Historiographical Essay on the Battle of the Somme

By Joseph Coleman

The Battle of the Somme took place during the First World War between July 1 and November 18, 1916 on both sides of the river Somme in northern France. The German army managed to maintain much of its front line over the winter of 1916-1917, before withdrawing from the Somme battlefield in February 1917 to the fortified Hindenburg Line. The German army had occupied a large part of the north of France since its invasion of the country in August 1914. One of the largest battles of the war, the Battle of the Somme was also one of the bloodiest military operations ever recorded and before the fighting paused in the late autumn of 1916 had claimed more than one million casualties on the forces involved. Also known as the Somme Offensive it had been planned by the Allies, primarily designed as an Anglo-French contribution and was intended to create a breech in the German line which then could be exploited with a decisive blow. The purpose of this essay is to point out that neither the Allies nor the Central Powers were prepared or trained for modern “machine” warfare.

Military planners and military leaders for thousands of years had realized the importance of military geography to battlefield success and the planners and leaders of the Somme Offensive were no different. Historians Mathew R. Bennett and Peter Doyle published an article in March, 1997 “Military Geography: Terrain Evaluation and the British Western Front 1914-1918.”[1] In their article, Bennett and Doyle spoke of the importance of military geography on all battlefields acknowledging the paramount importance of military geography to both staff planers and field commanders.

The Somme-Flanders lowland during The Great War was associated in England and its Empire with some of the most costly battles of the war. The geography of the Somme region consisted of a rolling chalk upland and the Flanders region is more of a clay plain and occasional sand units. From the German perspective, the Flanders region represented a strategically important threshold into France from Germany without major topographic obstacles. In 1905, Chief of the German General Staff, at the time, General Count Alfred von Schlieffen postulated that the Germans, in the next war, would be opposed by both Russia and France, with limited support from Britain and it would be necessary to initiate a rapid strike into France, before turning its main forces to oppose Russia in the east. Based on this perspective Schlieffen developed a strategic plan that would bear his name. Schlieffen’s plan allowed for the loss of some territory by withdrawal, drawing the main French force into Alsace-Lorraine as a feint, while the main German thrust was to be through Belgium and Holland. The German army was to rapidly sweep over the Flanders-Somme lowland, north of the Ardennes, and pass a wide arc to the west of Paris, eventually trapping the French between two advancing German armies. However, prior to the war, Schlieffen’s plan was modified by General Helmuth von Moltke, who was not in favor of violating Dutch neutrality nor was he in favor of abandoning territory in Alsace and as a result weakened Germany’s drive through northern France and Belgium by reducing the number of troops involved in the advance. Ultimately, the modified plan was abandoned when French and British troops turned the German advance at the Battle of the Marne in September of 1914.[2]

The stage was now set for what allied planners had designed, the Somme Offensive in the summer of 1916. The Somme battlefield, primarily assigned to the British Expeditionary Force, consisted of low hills and ridges where the massive armies of the Allies and Central Powers fought most of the attritional battles of the Western Front during this time period. The importance of Bennett and Doyle’s article is that its focus is terrain as a whole in influencing the outcome of battles in the Somme-Flanders area. There have been a number of studies concerning such geographical features like trench construction, water supply, tunneling and the availably of aggregates, however, this article takes military geography a step further and assesses how the influence of terrain on tactics had on the outcome of battles in these regions during this offensive and The Great War.[3]

