concentration constant, increased average disparity is associated with increased average rebellion. In order to assess the sensitivity of this result, we included the control variables in two blocks. First, we control for other measures of grievance; political, ethnic, and economic differences, and historical autonomy. The coefficient on disparity decreased to 0.25, becoming less significant (p = 0.061). However, this is still evidence that, even after controlling for several other measures of grievance, those minorities living in poorer the extent of the potential for using material kin-group disparity for political mobilization of minority groups, a bivariate model establishes the ease of identifying the relationship. If the coefficient on disparity was not significant at the bivariate level but was significant once we control for group concentration, that disparity is correlated with rebellion but only for different levels of concentration, not in general. The bivariate findings are thus important because the relationship holds even before other factors are taken into account. 277 countries than their kin group have a higher average level of rebellious activity than those who live in richer countries than their kin group. Second, we controlled for the measures of opportunity; terrain, oil, kindred dispersion, and polity score. In this model, the coefficient on disparity was almost 0.3 and was significant at the 5 per cent level (p=0.044). Finally, we estimated a full model, including both the measures of grievance and the measures of opportunity, as well as the difference in polity scores between the kin and host state. In this full model, the coefficient on disparity was comparable to previous models, 0.29, and was close to the 0.05 level of statistical significance (p=0.053). The results are reported in Table 7.2. The control variables were not all supported by these results. The prominence of the group concentration hypothesis was reproduced with significant and relatively large positive coefficients. A change from widely dispersed to urban concentration was negative but insignificant but changes to a regional majority or full concentration in one region increased the average rebellion score by approximately a full point in all models. Another significant relationship displayed in these results was that between the political power of kin groups and the dependent variable. The more power held by the kindred group, the lower the average rebellion score, for every increase in kin group power, by up to 1.5 rebellion score points.17 Political difference between the minority and majority groups increased the average rebellion score but the more democratic the host state the less likely a minority group was to rebel. Other variables were insignificant. Of the grievance-related variables, ethnic and economic differences, historical autonomy, and the difference in democracy between host and kin state, did not increase the average 17 One tentative hypothesis is that it is possible that the more powerful the kin group, the more outlets there are for migration or political activity in the kin state. 278 rebellion score in these models. The opportunity variables of terrain and the role of oil in state revenue also had no impact on the dependent variable. Table 7.2 Table of Coefficients Bivariate Grievance Opportunity b/se b/se b/se Disparity 0.394*** 0.251* 0.298** (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) Group Urban or Minority in Region -0.213 -0.083 (0.35) (0.40) Group Majority in Region 1.046*** 1.201*** (0.33) (0.39) Group Concentrated in One Region 0.891*** 1.109*** (0.28) (0.33) Economic Difference -0.008 (0.06) Political Difference 0.197 (0.07) Ethnic Difference -0.037 (0.04) Historical Autonomy 0.281 (0.26) Terrain 0.096 (0.09) Oil -0.413 (0.33) Kin Outside of Political Coalition -0.775** (0.37) Kin in Ruling Coalition -1.555*** (0.41) Kin Dominate State Coalition -0.76** (0.38) Host Polity -0.033* (0.02) Polity Difference Constant Observations Groups R-Squared *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 1.107*** (0.12) 5563 221 0.116 279 0.182 (0.31) 5234 220 0.1663 0.875* (0.51) 5126 192 0.2279 Full Model b/se 0.292* (0.15) -0.016 (0.39) 1.077*** (0.39) 0.914*** (0.33) -0.002 (0.07) 0.191 (0.08) -0.026 (0.04) 0.055 (0.28) 0.04 (0.09) -0.083 (0.32) -0.624* (0.35) -1.275*** (0.39) -0.889** (0.37) -0.048** (0.02) -0.024 (0.02) 0.744 (0.55) 4698 172 0.2819 Discussion These statistical results indicate that there may be a correlation between the disparity of kin-group country per capita GDP to host country per capita GDP and the level of rebellious activity experienced by the host country. It thus demonstrates the theoretical framework identified in this dissertation might have generalizability for ethnic groups with external kins around the world. Having said that, we also admit the limit and the coarse-grained nature of our analysis. First is about the use of the Minority At Risk Dataset. As a dataset that focuses on the groups that have already been mobilizing, all other groups that have not been politically active have effectively been excluded from our analysis. Thus, methodologically our analysis has selected cases purely on the dependent variable.18 Second, when we measure economic disparity between an ethnic group and their external kin, we use data on the host country as the measurement unit for comparison with that ethnic group‘s external kin. Due to the inability of economic data to focus purely on the ethnic group level, our measurement is thus not ideal. Third, it is impossible to tell the direction of the causation simply from looking at our regression results. That is, there is a potential endogeneity problem, meaning that we can think of a plausible causal link between rebellion and economic disparity, whereby rebellion is the cause of the disparity. Given the quality of the data, this is not an issue that can be solved statistically. Instead, this issue can only be addressed through studying sequencing in case studies. 18 Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990). 