Hew Strachan, Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow, published an interesting article in 1998 on British strategy during this period, “The battle of the Somme and British strategy.”[4] Dr. Strachan begins his article detailing how German General Erich Ludendorff during the first two years of the war had experienced battlefield success in the east primarily in Russia and had directed campaigns of comparatively high mobility accentuated by seemingly decisive battles. However, surprisingly, Ludendorff during his September 1916 inspection visit to the Western Front found a drastically different kind of battlefield from what he had experienced in the east. Ludendorff had the benefit of the open rural landscape in the east and was opposed by an enemy (Russia) not nearly as advanced as Europe’s industrialized powers. Therefore, he was able to fight a campaign against Russia that proved compatible with the intellectual framework of Germany’s pre-war doctrine. What he found on the Western front on the battlefields of Verdun and the Somme, to his amazement, was a desperately different situation. German troops in the trenches of the Western Front were in moral crisis. They had, for the previous six months, been locked in a deadly struggle of appalling carnage where neither side gained any significant ground. What was the culprit for this stalemate that seemingly had the German Army near the point of collapse? In the east, the Germans were opposed by an inferior opponent from a modern industrialized perspective. Additionally, the vast rural battlefields of the eastern theater enabled commanders to freely maneuver armies capable of flanking movements suited for what pre-war training the Germans had meticulously prepared. Germany on the Western Front conversely faced equally modern industrialized opponents mainly France and Britain in a far more restricted space. What Germany and the Allies were now experiencing at this juncture of The Great War were the horrors and devastation of industrialized war or machine warfare which neither side had ever witnessed. Pre-war expectations of an overwhelming offensive thrust had evolved into defensive battles fought in fixed positions, dominated by the weight of artillery which could be rapidly resupplied by rail. Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of the German General Staff, had accompanied his deputy General Ludendorff on his inspection tour of the Western Front and the Somme battlefield and realized what they had witnessed was shocking and that a detailed reassessment of the situation was imperative. Dubbed a Materialschlacht, a battle of materiel, [5]called for new tactics to be devised and deployed. Stupefied by their findings, both agreed that in addition to new tactics a reorganization of the German war industry must begin in utmost haste. Many historians dispute the degree of effectiveness Hindenburg’s rhetoric had on actual output in war materials but in juxtaposition with the new tactical methods German soldiers were devising that were based on experiences learned during 1915-16 led the Germans to embrace the concept of machine warfare.[6]

The British were also caught off guard by the evolution of machine warfare as Dr. Strachan points out the work of two historians Michael Geyer and Tim Travers who both have criticized the performance of British Expeditionary Force Commander General Sir Douglas Haig and his colleagues. Strachan writes that “According to Travers the British failed to shift from a paradigm that was manpower-centered to one that was machine-centered: new technology was grafted on to old tactical forms rather than used at the basis for a doctrinal rethink.”[7]

This article points out and correctly in my view how the main thrust of the Somme Offensive in the summer of 1916 was borne by the British army which represented a seismic shift in traditional British military strategy. Traditional British Military Strategy during the eighteenth century and prior to the Great War focused on contributing a small regular army and leaving the burden of land warfare to the traditional land powers like France and Russia. The Royal Navy was a traditional sea power and sent its battle cruisers to seek out major naval battles and found them at Coronel, the Falklands, Dogger Bank and Jutland.[8]

In his article “Learning War’s lessons: The German Army and the Battle of the Somme 1916.”[9] Dr. Robert T. Foley argues that the Germans were caught by surprise by Allied firepower and the persistence of their attacks, which caused the Germans high casualties. The Germans adapted quickly and used better defensive methods, with the reinforcements which arrived in greater quantity during September. It is important to note that the ability of the German army to quickly recognize flaws in their defensive systems and to analyze reports quickly was beneficial to their survival. Additionally, the German army’s ability to rapidly develop and implement new defensive tactics learned and refined during battle allowed the German army to remain intellectually flexible even though the great pressures of the battles were real and at times devastating. As an example, Foley identifies the massive offensive launched at the beginning of July, 1916 by British and French combined forces against German positions along the Somme River. The Germans were not expecting the ferocity and intensity applied by the British and the French armies and as a result suffered high causalities and a temporary loss of territory. Dr. Foley, considered by many as an expert on the German military brought out an important point of how adaptable the German army was in avoiding crushing defeat at this point in time.

One of the most debated topics from the British perspective during the Somme Offensive was the performance of British Expeditionary Force Commander General Sir Douglas Haig. Historian Geoffrey Norman gives his assessment of Haig’s performance in his article “The Worst General”[10]Norman begins his article by describing the vast carnage that occurred on July 1, 1916 along the Somme River when General Haig ordered approximately 110,000 British soldiers over the top and as many as 60,000 were wounded and as many as 20,000 of that number died. All of this and the attacking force did not gain even one of their objectives. Norman stresses that “the magnitude of the battle still stuns the imagination. The Somme was an Epic of both slaughter and futility; profligate waste of men and material such as the world had never seen.”[11]As architect of this debacle, Haig in a callous tone on the following day commented to his staff that ‘the enemy has undoubtedly been shaken and has few reserves at hand’[12]and seemingly less shaken than seems natural as he discussed methods of continuing the offensive with his subordinates.