280 Theoretical Contribution This dissertation has made three broad theoretical contributions. First, it follows the steps of the approach on ethnic mobilization that focuses on ethnic group‘s external kin relations.19 In particular, it points out the crucial role of an ethnic groups‘ external kin as a reference category in a comparative framework that informs the ethnic group‘s preference formation. Second, it highlights the usefulness of the ethnicity as a category approach to examine how inter-ethnic boundaries are constructed and maintained in different political, economic and social conditions.20 Finally, this dissertation also has implications for constructivist literature on political economy.21 It points out how economic interests can be constructed outside of the domestic setting. It thus questions the validity of the conventional political economy approach with its narrow focus on ―objective‖ structural economic conditions. As we discussed in Chapter Two, the triadic relationship model proposed by Brubaker looks at the interactive relationship among the ethnic minority group, its external kin, and the host state in which the ethnic minority group resides.22 The focus is usually to frame it in a bargaining model that seeks explanations of under what conditions ethnic movements would be mobilized and whether violence would break out and/or escalate.23 Signals and supports offered by external kin are particularly emphasized. The preference formation process on part of the ethnic minority group itself is not probed in Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe; Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment; Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict. 20 Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture"; Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. 21 Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism. 22 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. 23 Van Houten, "The Role of a Minority's Reference State in Ethnic Relations"; Jenne et al, "Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization." 19 281 detail. The common assumption is that an ethnic minority group is always committed to pursuing a separatist strategy from the very beginning. What this dissertation has done is to give more agency power to the ethnic minority group. It hypothesizes that an ethnic minority group has more freedom to make sense of its welfare within the current host state, and thus highlights the identity negotiation process between the ethnic group and the host state. It specifically argues that an ethnic group‘s external kin oftentimes play the role of a reference category, and that the ethnic group does compare itself with its external kin in terms of the costs and benefits of staying within the current host state. This dissertation also makes us think about why the external kin group tends to be chosen as the reference category by the ethnic minority group. On the one hand, we can engage with recent political psychology studies on ethnicity that posit how a common ethnic identity provides people a ―set of personal points of reference that locate the self in the social world.‖24 A common ethnic identity is how people make sense of the social reality, and it sets the parameter of how an ethnic group imagines itself.25 We can thus argue that in this way an ethnic group might evaluate itself and its well-being in conjunction with a comparison with its external kin, which the ethnic group deems the most appropriate reference category. In other words, an ethnic group‘s appraisal of itself is ―imagined‖ through such a relational comparison. On the other hand, this dissertation has also demonstrated the close presence of the external kin across the national border and tight networks between the ethnic minority group and its external kin. Business networks, cultural religious ties, and political organizations all provide a vibrant venue for interaction between the ethnic group and its external kin. These networks facilitate 24 25 Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity," p. 468. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. 282 the exchange of information, and provide solid ground for comparisons between kinship groups to occur and be sustained. This line of inquiry often occurs within the disciplines of anthropology, history and sociology. Thus, future research is needed in political science to systematically study those cross-border ethnic kinship ties. This dissertation has also made good use of the concept of ethnicity as a category and engages an approach that focuses on group boundaries as initiated by Fredrik Barth.26 Instead of engaging too much with the debate between the primordialists and constructivists, research on ethnicity can benefit greatly from this approach that can potentially bridge the two camps. In a recent endeavor to systematically theorize ethnic boundaries, Andreas Wimmer introduces a multilevel process theory to understand how the nature of ethnicity and its associated characteristics are generated and transformed over time and across cases.27 To Wimmer, ethnic identity in some situations might take on more primordialist characteristics as it may be solid and unchangeable. That means ethnic group boundaries can be rigid in some situations, where ethnic groups have closed themselves firmly against outsiders, as we have noticed in our study of the rigid boundaries between the Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang. Yet, in other contexts ethnic identity seems to be changeable, and group boundaries are more fluid, as we have seen in the cases of the Mongols, Koreans, and Dai in China where group boundarycrossings occur more often through intermarriage and assimilation. Wimmer points out that groups may use different ways to change the group boundary, such as through expanding the ―domain of people included in one‘s own ethnic category;‖ or ―modifying existing boundaries by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories;‖ or 26 27 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." 283 ―changing one‘s own position within a boundary system;‖ or ―emphasizing other, non ethnic forms of belonging.‖28 To Wimmer, ―[t]he definitional debates (between the primordialists and constructivists) may have diverted our efforts away from understanding why ethnicity appears in such variable forms.