For the next four months, Haig relentlessly prosecuted the offensive with an incomparable stubbornness that appeared to reveal his total focus on achieving victory and the possibility of personal fame at any cost. One might judge Haig’s conduct during this period as not only a constant quest to meet his military objectives but also a much desired personal and self-aggrandizing purpose of reserving for himself a place in history as one of the world’s great generals. This paper will also reveal that Haig had many defenders as well as those who were less inspired by his methods and tactics. Norman writes that “one can argue persuasively that Haig did not merely fail to achieve his stated objectives in the great battles of the Somme and Ypres. He failed in a much grander sense; failed classically in the fashion of Pyrrhus, who lamented after the battle at Asculum, ‘another such victory over the Romans and we are undone.’’[13]

Colonel Christopher M. Deverell of the British army wrote an interesting article “X. Haig versus Rawlinson-Manoeuvre versus Attrition: The British Army on the Somme, 1916.”[14]In this article, Colonel Deverell points out that the horrific events of the First Day of the Somme could have partially been attributed to the pre-war British grand strategy, at the heart of which was the desire for competitive advantage through trade and empire. Britain was the foremost maritime power at this point and was primarily focused on maintaining trade and protecting its empire, however, Britain also was concerned with maintaining a balance of power in Europe by impeding any one state or group of states from dominating the Continent with a particular concern of preventing Northern France or the Low Countries from falling into hostile hands. To this end, Britain sent a large land army to northern France to aid the French in expelling a hostile power, Germany, from France and the Low Countries. As a result, Britain was not experienced or prepared to maintain or operate a large land army of the size of the BEF. Even though the BEF was large in terms of pre-war British land armies it was small in comparison to major European land armies, therefore, Britain’s role was relegated to support the French. Colonel Deverell wrote that “Historical analysis of the British Army in World War I is replete with examples of its general lack of preparedness at the outset. The result of Britain’s massive mobilization was felt in particular in the lack of experience of the Army commanders.”[15] Additionally, Colonel Deverell points out that the British mindful of the allies’ failure at the beginning of the war to turn the German’s northern flank in the Race to the Sea and with the heavy French and Russian losses in 1915, were compelled to contribute a larger role on the Western Front in 1916 in defense of the Allies’ center of gravity. In short, Britain was compelled to act for the purpose of alliance cohesion, therefore, to take an increased active role in the land war. Furthermore, in December of 1915 the Allies held a military conference at Chantilly where the Allies agreed that “France and Flanders will remain the main theatre of operations and that every effort is to be made for carrying out the offensive operations next spring [1916] in the main theatre of war in close cooperation with the Allies, and in the greatest possible strength.”[16] At this point, the newly appointed Commander-in Chief of the BEF General Haig was committed to a major offensive in 1916 on the Western Front that afforded him an opportunity to win historical fame and glory.

Dr. Elizabeth Greenhalge, considered by some a revisionist historian on grounds that she uses sources in a misleading way wrote an article “Parade ground soldiers’: French Army assessments of the British on the Somme in 1916.”[17] In this article, Greenhalge describes how the French Army assessed the British on the Somme in 1916 including the direct influence that strategic and tactical decisions made by commanders had on the shaping of attitudes and moral. Dr. Greenhalge begins with an evaluation of the sources she used in reaching conclusions about attitudes and opinions. She plots the ups and downs during the half year of preparations and the opening battles on the 1 and the 14 of July 1916 that proved to be far less successful than had been anticipated by the Allies. She points out that both French and Anglo historians have neglected to any great extent to analyze the available sources and write about attitudes and moral of the Anglo and French Armies toward each other. Her conclusions include a delineation of the main themes observed in the charted opinions and attitudes of the French toward their British allies and suggest a reason for that judgment. Dr. Greenhalge admonishes Anglo and even French historians for their failure to use the many primary sources available many of which are in French like diaries, memoirs, and letters (both published and unpublished) of participants. She also made extensive use of the army postal control service records in her research.

Greenhalgh wrote: “when the British troops left their trenches at 7:30 on the morning of 1 July, they followed a hopelessly inadequate artillery preparation and used infantry tactics that merely increased casualties. Along most of the front very little ground was taken. Only in the south, where the British benefited from the much more effective French artillery barrages, was any real progress made.”[18] The theme of Greenhalgh’s discourse was that the French were impressed with the actions and bravery of the British infantrymen but less than impressed with their leadership.

Historian Roy A. Prete examines the origins of the Battle of the Somme from the perspective of the French leadership. “Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A study in Allied Military Planning”[19]is an interesting article. In this article, Prete points out that French commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre’s effort to coordinate Allied military operations along the Somme in 1916 was an attempt to lead the British into battle for the purpose of relieving the pressure the French were getting as a result of the German offensive against French lines at Verdun. He states that French grand strategy prior to 1914 relied on the support of France’s allies as well as French military strength. However, France had until this period considered Russia as its main ally on the continent. Prete pointed out that French Chief of Staff Joffre had realized when he received his appointment in 1911 that the next war would be a coalition war. Even so, he viewed the British as better suited for defensive warfare and believed the French would have to lead them into battle. During this period Joffre committed a lot of effort to coordinate with the British and their stubborn commander General Haig to relieve some of the pressure Germany was placing on the French at Verdun. It is argued by some that Haig’s make-up made this a difficult task.

Professor Roy Philpott wrote an interesting article that considers the Battle of the Somme in the strategic framework of the Allied general offensive agreed on in 1915 from an operational and tactical perspective. In this article, “The Anglo-French Victory on the Somme”,[20]Dr. Philpott like many historians who analyzed the Military operations that occurred along the Somme River in the North of France during the Summer of 1916 begins his discourse with words like futility, senseless, and slaughter. He called words like these “shorthand for military operations on the Western Front in the First World War”[21] A perpetual debate continues as to why over 1 million men were killed or wounded in a small area of ground of little strategic significance? No one, even military historians, has been able to cite any real strategic value that benefited either side in the aftermath of the senseless carnage along the Somme in the summer of 1916. Some historians have hotly debated the impact on morale and fighting capacity on one side or the other but nothing from a material or territorial gain view point. Philpott writes: “Somme has become as much a cultural phenomenon as a military action. However, placing the battle in its proper place in the wartime continuum helps in an understanding of its true nature and impact, shorn of it subsequent notoriety and iconography.” [22] It is important to remember that this four month campaign commonly called the Battle of the Somme took roughly six months to plan and organize, was designed as primarily an Anglo-British cooperation and was approved by all the Allies. This was truly an allied effort to carry on a war of attrition where the British, although not alone, suffered far too many casualties. The strategy for fighting the battle was formulated and managed by Joseph Joffre, France’s Commander-in Chief for the purpose of driving the Huns out of France and achieving an Allied victory over the Central Powers and eventually after a long war of attrition and from the perspective of the Great War as a whole the strategy was eventually accomplished.

In this article “Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh,”[23]Dr. Philpott makes a reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh who he considers a revisionist historian. Philpott begins his article with a contention that “in recent years a ‘revisionist’ view of Britain’s political and strategic role in the First World War has developed.”[24]Philpott points out that the Greenhalgh article published in War in History, ‘Why the British were on the Somme in 1916’ was a revisionist view of the battlefield performance of the British army and proceeds to make an argument that Greenhalgh represented an unwarranted criticism of recent secondary sources he had used in his analysis as well as her misreading of available primary sources in regards to her analysis of the Anglo-French alliance. In her article, Greenhalgh had criticized Philpott’s failure to include many available primary sources, written in French, to his research on the Battle of the Somme and believed as a result had failed to include many moral and personal feelings that existed between the Allies into his analysis.

In this article “Flames over the Somme: A Retort to William Philpott*”[25]Greenhalgh argues that Philpott failed to take advantage of multiple French sources in his analysis of the Somme in particular and the Great War generally. Additionally, she dismisses his long defense of Kitchener as beside the point she wrote: “[Philpott’s] sections I and II deal with policy and strategy, and with Kitchener’s role. Since my article dealt with the planning and execution of the battle rather than with theory, Philpott’s more than nine pages constitute an unbalanced and unnecessary riposte to one and a half pages of remarks about Kitchener.”[26]Greenhalgh argued that Kitchener’s political stock had fallen very low by 1916 and that the war office had been relieved for responsibility for munitions and deposited with the new ministry and that Kitchener had drowned before the battle began. So why did Philpott write so profusely about Kitchener’s role in the battle? Other points of contention from Greenhalgh’s perspective were Philpott’s assessment placing Haig’s performance in high regard and his assessment that the Somme was a success both of which Greenhalgh disputes. Greenhalgh writes: “He accuses me of (a) unwarranted criticism of recent secondary literature…(b) of misreading the primary evidence; (c) of being post-revisionist and making crude assumptions about his own point of view. Readers will judge for themselves whether my criticism of Anglo-centric nature of recent literature is warranted, and whether I have read and made apposite use of primary sources.”[27]

In conclusion, both sides when entering the Great War were not cognizant of the terrible nature of modern Industrial war or “machine warfare” and as a result were not prepared to effectively devise strategy and tactics to successfully prosecute offensive campaigns like many planners before the war believed would dominate the battlefield. In the Great War the defensive became paramount to survival and a long war of attrition would prevail until the resources and manpower of the Allies would eventually be successful and defeat the aggressor.