‖29 Instead, Wimmer argues scholars should focus on the process of how such ridigity/fluidity existing in ethnic group boundary-making comes about in various situations, and he directs attention to three sects of constraining variables, such as the institutional environment, the distribution of power, and the networks of political alliances.30 This dissertation provides four cases of ethnic groups in China, whereby group boundaries versus the majority Han Chinese are drawn in different ways and with different rigidity. The significantly rigid inter-ethnic boundary in Xinjiang between ethnic Uighurs and Han Chinese are constructed and reinforced in multiple ways. Intensified interaction with the large in-migration of Han Chinese, preferential policies, state repression, and inter-group violence, have all contributed to this rigidity of group boundary. On top of these domestic factors, the support that the Uighurs receive from their external kin in Central Asia and beyond has provided additional incentives for the Uighurs to maintain that rigid inter-group boundary. On the other hand, in the cases of the Mongols and the Joseonjok, interaction with their external kin and the subsequent rejection have subsequently pushed them away from their external kin, and make group members more likely to align with the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state. The ethnic Dai‘s relatively superior standard of living and political stability in China in the Andreas Wimmer, "Elementary Strategies of Ethnic Boundary Making," Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 6 (2008): p.1025. 29 Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory," p. 972. 30 Ibid.: p. 990. 28 284 past three decades have provided incentives for the Dai people to play down the boundary between the Dai and the Han Chinese, and yet group members still trys to prevent boundary crossing between the Dai and the other ―inferior‖ Hani in Xishuangbanna. Variations in group boundary rigidity/fluidity in these four cases are certainly based on multiple and complex forces. This dissertation, without playing down these forces, highlights the crucial role of external kin in the group boundary construction and maintenance process. This dissertation also has implications for the comparative political economy literature. Following Herrera‘s approach to constructive political economy, this dissertation also argues that economic development and group well-being are not absolute phenomena; they are embedded in different historical and social conditions.31 As a result of these contextual differences people might develop divergent interpretations and understandings of their economic interest. In particular, it indicates that economic well-being can be perceived outside the domestic setting. Our study of the economic disparity between ethnic groups and their external kin relations offers a fresh explanation for ethnic groups‘ perception of their economic interests and construction of their grievances. It thus points out the possibility that previous studies that purely look at domestic economic inequality between the majority and minority might have missed an important dimension. Future research along this line of inquiry is needed. Future Research and Policy Implications This dissertation proposes that for an ethnic group with external kin relations, its political strategy towards the majority state is conditioned upon a comparative framework 31 Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism. 285 between itself and its external kin. Through detailed analyses of four ethnic groups in China, it has demonstrated the validity of this argument, and has pointed out the diverging strategies these four groups have taken regarding their changing relationship with the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state. I would finally here like to discuss briefly what implications this dissertation has towards studies on ethnic politics in China, and offer some tentative policy recommendations for how to manage minority/majority relations in multi-ethnic societies in general. The first implication is the need to take seriously the ethnic diversity in China and the diverging relationship each ethnic minority group has with the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state. Certainly in the case of the Uighurs in Xinjiang, there are more confrontations with the Han Chinese and there are more astute aspirations for more autonomy or even independence from the Chinese state. However, we should not assume that such a tense relationship and dynamics of political mobilization exist across the board with other ethnic groups in China. Thus, if scholars interested in ethnic politics in China only look at the Uighur case, they may overlook the complexities in different groups‘ ethnic identity negotiation and their national belonging. This dissertation, due to space limits, only looks at four ethnic groups in detail. Other ethnic groups, such as the best known, the Tibetans, are not included in the study. It is indeed a misfortune; I hope I shall be able to carry out research on Tibet in the future. Meanwhile, along the line of inquiry from this dissertation, scholars are well advised to look into the dynamics among the Tibetan exile government, the Tibetans in China, and the Chinese government. The Tibetan case is further complicated by its explicit support from external patrons in the West. In other words, to fully understand 286 the Tibet issue, we have to take seriously the external element in the bargaining relationship between the Tibetans and the Han Chinese regarding the future of Tibet. Finally, the theoretical framework as laid out in this dissertation centers on political economy. Although it takes into consideration political and cultural variables, economic interest has been treated as a prime variable. This might make some readers to think of it as too economically deterministic. Acknowledging this ―bias,‖ the policy recommendations coming out of this dissertation for multiethnic societies are very simple – in order to improve minority/majority relationships, the central state has to improve the economic livelihood of its ethnic minority population. This is not to say that loyalties can be bought. Rather, this argument should be read as this: entrenched economic interdependence between the minority and the majority can greatly diffuse centrifugal political aspirations. This mirrors what liberal institutionalism preaches about the relationship between economy and politics – that is, economic integration leads to political integration.32 For example, see Robert Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1989). 32 287 Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Atwood, Christopher. 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